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TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

THE BAKER & TAYLOR COMPANY
NEW YORK

THE CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
LONDON

THE MARUZEN-KABUSHIKI-KAISHA
TOKYO, OSAKA, KYOTO, FUKUOKA, SENDAI

THE COMMERCIAL PRESS, LIMITED
SHANGHAI



PHOTOGRAPH BY THE AUTHOR

SPAIN'S TRIBUTE TO EMILIO CASTELAR
M. BENLLIURE'S MONUMENT (1908) ON THE PASEO DE CASTELLANA IN MADRID

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

JOSEPH A. BRANDT



THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

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COMPOSED AND PRINTED BY THE UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA PRESS
NORMAN, OKLAHOMA, U. S. A.

PREFACE

IF the history of Spain is a monotone from 1520, the year of the Comunero movement, until 1833 when the feudal monarchy ended, the story of the struggle between the Old Spain of decadence and the New Spain which liberals and Republicans sought to build in the years following 1833 is as thrilling as any in Spain's book of the ages. The political struggle which began that year culminated in the successful Revolution of September, 1868. Five years later Spain undertook for the first time the attempt to let the people govern themselves.

It is the effort of the Republicans to regenerate Spain which forms the story we tell in the pages which follow. The Republican movement is the greatest mine of politics in Spain's history. This mine we aim to explore, for its ore is the wealth of the New Spain.

The author wishes to acknowledge with thanks helpful suggestions made by his friends and particularly the courtesies of Don Isidoro Garrido of London for facts relating to his father, Don Fernando Garrido, and to Castelar, of Antonio de la Torre of the University of Oklahoma and of Caswell Proctor of Norman, for their helpful criticisms, and of P. J. Conkwright of the University of Oklahoma Press for the two maps illustrating the Republican movement, and of my wife, Sallye Little Brandt, for her valued help in proof-reading.

JOSEPH A. BRANDT

Norman, Oklahoma,
October 3, 1932.

CONTENTS

	PAGE
PREFACE	vii
FOREWORD. THE PERIL AND PROMISE OF REPUBLICANISM	1
I. 1873 AND 1931: ANALOGIES	1
II. UNION OR BREAK-UP?	4
BOOK ONE. THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE DYNASTIES	
CHAPTER	
I. KINGS IN THE SERVICE OF DEMOCRACY	11
I. THE UNITY OF SPAIN	11
II. THE CONSTITUTION OF 1812	15
III. THE CORNERSTONE OF DEMOCRACY	19
II. POLITICS AND PRONUNCIAMIENTOS	29
I. THE ARMY, SERVANT AND MASTER	29
II. ISABEL, THE QUEEN AND WOMAN	33
III. THE REVOLUTION OF JULY, 1854	39
III. THE FORMULA OF PROGRESS	48
I. THE NEW APOSTLE OF REPUBLICANISM	48
II. "THE SAME DOGS"	53
III. THE ROAD TO FREEDOM	56
IV. THE RENAISSANCE OF POLITICS	60
I. THE PROGRESSIVE THEORY	60
II. THE MODERATE CREDO	63
III. THE SOCIALIST CLEAVAGE	67
V. THE MAGNANIMOUS GESTURE	71
I. THE CONTRASTING CAPITALS	71
II. "THE OTHER COLLARS"	74
III. EL RASGO	77
IV. SAINT DANIEL'S NIGHT	81
VI. FALL OF THE BOURBON DYNASTY	84
I. THE ALIENATION OF GENERAL PRIM	84
II. THE DICTATORSHIP OF GONZÁLEZ BRABO	87
III. THE REVOLUTION OF SEPTEMBER	92
IV. ISABEL DETHRONED	96

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

VII.	THE REVOLUTIONARY SETTLEMENT	98
I.	"LONG LIVE SPAIN WITH HONOR!"	98
II.	THE CONSTITUTION OF 1869	104
VIII.	UNITY IN VARIETY: FEDERALISM	112
I.	REPUBLICAN PROTESTS AGAINST THE CONSTITUTION	112
II.	THE DECLARATION OF THE PRESS	114
III.	THE THEORY OF FEDERALISM	119
IV.	THE GERM OF CONFEDERATION	123
V.	THE UNITARIAN THEORY	124
IX.	UNITY TO VARIETY: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM	126
I.	THE FREEDOM OF THE CHURCH	126
II.	THE GOD OF TOLERATION	132
X.	IN SEARCH OF THE "KING X"	136
I.	POSSIBLE CANDIDATES	136
II.	THE CANDIDATURES	139
III.	ELECTION OF AMADEO	143
XI.	THE KING "WHO WENT ON STRIKE"	147
I.	AMADEO'S TASK	147
II.	CASTELAR'S BENEVOLENCE	150
III.	THE INTERNATIONALE OUTLAWED	154
IV.	THE TREND TOWARD THE REPUBLIC	159
V.	THE "CROWNED MANNEQUIN" RESIGNS	163

BOOK TWO. THE REPUBLIC OF WIT AND POETRY

XII.	SELF-GOVERNMENT REALIZED	173
I.	THE REPUBLIC PROCLAIMED	173
II.	THE COALITION GOVERNMENT	180
III.	THE BREAK WITH THE RADICALS	184
IV.	THE REPUBLIC IN CATALONIA	189
V.	THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ENDS	193
VI.	DISSOLUTION OF THE PERMANENT COMMISSION	195
XIII.	TOWARDS ANARCHY	201
I.	INTOLERANCE OF THE LEFT	201
II.	"WHO IS PEDREGAL?"	204
III.	DON CARLOS VII	213
IV.	A TURN TOWARDS THE RIGHT	216
V.	SALMERÓN'S PROGRAM	220

CONTENTS

XIV. PÍ'S GOVERNMENT OF CONCILIATION	222
I. PÍ GRANTED DICTATORIAL POWERS	222
II. CASTELAR'S PROGRAM	229
III. THE ALCOY DISASTER	239
IV. THE CANTON OF CARTAGENA	243
V. PÍ'S INCOMPETENCE	246
VI. THE FAILURE OF AN IDEALIST	252
XV. SACRIFICE OF THE REPUBLIC TO SAVE SPAIN	254
I. SUPPRESSION OF THE CANTONS	254
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROJECTS	268
III. "THE CABINET OF FORCE"	276
IV. CASTELAR ELECTED PRESIDENT	285
V. THE PROGRAM OF SALVATION	293
VI. SALMERÓN'S BREAK WITH CASTELAR	309
VII. DRAMATIC END OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC	316
XVI. THE GRAND DUKEDOM	327
I. THE NATIONAL REPUBLIC	327
II. THE CONSERVATIVE TREND	330
III. THE MANIFESTO OF SANDHURST: RESTORATION	337
IV. THE RETURN OF THE BOURBONS	344
XVII. THE END OF AN INTELLECTUAL ADVENTURE	345
I. DEFYING THE HAND OF DESTINY	345
II. REMOVING OBSTACLES TO PROGRESS	346
III. SELF-GOVERNMENT REALIZED FOR SPAIN	348
AFTERWORD. OLD WINE IN NEW BOTTLES	357
I. MOVING TOWARDS THE NEW SPAIN	357
II. THE MILITARY DIRECTORY	366
III. THE ARROW IN THE HEART OF THE MONARCHY	369
IV. THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF 1931	378
V. A STATECRAFT OF SOCIAL UTILITY	387
BIBLIOGRAPHY	403
INDEX	413

ILLUSTRATIONS AND MAPS

SPAIN'S TRIBUTE TO EMILIO CASTELAR	<i>Frontispiece</i>
GEOGRAPHICAL BARRICADES TO UNITY— <i>map</i>	12
ISABEL DE BORBÓN, QUEEN OF SPAIN	<i>Facing page</i> 38
EMILIO CASTELAR, FOURTH PRESIDENT OF THE EXECUTIVE POWER	50
AMADEO DE SABOYA, KING OF SPAIN	150
ESTANISLAO FIGUERAS, FIRST PRESIDENT OF THE EXECUTIVE POWER	180
FRANCISCO PÍ Y MARGALL, SECOND PRESIDENT OF THE EX- ECUTIVE POWER	206
CARLOS DE BORBÓN, THE PRETENDER	214
"AFRAID OF HIS SHADOW," A SATIRE ON CASTELAR	236
NICOLÁS SALMERÓN, THIRD PRESIDENT OF THE EXECUTIVE POWER	254
THE SPANISH REPUBLICS— <i>map</i>	<i>On page</i> 258
CASTELAR'S RETROGRESSION, A SATIRE	<i>Facing page</i> 310
FRANCISCO SERRANO, PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL RE- PUBLIC	328

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

FOREWORD

THE PERIL AND PROMISE OF REPUBLICANISM

I. 1873 AND 1931: ANALOGIES

TWICE within the last sixty years has Spain elected the republic as its form of government. The first Republic, proclaimed by a National Assembly which had been created when the Senate and the Congreso met together unconstitutionally, came into being February 11, 1873, following the renunciation of King Amadeo of Savoy who had found his position as a "crowned mannequin" intolerable. Amadeo had been the solution sought by the liberal generals in dethroning the Bourbons in the Glorious Revolution of September, 1868. The Republic, sought zealously by the Republican propagandists like Castelar, Orense and others since 1848, was thus largely accidental. The second Spanish Republic came into being April 14, 1931 as the result of the voluntary retirement of Alfonso XIII who yielded to the striking expression of the national will for a republic in the municipal elections two days earlier. Like the first, the second Republic was the result of a bloodless revolution and the voluntary retirement of the King.

The Republic of 1873 was one of the most extraordinary and spectacular political experiments in Europe during the latter half of the nineteenth century. When its course was half run, *The Nation* observed in its issue of July 24, 1873 that "no such spectacle of moral and political disorder has, we think, been witnessed since the fall of the Roman Empire." The tragedies of the first Republic, the mistakes of the Republican propagandists of that era, hold certain and unmistakable lessons for the second Republic.

There are striking analogies in both.

Isabel II, grandmother of Alfonso XIII, was expelled from Spain September 29, 1868 by liberal and semi-liberal political and military leaders following the virtual dictatorship of General Ramón Narváez and González Brabo. Alfonso XIII lost the affection of the nation in

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

similar manner, through the repression of the Military Directory of General Miguel Primo de Rivera.

Curiously enough, had General Serrano, the President of the National Republic of 1874, removed General Fernando Primo de Rivera, first Marqués de Estella, as captain general of Madrid and therefore arbiter of the fate of his government, he might have prolonged the life of that Republic and so prevented the restoration of Alfonso XII. Had Alfonso XII's son not accepted the pronunciamiento of Miguel Primo de Rivera, the second Marqués de Estella, he might not have lost the love of his subjects.

In the municipal elections of 1871 practically all of the larger cities of Spain returned Republican municipal councils. Popular will was similarly indicated in the April elections of 1931. In both elections a larger measure of freedom was allowed the voters than was usually the case.

The Republic of 1873 was proclaimed after Amadeo "went on strike." The second Republic came into being in somewhat similar fashion, Alfonso XIII withdrawing from the nation. Amadeo, however, renounced all rights to the throne for himself and dynasty. Alfonso renounced none.

The first Republic was proclaimed by a coalition of Radicals and Republicans. The Republic of 1931 found a similar coalition between Radical Republicans and the Republican Alliance and the Socialists. The coalition in the Republic of 1873 was destroyed in thirteen days by the Republicans. The coalition in the second Republic existed effectively from April 14 to June 30, 1931, when the Socialists indicated they preferred independence of action.¹

The break between the Radicals and the Republicans in the first Republic was the first fatal step taken by the Republic for it eliminated the only non-Republican group which could be counted on to share in the political life of that Republic, as well as the only party which had been tested by actual practice in government.

Virtually all monarchical elements abstained from the elections for the Constituent Cortes in 1873. There was practically no royalist opposition in the elections for the Constituent Cortes held June 28, 1931. In the case of the present Republic there are many Conserva-

¹ *A B C* (Madrid, July 1, 1931), statement of Prieto that the Socialists would not support a ministry of Lerroux.

THE PERIL AND PROMISE OF REPUBLICANISM

tive politicians formerly loyal to the Monarchy who now embrace the Republic. The Conservatives of 1873 merely ignored the Republic.

The first Republic was federal and was very soon threatened with the disruption of national unity, particularly in Catalonia and in Andalusia. In the Republic of 1931 Catalonia proclaimed its independence as a separate Republic at 11 o'clock on the morning of April 14 while the Republic of Madrid was not announced until 8:50 o'clock that night.² Two Republics thus existed independently for a period of three days and when Catalonia consented to await action of the Cortes, it was with the proviso that the Republic be federated. The Republic of 1873 perished largely through federalism. The Republic of 1931 faces its most critical test in federalism.

The Socialists and Communists proved irreconcilable with the conservative Republican regime in 1873. The second Republic must satisfy the aspirations of the Socialist party, most solidly organized of all Republican parties and the Communists (lineal descendants of the Internationalists of the Republic of 1873).

Don Carlos VII, the Pretender, asserted his right to the throne his great aunt Isabel had perforce left and provoked one of the bitterest civil wars in the history of Spain, a war which almost destroyed the Republic of 1873. Don Jaime de Borbón, who until his death early in October 1931, was the Pretender to the Throne of Spain, issued a manifesto April 25, 1931 claiming that the "legitimist" party is the sole monarchical party of the nation. Don Jaime declared that separatism threatens the unity of Spain and offered himself as the head of the federated monarchy.³ Thus, the Republic of 1931 faced two royal claimants for the power it exercised.

Separation of church and state and creation of a genuine free educational system were two of the major problems that the Republic of 1873 faced. They remain problems for the Republic of 1931. The church has always been identified with the state and consequently with the monarchy and as a result, a great portion of the Republican party is hostile to the church, while the party as a whole favors separation. Under Primo's Military Directory many of the lesser clergy were alien-

² *The Times* (London, April 15, 1931); *A B C* (April 15, 1931).

³ *A B C* (April 26, 1931). Don Jaime urged the formation of a national monarchical party which would be federative, anti-communist, defender of the national greatness, progressive and friendly to social reforms and which would place the army and church "in their true place," free of politics.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

ated from the monarchy through the Directory's refusal to increase their stipends from the state. The problem of education under the monarchical regime is stated simply by Major Ramón Franco: "Our present military . . . expenditures are five times greater than our scanty appropriations for public instruction, of which a great part is distributed among religious associations."⁴ Illiteracy proved a trap for the Republicans of 1873. It remains a menace for the Republic of 1931.

The first Republic had a peaceful beginning and a violent end. Its entire life was filled with disorders throughout the nation. The Republic of 1931 came peacefully and soon faced disorders throughout the nation.

II. UNION OR BREAK-UP?

The most significant problem facing Spain today is that of federalism, separatism and unitarianism. Shall the nation known as Spain remain a federation of the old kingdoms united in 1497 or shall the peninsula return to the original status of a group of independent republics? With the exception of separation of church and state and of the agrarian problem, all other problems facing the Spanish Republic fade into insignificance when compared with this fundamental one.

Estéban Collantes complained in the Republican Cortes of 1873 that federalism went against the spirit of Europe, which at that time was toward unity, as exemplified in Germany and in Italy. Today, however, we live in an era of "self-determination." Economic considerations, history—everything must yield to ethnographic considerations. Federalism, which was against the trend of Europe in 1873, is in keeping with the spirit of Europe today. And it is not beside possibility that United Spain may give way to a number of republics, the principal ones being Spain, Catalonia, Vasconia and Galicia. These were the principal claimants to special consideration at the hands of the Constituent Cortes of 1931 and represent the most distinct breaks in custom and language.

But this is in the realm of prophecy. In the field of history, the Republic of 1873 left Spain the dread inheritance of federalism, which had proved a veritable plague. The Republic of 1931 faces no more critical problem than the doctrine of federalism or regionalism. In the volume which follows we discuss the federal doctrines and their application during the Republic of 1873. From that graphic lesson we

⁴ Comandante Franco, *Madrid Bajo las Bombas* (Madrid: Zeus, 1931), p. 260.

THE PERIL AND PROMISE OF REPUBLICANISM

learn that federalism, however perfect it may be in permitting a maximum of local government, is charged with the greatest dangers for Spain.

It is often forgotten that the Spanish peninsula is composed of a number of peoples who once formed independent kingdoms. These kingdoms owed their origins to two factors, the geographical character of the peninsula and the necessity of resisting the Mohammedan invader. Thus there grew up the independent Kingdoms of Castile, Aragon, Navarre, the Principality of Catalonia—as often a republic as a principality—Asturias, the Basque land, Galicia, etc. Each fought its own battle in its own way against the Mohammedan. The first attempt at organization of these kingdoms into a unified whole was by Sancho the Great of Navarre in the eleventh century. Sancho called himself “King of the Spains” and regarded his position as being imperial in nature. Alfonso VII took the title of Emperor in 1135. It was not until the fifteenth century that the Christian Kingdoms were united under the Catholic sovereigns of Aragon and Castile.

The quality of union lay first in the fact that the kingdoms faced a common and hated Mohammedan foe, and second in the Catholic religion. Catholicism was the slender thread which bound the kingdoms of Spain together. Spanish political history until the time of the Republic of 1873 is essentially the history of the Catholic church in Spain.

Spanish unity, therefore, has been essentially a unity of faith.⁵

The close relation of church and state in Spain, a relation in which both are so closely identified that it often is impossible to distinguish the policies of the one from the other, is an anachronism which the Republicans attacked early. Emilio Castelar described the anomaly thus: “Our era recognizes that religion is the work of the conscience and past eras believed that religion is the work of the state.”⁶

⁵ For an interesting discussion of this see Fernando de los Ríos, *Religión y Estado en la España del Siglo XVI* (New York: Instituto de las Españas, 1927), as on p. 42: “The same year in which territorial unity was won the expulsion of the Jews took place, foremost undesirables who were left the alternative of being converted—which is for the Spanish political conscience of that time synonymous with being nationalized—or leaving. This identification between confession and nationality, nation and religion, was building in the spirit of Spain the fusion of church and state.” Also see Angel Ganivet, *Idearium Español* (3d impression, Madrid, 1915), particularly pp. 12 and 13.

⁶ Introduction to J. Martín de Olías, *Influencia de la Religión Católica Apostólica Romana en la España contemporánea* (Madrid, 1876), p. 16.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

Christ preached tolerance, Castelar said. A republic could be Christian but the Republic of 1873 was anti-Catholic, said the Canon Manterola.⁷ Liberalism, this Canon believed—and he represented the views of the neo-Catholics—consists in the rebellion of society against God. To the Spanish Catholics there is little worse than the Protestant heretic, for the church in Spain, it should be remembered, preserves much of the primitive character that it had in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Consequently, it had little sympathy for reasoning like this: "The Republic proclaims three cardinal principles: liberty, equality, fraternity. They are called Republican dogmas and every impartial man confesses that not only are they not opposed to the Catholic dogma but that they are principles of Christian morality which Catholicism recommends and practices."⁸

This viewpoint of the Republicans is preserved today as Major Franco declares that the reader of his book "will see a church that converts Jesus into a trinket to gain its reactionary and imperialistic desires and which tries to enslave humanity in the name of one who sought to redeem it."⁹

Now, the importance of this anti-Catholic viewpoint which obviously all Republicans do not share, lies in the fact that once the union of church and state has been destroyed, the thread which ties Spain together in large measure has been cut also.

What will the Republicans create to take the place of the unifying elements of throne and church?

The first Republic was an intellectual expression, the product of students of Krause, Hegel, Kant and Proudhon. It was a Republic of "wit and poetry" as Castelar described it. The Republic of 1931 is likewise the result of an intellectual revolt and, it may be assumed, an anti-Catholic revolt as well, since the church has not encouraged intellectual adventure in Spain. Will the Conservative statesmen who have cast their lot with the Republic be able to escape the virus of the old parliamentary regime and at the same time harness the intellectual exhilaration of Spain?

And if they do, what will they say to the Catalans who, since the first day of the Republic of 1931, have exercised a power co-equal to

⁷ Vicente de Manterola, *El Espíritu carlista* (Madrid, 1871), p. 14.

⁸ Joaquin Riera, *El Catolicismo y la República federal* (Madrid, 1873), p. 27.

⁹ Franco, *op. cit.*, p. xiii.

THE PERIL AND PROMISE OF REPUBLICANISM

that of Madrid? For such has been the case. Side by side on the peninsula are the Republic of Madrid and the Generalidad of Catalonia—two equal states existing side by side on the Iberian peninsula, joined together by a mere fiction known as federation.

Perhaps the radio and the airplane may prove aids in disseminating the new religion of the rights of man and the promise of the Republic. Spain as a whole first learned that it had become a Republic through the radio. At 7:45 o'clock the night of April 14, 1931, Colonel Macía, President of the Catalan Republic, spoke greetings to the sister republics over the radio. At 8:50, Alcalá Zamora, provisional President of the Spanish Republic, his voice trembling with emotion, spoke into the microphone the message all Spain heard at the same instant, that the Republic had been proclaimed. Earlier, in December, Major Franco had distributed a Republican manifesto from an airplane.

The Republic of 1873 was a reflex action of the revolutionary movement of 1848, which in turn was a continuation of the emotional tremors loosened by the French Revolution. The Republic of 1931 is in fact a delayed emotional manifestation of the world-war. The Spanish Republicans and the Liberals of Conde de Romanones' faction were ardently in favor of the Allied cause and foes of neutrality. The world-war touched the emotional nature of Spain. It reawakened the fervent ambitions of the Republicans of 1873 to end the strange chain of fatalities which each year saw Spain decline more and more into insignificance as a European power. The modern Republic like the old seeks to restore Spain to a position in the world commensurate with its dignity. The Spanish intellectuals rightly resent the libel frequently expressed that Spain is merely an African Power. Emilio Castelar was the first of the Spaniards to point the way to a return of Spain's greatness—through the intellectual union of the Latin nations, especially with the South American republics. This, then, is the significance of the Republic for Spain—and if a religion of progress under the Republic may retain the unity of the Spanish provinces, it is possible that Spain may again take her rightful place at the council tables of Europe.

BOOK ONE

THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE DYNASTIES

CHAPTER ONE

KINGS IN THE SERVICE OF DEMOCRACY

I. THE UNITY OF SPAIN


EXAMINE a map of the Iberian peninsula. You will perceive the most perfect boundaries—sea and mountain—created by Nature for the making of a great nation. Facing the French are the pine-clad Pyrenees. Jutting into the Atlantic Ocean, facing the Western world, lies the peninsula, with high, impertinent coast line, its nose touching Africa with the Atlas Mountains forming the African frontier, a peninsula surrounded almost entirely by Nature's perpetual fortification, the sea.

Glancing at such a map and not knowing the fretted history of the land, you might say: "Here is Destiny's nation. Kissed by the sun, warmed by the winds of the ocean, safe from the stranger on all sides, what nation could be stronger?" And yet. . . .

From a riparian harbor of this peninsula Columbus had sailed to discover a new world and adventurous Magellan had sailed from yet another of its harbors around the world. Gold-swollen caravels put into the southern harbors with gleaming tribute of raw earth for the effete Spanish grandee. From the shadows of the Pyrenees LaFayette and his crusaders embarked—from this same peninsula—to aid Liberty in the world Columbus had found. And yet. . . .

Spain, foster-parent of a new world in which Liberty flourished, proud, futile Spain! How much it has given of its greatness to suppress liberty! Felipe II, warped of body, warped of soul, ceaselessly driving the supple Prince of Parma against the salamander Dutch; putting the heretic to the rack; serving the Pope and God, his soul shriveling as his devoutness increased. Fernando VII, whose oath was like the chameleon, forgotten in a new color, signing constitutions with one hand, waving them aside with the other. The one ruled most of the world; the other was like an hourglass, the empire slipping slowly, irresistibly from his grasp. These were the symbols of Spain until the nineteenth century began its tempering course.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN



KINGS IN THE SERVICE OF DEMOCRACY

"Man is born free; and everywhere he is in chains. One thinks himself the master of others, and still remains a greater slave than they." But Prophet Rousseau spoke not of Spain; there man was born devout and loyal. Only the second premise was true; for the kings and the queens, the masters of men, were even greater slaves, slaves of the church. What did Felipe or Fernando know of liberty? of the "rights of man?" of men born free yet in chains?

Should hope for liberty be abandoned in this land where Cervantes, Velásquez and Goya created, where a valiant folk had withstood the invader Moor century after century? Glance again at the map; see what a trickster Nature may be. Prodigal Nature, having erected perfect boundaries for the peninsula, placed within it barricades to unity. Mountain ranges, great plateaus, deep valleys—all are in conspiracy to keep each province to itself. Bigoted man has not been alone in writing the troubled history of Spain; that history lies written also in eternal rock.

And thus there is in reality no Spanish nation. There are the Galicians in whose corner of the peninsula the independence of the Spains was preserved by fierce resistance to the Moors; they have their dialect—almost their own language—and their customs that serve more to divide than join them to their neighboring Castilians. Up the Atlantic coast beyond Castile lies the Basque country with its own language and customs. Down the Pyrenees toward the Mediterranean Sea are the Catalans whose memory of independence nurtures the desire for freedom even today. From Catalonia, whose citizens are as distinct in language and habits from the Castilians as the Castilians are from the French, one finds on his way toward Cádiz dialects and customs distinct from those of Castile, so different as to mark the languages and customs of other nations. Political history recorded the physical union of these nations; but custom and language have preserved their independence.

Nature has kept the Spaniard—which, for want of a better name, one must call the inhabitants of the peninsula claiming allegiance to Madrid—impoverished. "Spain is a country poor in the highest degree," observed José María Orense, the Marqués de Albaida, one of the greatest students of Spanish economics. "Spain is poor because it does not have those great rivers, those arteries which one sees in France. . . . There there are two magnificent rivers by which transportation is very cheap. But here our rivers in summer serve for

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

nothing and in winter their torrents cause much misfortune. Our land, which we think is so fertile, is not so. There are some corners like the orchard of Valencia, which are very fertile. But what is a point of land compared with this interior zone entirely sterile, which produces only by the force of work? And we have not only a lack of rivers but also of water."¹ Even where, in other nations, there are mountainous barriers in the interior, great rivers serve as boulevards which teach one that his neighbor is like himself. But not in Spain. There is the Tagus, it is true, grinding its way through Toledo's bastioned heights, through fertile plains to the sea. There is also the broad Guadalquivir, nervously wending seaward. Some commerce there is on these rivers. But also there are rivers—many of them—which lie dry most of the year, pitiful reminders of flood days.

There flows through Spain no common wave of nationalism. It is all provincialism, ageless, suspicious, jealous, destructive. Mountain ranges divide where plains should join; dry rivers lock intercourse within their seared beds. One bond only is common, the strongest bond in man's social life, religion. The roots of that religion sprang from the blood of countless patriots, centuries ago. Once the tolerant and intelligent Moor had ruled the country—all but Asturias, locked up in its mountain fastnesses. From Asturias had come the battle cry that throughout time has thrilled man as no other battle cry: For God! The infidel was driven from Spain. And rarely since that time has there been tolerance in Spain. Religion may be a powerful force in changing a nation's destiny. A Luther, a Knox, a Wesley may weld a nation into a common force, now for tolerance, then for intolerance. A Calvin may cause a nation like the Dutch to gird itself to battle for its liberties; and once the liberties are gained, to keep them in a measure, purified by the sacrifice. In Spain it had been the church that had impelled the patriots to expel the Moor. But once the Moor had been driven back to his African mountains, no other religion dared claim the loyalty of the Spaniard. There was no more dread enemy than thought, which may become critical—and disbelieving. State and church were as one. Learning was in the hands of the church and it was given in measured quantity, for learning sometimes makes heretics.²

¹ *Diario de las sesiones de las Cortes Constituyentes de la República Española* (Madrid, 1874), II, 1348.

² Leucadio Doblado (J. Blanco White), *Letters from Spain* (2d ed., London, 1825), is an interesting account of the reactions of a celebrated heretic to the church.

slavery which had induced the elder Field to undertake, without hope of monetary reward, the defence of Dred Scott, the slave, for whom he fought a long and brilliant legal battle, made him a strong supporter of the Union when rebel sympathizers sought to win Missouri to their cause. But young Field and his brother Roswell knew little of the struggle of the border loyalists, for they were then under the care of their well-beloved cousin, Mary Field French, in Amherst, Massachusetts. However, the war spirit as he felt it in New England and manifestations of which he beheld all about him impressed the boy deeply. In my last conversation with him, in August, 1895, Field told me in some detail his plans for a book which he contemplated writing and which was to bear the title, "A New England Boy in Wartime." In that book he intended to relate his experiences and impressions during the war years, sketching also the actions of the fervent men and women whom he saw determinedly holding the lines behind the Union armies. His love for the rugged Yankee character would have made the writing of this book a delight to him. I have no doubt that its humorous and pathetic scenes, framed in his boy's wonder, would have proved very effective not only in a literary sense but also as a cross-section of human emotion in a time of great strain. Field told me that he would attempt to show how the long and desperate conflict affected individual men and women, what they said and did, how their strong characters reacted to the shocks of lost battles and to their grief over slain sons.

He related one incident that he intended to incorporate in the volume. With two or three other boys he was walking one day along a country road not far from Amherst, when they saw some distance away an old horse and carryall. "It is Deacon Spencer's," they told one another, "but there's nobody driving." To think of the

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

Napoleon came, conquered, ascended the great marble stairway of the Palace of La Corte, was driven out again when the Spaniard discovered that he must look to himself rather than to his king for safety. Napoleon's brother Joseph, King of Spain, had tried without success to make Spain conform to the centralized system he knew in France. Right or wrong, Joseph was doomed to failure, for he was unwelcome to the loyal Spaniards—he was not Spanish, he was an alien.

In one corner of Spain, however, an amazing group of men were discussing a most heretical thing. They were talking about a constitution for Spain; they were even mentioning the responsibility of the king to the Cortes. These men were members mostly of the Spanish navy; they belonged principally to the Freemasons, who since the middle of the eighteenth century had had a Grand Lodge in Madrid.⁶ Certainly, at Cádiz, the outlet of Spain to the Western world, the Masons were quite strong. They included in their lodge almost every influential man in the navy. If there was any place in Spain where intelligent discussion of constitutions, of the rights of the people, of the duties of the king, could take place, it would be Cádiz. Seaports are always the solvents of civilization; and Cádiz was no exception. It had been the mooring place for ships from America; it had been the point of departure for countless ships sailing to the New world. In these days, decay was setting in but it was not a decay of the spirit.

While these audacious men were meeting in a theater for want of a better place and were talking of the sovereignty of the nation, the young King Fernando VII was preparing to leave France where he had been the enforced guest of the Emperor Napoleon at Valençay. King of Spain! Plotter against his parents, servile to Napoleon, Fernando had fled when valiant subjects resisted the invading French. Carlos IV, his father, had yielded the throne without a struggle; and Fernando was even more abject. While the liberals planned at Cádiz, Fernando and a few of his choice friends amused themselves at Valençay. Fernando did not fret at his confinement; like his friends he became adept in those things idleness induces. There was little to inspire kingly feelings in the young Bourbon. His father was anything but a king. His mother had few queenly virtues. His own friends wanted ease alone. No thought of liberating Spain from its invaders

⁶ Vicente de la Fuente, *Historia de las Sociedades secretas antiguas y modernas de España* (Lugo, 1870), I, Preface p. vi.

KINGS IN THE SERVICE OF DEMOCRACY

came to his mind; no appreciation of the sacrifice and the loyalty of the patriots escaped his lips. Almost all who have examined the life of this most pitiful of kings agree that he was one of the most perfidious men who ever sat on a throne. He did two things well: He smoked the choicest cigars of Havana; he knew how to break his word and when to break it. These alone were his attributes to kingship. This was the man who was to be the constitutional king of Spain, if the men of Cádiz were to fare well in their deliberations.

Out of the discussions at Cádiz came the Constitution of 1812, a remarkable expression of political philosophy rarely surpassed in Spain for its liberality. For years it was to be a rallying cry for the Democrats (a new name in Spain, not heard as yet). It was to be the nucleus for the Constitution of 1822 and for later constitutions, and it formed the basis of the Constitution of Portugal, which, with certain periodic changes, remained essentially the same to the twentieth century.⁷ Many of its principles were a restatement of those prevailing in the sixteenth century.

The Constitution was in itself a revolution for it said that "sovereignty resides essentially in the nation." How would Fernando VII, King by the grace of God, like that? Other striking features of this Constitution were: A unicameral Cortes of Deputies chosen by the people must meet once a year on the first of March "without waiting any instrument from the King for their convocation," though the "session may be prolonged by their own vote of two thirds of their members for another month." In bygone years the Cortes met at the will of the king and then not very often. Allegiance then was to the king alone. Now, however: "The Deputies swear to protect the Constitution and to be faithful to the nation." No reference was made to the king in the oath of allegiance. The king was to open the Cortes with a speech; he was to come to the Cortes without a guard. The Assembly could not deliberate in his presence. Debates were public. Members were inviolable for their opinions; members could not ask or accept rewards, honors or pensions from the king. Before any offensive alliance could be made with other nations, the king must obtain the approval of the Cortes. Bills must be read three times in the Assembly; approved by it, the king must give his consent to them; after thirty days, his si-

⁷ Theodoric Legrand, *Histoire du Portugal du Xle Siècle a nos jours* (Paris: Payot, 1928), pp. 143-145.

despite what they called his "Eastern notions." The very considerable size of the library that Field owned was a wonder to them. However, the hotel burned and Field's books burned, too. Another loss which Field suffered through this fire he never ceased to regret. It was the loss of all the letters his father had written him from the time he was taken away from his St. Louis home after his mother's death.

One of Field's associates at Knox long afterward recalled how Field looked as he sat in his hotel room, carelessly dressed and wearing his hair rather long, smoking a cob pipe and surrounded by youths who listened delightedly to his droll stories. His love for newspaper work manifested itself in his frequent contributions, mainly on college topics, to the Galesburg *Register*. A common question about the college was: "Have you read what Field had in the *Register* to-day?" Though his mischievous doings were innumerable, the professors and instructors were fond of him, since there was nothing ill-natured or demoralizing in his fun.

V

Field once related to me a curious incident of his life at Knox. His head, he told me, was full of romantic ideas and he had a very special desire to emulate the example of his greatly admired father by winning renown as an ardent lover. For the elder Field, as a budding lawyer in his native town of Newfane, had suddenly taken captive the heart of a young girl and the two had been hastily united by a clandestine marriage, though the bride at the time was engaged to be married to another man who had the approval of her parents. The girl's incensed relatives immediately brought about the separation of the runaway couple and soon induced the girl to marry illegally the man of their choice. Field carried the matter into court, de-

KINGS IN THE SERVICE OF DEMOCRACY

III. THE CORNERSTONE OF DEMOCRACY

Fernando had no intention of obeying the Constitution he had sworn to uphold. All along the route from the frontier (which he passed without apparent joy) he was assured by various royalists that he need not adhere to the Constitution. And it needed the slightest pretext only for the King to reject it. Fernando's violation of his oath (readily excused by a complaisant church) was the beginning of a long era of revolt and of counter-revolt in Spain, of constitution granted and of constitution violated, of pronunciamiento, of rule by the garrison.

Fernando unconsciously became the cornerstone of a new movement which ultimately was to destroy the throne: Democracy. At this time (1814) there was no question but that the Spanish people were loyal to him. The Bourbons, with a few noble exceptions, had been impervious to a changing world; they did not appreciate the intense loyalty of their subjects, a loyalty deeper perhaps than any monarch in Europe could claim. The family pact and the church, these were the dogmas of Bourbon statecraft. Highways remained undeveloped. The land was deforested everywhere. Education was discouraged and more than eighty per cent of the people were illiterate. Devotion to saint and to king alone met with hearty encouragement. Attachment to the church in Spain—as we have observed—was stronger than almost anywhere else, for there was an element of the primitive in Spanish worship absent even in Italy. Every town had its saint, its *fiestas* celebrating the saint's anniversary. Almost every subject heartily detested the heretic and if he did not, he would be kept faithful through the instrument of the Inquisition.

The Spanish rulers did not sense the *power* they had in such blind attachment to the throne; else the story of the nineteenth century, with its *coup d'état* which overthrew the monarchy and eventually established the Republic might never have been written. Fernando continued to pursue his pleasures in Madrid as at Valençay, with the same *camarilla* of worthless friends who had amused him at the Princess de Talleyrand's. All the while there were signs of unrest in Spain, not menacing but signs of impending change in the spirit of the people. The masonic lodges, the carbonarios, the *cumuneros*, secret clubs here and there, kept alive the liberal agitation against the reign of abso-

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

lutionism which began with the restoration of Fernando in 1814. Slow as this spirit of revolt was in manifesting itself on the peninsula, the colonists in South and Central America had begun to assert themselves. The great viceroyalties that had fed Spain gold now were broken up. Fernando the dissipated was losing his empire to abler, bolder men than he: Juárez, Bolívar, the wise O'Higgins, the brave San Martín, the crafty and strange Doctor Francia (the most remarkable dictator of the nineteenth century), these and others during the century were engaged in unrooting Spain from the Americas. Florida passed to the United States. Mexico asserted its independence. Peru, Chile, Bolivia—gradually new names appeared on the map during the century where only a few years before the great spirit of San Isidro had been wont to guard.

Spain, too, was restless. The Constitution of 1812 had proposed to sweep away the señorial privileges. At Valencia in May, 1814 Fernando declared the Constitution null and void and the decrees and acts of the Regency functioning during his absence from the Kingdom to be of no effect. That same month he ordered all the masonic lodges closed. Soon thereafter he was harrying the liberals, putting some in prison, ordering others shot and endeavoring by all the means of his absolute power to destroy the dread enemy, liberalism. Revolts here and there in Spain during the next six years gave warning that Fernando was not to find absolutism accepted without challenge. Mina in 1814, Porlier in 1815¹¹ Torrijos in 1831¹²—liberals like these unsuccessfully tried to restore the Constitution. Eighteen such attempts during the period from 1814 to 1820 met adamant.¹³ Not only were many of Spain's great men like Agustín de Argüelles and Francisco Martínez de la Rosa in prison or in exile, not only were the secret clubs like the Fountain of Gold constantly threatened but it seemed as if the very soul of Spain were to be destroyed. Brute force could not quell the new liberal spirit however. Many of the nobility were forced to espouse the liberal cause as Fernando continued his ruthless pursuit of

¹¹ Porlier was executed. He interrupted the reading of the sentence at the word "traitor" to exclaim: "Traitor! say rather, the most faithful servant of the fatherland!"

¹² Antonio Gisbert has immortalized this conspirator with his impressive painting "El fusilamiento de Torrijos y sus compañeros." The painting hangs in the Museo de Arte moderno at Madrid. José María Torrijos and forty-nine companions were executed at Málaga December 11, 1831, after raising the cry of "Constitution or death!"

¹³ La Fuente, *op. cit.*, I, 230.

KINGS IN THE SERVICE OF DEMOCRACY

revenge. Even the destitution of monarchy was the goal of revolts of Republican tenor in Barcelona and Saragossa in 1820.

The army was the focus now of the liberals. An attempt to initiate a revolt among troops destined for the Americas in 1819 was betrayed. January 1, 1820 General Rafael del Riego with several army corps waiting for embarkation for overseas raised the cry on the Island of Leon in the South for restoration of the Constitution of 1812. Riego was given cordial support in the southern provinces. Fernando yielded to the revolt March 7. Two days later he swore to adhere to the Constitution. On July 6 the Cortes met and Fernando swore in the presence of many of the liberals he had placed in prison to observe the Constitution.¹⁴

The army for the first time in the nineteenth century—but not the last time—intervened in the affairs of the nation to effect political change. Riego's revolt lacked some of the elements characterizing the first pronunciamiento, that of La Granja during the minority of Queen Isabel. But the rebellion proved to many liberals that the surest guarantee of certain reform was force.

Alexander of Russia had completed the circuit of his political beliefs from liberalism to conservatism. Although he had recognized the Constitution of 1812 and the acts of the Cortes then meeting, now he was alarmed at the new government, born of rebellion. The members of the Holy Alliance were all eager to come to the aid of Fernando so that liberals all over the world might take due warning that there were kings who ruled by divine right. Rather unwillingly France "rescued" the King of Spain from his subjects. The Duc d'Angoulême entered Madrid April 23, 1822, named a new Regency and proceeded towards Seville where the Cortes was meeting. For the second time in a decade a foreign army marched in Spain to correct internal affairs at the request of Spain.

Freed from the Constitution, Fernando with the greatest ferocity avenged himself on the liberals, the sixty-three Deputies of the Cortes who had continued their meeting in 1823 at Seville and Cádiz being condemned to death as rebels and all courts were ordered to apply the penalty simply on recognizing any such Deputy.¹⁵

¹⁴ Hemingway, *op. cit.*; Mariana, *op. cit.*; Agustin de Argüelles, *De 1820 á 1824* (Madrid, 1864).

¹⁵ De Argüelles, *op. cit.*

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

For six more years Spain ceased to be a nation in the true sense of the name. Universities, newspapers, speech, all were forced to acquiesce to the reign of absolutism. The men of '23 were mostly in exile or in prison; but they had not forgotten their taste of liberty. Among the younger nobility even were some who had fought with the militia in 1823 to oppose the advance of the French. Among these was the first of the *grandees* of Spain to espouse the Republican cause, José María Orense, Marqués de Albaida, who was born October 20, 1803 in Laredo, near Santander. Profoundly liberal, under English influence as regards constitutional liberty, Orense became the real founder of the Republican party in Spain. Other men like him were waiting for a more favorable time to demand substitution of a republic for the monarchy.

Fernando, who had contributed so little to the happiness of Spain while living, was to leave it a dreadful legacy of disunion in dying.

Since 1713 Spain had observed the Salic Law of Succession by which the throne succeeded to the male line only. Married three times, Fernando had no heir. Succeeding him would be his brother, Don Carlos, exceedingly bigoted and intensely conservative. Fernando's third wife, María Amalia, died May 17, 1829 and on December 29 that year he married María Cristina, daughter of the King of the Two Sicilies, who was twenty-three years old, Fernando being forty-five years old. Fearing that he might be denied the throne, Don Carlos and his partisans announced that they would expect the Salic Law of Succession observed. On October 10, 1830, Fernando's marriage bore fruit in an heiress, Isabel.

Prodded by María Cristina, Fernando announced a Pragmatic Sanction April 5, 1830, setting aside the Bourbon law of succession. In reality this was restoring the old custom of the crown, for women had reigned as queens of Spain prior to Felipe V. Don Carlos again protested vigorously. Beset with the terrors Don Carlos' friends painted for the King, and near death, Fernando in September, 1832 revoked his decree, thus permitting Don Carlos to succeed him. Recovering his health again, Fernando assembled the *grandees* of the Kingdom and on December 31, 1832 presented them with a decree written in his own hand, re-establishing the Law of 1830 and at the same time deploring the "consummate perfidy and the horrible conspiracy" by which the Carlistas (the partisans of Don Carlos) had accomplished his "seduc-

KINGS IN THE SERVICE OF DEMOCRACY

tion." He stated that the Carlistas had assured him that the Spanish people were opposed to the Pragmatic Sanction and that the proclamation of 1830 would provoke bloodshed. His conclusion was significant of the trouble in store:

"Knowing today of the falsehood with which they calumniated the loyalty of my beloved Spaniards, always loyal to the descendants of their kings; thoroughly persuaded that it is not in my power or in my desires to change the immemorial custom of succession established by the centuries, sanctioned by law, made fast by the illustrious heroines who have preceded me on the throne, and demanded by the unanimous vote of all the kingdoms; and, free on this day from the influence and coercion of those evil circumstances, I solemnly declare, voluntarily and freely, that the Decree signed in the anxieties of my illness, was torn from me by surprise, a result of the false terrors with which they surprised my mind, and that it is null and void, being opposed to the fundamental laws of the monarchy and to the obligations which I owe to my august descendants as a king and as a father."¹⁶

The Spanish monarchy had reached a grave crisis. Royalists now had to elect between two settlements, both based on the law of the monarchy. They had to choose between an inveterate liar and an uncompromising bigot. The royalists faced division in their ranks at the very time they should have been united so as to face the new foe, liberalism, successfully.

Had Fernando need of warning of the danger facing his subjects, he had but to look at Portugal, then undergoing a civil war as a result of two claimants to the throne. Portugal had been influenced greatly by the liberal movement of Spain and in 1822 had obtained a constitution based on the Constitution of 1812. The liberal revolt in Portugal preceded by several months the independence of Brazil. Dom Pedro, son of the king Juan VI, became Emperor of Brazil. Dom Juan had accepted the liberal Constitution of 1822 but his queen Carlota, sister of Fernando VII, supported the absolutists through her son, Miguel, nephew of Don Carlos and Don Fernando of Spain. On the death of Juan in 1826 Pedro had renounced his rights to the throne of Portugal in favor of his eldest daughter, María de la Gloria, age seven

¹⁶ Mariana, *op. cit.*, XXIII, 145, where the decree is quoted; *Spaniens Verfassungskampf, seine Parteien und hervorragenden Staatsmänner, 1812-1854* (Leipzig, 1854), p. 5.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

years. Miguel became Regent of the Kingdom and in 1828 dissolved the Cortes meeting in accordance with the liberal constitution Pedro had enunciated in 1826, modifying that of 1822. Portugal was plunged into a civil war again, the liberals sustaining María, the absolutists, Dom Miguel. This struggle was at its height during the period when Fernando was setting aside the Salic Law.

This division of the royalists could have but one result. Don Fernando, last of the feudal kings of Spain, would have to depend on the liberals for the success of his Pragmatic Sanction. Already he had warning of this fact, for Francisco Zea Bermúdez whom he made President of his Council in 1832 on discovering the Carlista sympathies of Francisco Calomarde, was forced to make concessions to the liberals.

Not only was the institution of monarchy in danger in 1832 but the unity of the nation was in jeopardy as the result of the appearance in that year of a proposed federal Republican constitution for Spain. Political parties had already made their appearance in Spain for the first time as a result of the liberal experiments of 1812 and 1822. The Progressive party, heir to the national sovereignty theory enunciated by the Constitution of 1812, was a liberal party believing in the responsibility of the king to the nation. It did not believe in the divine right of kings. While the genesis of the Progressives was the year 1812, the Moderate party owed its origin to the events of 1820-1823. It believed in a centralized state, a responsible monarchy and a gradual granting of the rights of citizenship.¹⁷ Both of these parties accepted the Pragmatic Sanction. A section of the Progressive party, however, was frankly Democratic in spirit. To this group adhered the Republicans. There was no widespread demand for the republic and the movement manifested itself principally in the South and in Catalonia in the form of sporadic revolts. King and bishop were the threads which tied the nations of Spain together. Now, in 1832, Ramón Xauradó y Fábregas, a Catalan, who had advocated a republic for Spain from 1820 until his death in 1837, when he was shot for precipitating a revolt in Barcelona, published the *Bases of a Political Constitution* in Paris.

Federalism, the basis of this constitution, is at once the most constructive and the most destructive political theory advanced in the his-

¹⁷ Sabino Herrero, *La Revolución y las partidas liberales de España* (Valladolid, 1868), p. 11.

to whom had been assigned the task of introducing him failed to appear. The crowd had assembled and was growing impatient, the orator of the occasion was on the platform, but still the absence of the chairman of the meeting prolonged the awkward wait. Schurz expressed his annoyance to those seated near him. Field thereupon jumped up from his chair, saying, "I'll introduce you, Senator," and, knowing that Schurz would suspect a trick, advanced to the front of the platform before Schurz could demur. Then Field made the introduction substantially as follows:

"Ladees und chentlemens, h'm, h'm!" (He coughed hoarsely.) "I recret it dot I haf a fery bad coldt." (More coughing.) "I am so sorry to say it, but I gannot make dot speech. Howeffer, it gifs me creat bleasure to introduce to you mine tear friendt, dot prilliant chournalist, Meester Euchene Fieldt"—turning and waving his hand toward the amazed and indignant Schurz—"who will now atdress you." Then he sat down.

Field's lively verses, "The St. Jo Gazette," presents a very good picture of the work of a "lokil editor" in a city of the size of St. Joseph back in 1875, in the spring of which year Field removed thither. Something of his mettle as a gatherer of news is indicated by a story he told me one time with a considerable show of satisfaction. On an afternoon in the early summer of 1876 he called on the railroad station agent, as was his daily practice, seeking some bit of information for the columns of the *Gazette*. He found the agent disturbed and puzzled.

"I heard a message going over the wires a little while ago," the agent told him. "I didn't hear much of it—only enough to learn that there has been serious trouble somewhere and that a lot of men were killed. There was fighting or something like that."

Field was deeply interested at once. He tried to solve the mystery by a system of deduction hastily improvised. He knew that General Crook was in pursuit of Sitting Bull's rebellious Sioux warriors somewhere in Wyoming and that General Custer and his forces were particularly active in the chase. So he took a chance. With such information as he could gather from recent reports of the movement of the troops in the northwest he wrote the story of a battle that might very well have been fought. He thought he was making the conflict reasonably sanguinary, but he did not make it sufficiently so fully to conform to the facts. However, it was a first-class fighting story. The *Gazette* published it with suitable headlines and so that newspaper was able to boast when authentic reports of the disaster to Custer and his men were received that it had given the world the first news of the massacre on the Little Big Horn. Field was particularly happy because his deductions had been so nearly right that his story stood up unashamed in the face of the official dispatches.

II

It was after his return to St. Louis late in 1876 that he began to win more than local fame. The year before he left that city to become the managing editor of the *Kansas City Times* he wrote his first poem, "Christmas Treasures." In Kansas City he found himself in a whirl of stormy journalism, for the fiery editor of the *Times*, Dr. Morrison Munford, a Southerner and an ex-Confederate soldier, was a true son of battle. The year that he passed amid these surroundings closed his considerable term of active newspaper service in Missouri, a state which he had come to know thoroughly in all its aspects. The Missourians always had a fascination for him. He wrote much of them, and his knowledge of their public men was inti-

KINGS IN THE SERVICE OF DEMOCRACY

the nineteenth century and one of the principal protagonists of federalism, Emilio Castelar y Ripoll. Castelar was born in Cádiz, home of democracy in Spain, September 7/8,¹⁹ 1832, the son of an exchange broker. His mother was Doña María Antonia Ripoll, the daughter of a lawyer and landowner. Thus Castelar was born into the middle class of Spanish society, although by choice he regarded himself a member of the "fourth estate" or oppressed class. His mother had married Manuel Castelar in Alicante in 1819. The Castelars were forced to emigrate in the period when liberals were persecuted in 1823, returning when amnesty was granted in 1831 to settle in Cádiz. Manuel Castelar possessed one of the best libraries in Cádiz and here Emilio whetted his appetite for history and philosophy, a love for which was to remain with him throughout life. The family moved to Madrid in 1839 but were hardly established before the father died, leaving Doña María Antonia without means to support her two children, Concepción and Emilio. The mother saved the library, however, when the family possessions were sold and accepted the offer of her sister in Elda to share the latter's home.

Castelar thus received his first elements of education in the semi-tropical province of Valencia, near his beloved Mediterranean Sea. Throughout his life Castelar retained a gentleness and idealism which he owed to his mother and a richness of imagination which was fostered by his almost oriental environment. His mother undertook the first steps in his education and made the boy her confidante. Castelar was fond of dwelling on the goodness and understanding of his mother. So great was his deference to her that when he fell in love with Benita Guijarro, a young woman of talent though no beauty, who was a lady-in-waiting at the Court, he broke the marriage arrangements when his mother refused to approve because they had been arrived at without her knowledge. The goodness of his mother made an imprint on the boy's heart which he did not forget. "Wine, love and tobacco, the play and women, none of those things which occupy a Spaniard's

¹⁹ Castelar gives the date of his birth as September 8 in his *Autobiografía*, written in the third person apparently for use of South American newspapers and issued by his old publisher San Martín in the first volume of the Collected Works in 1920, with an Introduction by Dr. Ángel Pulido. Actually, Castelar was born at 10:30 P.M. September 7. (See E. Varagnac, *Emilio Castelar* [Paris, 1920], pp. 1-2 for an interesting discussion of this anomaly.) It was exactly forty-one years later to the day (September 7, 1873) that Castelar became President of the Executive Power of the Spanish Republic.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

life, seem to have charms for him," the French Compté Paul Vasali observed.²⁰ So powerful was sentiment on the youthful democrat that when the Castelars left Elda for Madrid, where Emilio's uncle had established himself, young Emilio tearfully embraced the trees in the orchard of the home in which he had spent so many happy days.²¹

In Barcelona Francisco Pí y Margall, the greatest exponent of federalism, was beginning the first steps of his education in philosophy. Estanislao Figueras, the great parliamentarian of the Republican party, born five years before Pí y Margall, November 13, 1819 in Barcelona, was beginning his studies of the humanities in the capital of Catalonia.

Men of genius would soon be disseminating the capital idea of republicanism, a federated Spain. Death drew the curtains about the dissipated life of Don Fernando September 29, 1833. The last feudal king of Spain was dead. Long live the king!

²⁰ Compté Paul Vasali, *La Société de Madrid* (5th ed., Paris, 1886), p. 120.

²¹ J. O. Picón, *Discursos leídos ante la Real Academia Española en la Recepción pública de J. O. Picón* (Madrid, 1900), p. 35. The city of Elda commemorated the centennial of Castelar's birth September 7, 1932 with a *fiesta*. Twelve prizes were offered by President Alcalá Zamora, Alejandro Lerroux, the Province of Alicante, the city of Elda and others for various literary compositions on phases of Castelar, such as his oratory, his work in the Republic of 1873, his biography.

CHAPTER TWO

POLITICS AND PRONUNCIAMIENTOS

I. THE ARMY, SERVANT AND MASTER

ISABEL II became Queen of Spain at the age of three years, the first Bourbon woman to sit on the throne and the second woman ruler of the nation since the union of the kingdoms. At no time in the history of united Spain was a strong ruler so needed as now. Don Carlos from Portugal on October 1, 1833 announced himself the ruler of the Kingdom and denied the validity of his brother's settlement by which María Cristina became the Regent. Three days later various communities of northern Spain pronounced for Don Carlos. Miguel of Portugal recognized him as the legitimate King. To the aid of Don Carlos came two of the ablest military leaders of the country, Tomás Zumalacárregui and Ramón Cabrera. For a half century Spain was to become little more than an armed camp, the scene of a struggle between the Carlistas and the Isabelinos.

María Cristina was not deterred by the obstacles confronting her. She confirmed the arrangements Fernando had made and assumed the duties of Regent. A clever, designing woman, she brought to her task all the cunning and petty cleverness of the lesser Bourbons. Four years of experience with Spanish government did not prevent her assuming active direction of affairs. Zea Bermúdez yielded the presidency of the Council of Ministers to Martínez de la Rosa, a member of the Cortes of 1813, in January, 1834. The Queen Regent realized her dependence on the participation in government of the Moderates and Progressives. Hence the promulgation of another Constitution, the *Estatuto Real* of 1834, which satisfied the principles of the Moderates but represented retrogression when compared with the Constitution of 1812. It also did not exemplify the liberal principles Martínez de la Rosa should have learned in the Parliament of Cádiz. Its only concession to political progress was the guarantee of a Cortes, which was called to meet in July, 1834. This Cortes met in Madrid at a time when cholera was ravaging much of the country. It restated demands that

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

now had a familiar sound, especially for greater freedom of the press.¹ War and pestilence thus afflicted Spain in the opening years of Isabel's reign. The Carlista War progressed from the stage of minor rebellions to a major civil war. Thus the army became of paramount importance to the throne. Previously, the strongest agencies of order were the throne and the church. Exigencies of the moment now raised a third power within the state, the army.

Spain has been impoverished always by her military expenditures, especially in the number of officers and generals it had to support. Thus, in 1851, to take a typical year, there were ten captains general, seventy-eight lieutenant generals, two hundred and three field marshals, three hundred and forty-five brigadier generals. The war strength of the army then was 180,000 men.² Fifteen years later there were 302,000 men in uniform, with 100,000 men in reserve, or 400,000 men were available for the military out of a total population of fifteen million.³ A commentator in 1872 complained that the Spanish army was commanded by enough officers to take charge of an army of two million men. Then there were six captains general, two hundred lieutenant generals and marshals, and three hundred and eight brigadier generals, or a total of five hundred and fourteen officers. This commentator estimated that it would require only 292 major officers to command an army of 700,000 men.⁴ Donoso Cortés remarked in 1866 that a reduction of 100,000 men in the army would mean that "you would have passed from the rôle of slaves in uniform to that of workers."⁵

The army had made its influence felt in 1820. Now it began with increasing frequency to make political demands and with unvarying success. Martínez de la Rosa resigned early in 1835 as the result of a revolt of the militia in Madrid. The voluntary militia was often indistinguishable from the mob and the revolt of Madrid was but a reflection of the agitated condition of the country, resulting from disease

¹ *Spaniens Verfassungskampf*, p. 6. This Constitution was proclaimed April 10, 1834. The franchise for the Second Chamber was indirect and based on a very high tax payment. Elections were to be held every three years. The Cortes did not have legislative initiative and it approved the budget only every two years. The crown exercised an absolute veto.

² *Ibid.*, p. 85.

³ B. de Renusson, *Les Craintes et les Espérances de l'Espagne a la fin de l'année 1866* (Paris, 1866), p. 16.

⁴ *¡Abajo los ejércitos permanentes!* (Madrid, 1872), p. 39.

⁵ De Renusson, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

POLITICS AND PRONUNCIAMIENTOS

and devastating war. This agitation soon took the form of anti-religious riots throughout the country. There were rumors that the priests were in a measure responsible for the cholera. This spirit of unrest translated itself into action following the proposal of the Progressive Mendizábal, who succeeded the Conde de Toreno following Martínez de la Rosa's resignation, to confiscate the great wealth of the monasteries. This proposal was a gesture of despair, made to obviate the threatened bankruptcy of the nation. There were at this time 600 nunneries in Spain with a total of 12,000 nuns and 1,940 cloisters with 30,000 monks and almost 25,000 nuns. The church was the only element in the state that possessed tangible wealth. The populace in July, 1835 translated its vague fear into attacks on the convents and monasteries, particularly in Saragossa and Barcelona.⁶

Equally important with the advent of the army in politics was the beginning of a semblance of party government. The Conde de Toreno was a Moderate. He was replaced by a Progressive. When Mendizábal's program of confiscation of church property brought the government in conflict with the Pope, the Moderates returned to power. Mendizábal had granted a greater measure of freedom to Spain than his predecessors; Istúriz, a former Progressive, met with resistance when he assumed the presidency of the Ministry succeeding Mendizábal. The popular militia protested, particularly in the South, when the Cortes of 1836 was dissolved. In August, 1836, the guard at La Granja pronounced for the Constitution of 1812. María Cristina, brought face to face in this manner with a popular demand, capitulated August 13. Istúriz resigned and Calatrava, a Progressive, became President of the Council of Ministers. The Constitution of 1812 was proclaimed in effect again—thirteen years after Fernando believed that he had destroyed it. The following year the Cortes was granted the power of initiating laws. The Crown retained the right of absolute veto in the Constitution of 1837.

General Baldomero Espartero, a Progressive, had won the attention of Spain in December, 1836, when he relieved the siege of Bilbao, under attack a second time from Don Carlos. By quelling the Carlistas and obtaining the Treaty of Vergara August 31, 1839 Espartero became the most powerful figure in Spain. In 1840 the Cortes approved a law proposed by the Moderates which gave the queen power,

⁶ *Spaniens Verfassungskampf.*

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

through the minister of the interior, to name the mayors and sub-mayors of all municipalities of Spain, for thus the Moderates, supported by María Cristina in their policy, designed to destroy the growing power of the Progressives in the cities. Barcelona pronounced in July against the law. The Moderate Ministry resigned.

Affairs now moved quickly.

María Cristina opposed Espartero. The Municipal Corporation of Madrid and the Provincial Deputation pronounced against the Moderate regime September 1. They named a provisional government. Among the leaders of this revolt was Luis González Brabo, a carbonario in earlier years. The movement of Barcelona and Madrid met with support in the South. The Queen Regent asked Espartero to march on Madrid. The great Progressive leader refused. He asked, instead, that the Moderate Cortes be prorogued, a new and liberal Cortes called and that the municipal and other distasteful laws be re-submitted for approval.

The Pronunciamiento of 1840 resulted in María Cristina's renunciation of the Regency October 12. The queen mother had become yearly more unpopular, due both to her grasping business acumen and her love affair with a guardsman, Muñoz, whom she later married and raised to the rank of a duke. Shortly after her renunciation, on October 17, María Cristina left Spain for France. Espartero became Regent of the Kingdom, his election May 8, 1841 being one of the first acts of the new Cortes, although Agustín de Argüelles, one of the great leaders of the men of '12 received a large vote.

Five months later General Leopoldo O'Donnell pronounced against Espartero at Pamplona, declaring that Espartero had "compromised the Spanish nation" and that he was incapable of governing it. The revolt was crushed. Conditions did not improve nor did the new era promised in the magic of Espartero's name materialize. Failing to approach the matter of taxes in a manner that would help balance the nation's budget, Espartero temporized. Barcelona pronounced in 1842 for the republic and established a central government. The government of Madrid regained control with difficulty. In May, 1843, Juan Prim y Prats, one of the younger Progressive leaders, pronounced against Espartero. O'Donnell, General Ramón Narváez, one of the principal Moderate generals, and other military leaders joined. Quickly the revolt spread over Spain. Narváez forced his way to Madrid

POLITICS AND PRONUNCIAMIENTOS

which capitulated July 23. Prim followed the next day. Six days later, on July 30, Espartero renounced the Regency. One of the most remarkable men of this remarkable century in Spain, Espartero had advanced from the rank of an humble civilian to be Regent of the Kingdom, only to lose that post because of political ineptness. Yet it was a striking commentary on how little the various pronunciamientos represented the real thought of the Spanish people, that Espartero's popularity with the people themselves was undimmed by the bitter accusations of the generals that he was "blind and ambitious."⁷

II. ISABEL, THE QUEEN AND WOMAN

The Cortes declared Isabel of age October 30, 1843. Now thirteen years old, the young Queen was to take over the actual government of Spain. While the generals pronounced, while her mother played one political party against the other, while Espartero was bringing Don Carlos to terms, Isabel was obtaining the education of a princess in Spain—from priest and nun.

Washington Irving, American Minister to the Court at Madrid at this time, described her in 1842 as being "well grown for her years and well formed, inclining to fullness rather than the contrary; with extremely well shaped arms. Her countenance, though not handsome, is agreeable; she has light hair and light eyes; which are somewhat unusual in Spain. Her general health I should think from her appearance to be excellent; but she is unfortunately troubled with a complaint of the skin which gives it a rough and somewhat mealy look. In consequence of neglect on the part of her mother it was suffered to confirm itself and become obstinate. It is probable however, that with the assistance of baths which she now takes frequently, she will grow out of it. She will then become quite what is called 'personable.' Her sister . . . is said to be of a sprightlier turn than the Queen; but the latter, if she begins to think for herself, and to cast a thoughtful eye on the past, the present and the future, has enough to give a grave cast to her character."⁸

Spain needed a strong ruler, a sympathetic ruler. Isabel was not that ruler. She had a generous heart which her father lacked. She

⁷ *Ibid*; *L'Espagne en Octobre, 1841* (Paris, 1841); La Fuente; Heliodoro del Busto, *Los partidos en cueros, ó Apuntes para escribir la historia de doce años, 1843-1855* (Madrid, 1856).

⁸ Washington Irving, *Letters from Sunnyside and Spain* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1928). Letter of November 20, 1842.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

was devout and that endeared her to the hearts of the country people. She took solace from disappointments in clandestine and ofttimes open love affairs. If the monarchy was to be saved, it required one regnant of wiser, sterner stuff than Isabel.

The Moderate-Progressive coalition which had destroyed the Regency of Espartero continued the era of place hunting and rewards which was rapidly destroying the basis of representative government. The Progressives were given civil posts only. Narváez became captain general of Madrid (New Castile), O'Donnell was made captain general of Cuba and General Manuel de la Concha captain general of Andalusia. General Francisco Serrano y Bedoya became a member of the Council of Ministers. Narváez and Serrano co-operated eagerly in destroying the national militia. Other repressive measures were put in execution rapidly: The privileges of the press were limited, the Cortes lost its right to regulate annually the strength of the army and navy. The banker Salamanca exercised great influence with the ministry. He won money in speculation on the bourse from Narváez and María Cristina. The former carbonario González Brabo became a minister, co-operating with Narváez. Only one important contribution to Spanish life did the Moderates make under Narváez, and that was the establishment of the Civil and Rural Guards which to this day remain the surest guarantee of public order in the nation.

Narváez, who created the Civil Guard, was a man of iron firmness, the mainstay of the throne during the trying score of years following the overthrow of Espartero. His diagnosis of the ills of Spain contained also his method of curing them: "Spain is a country where there are many rascals; it needs a head to think for it and an arm to keep it in order."⁹ Personally acceptable to the Queen, Narváez at times gained the disfavor of the Palace due to his repressive measures. He was ever loyal to the Queen, often playing the rôle of fatherly advisor and minister of state. When the Queen outraged public sentiment by recognizing openly her favorites, it was Narváez who banned the favorites from Madrid and reproved her. When later, following her marriage, the Queen proved cold to her spouse, it was Narváez who reconciled them. It was Narváez who acted as the governor to the overweening counsels of María Cristina. Although he had con-

⁹ A. Fernández de los Ríos, *Estudio histórico de las Luchas políticas en la España del Siglo XIX* (2d ed., Madrid, 1880), II, 101.

POLITICS AND PRONUNCIAMIENTOS

spired at Seville against Espartero in 1840, now he became the statesman.

The era of pronunciamientos was not ended, however, with the advent of Narváez. Sir Henry Maine's comment on Spain was all too true: "There are some places in South America where the people date events, not from the great earthquakes, but from the years in which, by a rare intermission, there is no earthquake at all. On the same principle we may note that during the nine years following 1845, and the nine years following 1857, there was comparative, though not complete, freedom from military insurrection in Spain. As to the residue of her political history, my calculation is that between the first establishment of popular government in 1812 and the succession of the present King [Alfonso XII] there have been forty military risings of a serious nature, in most of which the mob took part. Nine of them were perfectly successful, either overthrowing the constitution for the time being, or reversing the principles on which it was administered."¹⁰

The first few years of Isabel's reign were no freer from military revolt than those of María Cristina's Regency. They were minor revolts, rather than rebellions designed to change the central government.

Meanwhile, despite the repressive measures of Narváez, the Progressives were witnessing an evolution within their ranks. The advanced liberals were turning toward the Democratic party, or rather, the Democratic wing of the Progressive party, since the Democrats were forced to masquerade under the older party label due to the fact that they had no recognized standing. As early as 1840 the Republican newspaper *El Huracán* urged the Democrats to establish a junta, which, though created in Madrid, was short-lived and ineffectual. *El Huracán* advocated a federal republic and other Republican newspapers, like *La Revolución*, began to appear.¹¹

More significant than any of these symptoms of change was the election in 1844 of Orense as a Democratic Progressive from Palencia to sit in the Cortes. Not only was he the first of the advanced Progressives to sit in the Cortes but he was one of the first to supplement the Progressive program with one frankly Democratic.

¹⁰ Sir Henry Maine, *Popular Government* (London, 1890), p. 10.

¹¹ In 1821 two Republican newspapers appeared, *El Zurriago* and *La Tercerola*. Rodríguez-Solís, *op. cit.*, II, 374; E. Hartzenbusch, *Periódicos de Madrid* (Madrid, 1876), pp. 45-46.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

He declared the bases of a "true constitution are: inviolate respect for the domestic hearth, respect for all classes of property, the right of association without restrictions, complete freedom of the press without a deposit or responsible editor, and universal suffrage."¹²

Four years later the extreme left wing of the Progressive party issued a complete Democratic program, including, in addition to Orense's demands, religious freedom, free primary instruction, trial by jury and equal rights for all.¹³ By 1848 a Democratic creed, radically differing from the conventional Progressive doctrine, had been formulated and a Democratic party that was Republican in reality had come into being in Spain.

The Progressives in 1844 introduced another form of revolution, as significant as the revolts and counter-revolts. As their protest against Moderate repression they decided to abstain from the elections in that year. The *retraimiento* (abstention) has continued until the twentieth century to vie with the *pronunciamiento* as a forceful protest against political practices in Spain.

Undeterred by this new threat the Moderates in 1845 revised the Constitution of 1837 by returning to the *Estatuto Real* of 1834, with certain modifications. The Lower Chamber approved this Moderate charter in December, 1844 and the Senate did so the following year.

Interference in the internal affairs of the nations of the peninsula on the part of the European powers had already been established both by England and by France. Now again, on the occasion of Isabel's marriage were they to intervene. The question whom should the young Queen marry became the subject of *pourparlers* between France and England in 1846. Queen Victoria would not be averse to a marriage of Isabel with a member of the Coburg family with whom she herself was allied; failing that, with Don Enrique de Borbón, Duque de Sevilla, a liberal. Louis Philippe of France wanted his fifth son, the Duc de Montpensier, to marry the sister of Isabel, the Infanta Luisa. This was unacceptable to England, which saw in the proposal a closer union between Spain and France. There were two other possible candidates for the Queen's hand, the Duc de Trapani of Naples and Don Francisco de Asis, grandson of Don Carlos IV and a first cousin of Isabel. There was a considerable group in Spain which fa-

¹² Quoted in Emilio Castelar, *Cuestiones políticas y sociales* (Madrid, 1870), Vol. III.

¹³ *Ibid.*, III, 158.

vored the Queen's marriage to Leopold of Coburg but France remained insistent in opposition to him, thinking that his candidature meant decided English influence at Madrid. Don Enrique proved unacceptable to the Queen, while considerable objection was voiced to Don Fernando, who was popularly considered to be impotent. The Coburg candidacy was advancing rapidly until Viscount Palmerston, the English Foreign Minister, unfortunately mentioned Leopold as one of the possible candidates in a note to the French Minister, Guizot. This reawakened the suspicions of France, lulled by the frankness of Lord Aberdeen, Palmerston's predecessor and the French Minister at Madrid, Comte Bresson, assured María Cristina that a simultaneous marriage would be agreeable to France, if Isabel married Don Francisco and Luisa married Montpensier. It had been agreed between England and France that no effort would be made to secure the marriage between Montpensier and Luisa until Isabel had children. Bresson, fearing that the English were stealing a march, himself stole a march on England.

Bulwer, the English Minister at Madrid, informed Palmerston of the *coup* Bresson had achieved on August 28, 1846: ". . . A council was held of the queen mother's friends who determined to bring matters forthwith to a conclusion. Queen Cristina, I understand, spoke to her daughter and told her she must choose one of two things, either marrying now or deferring the marriage for three or four years. That the Prince of Saxe-Coburg was evidently impossible; that Count Trapani would be dangerous; that Don Enrique had placed himself in a position which rendered the alliance with him out of the question and Her Majesty must either make up her mind to marry her cousin, Don Francisco de Asis, or to abandon for some time the idea of marrying. The Queen, I am told, took some little time to consider, and then decided in favor of her cousin. The ministers were called in, and the drama was concluded."¹⁴

Although Queen Victoria called the arrangement "infamous," the marriages were concluded. Isabel was thus married, at the age of sixteen, to a man who was her first cousin, who was thought impotent, and who had apparently but one ambition in life, that being to see the Pope. The marriage in its effect on Spain was important. Isabel had

¹⁴ A. Debidour, *Histoire Diplomatique de l'Europe* (Paris, 1891), I, 429 ff.; *The Letters of Queen Victoria* (London, 1908), II, 89-107.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

espoused a conservative. She had refused the liberal Don Enrique, who already had veered to the Republican cause. Once again the Spanish crown had failed to anticipate the trend of events; once more Spain had refused to take the path of progress on which the world was marching, toward democracy and responsible government.

Isabel's marriage was unhappy. Madrid soon heard rumors that there were favorites of the Queen, just as there had been of her mother. Soon the King and Queen lived apart and it required the conciliatory approach of Narváez to re-unite them. A German commentator pungently remarked that the "position of the Prince Consort was of a *prince qu'on sort*," and continued: "After five years of married life, Heaven finally blessed this glorious union. Isabel bore a daughter, who was followed by a series of brothers and sisters. Don Francisco de Asis alone was not overjoyed. He was a holy man and knew that the ways of providence surpass understanding. He thanked her for the belated joy and loved 'his' children."¹⁵ The christening ceremonies in the Church of the Atocha did not evoke popular enthusiasm, for it was remarked that the mean-appearing King who looked like "a little boy who has been very well whipped," seated beside the portly Queen, was not the right man in the right place.¹⁶

Twenty years after her marriage, when her days as ruler were nearing their end, when she was ignored by most of Spain, Isabel remained the "personable" Queen Irving had visualized. An English resident in Madrid in 1866 described her thus: "She is exactly like her photographs, except that you must add to them a nose and lips that look as if newly stung by a wasp. She has, however, a frank, pleasing expression, which makes you fancy she must have been comely enough when she was young; and her manners are said to be singularly agreeable, and withal, queenly. Everyone says that after you have been a short time in her company, you forget what she is, in the charm of her manner."¹⁷

Living together in Madrid to satisfy the conventions, in exile later the royal couple lived their lives separately. Isabel retained the semblance of her old life at La Corte, with her mock court and her interest in Spain. Don Francisco lived in his palace at Epinay, near Paris—a

¹⁵ Sigmund Feldmann, *Paris, Gestern und Heut* (Berlin), pp. 60-61.

¹⁶ *La Corte: Letters from Spain* (London, 1868).

¹⁷ *Idem*.



FROM A CONTEMPORARY PRINT

ISABEL DE BORBÓN
QUEEN OF SPAIN

POLITICS AND PRONUNCIAMIENTOS

palace Alfonso XII purchased for him—and continued his royal pursuits to the grave: alternating the greedy reading of the romances of Paul de Kock with making his several hundred clocks strike the hours at will for one who had never sensed Time.

III. THE REVOLUTION OF JULY, 1854

It was the tragedy of Spain that feudalism was succeeded by a species of anarchy.

The movement toward self-government had begun under the most adverse circumstances. Constant intervention in politics on the part of the army, frequent ministerial changes, petty meddling with politics by María Cristina, the disgust of the Progressives as manifested in the retrainiento, the non-co-operative attitude of the church toward the new political life, all of these were discouraging factors at the very time when intelligent direction was needed. Sad index to this condition was the frequent promulgations of constitutions, each one designed to satisfy the theory of some party or some individual rather than to serve as a charter for the state. A strong and sympathetic monarch might have directed the confused ambitions of Spaniards in the direction of self-government. Isabel had succeeded an absolute king. She was young, but under the influence of her mother. Whatever hope there might have been of recognition by her of the departure from feudalism was dissipated in her marriage to Don Francisco October 10, 1846. In this Pandora's box victory could lie only in the most astute general.

The era of revolt continued after the marriage. Narváez had been forced to yield the power early in 1848 because of the growing spirit of protest against his rule. Soon thereafter revolts in the widely separated districts of Galicia and Alicante initiated by the Democrats required government troops to suppress them. Shortly after their marriage, Isabel and Francisco disagreed. It was not long until Narváez was compelled to remove the handsome General Serrano from the Palace by naming him captain general of Granada. Another sad chapter was the speculations of María Cristina on the Bourse through the banker José Salamanca. Spain, it would seem, had reached the depth of abnegation under Fernando; but there seemed, as the years continued to unfold, to be no depth to the decadence of Spanish politics.

Although the Revolution of 1830 which swept over France had little reaction in Spain except for the revolt of five hundred emigrés at

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

Vera,¹⁸ the Revolution of 1848 found greater response, although the government at Madrid was not overturned. Republicans in Madrid revolted March 26, 1848. Peasants and townspeople this time, laborers for the most part, cried "Long live the republic!" and "Long live the militia!" General Narváez overcame the revolt after twelve hours of street fighting in which thirty Republicans were killed. At Gerona, near the French frontier, Francisco Ballera met with little response in proclaiming the republic. At Seville May 13, Don Enrique de Borbón, he who had been mentioned as possible bridegroom for Isabel, proclaimed the republic but his appeal failed.¹⁹ A Major Portal was captured in this revolt; on his person were found letters indicating that Bulwer, the English Minister, was in love with Portal's sister. Bulwer was personally unpopular with Narváez, since he had counselled less repression on the part of the Moderates. Narváez availed himself of the Portal incident to give Bulwer his passport, with the request he leave Spain within forty-eight hours, as a protest against interference in Spanish affairs.²⁰

Queen Victoria wrote of the affair that Bulwer "invariably boasted of at least being in the confidence of every conspiracy 'though he was taking care not to be personally mixed up in them'; and after their various failures generally harbored the chief actors in his house under the plea of humanity. At every crisis he gave us to understand that he had to choose between a 'revolution and a palace intrigue' and not long ago only he wrote to Lord Palmerston, that if the monarchy with Montpensier succession was inconvenient to us, he could get up a republic."²¹ Palmerston had written a letter to Bulwer lecturing Isabel on her choice of ministers and Bulwer had shown this to Narváez.

At Alicante the sixteen-year-old Emilio Castelar revealed to companions how powerfully influenced he had been by Lamartine. Varragnac, a modern biographer of the great tribune, relates how Castelar with several companions was walking beside the sea, reading a memorandum of Lamartine, then Minister of Foreign Affairs in the new French Republic. Castelar turned to his companions and exclaimed:

¹⁸Antonio del Riego, *Dos años y un Día: El Gran plan*, memoria histórica-política (Madrid, 1864), p. 25. Riego was a nephew of Rafael del Riego, the popular leader of 1820.

¹⁹Rodríguez-Solís, *op. cit.*, II, 395.

²⁰*Spaniens Versassungskampf*, p. 27.

²¹*Letters*, II, 175.

POLITICS AND PRONUNCIAMIENTOS

"You may think I am foolish, but I feel that it will fall to my lot to announce the advent of the republic in Spain!"²²

In the preface to a Republican catechism issued by Fernando Garrido in 1865, Castelar described the effect of the Revolution upon his spirit: "The Revolution of 1848, that happy song of liberty, which had aroused all sleeping peoples, which had revived oppressed lives, resounded in my child's heart with such delightful harmony, that, inclined by education and by the sentiment of my religious ideas, without having known any other world than the horizon which surrounded the delightful valley where I spent my youth, I became passionately fond of democracy, thinking always to see in it the realization of the Gospel."²³

Of far greater significance than revolt in the field of politics was the opening of the first railway line in Spain, in October, 1848. It was a short line skirting the Catalanian coast from Barcelona to Mataro. The development of the railway system—principally from Barcelona—gave great impetus to the industrial revolution which had begun in Spain around 1840. The great seaport of Barcelona where coal could be brought cheaply became the industrial center of Spain. Catalonia, with its active population, developed the cotton weaving and manufacturing industries.

The geography of the peninsula explains in part why a great highway system had never been developed in Spain. There were post-roads, as well as roads improved by the church. In the south of the peninsula, the use of roads was endangered by bandits. The establishment in 1840 of the Civil Guard by Narváez improved the safety of travel but it was the railroad system, exploited principally by English capital, which really made Spain a part of the modern world.

The development of the railway system was from Barcelona rather than from Madrid, the capital. Many ambitious projects were laid out for foreign capital to invest in, resulting in many scandals due either to faulty estimates of the amount of money required to complete the work or faulty surveying. Despite the cost and the engineering problems encountered in the Spanish plateaus, by 1860 the railway line from Irun on the French frontier to Madrid was virtually com-

²² E. Varagnac, *Un Grand Espagnol, Apôtre du droit des peuples, Emilio Castelar* (Paris, 1920), p. 13.

²³ Castelar's *Prólogo* to Fernando Garrido, *La República democrática federal universal* (7th ed., Barcelona, 1868).

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

pleted. Another line connected Madrid with the Mediterranean sea-coast at Alicante. A branch line connected with this latter railway, joining it with Toledo, while yet another branch was under construction from it at Almansa to Valencia. Córdoba and Seville were joined by a railway. From Barcelona ran a growing network of lines: to Arenys del Mar; to Mantorell; to Granollers, joining the post-road that led to France; to Manresa, joining the post-road that led to Saragossa. The first section of the line from Tarragona to Lérida was in operation, ending at Montblanch. In the North a railway led from Alar to Santander, complete except for fifty-three kilometers. Another line, the start towards Saragossa, led from Madrid to Guadalajara. A short line was in operation from Langreo to Gijón. Under construction and nearing completion was the coastal line from Valencia to Tarragona and from Saragossa to Guadalajara. The Madrid-Portuguese line was projected, taking the Madrid-Alicante route to Alcázar de San Juan and from there to Badajoz.²⁴

Barcelona had no railway contact in 1860 with the French frontier or with Madrid. The capital, too, was isolated from a great part of the Kingdom.

While Spain was beginning to have an industrial life, the unfavorable trade balance between exports and imports remained to hamper the Spanish budget and it was not until the twentieth century that Spain's exports began to exceed its imports.

Agriculture continued to be the dominant occupation of the average Spaniard. The problems of the farmer were many, particularly the need of modern machinery, accessible credit, and smaller farms. Practically all agriculture was dependent upon irrigation and little improvement in irrigation methods had been made over those left by the intelligent Moors.²⁵ Once the farmer had produced his crop, he found it difficult to send it to market due to the undeveloped roads. Agricultural development was at its height in the South. In all of Spain it was hampered by the great number of estates which were not developed. It was not until the Republican era of 1873 that attention was paid to the need of increasing the number of independent farmers, as well as to obtain better distribution of the farmer's crops. As it was,

²⁴ A. Germond de Lavigne, *Itinéraire de l'Espagne et du Portugal* (Paris, 1859), p. xxiii.

²⁵ For a view of the modern progress of irrigation, see M. Lorenzo Pardo, *La Confederación del Ebro, nueva política hidráulica* (Madrid: C.I.A.P., 1930).

POLITICS AND PRONUNCIAMIENTOS

the wheat raised in Castile rarely found its way to Andalusia, there to be exchanged for rice and other staples.

The concentration of manufacturing in Catalonia brought in a new class, the skilled laborer. And with the laborer came the question of labor organizations, shorter hours of work (the ten and twelve hour day were the rule for children and adults), higher wages and improved working conditions. Children of tender age were permitted to work without proper safeguards—as well as little effort being made to educate them—and wages rarely rose above a peseta or two a day for workers.

Three years after the movement of 1848 the first junta of the Democratic party was founded. Nicolás María Rivero called a meeting of Democrats in 1851 to organize a directive junta of the party. In this same year the number of Democrats in the Cortes increased to four.

Isabel's affairs were growing worse. Cabrera had pronounced for the Conde de Montemolin soon after the marriage of the Queen with Don Francisco. Don Carlos V had abdicated his rights to the throne in 1845 and he was succeeded as Pretender by his eldest son, Don Carlos VI (born in 1818, died in 1861), the Conde de Montemolin. The new Carlista revolt was crushed by the constitutionalists in 1848, at almost the same time that Don Carlos VII, son of Don Juan de Borbón, brother of Don Carlos V, was born at Laibach.²⁶ Don Juan was unpopular with the Carlistas because of his liberal sympathies and was forced to renounce his rights on the deaths of Don Carlos VI and his brother Don Fernando in 1861. Narváez in 1849 heeded the appeal of Pope Pius IX, then at Gaeta whither he had fled after the rapid progress of liberalism in the Eternal City, to proceed against the Roman Republic. Spain sent troops to maintain the principles of temporal power of the Pope and to aid a Pope who in the later years of his life did great harm to the progress of liberal thought in Europe. Narváez found himself more and more in disagreement with María Cristina who exercised great influence at Court. The queen mother took advantage of a quarrel in 1850 between Narváez and Bravo Murillo, a reactionary Moderate in the Ministry, to break Narváez's power. Isabel hesitated to dismiss Narváez, whom she personally liked. Narváez insisted on resigning and threatened to kill himself if his request

²⁶ March 30, 1848.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

was not granted. Isabel agreed and parted with him in tears. On January 15, 1851 Narváez left Madrid. Bravo Murillo, who, like González Brabo, had been a constitutionalist at one time, became Prime Minister and introduced an era of even greater reaction than Spain had known under Narváez.²⁷

More and more the resentment of the liberals was being transferred to the Queen. An attempt had been made May 4, 1847 to assassinate her and on February 2, 1852, on the occasion of the christening of her daughter Isabel (a child had been born to her dead in 1850²⁸) she narrowly escaped death. The sixty-year-old priest Merino stabbed her. An eye-witness described the scene:

"The Queen was leaving the royal chapel, at the head of the grand staircase, her face beaming with happiness. . . . Her dress was truly gorgeous; but it was easy to see that, under her royal robes, her heart was beating with maternal feeling, and with no sentiment of gratified vanity. Yet at the moment when the miserable suppliant [Merino] approached, and kneeling down, tendered her a petition, she stretched out her hand to receive it. It was like a flash of lightning. The whole passed in a moment. She was seen to put her hand to her heart, stagger to the wall, and all who were near her could see the blood flowing from the wound. The first words she spoke were 'My child, my Isabel!' . . . Swords were drawn. The murderer was seized in a moment, and with difficulty saved from instantly being torn to pieces.

"I saw him led to execution, commenting upon various indifferent matters as he went along, observing, for instance, that a church was off the perpendicular and was unsafe. He expressed no regret for his crime but much surprise upon learning that the blow had not been fatal. . . . The executioner refused to perform the office [of burning the prisoner]—said it was not his business; so several respectable individuals were forced to take it upon themselves. His head, which had fallen off, was kicked, shudderingly, into the flames, and his ashes scattered to the wind."²⁹

The shadows of reaction enveloped Spain deeper. In the Cortes

²⁷ *Spaniens Verfassungskampf*.

²⁸ Another child, born January 5, 1854, lived only three days. *Annual Register* (London, 1854).

²⁹ *The Attaché in Madrid, or Sketches of the Court of Isabella II*, trans. from the German (New York, 1856).

POLITICS AND PRONUNCIAMIENTOS

of 1853 there was scarcely a fourth of the members in the Congreso who were liberals. Bravo Murillo resigned December 14, 1852, after almost two years of the sharpest repression of liberty. Roncali, who succeeded him, resigned April 11. Three days later Lersundi formed a Ministry, in which were some of the Moderates like Martínez de la Rosa, Bermúdez de Castro, a foe of Bravo Murillo, and Egaña, a proselyte of María Cristina. On September 19 the Conde de San Luis, son of a former German officer, formed a Ministry. San Luis inherited a grave quarrel, that over the railway concessions then stirring Spain. There was considerable opposition to granting them to the banker Salamanca who was the financial ally of María Cristina. While this debate was going on Isabel, who had usually been received by cheers, was greeted with hisses on visiting a theater October 18. The Senate rejected the concessions to Salamanca by a vote of 105 to 69 December 9.

The capital continued in a state of foment. Attacks on the *polacos*—those in San Luis's party—especially on Salamanca, gained a wide audience through *El Murciélago* (The Bat), a clandestinely circulated paper. The funereal appearance of the publication, its bitter attacks on the Ministers, attracted much attention. It reiterated the rumors of debasement in economic life. "Any person desiring an office can call at the Department of Public Works, where Don Juan Pérez Galvo will attend him. Notice! The money must be paid beforehand." Thus read one "advertisement." Another: "War Department—Employments, grades, crosses, honors. Apply to Don Saturnino Parra, commissioner of the Sub-Secretary of War, to treat of their price."

San Luis exiled the brothers De la Concha—Don Manuel and Don José—to the Balearic Islands and General O'Donnell to the Canary Islands. He deported Serrano, González Brabo and others, narrowing the list of those on whom the Queen might call in an emergency.

Saragossa and Catalonia pronounced against the government. Disorder increased in Madrid. The government had added to the discontent by ordering the destruction of several old buildings on the Puerta del Sol in Madrid, one of which had a clock. The Madrileños resented the disturbance of their habits ("Can one be expected to be pulling out his watch all the time?"). June 28, 1854, O'Donnell pronounced against the government.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

As early as February, 1854, O'Donnell had planned a pronunciamiento but it proved premature, the plot being discovered and the Democratic committee who were part of the conspiracy being surprised in a meeting, some of the best known Democrats like Rivero, Francisco Salmerón and others being imprisoned.

O'Donnell issued a manifesto from Manzanares July 7 which insured the success of the revolt he had initiated. This manifesto, which was partly the work of Antonio Cánovas del Castillo, who was chiefly instrumental in the restoration of Alfonso XII in 1874, declared:

*"We want the conservation of the throne, but without the camarilla which dishonors it; we want the rigorous enforcement of the fundamental laws, the betterment, above all, of the electoral and press laws; we seek to rescue the people from the centralization which devours them, giving them the local independence necessary to conserve and to increase their rightful interests, and as a guarantee of all of this, we desire and shall establish the national militia."*³⁰

The Declaration of Manzanares brought the throne a step nearer its destruction and quickened the progress of the revolt O'Donnell had begun at Vilcalvero. The July Revolution radically changed the course of Spanish politics. With it began the ceaseless agitation culminating in the Revolution of September, 1868. O'Donnell was inclined to look with favor on liberal institutions, and the Unión Liberal, composed of Progressives and Moderates who did not wholly subscribe to the policies of their respective parties, was the heir to the Program of Manzanares. At one time O'Donnell had advanced so far into liberal fields that he told his friend and fellow conspirator Angel Fernández de los Rios, "We risk our heads, and if it is necessary, we shall go as far as a republic." Rivero once declared that the Democratic party should erect a monument to O'Donnell as its true founder.

The Hymn of Riego could be heard on the streets of Madrid. The night of July 16 crowds formed on the streets and here and there arose the doleful cries of "Death to Cristina!", "Death to San Luis!" and "Death to the robbers!"

A fire was kindled in front of the postoffice, where the government offices were; in the Calle Mayor arms were taken from the palace of

³⁰ Fernández de los Rios, *op. cit.*; *Spaniens Verfassungskampf*; Fernando Garrido, *Historia del Reinado del último Borbón de España* (Barcelona, 1869), Vol. III; *The Attaché*.

POLITICS AND PRONUNCIAMIENTOS

the Civil Governor; the home of San Luis and the banker Salamanca on the Prado were broken into and the occupants forced to flee; the palace of María Cristina was wrecked.

It was a state of siege.

San Luis resigned on the eighteenth. The Duque de Rivas, named his successor, also resigned. Barricades were everywhere.

Isabel, in despair, was tempted for a moment to abdicate. Then she called on Espartero, despite the warning of her mother that doing so meant she would lose the throne within three months. The *Gaceta de Madrid* announced Rivas's resignation and the appointment of Espartero. The threats of The Bat against the dynasty were repeated openly. The *Diario Español* proposed as one of the questions facing the Cortes to convene, whether the Bourbons were to be retained as the reigning family or whether Dom Pedro V of Portugal should be called to the throne.

The magic name of Espartero swept away the resentment of the moment. The barricades remained but the Madrileños turned to the dance.

Isabel II was still the Queen of Spain. And it was largely by the grace of God.

CHAPTER THREE

THE FORMULA OF PROGRESS

I. THE NEW APOSTLE OF REPUBLICANISM

THE Democratic idea is not bloodthirsty, for on its banner is written the abolition of the death penalty. It is not destructive, because it wants to harmonize all interests and to realize all rights; it is not a friend of disputes and of insurrections, because its weapon is reason, its barricade the professor's chair; it is not atheistic, because its ideal is Jesus Christ, its object to realize the thought of God on earth."¹

Few persons in Madrid gave serious attention to this exposition of Democratic aspirations in a letter appearing in *La Iberia*, the Progressive newspaper, shortly after the Revolution of July. But it was not long before the twenty-two year old author, Emilio Castelar, was to write his name on the consciousness of Spain.

The Liberal Youth, embracing both Republicans and liberal monarchists, were holding a meeting September 25 in the Teatro de Oriente, as Republicans then called the Royal Theater. The meeting was proceeding slowly and the speakers had not met the expectations of their auditors.

Restless voices imitated the uncertain tones of a young man in the audience, carrying to a crescendo his "Pido la palabra!"

The young man was Castelar. He made his way to the stage. With electric suddenness he sent a thrill through the audience.

"Do you want to know what democracy is? That is what I have come to tell you.

"When an idea as noble and as grand as ours penetrates the conscience, it has the power to illuminate the truth far into the future. Rousseau and Kant are its prophets; Mirabeau and Vergniard are its priests; Hoche and Napoleon its soldiers. But when an idea, cursed by God, is imposed on an unwilling people, its symbols are called

¹ Miguel Morayta, *Juventud de Castelar* (Madrid, 1901), p. 43; Gines Alberola, *Semblanza de Castelar* (Madrid, 1905), p. 35.

THE FORMULA OF PROGRESS

Carlos IV, Fernando VII, María Cristina, Fernando of Naples and Napoleon III.

"Only the Democratic party is able to raise our glorious revolution to the summit."²

Here his speech was interrupted by a tremendous burst of applause and by demands to know his name. At the conclusion of the address he was acclaimed by the crowd and escorted to his home. By a single oratorical triumph Castelar had become famous. The next morning newspapers carried full accounts of his speech. His name was mentioned in every drawing-room. Isabel called him to the Palace to win him over to the royalist cause but he would not compromise his principles. He proudly told the Queen that he was a Republican and "I told her with all respect and urbanity the fate which was going to befall her dynasty."³ He refused the offer of the Ministry to send him to school in Germany; and in a letter to his mother explained why:

"The other day I held in my hands the fortune of all of our family and I renounced it to remain true to my conscience. You, who are virtue itself, will understand my conduct."

"On the day following my speech a colonel or aide de camp presented himself in the home of Miguel [Castelar's uncle], telling me to be at the Ministry of Finance at 9:30. I went, and, in effect, at my name all of the doors opened. . . ."

"Luján, Santa Cruz and Collado entered immediately."

"Luján told me: 'Wanting to give you a proof of appreciation, the government has decided to send you to Germany to study, with fifty thousand reales as a pension.'"

"I replied: 'I cannot accept this honor, for it would be believed that my speech was a memorial and that I had sold my conscience.'"

"'Accept the gift from me, then,' Collado added. 'I am not Rothschild but I have enough to send you to Germany. Take it, not from the minister but from the man himself.'"

"'I am not able to distinguish the man from the minister.'"

"'Then ask it for your family.'"

"'My family is poor but I want nothing for it!'"⁴

The interview lasted two hours. Castelar refused the urgent re-

² Castelar, *Fragmentas de sus obras* (Madrid, 1899), p. 10; Morayta, *op. cit.*, p. 52.

³ Castelar, *Discursos políticos dentro y fuera del Parlamento en los Años de 1871 á 1873* (Madrid, 1873), p. 44.

⁴ Alberola, *op. cit.*, pp. 38-40. Alberola was for several years Castelar's secretary.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

quest to visit Espartero. The one Spaniard who might have saved the monarchy had remained true to his convictions. And, though Castelar revealed himself devoid of humor and naïve, it was a hopeful sign of the future: Here was a young man who refused to sell himself, who sought no place, who stood out from the throng of place hunters that crowded La Corte. Castelar was proud of the achievement of his address. In his Autobiography Castelar says with that entire absence of humor which characterized him: "His speech was not only applauded, it was acclaimed. From the first to the last words a tempest of enthusiasm followed him. The next day the press of all parties placed him among the great orators and *La España*, a literary paper of the Moderate party, said: 'He is destined to replace all our great orators, and to replace them with advantage.'"

The same Spain which greeted Isabel with silence, which cried death to her mother, acclaimed this young man. Well might the Queen talk with him, seek to win him to her wanning cause. For, as the years soon were to prove, Castelar was one of the greatest political figures in modern Spain, as well as one of the greatest of Spaniards. He has always been the subject of violent debate, both in Spain and abroad. *The Nation* of New York which sympathized with him during his tortuous direction of the Republic could not resist affirming that he "is one of a large band of Latin politicians, upon whom the sound of their own phrases seems to act as a kind of laughing gas."⁵ A German Carlista sympathizer called him "the endless gossip."⁶ The French critic Taine asked disdainfully, "Is this the Spanish canary?"⁷ Castelar's vanity early infuriated his contemporaries. *El Padre Cobos*, the Moderate satirical paper, observed shortly after his famous address that "from his publications one deduces only that he is the partisan of Don Emilio Castelar in religion, in politics and in loves."⁸ Thiers, who as President of France appreciated the presence of Castelar in the high Republican councils, called Castelar "the great doctor of democracy."⁹ Joaquín Martín de Olías observed that Castelar's history "is

⁵ *The Nation* (New York, February 20, 1873).

⁶ Adalbert Huhn, *Der Kampf in Spanien und seine Bedeutung* (Munich, 1875), p. 11.

⁷ Rubén Darío, *Castelar* (Madrid), p. 15.

⁸ *El Padre Cobos* (Madrid, January 5, 1855).

⁹ Morayta, *op. cit.*, p. 80.



FROM A CONTEMPORARY PRINT

EMILIO CASTELAR Y RIPOLL
FOURTH PRESIDENT OF THE EXECUTIVE POWER

THE FORMULA OF PROGRESS

the history of democracy in our country.”¹⁰ Almost all contemporaries who heard him speak considered him the greatest orator of the world. Vasali, who heard him in 1866, called him the Spanish Cicero “whom I do not hesitate to qualify personally as the first orator of the world.”¹¹ Castelar himself agreed with this friendly judgment, stating in his Autobiography: “Emilio Castelar is acclaimed as the great orator of our time.” Cañamaque thought that Castelar was the first orator of the world, although not the best parliamentary speaker. “The voice of Castelar, which in the prose of life has a feminine timbre which annoys, is clear, robust, harmonious and equal in the tribune. . . . His face is sympathetic, well proportioned and agreeable. Several inches more of stature is all that he lacks.”¹² Castelar worshipped that fatal word, honor—a word which has cost Spain more than any other in her language. His speeches consequently were prolix as James Russell Lowell observed: “Señor Castelar is no doubt more eloquent [than Cánovas del Castillo]; but his speeches always, in my judgment, obscure his subject with a rainbow-tinted mist, through which the most familiar objects look strangely unreal. His principles of action (I might almost call them principles of diction) have always, like the goddesses of Homer, a convenient cloud into which they withdraw at need from mortal apprehension. But if the use of speech be to move men rather than to persuade them, he is, I am ready to believe, the greatest of contemporary orators. . . . He says many sensible, many wise things, but they seem with him rather acquired than intuitive.”¹³

The creators of the Revolution of July were patriots in their way. But their patriotism lacked the selfish intensity of Castelar's. Castelar early made republicanism a mission of patriotism. In a speech before the Cortes in 1871 he declared his passionate admiration of his country in a fervid burst of oratory: “The love of the fatherland is fused with all the loves of our existence. But, when that country is the Spanish nation, that nation proud of its liberty, that nation which has seen with horror the name of Sagunto replaced by that of a stranger, that nation which conquered Charlemagne, the greatest warrior of

¹⁰ J. Martín de Olías, *Políticas contemporáneas*, Vol. I: *Emilio Castelar* (Madrid, 1876), p. 9.

¹¹ Vasali, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

¹² Francisco Cañamaque, *Los oradores de 1869* (Madrid, 1879), p. 51.

¹³ Lowell, *op. cit.*, pp. 29-30.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

the Middle Ages at Roncevalles; which vanquished Francis I, the greatest leader of the Renaissance, at Pavía; which conquered Napoleon, the great general of modern times, at Bailen and Talavera; the glory of that nation cannot be restrained by space, for it has a genius like God, a creative force capable of launching a new world into the oceanic solitudes."¹⁴ "I want to be a Spaniard and only a Spaniard," he told the Republican Cortes.

Most of the Spanish generals and political leaders of 1854 and later believed in extra-legal means of attaining political change. Castelar, on the contrary, was one of the few Spanish statesmen who refused to leave the path of legality in government. In the troubled history of Spain in the nineteenth century, two names stand singularly free from the obsession of appealing to arms for a settlement of political disputes. These names are those of Don Amadeo of Savoy, elected King of Spain to succeed Isabel, and Castelar.

"Our ills result from two things: The fact that those in power, when they have force, think only of *coups d'état*; and that the people, when they have force at their command, think only of revolutions," Castelar declared. "Here no one thinks of legality."¹⁵ These sentences in truth epitomize the history of Spain in the nineteenth century.

O'Donnell and his friends brought no new philosophy to enrich political life. Castelar and his Republican partisans, on the contrary, were daily contributing to the political wealth of Spain in the form of ideas for regenerating the nation. The greatest contribution of Castelar himself was the advocacy of an intellectual union between Latin America and Spain. He believed that the Spanish were essentially the most democratic race in Europe. This had been remarked by Lowell. "In one respect the Spanish people are better prepared for a republic than might at first be supposed. I mean that republican habits in their intercourse with each other are, and long have been, universal."¹⁶ Castelar was convinced that the mission of the Spanish peoples was to civilize the Latin world. He was the first of the Ibero-Americans who today seek to supplant the United States in influence in South America by an appeal to Latin pride in the spiritual origins of their culture in Spain. *El Sol*, a Madrid newspaper, the leader of the present Ibero-

¹⁴ Castelar, *Discursos políticos*, p. 44.

¹⁵ Castelar, *Discursos parlamentarios y políticos en la Restauración* (Madrid, 1885), I, 56.

¹⁶ Lowell, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

THE FORMULA OF PROGRESS

American movement, suggested February 11, 1924 that America be renamed "Ibero-Latina" as a compliment to Spanish influence in its history.¹⁷

"The Latin race ought to exercise in the new world an apostleship superior to the Anglo-Saxon," Castelar wrote in his *Recuerdos y Esperanzas*. "The reason is simple. An artistic, war-like race, given to discipline and unity, to the concentration of its forces, a race eminently social, the Latin peoples can do much more than the Anglo-Saxons in the New World. Examine the character of this race. It is not humanitarian; its character, its tendencies, its own literature, are eminently local and particular. The Anglo-Saxon does not work for an idea but for commerce. . . . Our work in America is that of preaching, of love, of fraternity."¹⁸

Like O'Donnell, who in 1859 revived Spanish pretensions in Morocco, Castelar believed the war in Africa just, since Spain's mission should be to civilize Africa, just as Russia's should be to civilize Asia. Like many of the Progressives of that time, Castelar was a pan-Iberian. Spain and Portugal "which live under the same sky, two nations which have been the shield of the world against Mohammedanism, should form a single nation . . . if they do not want to be ignored always, and be disdained in the councils of Europe and live, dying under the shadow of the feudal memories of the Middle Ages. . . . Language, geography and history point to union. . . . The world moves toward unity."¹⁹

The generals who had force at their command, the Queen who remained intellectually immobile, the church whose dictum was absolute, were facing a new element in Spain, a foe for which they were no equal, the thinkers. And O'Donnell, who had stirred deeply the uneasy political ferment of the nation with his revolt at Vilcalvero, unwittingly presented the Republicans of Spain with their Rousseau.

II. "THE SAME DOGS"

The Spanish have a proverb describing ministerial and political changes which reveals the debasement of political life: "The same dogs with other collars." O'Donnell was just another general who

¹⁷ For a complete Hispanic-American program in the twentieth century see Rafael Altamira, *España y el programa americanista* (Madrid, Editorial-América).

¹⁸ Castelar, *Recuerdos y Esperanzas* (Madrid, 1880), I, 96.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, I, 50.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

had invoked force to alter the direction of government. His advent marked no progress in eliminating the era of pronunciamientos because he proposed no fundamental change. María Cristina had fled to Portugal and that removed one evil influence in the national life. Espartero arrived in Madrid to become the President of the Council of Ministers. That indicated a trend to parliamentary government. But these were passing incidents.

The elections for the Cortes Constituyentes were relatively free and the Democrats, as a result, found themselves with twenty-one Deputies in the Congreso. The Cortes met November 8, 1854 to begin consideration of another constitution for the nation. Most significant feature of this Cortes was the proposal of a resolution declaring the base of the political structure of Spain to be the Bourbon dynasty as represented by Doña Isabel. It was the first confession of the royalists that the institution of monarchy was in danger. And though the resolution was overwhelmingly approved, there were twenty-one Deputies who voted against it.²⁰ As early as 1854, therefore, the axiom that throne and state were one was given parliamentary challenge.

Despite the debates on the constitution, the liberals held little hope of progress. The Revolution of July, declared Heliodoro del Busto, was nothing more than a "negotiation" and the declaration by the Cortes that the Spanish nation is "eminently monarchical" represented stagnation. "Indeed, in 1833 they said: 'The best form of government for the country is that to which it is accustomed.' Twenty-one years later the same phrase is repeated."²¹ Thus wrote Del Busto in 1856.

These fears were soon proved justified. The Cortes itself was the first in Spain which was modern in spirit. It considered means of improving economic life, of attracting foreign capital in the development of railroads, of aiding agriculture, especially in the construction of the canal of the Ebro and of curbing the power of the church. It created a Constitution which reaffirmed the national sovereignty—which had been fundamental in the Constitution of 1812—and which permitted the private exercise of religion other than the Catholic. The Constitution further abolished the death penalty for political crimes and restored freedom of the press. It forbade imposition of taxes not specified by law. It required the annual meeting of the Cortes and re-es-

²⁰ Rodríguez-Solís, II, 476.

²¹ Del Busto, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

THE FORMULA OF PROGRESS

tablished the national militia which Narváez had disbanded.²² Thus far, Spain was moving toward progress. But O'Donnell and Espartero disagreed. Isabel herself could not bring royal approval to the action of the government in breaking relations with Pope Pius IX who had attacked the new Spanish government with great violence. Throughout 1855 there were Carlista and Republican revolts to disturb public order. These revolts continued in 1856. The Cortes in June that year approved the Constitution of 1856. Fourteen days after the Cortes adjourned, Espartero resigned and O'Donnell formed a new Ministry on July 14. Reaction set in. O'Donnell on September 15 re-established the Constitution of 1845 with certain liberalized modifications and proceeded to undo the work of the Revolution he had initiated. This same year marked the birth of a new political party, the Unión Liberal, composed of the more liberal Moderates and the more conservative Progressives. O'Donnell's Ministry was short-lived for Isabel entrusted the government October 12 to Narváez. The Cortes of 1857 proved to be another "family" congress. The royalists seemed to have regained full control of the destinies of the nation and their position was strengthened greatly by the birth of Don Alfonso, the first male heir of Isabel, on November 28, 1857. Old names reappeared in the ministries, the old disagreements flamed anew and O'Donnell found himself entrusted with the government again in 1858.

O'Donnell decided to retaliate against the Riff tribesmen who had been attacking the Spanish coast garrisons in Morocco and October 22, 1859 declared war against the Emperor of Morocco. It was while this campaign was in progress that the story was current in Madrid that the Queen had remarked, apropos of a brilliant O'Donnell victory, "Oh, were I only a man, I would take up arms for my country." "And I, too," added the King Consort. A great victory by General Juan Prim y Prats, the entry in Tetuan, these constituted the principal gains of the Moroccan War which was terminated early in 1860. The war continued the traditional imperialistic policy of Spain, a policy which had done as much as any other factor to cause the permanent cleavage between Mohammedan and Christian.

²² Rodríguez-Solís, II, 479. Figueras declared in the sessions of May, 1855 that the national militia was "a bayonet put at the heart of the monarch to make him respect the Constitution." *El Padre Cobos* (March 25, 1856). This is much like the cry of the Republicans in April, 1931, "Let your vote be an arrow in the heart of the monarchy."

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

III. THE ROAD TO FREEDOM

During these sad years Castelar had served a tutelage on various newspapers, he had broken away from the revolutionary Republicans and he had achieved a notable victory in the competitive examinations for the chair of Professor of Critical and Philosophical History of Spain in the Central University of Madrid. His lectures later in the Ateneo on "Civilization in Europe in the First Five Centuries of Christianity" had brought him into opposition with the neo-Catholics.

Castelar now endeavored to give definite form to the aspirations of the Republicans by the publication in 1858 of his most famous polemical work, *La Fórmula del Progreso*, which still remains the most important single contribution to Republican literature in Spain.²³ It contained the definitive principles of Spanish democracy, as Castelar justly said of it in a speech at Barcelona in 1888. It was a complete exposition of Castelar's theory of democracy—*el Mundo camina á la libertad*—the world moves towards liberty.

"Every age has its formula, its idea. The middle age was the age of aristocracy; the Renaissance was the age of the absolute kings; the space which separates 1789 from 1848, the age of the middle classes; the times which are beginning now are those of justice, of right, the age of Democracy," he wrote.²⁴

The base of political right is universal suffrage. Mankind should be free by natural law. The blind submission of man to man is the complete sacrifice of human personality, he declared, deprecating man's seeming willingness to engage in warfare. "The truth is that one cannot go against the law of nature, against the laws of the conscience."

The theme of the Formula is the progress of the world toward democracy. "Progress is a philosophical and an historical truth. Progress is the constant path of man to liberty. Progress has in every age its formula which tends to liberty. The formula which is the most liberal is the most progressive. The most liberal formula in the nineteenth century is democracy."

The Formula of Progress is stated in twenty propositions, which together formed the complete creed of Spanish republicanism:

²³ Of co-equal importance in the modern period is the Federal Manifesto of Francisco Pi y Margall issued June 22, 1894, on which the Catalan regionalists base many of their demands in the Republic of 1931.

²⁴ Castelar, *La Fórmula del Progreso* (5th ed., Madrid, N. D.), p. ix.

THE FORMULA OF PROGRESS

"Right as the basis of the sovereignty of the people.

"Equality of political rights for all citizens.

"Freedom of the press.

"Liberty of association for all the ends of human activity.

"Universal suffrage.

"The jury.

"Inviolability of the domestic hearth and of human personality.

"Administrative decentralization.

"Autonomy of the municipality and of the province.

"Irremovable public employes.

"The single tax.

"Abolition of all indirect tax.

"Liberty of commerce.

"Freedom of credit.

"Equal consideration and respect for all the manifestations of the human spirit.

"Participation in public life of all classes of citizens.

"Abolition of the death penalty.

"Abolition of conscription, making the militia a true profession for the soldier.

"Abolition of all privileges and privileged jurisdiction.

*"The consecration, in a word, of human responsibility with all its rights and with all its faculties."*²⁵

Thus, by 1858, with scarcely seven years of life, the particularly active group of Republican propagandists had developed for Spain a theory of rights and duties entailed by citizenship conferred on all classes. The Formula is a synthesis of Republican theories, rather than an original contribution on the part of Castelar. Many of the points had long formed the bases of Orense's propaganda: the abolition of conscription; the destruction of the practice of promiscuous employment of public servants; creation of a civil service with secure tenure; liberty of association; universal suffrage and the abolition of the tax on food and indirect taxes through the salt and tobacco monopolies. The Spaniards hated the *octroi* duties so intensely that on the proclamation of the Republic many of the cities of Andalusia abolished even customs duties. The Progressive program of 1848 had demanded religious freedom, trial by jury, irremovable magistrates and free primary

²⁵ *Ibid*, pp. 244-248.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

instruction. Fernando Garrido, one of the most indefatigable Republicans of the Socialistic wing, preached as early as 1847 the benefits of the direct tax which in practice would differ little from the single tax on land advocated by single tax parties of later days. He furthermore had insisted on the freedom of trade, accessibility of credit for all and the right of association by laborers. In fact, Garrido was one of the first Spaniards to sense the new obligations imposed by the industrial revolution then going on in Spain, particularly in Catalonia. During an exile in England he had become acquainted with Robert Owen and on his return to Spain introduced the co-operative movement which met with considerable success. Garrido's son, Isidoro Garrido, is the leader of the modern single taxers of Spain. To Pí y Margall and Orense is due the demand for the abolition of the death penalty. The demand for the abolition of the *fueros* or privileges of the Basque Provinces came from the southern Provinces of Andalusia, Valencia and Catalonia, where republicanism was gaining strength rapidly. The early Republican propagandists shrewdly appealed to the popular prejudices in the matter of privileges and taxes in their programs, and as a result they early began to win over the South.

Castelar, however, while adopting the major Republican policies, introduced into his propaganda the theory of the obligations which the citizen owed the state in return for the rights guaranteed him. In early Republican literature we find many references to the rights but little or no mention of the duties of the citizen. Castelar associated duties with rights. "Every man is obligated by the moral law and by the political law to respect the right in every man," he said in the Formula. Society should punish those who fail to recognize this duty, for its recognition will prevent the people from being converted into tyrants. Man is a rational being and free; therefore he must respect the natural state of man, who, being a rational person, has intelligence, judgment and a conscience, and being free, has desires. He declared for the freedom of man to worship as his conscience dictated. The Progressives attacked this doctrine, saying that democracy is anti-Christian. Castelar denied this, for he held that Christianity is not only a religious truth but also a social truth; democracy is the social realization of Christianity.

"We want to raise the oppressed but not to convert them into oppressors; we want to destroy privilege, but not to hold the privilege in

THE FORMULA OF PROGRESS

our own hand; we want justice for those same persons who have been unjust to us; we want truly to be brothers to those who have called us enemies, and to give freedom to those who have rivetted our manacles." At another time, in February, 1858 Castelar wrote: "In modern history Christianity descended from the skies to give to mankind a consciousness of liberty."

"Duty is the recognition of right in one person as distinct from ourselves," he held. The danger of ignoring the rights of others by not observing the duties of the citizens to the state lay in the fact that in wasting the rights of another, one wasted his own.

And so Castelar kindled a new light in the twilight of the Bourbons.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE RENAISSANCE OF POLITICS

I. THE PROGRESSIVE THEORY

CASTELAR believed that the world is governed by ideas. His trust in the power of ideas was justified in the response his Formula of Progress aroused in the opposition parties. It was during an era of governmental barrenness that the first political debate in modern Spain took place. Theories of government had been enunciated frequently and had been quickly forgotten. Spain had had four distinct constitutions in a half century; it had experimented with representative government and after each such attempt it had returned to a species of absolutism. The Army of Faith, the Serviles, the Exaltados, the Puritans, these parties and bands had disappeared. Surviving each change in government, however, were the Progressives and the Moderates. The former had already begun to face serious danger of disruption in the Democratic wing. The Unión Liberal defection again weakened it. But it was still a political force in 1858. The Moderates most consistently were called upon to govern Spain. Since 1854 they had shared the government with the Unión Liberal. None of the parties had made a serious attempt to justify its position before the electorate, principally because the electorate was largely fictitious. Elections were closely supervised by the party in power, so as to insure the return of a Cortes favorable to it. This fact had led the Progressives into the retraimiento. It had favored the appeal to the army on the part of ambitious generals.

Now, in 1858 and 1859 an intelligent attempt was made to set before Spain the policies by which the various parties sought to govern the nation. The replies to Castelar's attacks brought to the fore the most brilliant partisans of the opposition. Carlos Rubio, the director of the Progressive party newspaper, *La Iberia*, replied for the Progressives with his *La Teoría del Progreso*. Ramón de Campoamor, the Moderate poet, replied for his party in *El Estado* with his *Polémicas con la Democracia*. Gabriel Rodríguez, the economist, Paula Canale-

THE RENAISSANCE OF POLITICS

jas, Juan Valera and other well known contemporary writers participated in the polemics. Castelar replied to them in *La Discusión* with his *Defensa de la Fórmula del Progreso*.

Rubio was a royalist. "The Anglo-Saxon race is essentially anti-monarchical," he wrote later. "The Latin race is essentially monarchical. . . . I want Spain to be a monarchy because the monarchical form appears to me to be more perfect and more democratic than the republican. I am persuaded that it is not possible to establish in Spain or any Latin country a durable republic."¹

In his *La Teoría del Progreso* Rubio disagreed fundamentally with the democracy of Castelar.² He believed the democratic ideas as stated by the Republican were dangerous to the country and likened them to false moneys, of which a simple examination would suffice to show their true value. He did agree with Castelar that socialism was a "system of coercion."

The aims of the Progressive party, he said, were reduced to procuring "*for the people all the liberty possible today and to prepare them so that they may have more liberty tomorrow. Their forms of governing themselves are transitory, because all are for given circumstances; the principle, without doubt, is immutable. This principle is popular sovereignty.*"

"The absolute party, proclaiming divine right, considers the nation, in respect to the monarchy, as in ancient Rome the family was considered in relation to the father: a property.

"The Moderate party, child of absolutism, proclaims the same theory, notwithstanding its denial of divine right, and believes that the king should give the people some liberty, just as some release is given the boiler so that the steam will not burst it.

"The party called Democratic in Spain sustains the theory of right as superior to that of sovereignty, and declares sovereignty impotent by restricting none of the liberties of the individual, except when the individual consents to it; then, for this party, this concession is equivalent to suicide. Deducing the logical consequences of this system a Democrat [Pi y Margall], one of the most illustrious in Spain, declared several years ago in La Reacción y la Revolución, 'I am sov-

¹ Rubio, *Historia filosófica de la revolución española de 1868* (Madrid, 1869), Vol. I.

² Rubio, *La Teoría del Progreso* (Madrid, 1859).

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

ereign; all power is directed against my sovereignty; then I ought to combat all power.'

"The Socialist party likewise in the name of nature, seeks to organize society on the system of coercion and every leader of the sect thinks like Rousseau that society is an immense machine constructed by the legislator. The citizen in this machine is nothing more than a vile and inert material."

Alone of the parties, Rubio claimed, the Progressives proclaimed human sovereignty. "Only the Progressive party is truly liberal." The program of his party he stated thus:

"The legislative power, the origin of all powers, resides in the nation; the division into two chambers cannot be sustained in free governments, saying as it does that one chamber represents the people and the other the throne, because the throne has no right to legislate, since it is no more than a delegation of the people; one chamber ought to represent the upper and lower classes, there being no more than citizens, among whom the most virtuous would be the first."

Though advocating unrestricted suffrage, Rubio thought it would not be practical immediately because the country had been under the heel of the oppressor for so long that unrestricted suffrage might result in the repetition for Spain of the election of a Napoleon III. The press ought to be free. The executive power should be vested in one person, the king. Here Rubio, who agreed in principle with many of Castelar's demands, departed radically from the Democratic views. "A country excessively centralized is like a statue of clay with a head of gold," Rubio admitted. But he did not want to destroy the country by excessive decentralization. "The province is never free to present its soil to a foreign government because the soil does not belong to it, but to the nation." He quoted Guizot as stating that many Italians lamented the republican regime of the Middle Ages in Italy, since all the cities separated and became independent, thus preventing the creation of a great nation. There should be one law for all of the provinces, however. "The intervention of the government in the interior regime of the provinces is like the intervention of the government in the family; and for us, the family hearth is inviolable."

He outlined a program for Spain's foreign relations. "The first step we must take to recover our past greatness is to form one nation with Portugal." Thus Spain could oppose France, which seemed in-

THE RENAISSANCE OF POLITICS

tent on extending its boundaries to the river Ebro. Africa was necessary to the nation in order to form a bulwark for Spanish independence. "We should be friends of France but not satellites and converts, as we have been many times. We should likewise be friends of England, but without forgetting our interests or the key of her Carthaginian policy. In Rome, let us respect the authority of the Holy Father, since we are Christians, but without forgetting that the Kingdom of Christ is not of this earth, that in temporal affairs the Pontificate has no right whatever in Spain."

Rubio replied sharply to Castelar's claim that democracy was not incompatible with Christianity. "Has not Señor Pí y Margall in his *La Reacción y la Revolución* stated that revolution is democracy and that democracy is anarchistic and atheistic? Did not Proudhon in France say to make war on God?"

Rubio went a long way with Castelar on the road of progress. He believed that the monarchical parties had served their purpose for "will it benefit the old man to boast of his youth if he cannot return to it?" Yet the Progressive program differed radically from Castelar's in three respects: The Progressives wanted an hereditary monarchy, which Castelar and the Republicans rejected; the former supported national sovereignty as against the latter's individual sovereignty; and while both Rubio and Castelar agreed on the principle of universal suffrage, Rubio believed that the right to vote should be granted gradually as various classes qualified. Castelar wanted every citizen to go to the polls at once. "Society founded upon the maxims of Señor Castelar will be unjust, will be tyrannical, and will degenerate from the moment in which it does not permit me to do whatever will bring me profit," Rubio predicted. He reduced individual autonomy to this: If a criminal were brought before a magistrate, he could say, 'It may be bad according to your criterion but not according to mine, which tells me it is good.'

II. THE MODERATE CREDO

Chiding Castelar for his "literary republicanism," Campoamor wittily and sarcastically attacked the Democrats and at the same time presented the beliefs of the one political party which has ruled Spain more consistently than any other.³

³ Ramón de Campoamor, *Polémicas con la Democracia*, in *Obras completas* (Madrid, 1901), Vol. II.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

Campoamor did not object to liberals, he said, and in fact would like to see a union of all liberals of a conservative order. He believed in liberty without license. "Moderatism is the expansion of all, absolutely of all, the liberties which can be comprised in the circle of order," he stated. "Between despotism, which tells the people 'Believe or die,' and democracy which advises 'Believe what you want to,' I am for the Moderates who say 'Believe what you ought to.'"

"Señor Castelar," he said, "has written several articles against the absolutists, against all parties except the Democrats; and he has produced naïvely, not without reason, these children of his intelligence which are circulating through the world without a known father. These articles he has collected with the greatest tenderness and, cutting the legs from this, the head from that, adding to them the artificial teeth of another, sewing them together with threads of gold, painting the assembled whole with that indefinable color which is called the blue of the blue sky so that his minutely patched work may not be discovered, he has gracefully made for us this brain child, this political booklet."

Campoamor complained that Castelar treated absolutism as he would the sacristan of a village church. The Republican's assertions regarding the Moderate party were false, he affirmed, and in a man of Castelar's mental powers, imbecile. This was the tone of the debate, the Moderate at one time exclaiming "God give us patience to suffer Señor Castelar!" He lightly referred to Castelar's hopes as "premature omniscience," and declared what his young opponent had need of was what Ordax Avecilla called "morality of reference." Castelar resented the Moderate's method of attack: "Señor Campoamor does not reason in defending his party, he declaims; he does not answer, he insults; and I will not return declamation for declamation, nor insult for insult."

The function of the Moderates was to be the "mean" party—to stand between the Democrats and the absolutists. The latter said: "We want a government of the few." The former demanded government of all. The Moderates stood between these two views, saying "We want a government of the many." Democracy was incompatible with religious unity for where there is a limitation of rights there is no democracy. The church the Moderates were unwilling to give up.

THE RENAISSANCE OF POLITICS

Campoamor attacked the irresponsibility of the Democrats: "Democracy never seeks to study more than the ends of the problem, always rights and never duties; always liberty and never its limitations."

"Having proprietorship, universal suffrage is impossible," he declared. "Thus I, the head of a family, and a proprietor, disinherit my son for voting contrary to my desires." Inequality is a natural law, "With respect to individuals misery is a probable sign of ineptitude; in cities, the grades of poverty infallibly mark the grades of degradation." His program admitted the fraternity of virtue.

Campoamor remarked that it was only in that nation of *nacion-cillas*, the United States—in which Castelar had stated it alone was possible to have liberty—where slavery was possible.

He outlined the Moderate creed:

"The throne as the most active element of progress.

"Sovereignty of the legitimate powers.

"The Catholic religion, which, being the most holy, is the most rational.

"Just as society exercising power guards material order, so the public conscience watches for moral and intellectual harmony.

"Two [legislative] chambers which represent the permanent and transitory interests, which cannot be the echo of momentary preoccupations but of constant opinions.

"The throne decides when both chambers are deadlocked.

"The army is a military order commanded by its grand master, the monarch.

"Complete abolition of all citizens' militias, which are no more than the organization of disorder.

"All of us have the right to comply with our duty; liberty does not consist in doing what one wishes but in doing what one ought.

"Liberty of the individual guaranteed by the force of the state.

"Suffrage of the most capable, with preference to the greater number.

"Between order and liberty, the former is the first; better absolutism which we do not love than anarchy which we detest.

"The aim of democracy being 'to bring the greatest possible happiness to the greatest number,' let us go toward this goal through the monarchy.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

"Gradual reduction of direct taxes and amplification of indirect taxes.

"Politico-administrative centralization which extinguishes the remains of feudalism, creating national unity.

"A system of entailment which obviates the decadence of the aristocracy and which in the future saves society from universal indigence.

"The rule of the rich for the poor in contradistinction to the socialistic school, which tends to establish the authority of the poor against the rich."

Castelar replied in his *Defensa de la Fórmula del Progreso*.⁴ He charged Campoamor with resenting the Formula like a noble of the Middle Ages. Castelar introduced no modification in his beliefs, nor did he contribute any new views. Substantially his ideas on federalism and his philosophical beliefs in the natural rights and duties of man remained unchanged. "The Moderate doctrine," he declared, "is a negation and nothing more than a doctrine. The doctrinaire school denies divine right and human right; it denies reason and history." His religion, he said, taught him three great truths: "The unity of God, the unity of the human species and the moral responsibility of man. The unity of God destroys the tyranny of destiny; the fundamental equality of nature gives the death wound to privilege; human responsibility exalts liberty, makes man the master of his soul and the designer of his life."

Castelar repudiated the Moderate charge that democracy would result in anarchy, because "the laws of democracy are the only ones sure of realization, because the command of all cannot be resisted by one and because minorities voluntarily submit to majorities, who obey the majorities when they themselves are converted into majorities."

Enrique O'Donnell, a nephew of Leopoldo O'Donnell, entered the controversy with a folleto called *La democracia española*,⁵ to which Nemesio Fernández Cuesta replied in his *Vindicación de la democracia española*.⁶ O'Donnell, stating that the Unión Liberal based its policies on the Constitution of 1845, declared that the party would

⁴ Castelar, *Defensa de la Fórmula del Progreso* (Madrid, 1870).

⁵ O'Donnell, *La democracia española* (Madrid, 1858).

⁶ Fernández Cuesta, *Vindicación de la democracia española*, contestación al folleto de D. Enrique O'Donnell (Madrid, 1858).

THE RENAISSANCE OF POLITICS

"make the throne and liberty brothers."⁷ When the Unión Liberal initiated its revolt, the Moderates and Progressives were necessary parties; now, they were no longer needed and would die like flowers after having lived their time.

III. THE SOCIALIST CLEAVAGE

This search for the ideal in government—despotism, aristocracy, democracy—had not revealed any strikingly original contributions to political thought. In reality, as the ages have proved, there is no ideal in government, for, as Grotius truly observed, "Whatever form of government you take, you will never escape all inconvenience." All elements of the state, however, that had a consciousness of progress, were opposed to absolutism as it was manifested under Fernando and Isabel. One voice with a new idea had been raised earlier than Castelar's. It was that of Pí y Margall, the student of Hegel and Krause. Although Krause had been overshadowed in Germany by Hegel, his universal world society had found interested disciples in Spain, partly for their respect for the plan, partly because of their masonic sympathies. Pí proposed as early as 1854 an idea which later was to make Proudhon a world figure, the federal pact. In that year he had published his *La Reacción y la Revolución*, five years before Proudhon advanced the same theory. Not only was the book significant for its reiteration of the federal theory (already advanced in Spain as early as 1833) but for the extraordinary doctrine of individual autonomy:

"A self-contained being is undoubtedly sovereign. Man, then, all men are ungovernable. All power is an absurdity. Every man is a tyrant who subjects another to him. It is more: it is a sacrilege.

*"Between two sovereigns there is no other link than pacts. Authority and sovereignty are contradictory. The social base authority, consequently, should be substituted by the social base contract. Logic demands it."*⁸

As the years advanced this theory of the individual contract as the basis of the state found more and more support among the Republicans, as we shall see in a later chapter on the federal theory. Pí y Margall represented one of the principal cleavages in the new Republican

⁷ O'Donnell, *La Unión Liberal*, su pasado, su presente, y su porvenir (Madrid, 1864), p. 5.

⁸ Quoted from Chapter Seven by Pablo Correa y Zafrilla, "Biografía política del Sr. Pí y Margall," in *La Federación* (Madrid, 1880), p. 13.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

party, in that he was a Republican Federalist and a Republican Socialist. Orense and Castelar were Federalists and Individualists. Very soon, the debate between the Socialists and the Individualists assumed greater importance than a mere polemic.

The Socialists of Spain at this period represented more of a compromise between the bourgeoisie and the intransigent Socialists than adherence to purely Marxian doctrines. All of the Republicans, whether Socialist or Individualist, sought to improve the condition of labor. The former regarded the fourth estate as composed of proletarians. The latter contented themselves with working for the right of the labor unions, which had already begun to be of importance. The first important union had been formed in Barcelona in 1840, consisting of cotton weavers. The first strike was in Barcelona in 1854, at the very time that O'Donnell was pronouncing. The strike of 1855 attracted the attention of the Cortes, which proposed the establishment of mixed juries to arbitrate labor troubles.⁹

"The workman, the eternal victim of society, made master of his actions and secure in his rights by means of free association through the emancipation of his will and of his conscience, will be able to have more work, more pleasures in life and a more assured future," Castelar declared in his program issued in 1859. Capital is a producing element; the work of human beings is likewise capital, he rightly declared.¹⁰

Fernando Garrido, the leader of the co-operative movement, expressed the tenets of the Socialists concisely:

"The productive classes are the support of society, they are society itself, therefore, without them, there would be no society possible.

"Today there are no slaves or serfs but there are proletarians who work and waste away, who are born, live and die in misery, slaves of the first master who offers them a chance.

"It is necessary that the working classes whom this great revolution ought to emancipate gain a knowledge of their rights.

"It is indispensable that the public be instructed. Education is the condition necessary for political emancipation as it is of social emancipation.

⁹ Address of Pi y Margall in debate on the Internationale, quoted in *Legalidad de la Internacional* (Madrid, 1871).

¹⁰ Castelar, *Recuerdos y Esperanzas*, I, 121.

THE RENAISSANCE OF POLITICS

"Without the conquest of their political rights the working classes will not conquer any of their social rights. Their political rights they will have to conquer with their virtues, with their unions, with their valor; that is the only way of winning them."

The rights of man are not respected because *"the people groan under the yoke of kings and priests who live to exploit their misery and ignorance."*¹¹

Orense engaged Garrido in debate on the question of socialism and for a while the polemics threatened to divide the party. Pí thereupon issued in 1860 his "Declaration of the Thirty" which stated that all should be considered Democrats who, "whatever their opinions might be in philosophy and in economic or social questions, professed in politics the principle of the human personality or of individual liberties and universal suffrage."¹² Orense signed this statement and Castelar acquiesced and for a time the question was allowed to remain in the background. The Individualists were not satisfied and sought under Castelar's leadership to break away from the Socialists.

When Castelar issued the prospectus on December 1, 1863 for his first independent journalistic adventure, *La Democracia*, he announced a dual purpose, to combat the dynasty and socialism. He was opposed to socialism throughout his life. "The word socialism signifies nothing more than distrust of the means and processes of liberty," he wrote in his *Historia del Movimiento Republicano*. Castelar believed that socialism tended to Caesarism, to coercion of the conscience, but his fundamental objection to it arose from his belief in its "secular pretension to violate liberty and to be a formula superior to democracy . . . for we belong to a race which has sacrificed always its liberty on the altar of social unity." In his prospectus he declared that the emancipation of the laborer could be obtained without wounding the right of the individual. "Property and labor are two correlative terms and are indispensable in every society," he said. In the same prospectus he declared that the "laborer ought to believe that liberty will better his social condition."¹³

Holding these views Castelar readily entered into combat with Pí,

¹¹ Garrido, *La República democrática federal universal* (7th ed., Barcelona, 1868), p. 31 ff.

¹² Rodríguez-Solís, II, 490.

¹³ Castelar, *Cuestiones políticas y sociales*, III, 37.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

who, was now directing *La Discusión*, in which newspaper the latter published an article entitled "We Are Socialists." Castelar replied in his newspaper and for several weeks Pí and Castelar carried on an acrid polemical discussion. Pí contended that every man had the right to enjoy the fruits of his labor and said that many of Castelar's theories, such as popular education and public ownership of utilities, were Socialistic. Garrido accused *La Democracia* of being "the candid agent of reaction." *El Pueblo*, the Unitary Republican newspaper directed by Eugenio García Ruiz, assisted Castelar in the polemics but the contest between the two factions never attained greater importance than a test of strength. Castelar's object at this time was to exclude the Socialists from the Democratic Directory and to this end he formed a Democratic Committee from which all Socialists were excluded. Garrido bitterly attacked the formation of this Committee: "The so-called Committee of Madrid has been formed under the influence and stupid management of Señor Don Emilio Castelar, who, very *humble* and *modest* in his appearance, has been for the last ten years a terrible element of discord in our party."¹⁴ The division was only temporary for Chao, Rivero, Figueras and Sorní resigned from the regular Democratic Committee as a result of Castelar's action and issued an appeal to the party, pleading for unity. Pí appeared before the reconstituted Democratic Committee presided over by Orense and in a masterful address pleaded for maintenance of an *entente* on the basis of the Declaration of the Thirty. Pí's proposal was accepted and thus the matter was allowed to stand, Socialists and Individualists working together along with Federalists and Unitarians, all for a republic which each thought would be the Federal, Universal, Socialistic, Democratic republic.

The renaissance of politics promised danger for Isabel. The cleavage between the Socialists and the Individualists promised disaster for the Republicans, her foes.

¹⁴ Garrido, *Historia del Reinado del último Borbón de España*, III, 897-8.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE MAGNANIMOUS GESTURE

I. THE CONTRASTING CAPITALS

SPAIN was moving forward, the Bourbons did not move at all. During this period of political clarification, from 1858 through 1860, Isabel and her mother clung to the old Bourbon principles of depending on the reactionary parties for the government of the nation. Isabel had learned nothing from O'Donnell's pronunciamiento or from the retraimiento of the Progressives. She did not realize that she could not continue to deny the aspirations of the liberals forever without herself paying the penalty for such denial.

In contrast there was promise in the industrial revolution that the feudal-ecclesiastical state might be supplanted by a modern state—that was the promise of the Republicans. Certainly in Barcelona, which with Madrid, was one of the two most important cities of Spain, the new era was finding expression in the rapid expansion of the city's boundaries, despite the continual interference of the central government to prevent it.

Barcelona was a bustling seaport in 1860, eager to expand beyond the walls which bound up its life around the Rambla. Destruction of the walls was urged by every political movement that agitated the province but the government of the Queen always interposed objections. A provisional committee of the government in June, 1843 had decided to destroy all the walls except the sea wall but the government of Madrid had objected. Again in 1845 the project had been broached but again it was vetoed.

The streets of the city were crooked and tortuous and life crowded onto them. Work had been started straightening some of the main thoroughfares while in the new districts that were being built in response to the demands of the growing population the streets were wide and straight, lined with great stores and beautiful residences, with stuccoed fronts and little balconies overlooking the avenues. As today, the Rambla was the center of municipal life; it was lined with two

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

rows of trees and along its wide path extending from the Puerta de Isabel II to the port were many important buildings of the city, like the opera, the lyceum and others. The sea wall vied with the Rambla as a center of concourse.

Much of the new industrial life centered in the adjacent town of Barceloneta where the streets were straight and parallel. It lay to the south of the Plaza de Toros and southeast of Barcelona, beside the port and on the peninsula forming the bay. To the north of Barcelona was another suburb, Gracia, joined with Barcelona by a beautiful tree-lined avenue, the Paseo de Gracia, which began at the Mantorell railway near the Puerta del Angel. Because of the fact that Gracia was located on hills above Barcelona, with pleasant gardens, it was a popular residential section.¹

Madrid, on the other hand, did not provide such a pleasant contrast with the growing Barcelona which endeavored to modernize itself despite the opposition of the central government. It had its great wide streets like the Prado, with its magnificent buildings. But there was also the old Madrid, with ugly buildings and narrow streets. An English resident of Madrid at this time describes the city with considerable bias, but nevertheless much of her description is true:

"It is a marvellous thing to me how Spaniards go boasting as they do that it is the 'Capital of the World,' for some of them must have seen other cities and certainly any third rate town in France or England would put Madrid to the blush if indeed anything Spanish is capable of blushing.

"The only fine building is the Palace. . . . What strikes you most is the slovenly unfinished look of everything [in the Palace]; the great courtyard into which the principal door of the Palace opens is worse paved than any stableyard in a dilapidated house in England, and the heaps of rubbish where the building has ceased, still lie in view of Her Majesty's windows. . . . The streets are all wretchedly paved, but they say it is owing to the extreme dryness of the soil, which prevents any pavement remaining long in good order.

"The Puerta del Sol, of which the Madrileños boast so much, is a large open place in the center of the town, with an immense fountain which is always playing. All the principal streets meet here, and the broad pavements are filled all day and almost all night, by a crowd of

¹ A. Germond de Lavigne, *op. cit.*, pp. 275-278.

THE MAGNANIMOUS GESTURE

idlers. The greater part of one side of this square is taken up by the government offices and the postoffice; they are mill-like-looking places, which have once been stuccoed, but the plaster has peeled off in great patches, so they look like the face of an old doll that has seen much service in a house where brothers abound. The lower part of the walls are covered with advertisements, so that these buildings are by no means ornamental, however useful they may be.

"The streets are narrow, and are always crowded. In some there are respectable shops enough, but in many more they are mere open stalls. . . . The Carrera San Geronimo is, perhaps, the principal street of Madrid. . . . ; it is a fine wide street at the lower end, with trees on each side, and the Congreso de los Diputados stands on the right as you go up towards the town. It is not, however, a very imposing building, with two dilapidated plaster lions sitting at the door, bearing unmistakable marks of past pronunciamientos. These are, however, only keeping the places for marble lions which are coming by-and-by. Inside the Cortes too, I saw nothing much to be admired, except some very beautiful pieces of marble which form the pedestals for the statues of Isabel la Católica and her husband. . . . Every building is colored almost white, and is painfully dazzling in the blazing sun.

"Madrid is a curious mixture of extreme French fashions and semi-civilized ideas; of pomp and glory and squalor. The Spaniards pride themselves on the magnificence of their court. The Queen never goes out without a guard of soldiers, and at least six horses to her carriage, with an empty carriage of respect, also with six horses, behind; and her suite follow in the same style, while a perfect cavalcade of outriders in cocked hats—looking very much like Jack Sheppards—are in attendance. It takes six horses to cart the little Infante's perambulator up to the Retiro. Then again, whenever a royal carriage, whether it be empty or not, passes a barrack, the sentries have to blow a trumpet before it, and the guard turns out. And as Madrid is full of barracks and also full of royal carriages, always driving about some of the hundred and fifty Infantes, aunts and uncles, brothers and sisters, or cousins of their Majesties, the place is in a chronic state of trumpeting, and the guard pass their time for ever turning out and in again."²

² *La Corte: Letters from Spain.*

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

II. "THE OTHER COLLARS"

The close of the African war in the early part of 1860 brought little glory to the monarchy. The Queen herself took more and more direction in the affairs of government. The Revolution of July had early proved that the new political leaders were the same dogs with other collars. It was not long before O'Donnell became distasteful to Isabel.

Foreign affairs occupied the attention principally of the O'Donnell Ministry which had taken office in 1858. After Africa came an internal test with the Carlistas. Don Carlos VI, the Conde de Montemolin, pronounced against Isabel. He and his brother Don Fernando were captured by the Isabelinos in April, 1860, at about the time the Riffian war was ended, and the Pretender as a result renounced his rights to the throne in so far as they would be fomented by an appeal to arms. Both brothers died the following year and soon the third brother, Don Juan, a liberal, was forced to renounce his rights in favor of the young Carlos VII, his son.

O'Donnell in 1861 intervened in Mexico and in Santo Domingo, in the former case with France and England. General Prim was commander of the Spanish forces. He withdrew on discovering the plot to place Maximilian on the throne of Mexico. The Santo Domingo adventure was abandoned three years later. Like all the other projects of the Bourbons during the first three score years of the century, it was a failure. Not a single major undertaking of Spain during this period had been successful—the saddest indictment of the government of the nation the liberals could want.

The Republicans and the Progressives were discontented at the policies of the government which refused them a share in it. The former organized a revolt in 1861. Castelar had taken the leadership in 1858 of the movement to make the Republican party a legal one. The need of secrecy was making the revolutionists within the party near dominant; Castelar was opposed to force as the agent of political reform. "I want an anti-revolutionary democracy," he said later. The division into right and left wings of the Republican party, already discernible as early as 1848, was being accelerated by the repressive conduct of the Moderate and Unionist governments. The manifesto of the National Directory of the Republican party issued February 1, 1858 showed how far to the left the party had moved, for it urged "a

THE MAGNANIMOUS GESTURE

close fraternity with every revolutionary government." The Progressives replied with a manifesto declaring that they were the enemies of anarchy as well as of despotism. The leaders of the left were not happy in their association with the right, as Garrido revealed: "In these days, Castelar, inspired by the necessities and desires of the Republican party, assuaged his ambition for glory and placed the interests of the party in which he worked above his personality."³ Castelar, however, continued working for legal status for the party and at the same time sought to destroy the Progressives. He declared that the Progressive party was "the strongest yesterday and the most completely disorganized today." With the greatest shrewdness he epitomized the weakness of the political system based on generals: "Espantero has desired liberty but has not comprehended it; Narváez has comprehended it but has not desired it; O'Donnell loves nothing."⁴ As a result of the reaction of 1856 a secret society similar to the carbonarios had been formed in several of the southern provinces. It was this society which on June 28, 1861 called on all Republicans at Loja, in the Province of Granada, who were not cowards or "bad Spaniards" to revolt. Loja was the birthplace of Narváez and the leader of the revolt was a Rafael Pérez del Alamo, a Socialist and veterinarian who had been imprisoned several years previously for possessing twenty-five copies of García Ruiz's folleto *La Democracia, el socialismo y el comunismo*. The revolt was significant in that six thousand Republicans responded to the manifesto, although the government had little difficulty suppressing the rebellion.⁵

O'Donnell's foreign policy was criticized severely by the conservatives while his internal policy aroused the hostility of the liberals. The naming of a civilian as Minister of the Navy caused a revolt among naval officers which Isabel supported against O'Donnell, the Queen refusing to accede to his request to prorogue the Cortes. O'Donnell soon was forced to resign and on March 3, 1863 the Marqués de Miraflores formed a Ministry. Miraflores failed to command a majority in the Senate and resigned, being succeeded by Arrazola January 17, 1864. Mon, a Moderate, soon succeeded him, on March 1. The circuit was completed when Narváez on September 16 succeeded

³ Garrido, *Historia del Reinado*, III, 588.

⁴ Castelar, *Recuerdos y Esperanzas*, I, 29-33.

⁵ Rodríguez-Solís, II, 555-558.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

Mon as President of the Council. The same dogs had returned to their accustomed kennels.

It was no surprise, therefore, when the Supreme Junta of the Progressive party decided to abstain from the elections called for the Cortes by Narváez. The Democrats joined in the *retramiento*. The decision had been made following Calvo Asensio's appeal in *La Iberia* to the liberals to refrain from voting as a protest against the government's treatment of the Democratic party in 1863. The Democrats that year had planned to participate in the elections and had sought the government's permission to do so. This was refused by O'Donnell, then Prime Minister, who issued a decree which, by increasing the property qualifications for voters, virtually made it impossible for any liberal party to return its candidates and, as Castelar mournfully observed, it destroyed the effect of the orators of the Democratic party.

Certain Progressives opposed the *retramiento* for they held that their party was defending the Democrats who had no legal status. Prim was of this mind but Olózaga, one of the principal party leaders, early accepted the idea, which appealed to the party as a whole.⁶

Castelar welcomed the *retramiento* as the sole hope of the liberals. Though it might be true, he said, that the opponents of liberal abstention thought that the parties should take their turn in the government, the Moderates would never permit the liberals to come into power. Even if the liberals should appear at the polls, they would be assured only of their permanent minority.

"The Moderates are the lords, we are the slaves; they are the governors, we the opposition," he said.

The abstention from the polls would arouse the people to the evils of one party rule.⁷ It was nothing more than a "liberal revolution," he said. When some of his Republican colleagues urged upon Castelar the fact that the Democrats and the Progressives had nothing in common, he replied that both had a common foe, the Moderates, against whom union alone would be effective.

As a result of the action of the liberals, only one Progressive was elected to the Cortes which met December 22, 1864.

⁶ Ricardo Muñiz, *Apuntes históricos sobre la Revolución de 1868* (Madrid, 1884-6), I, 43; Castelar, *Historia del Movimiento Republicano* (Madrid, 1873), I, 633-637.

⁷ Castelar, *Cuestiones políticas*, I, 143; Andreo Sanchez del Real, *Emilio Castelar* (Barcelona, 1873), p. 123.

THE MAGNANIMOUS GESTURE

III. EL RASGO

Isabel solemnly observed the thirty-first anniversary of her father's death September 29, 1864. She listened to a special sermon in the royal chapel extolling the memory of Fernando VII. A few hours later she read in the Republican newspaper *La Democracia* a bitter attack on her father written by Castelar and called "The Reign of Fernando VII." Her anger rose as she read:

"Thirty-one years ago today this evil king died; this king who has stained our history and who has debased our politics. All these years servile adulation has never ceased. The places where one should hear only the voice of justice overflow with flowers to his depraved memory, as if the incense of adulation could destroy the stench which his loathsome tyranny always exhales."⁸

Madrid, like the Queen, was shocked. In truth, Castelar could write in his *Historia del Movimiento Republicano* that no Spanish ruler heard on the throne what Isabel heard. A royalist newspaper remarked that there "were foul-mouthed orators who would stop at nothing."⁹ Vilarrasa and Gatell, who were Bourbon adherents, declared in their History of the Revolution of September: "This article appeared, not in a clandestine libel but in a Madrid newspaper which circulates in all parts, even reaching the royal chamber. This language, repeated in the cafés, in the casinos, in the barracks, was a sharp attack on Doña Isabel as a Queen and as a woman."¹⁰

Isabel demanded of Narváez that he suppress and censure *La Democracia* but the Minister-President felt he could do nothing at the time because of the threatened retraimiento.

If Isabel was annoyed by the article on her father, she could well be alarmed by the successive articles, for she was now face to face with a new type of foe, a civilian rather than a general, one whose weapon was the cunning word rather than cannon. Members of Castelar's staff decided to write a daily article on some fallen dynasty as an object lesson to the Bourbon dynasty. Castelar himself wrote the first of these, "The Reactionary Dynasties" on October 22. It contained an obvious reference to Isabel in the statement that reactionary dynasties

⁸ Castelar, *op. cit.*, I, 116.

⁹ Sanchez del Real, *op. cit.*, p. 122.

¹⁰ Eduardo María Vilarrasa y José Ildefonso Gatell, *Historia de la Revolución de Setiembre* (Barcelona, 1875), I, 37.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

were succumbing to the progressive spirit of the age. Castelar professed his bitter enmity toward General Narváez who, he said, was a dictator who could not give liberty without destroying himself. "We are incorrigible in our hatred toward General Narváez," he affirmed.¹¹

The government had ignored Castelar's attacks thus far but on the appearance of the article on reactionary dynasties, Alcalá Galiano, Minister of Public Works who was also the Director General of Education, issued a circular to all universities, attacking those who held positions under the government while members of opposition parties seeking to overthrow it. The offending article appeared October 22 and the circular followed October 27. It declared:

"Our government is a constitutional monarchy. Any other system is contrary to the fundamental laws of the state." A professor's private conversation, even if worthy of censure, is outside the jurisdiction of university authorities. However "in the public and solemn acts in which he himself declares opinions boldly and endeavors to extend and propagate them, the teaching of doctrines contrary to the fundamental laws of the state would be provocative, and whoever did so would be worthy of censure."¹²

The government's position was a reasonable one but naturally it did not please Castelar who wrote a letter of protest which he published in his newspaper, declaring that he had conformed to all the laws in his teaching and in the founding of his newspaper. "What laws have I violated in my teaching? or in my newspaper? The government is unable to decide this. The government, placing its capricious interpretations on the laws, says that citizens, fighting in extreme parties, cannot be professors." Castelar said that he was a journalist and a Democrat before he became a professor. "I declare myself guilty of this sublime idea: I am a Democrat. Let the government proceed as it will."¹³

This was a pompous challenge to the government to proceed in its course and remove him. Castelar felt secure in his position because of the tremendous popular appeal which could be called forth were he removed and because he really believed that he had a right to advocate doctrines subversive to the monarchy even though he were an employe

¹¹ Castelar, *Cuestiones políticas*, I, 143; II, 39.

¹² *Narváez y Castelar*, folleto político (Madrid, 1864), pp. 15-17.

¹³ *Idem*, pp. 20-21.

THE MAGNANIMOUS GESTURE

of the monarchy in the University. Castelar used his professor's chair frequently as an agency of Democratic propaganda. He complained that Isabel, as her father had by royal decree declared that the three constitutional years of 1820 to 1823 had not existed, likewise had ignored the existence of the Democrats. "In vain do the Democratic Deputies enter the Cortes, the Democratic newspapers the Palace in Madrid; in vain do very popular professors in the Central University of Madrid publicly express these ideas which inspire an entire generation; for the crown facts are not facts."¹⁴

Castelar called Alcalá Galiano's circular a *coup d'état*, for, if obeyed, many professors would have to resign. Pérez de Montalvan, the Rector of the University, deciding to stand by Castelar, replied to the circular: "If Señor Castelar is dismissed from the University of Madrid, we—and I shall be the first one—will present our resignations. The provincial universities will undoubtedly follow our example."¹⁵

The circular, in addition to its attack on Castelar, was also the government's manifesto that it did not propose to allow the Democratic party to come into the sphere of legality. In the debates that followed Saint Daniel's night which climaxed the controversy with the professors, Orovio, who succeeded Alcalá Galiano as Minister of Public Works on the latter's death April 15, 1865, declared that only Progressives, Moderates and Unionists could become professors, because Democrats had no legal standing.¹⁶

It was Castelar who took the first generous overture of the Bourbons and used it to further their destruction.

The Treasury in its estimates for 1864-65 required a sum of 2,558,-550,840 reales.¹⁷ The Ministry conceived the idea that it would tend to rehabilitate the Queen's waning popularity and at the same time, afford a real help to the Treasury, if they sold part of the royal property.

The effect of the announcement of the Queen's decision to do so was tremendous. Madrid was illuminated. A newspaper suggested that a statue be erected to Isabel. Streets were filled with gay crowds chanting Isabel's praise. Spain's poets wrote laudatory sonnets in her

¹⁴ Castelar, *Historia*, I, 633.

¹⁵ *Narváez y Castelar*, p. 21.

¹⁶ Castelar, *Historia*, I, 657.

¹⁷ Vilarrasa y Gatell, I, 39.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

honor.¹⁸ Narváez on the day the Queen's decision was announced, February 20, 1865, went to the Cortes to ask a vote of thanks.

The Democrats were in despair. "With those rapid transformations of southern peoples, many believed that by this means the Queen had recovered her popularity and with this popularity democracy had lost all hope of its approaching event," Castelar observed.¹⁹

Castelar did not hesitate. Although a threat of expulsion from the University still hung over him, Castelar on February 21, the morning following the royal decree, challenged the right of the Queen to give away property belonging to the people of Spain, in an article called "To Whom Belongs the Royal Patrimony?"

If this article was to arouse dismay in the hearts of the Moderates that of February 26, "The Magnanimous Gesture" (El Rasgo) completely destroyed the good effect of the Queen's action and left the position of the throne more critical than before.

Castelar expressed the view of all liberals who for a decade had insisted on the sale of both church and royal property in order to improve the financial condition of the nation. The Moderates were trying to utilize an idea which the liberal parties had advocated, instead of capitulating and permitting the liberal parties to take office, Castelar charged.

"The royal patrimony is the patrimony of the nation, exclusively of the nation," he stated. He quoted from the history of Spain, both in ancient Castile when the councilors held that the royal patrimony belonged to the nation, and from the Constitution of 1812, which assigned a portion of the land to the king for his use.²⁰

The first article on the Queen's gift was effective but the *coup de grâce* was "El Rasgo" which, as Castelar truly said in his Autobiography, "completely changed public opinion."

"The magnanimous gesture of the patrimony has been nothing

¹⁸ This tribute of verse was collected in *Poesías dedicadas á S. M. La Reina Doña Isabel II al ceder á la nación la mayor parte de su Real Patrimonio* (Madrid, 1865). Typical of the collection was this by Juan Valera:

"Así tu noble acción será fecunda;
Así, en nuevo camino,
España vencedora del destino,
No fuera de sazón será la copia,
Sino rival por la grandeza propia."

¹⁹ Castelar, *Historia*, I, 649.

²⁰ Castelar, *Cuestiones políticas*, I, 148.

THE MAGNANIMOUS GESTURE

more than a daring magnanimous gift against the laws. If it has been a great illegality, it has also been a great disenchantment. The Queen reserves to herself our art treasures, the fertile territories of Aranjuez, El Pardo, La Casa de Campo, La Moncloa, San Lorenzo and other royal property." The *rasgo* was imprudent on the part of the government for the poor people believed that it would obviate the anticipatory tax already announced to meet the heavy budget need, which it could never do.²¹

IV. SAINT DANIEL'S NIGHT

The government could no longer ignore the daring attacks of the young Republican. The seriousness of Castelar's articles arose from the dual nature of his position, being at the same time a university professor and a newspaper editor. The long delayed threat of the circular to the universities was put into execution. The article "El Rasgo" was denounced in the courts for offending the press law and the article itself was submitted to the Rector of the University, who was to present it to the faculty for a vote of censure, as provided by the government's ruling.

Montalvan refused to proceed against Castelar. Instead, he submitted the request of the Ministry to Castelar, who denied the jurisdiction of the University to try him for an offense committed as a citizen. Castelar declared he would appear before a civil court but the University could try him only for an academical fault. Montalvan thereupon replied to the government, saying that the matter was not subject to action of the University. Thus defied, the government published in the *Gaceta de Madrid* the dismissals of the Rector and of the professor and two days later announced the appointment of the obscure Marqués de Zafra as Rector.²²

The governor of the Province of Madrid granted the request of the students to serenade the dismissed Rector, as was customary on the occasion of the retirement of the University head, but the permission was withdrawn almost as soon as granted, the governor contending that the serenade had a political objective. This was on April 8, 1865. The students were not satisfied and wandering groups of them insulted the Civil Guards maintaining order and gave *vivas* for Montalvan. The next day, Sunday, passed without incident but on the tenth, when

²¹ *Ibid.*, I, 209.

²² Castelar, *Historia*, I, 652; Vilarrasa y Gatell, I, 64.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

the Marqués de Zafra took possession of his office, the student movement became a mutiny. Students of all the institutes of Madrid united and passed through the streets, hissing the guards and cheering Montalvan. Narváez then filled the Puerta del Sol with troops. In the evening, as laborers returned from their work, they stopped near the Puerta del Sol, attracted by the mounted guard and the crowd of students. The onlookers, composed principally of workmen, increased in number as the evening advanced, in spite of the plea of Narváez for them to disperse. A group of young workmen provoked a conflict by throwing stones at a mounted guard. Eight persons, none of them students, were killed in the ensuing disorder.²³

Saint Daniel's night proved the downfall of the Narváez Ministry and a step further on the path towards revolution against the Bourbon dynasty. Castelar, the cause in the first instance of the affair, swore "to consecrate my body and soul to destroy a throne which has such small consideration for the blood of Spaniards."²⁴ The Progressives who were members of the Senate returned and Prim, Laserna and others protested against the procedure of the government, and in the Congreso, where the Progressives had no representation, Ríos Rosas of the Unionists attacked the government. In the face of this parliamentary attack Narváez yielded to O'Donnell June 21. Castelar and Montalvan were re-instated in their positions and the royal order on education was allowed to lapse.

O'Donnell sought to bring the Progressives back into the parliamentary system. Many of the party leaders, supported by Rivero and Figueras of the Democrats, favored abandonment of the retrainiento in return for O'Donnell's reduction by half of the qualifications for voters. Castelar and Orense resisted the appeal, believing that by yielding the whole object of the "revolution" would fail. The younger Democrats in the provinces were beginning to look upon abstention as a revolutionary action designed against the dynasty. To abandon it then, Castelar thought, would be tantamount to abandonment of the object desired. "The Democratic party is incompatible with the ancient dynasty," he said. Believing this, Castelar endeavored to win over his party to non-participation in the elections, for in doing so, the Democrats would continue merely being an adjunct to the Progressive party.

²³ Muñiz, *op. cit.*, I, 61-64; *La Corte*.

²⁴ Alberola, *Semblanza de Castelar*, p. 56.

THE MAGNANIMOUS GESTURE

The liberal parties, he rightly observed, had committed themselves to the support of the anti-dynastic party and inevitably found themselves as protagonists of the movement to overthrow the dynasty.²⁵

During the summer of 1865 cholera ravaged many provinces of the nation. Despite this, the Democrats held their first party meeting since 1854, November 5 in the Circo Theater and named a national Committee. Castelar, one of the speakers, laid the repression of liberty at the door of the monarchy. When the Queen herself returned to Madrid after some absence from the capital, she was greeted in silence. *La Democracia* published a pertinent statement from Mirabeau—for which it was denounced by the government: “The silence of the people is a great lesson for kings!”²⁶

That silence was the shroud of the Bourbons.

²⁵ Castelar, *Historia*, I, 710; Garrido, *Historia del Reinado*, III, 1039.

²⁶ Castelar, *Historia*, I, 739.

CHAPTER SIX

FALL OF THE BOURBON DYNASTY

I. THE ALIENATION OF GENERAL PRIM

THE situation of Isabel was indeed foreboding towards the close of 1865. The long demonstrated impossibility of the liberal parties obtaining power had driven them into the retraimiento. Frequent pronunciamientos and frequent ministerial changes, the decadence of national life, the decline of Spain as a world power, the birth of a new industrial civilization with all the problems of the machine age and the new social obligations, the growth of the Republican movement—all these boded little good to the first woman Bourbon ruler. Since 1854, when she had contemplated resigning the throne, Isabel had succeeded in maintaining a semblance of power, thanks to repression. Spain, writhing under that repression, found a new champion.

The return of Prim from the Mexican War, more a popular hero than before, accentuated the outcast condition of the Progressive party. Prim, one of the ablest men Spain produced during the nineteenth century, was a rare combination of aristocrat and democrat, a man whose home was a palace, yet who was at home in a cottage. Brave in battle, brilliant, an able conspirator, he was not opposed to Isabel's dynasty in 1864.¹ Only the futility of Spanish politics drove him into opposition. And with his logical mind, Prim saw that it would be futile to endeavor a regeneration of Spain under Isabel, who had so often failed to achieve the New Spain.

Prim was personally fond of the Queen. He accepted in good faith the offer she had made him through Don Pedro Egaña that free elections should be held in Spain, and so enable the Progressives to come into power. To achieve this end, following the ill-fated Miraflores Ministry—the one which had driven the liberals into their bloodless "revolution" of abstaining from voting—the Moderate Arrazola

¹ Muñiz, *op. cit.*; Vilarrasa y Gatell, *op. cit.*; Castelar, *Historia*; H. Léonardon, *Prim* (Paris, 1901).

FALL OF THE BOURBON DYNASTY

Ministry took office. Its program was to accept Prim's advice and hold elections in which the ballots would be allowed to indicate the real opinion of Spanish voters.

This wise policy was dissipated by one of those capricious circumstances that often foil the best plans. Isabel resigned for a while the government to the King Consort, since she was with child, and during the King's Regency, the banker José Salamanca, through the King's influence, provoked a vote of confidence in the Cortes in the matter of the Alduides railway concession. Arrazola was defeated and was succeeded by Mon, representing O'Donnell. Soon thereafter Narváez became Minister-President.² These events, we will recall, took place in 1864.

Once again the old alternation of power between O'Donnell and Narváez drove home to Prim that he had nothing to hope for in Spanish politics as then constituted. He became a conspirator in the army, winning over to his cause this regiment, then that regiment.

Prim had determined to expel the Bourbons from Spain.

He was the first general to enter the corral which the Bourbons themselves had created by years of abuse of their royal prerogatives. Prim fomented several minor revolts. January 1, 1866 he pronounced against the dynasty but his revolt proved abortive. Prim fled to Portugal and issued a manifesto explaining the delay in executing his revolutionary plans with the statement that "the horse is being shod" and suggesting a closer union with Portugal where some liberals already were looking for a dynastic successor to the Bourbons.

Prim had taken the leadership of the revolutionary Progressives. But it was as an anti-Bourbon, not as one opposed to the institution of monarchy.

Isabel was cognizant of the danger threatening her. She tried to bring Prim back into parliamentary life. Early in February Don Nazario Carriquiri on behalf of the Queen broached this possibility to Don Ricardo Muñiz, Prim's agent in Madrid. Muñiz visited Prim in Paris to acquaint him with this development. The exiled general expressed great suspicion of the *gente palaciega* and of Don Francisco de Asis, the King Consort; nevertheless, he said that details should be arranged by a Progressive Senator of the right and a Progressive Deputy

² Muñiz, I, 40-47.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

of the left. Manuel Cantero and Manuel Ruiz Zorrilla, the Progressives acceptable to him, conferred with Carriquiri and an agreement was reached.

It was agreed that a Moderate ministry acceptable to the Progressives should be named under Lersundi, a Montpensierest Moderate, that an amnesty should be declared, the Cortes dissolved and free elections held in which the Progressives were to participate.

This apparently successful solution to the Progressive revolution brought joy to both Progressive and Moderate representatives who were privy to the conference. But O'Donnell, acquainted of the conference by one of the palace *camarilla*, decided to foil the threatened destruction of the Unionist Ministry; he named Lersundi captain general of Cuba. And, although Lersundi understood that he was to be president of the council of ministers, he accepted the appointment.³

Prim's fears of the palace gentry had been realized. A final diplomatic effort which might have averted military revolt against the dynasty had been vitiated by Isabel's own friends.

The revolutionary spirit had aroused both Progressives and Democrats who were ready to aid Prim in his next attempt on June 22, 1866. The Democrats constituted a junta and formed a liaison with the Progressives through Ruiz Zorrilla.

On the gloomy morning of June 22, the sergeants of the San Gil barracks of the artillery corps in Madrid entered the officers' watch and gave a cry for Prim and for liberty, ordering the officers to surrender. An officer instead fired his revolver at a sergeant. The sergeants retaliated, killing several of their superiors. The rebellion became widespread, General Pierrad, later to be a commander under the Republic, being in charge of the street fighting. The government acted quickly. Narváez, Serrano, O'Donnell and other royalist generals who were present in the capital at the time had control of the situation before the close of day.

A Council of War on September 21 condemned to death in *garrote vil* many of the revolutionary leaders, such as Castelar, Cristino Martos, General Pierrad, Carlos Rubio and others. All escaped to France and England, there to await the consummation of the struggle against the Bourbon dynasty.

³ *Ibid*, I, 108-112.

FALL OF THE BOURBON DYNASTY

II. THE DICTATORSHIP OF GONZÁLEZ BRABO

The revolt of June 22 compelled O'Donnell to yield the Ministry to the ever-faithful Narváez who included in his cabinet the former carbonario Luis González Brabo, a civilian especially distasteful to the Progressives in view of the part he had played in 1843 in unseating the Olózaga Ministry.

González Brabo was a man of great determination and at this time was inflexibly opposed to the threatened revolution, although at one time he had been an enthusiastic adherent of Espartero. Like some of the other bulwarks of the throne, González Brabo was something of a chameleon in politics. His inclusion in the cabinet indicated that the throne was to make a determined and unrelenting resistance to the Progressives.⁴

The Ministry inherited a problem of some delicacy from the O'Donnell Ministry, apart from the disturbed condition of the army and nation as a result of Prim's agitations and Castelar's propaganda. O'Donnell had made a gesture to placate the liberals in the recognition of the Kingdom of Italy. This was not only an insult to the Catholic church, since the Pope was unalterably opposed to the progress of United Italy, but it had repercussions against the House of Bourbon. A United Italy meant the absorption by Piedmont of the Kingdoms of Naples and of Parma, ruled over by Bourbons who were cousins of Isabel II. The Moderates in the Cortes determinedly opposed the recognition O'Donnell proposed. In the words of Aparisi y Guijarro, one of the leading Catholic orators, Spain could not recognize Italy "because a Bourbon, the head of the family, the last of the Bourbons ruling in Europe, Doña Isabel II, Queen of Spain, cannot give the *coup de grâce* to Francisco of Naples." The archbishops and the bishops protested energetically to the Queen. "You should be guided in this negotiation by no policies other than those which are a faithful expression of the Spanish people," the Bishop of Salamanca told the Queen. The politics expressive of the Spanish people in international affairs were "Catholic, which is eminently Spanish," the Bishop added. The Bishop of Zamora hastened to urge Isabel to "save the throne of Your Majesty and your august dynasty, adhering firmly to the throne of Peter, whose foundation has never . . . been undermined by the most furious political tempest. Save the only reigning Bourbon in

⁴ Vilarrasa y Gatell, I, 100-128.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

Europe from the currents that would carry her to ruin." Despite these protests, O'Donnell proceeded with the recognition of Italy.⁵

An Italian visitor to Spain during part of the period of agitation over recognition of the Kingdom illustrated the irony with which the times were filled. Amadeo, Duke of Aosta and youngest son of King Victor Emmanuel of Piedmont, had been considered as a possible choice as consort for one of Isabel's daughters. He visited Isabel at her summer palace September 7, 1865 and dined with the Queen whose throne he himself was to occupy six years later as King of Spain. Amadeo was given to understand that a cousin of Francisco of Naples, Fernando of Tuscany and Roberto of Parma could never marry the son of a King who had dethroned them.⁶

The Narváez-González Brabo Ministry took office July 10, 1866. The message from the throne was reactionary. "In the terrible war of revolution with legitimacy, of force with right, the Holy See symbolizes the cause of right and legitimacy," the Queen's message stated. The Ministry announced a more liberal attitude towards primary education and suggested other reforms in administration and finance.⁷ Under normal conditions, the announced legislative program might have ended as politics in Spain usually ended, merely in a change of ministries. But it was too late now for reform to avail.

Isabel soon suffered two grievous blows which hastened the destruction of her throne. O'Donnell died November 5, 1867 and on April 23 of the following year Narváez succumbed at the age of sixty-seven.

Ramón María Narváez, the Duque de Valencia, personified the strength of the Moderate party. He was loyal to the Queen, although she at times could not conceal her impatience at her dependence on him. He was ever accessible to the call of duty and held office during six ministries. He was a man of great loyalty, first as a soldier—although he had conspired against Espartero—then as a statesman. He gave Spain a great monument, the Civil Guard and the Rural Guard, the surest guarantee of order within the nation. Leopoldo O'Donnell, the Duque de Tetuan, who died at Biarritz at the age of fifty-eight, was a descendant of the celebrated Irish family of the same name which

⁵ *Ibid*, I, 90 ff.; Castelar, *Historia*, I, 707.

⁶ Vilarrasa y Gatell, I, 98.

⁷ *Ibid*, I, 102.

FALL OF THE BOURBON DYNASTY

furnished some distinguished names in several Catholic countries of Europe following the Battle of the Boyne. He was an opportunist in politics, more of a conspirator than Narváez. He gave more serious attention to foreign affairs than any of his contemporaries but in internal affairs permitted reaction to destroy the bright promise of the Revolution of July which he had initiated. Had either Narváez or O'Donnell lived, the story of the last year of Isabel's reign might have been different.

Two lighthouses in the Queen's sea of trouble had been darkened.

On Narváez's death González Brabo accepted the presidency of the Ministry. He explained that there was no one else who could take it. But he precipitated a division in the Moderate ranks, for the Marqués de Miraflores, long loyal to the House of Bourbon, resigned the presidency of the Senate in protest and his letter of explanation, published in *La Epoca*, increased the ferment into which Spain had been thrown by quickly moving events. Miraflores declared that the past history of the Minister-President did not invite Moderate confidence, as indeed it did not.

"We are a government of resistance to every revolutionary tendency," González Brabo stated in his message to the Cortes when his Ministry, which included Marfori, the opera singer favorite of Isabel, as Minister of Overseas, faced the legislature. Brave words, but unfortunately they were uttered by a man who did not command an army. And in Spain that was everything.

An intense pall of reaction hung over the Kingdom. Though some of the Republican leaders were in exile, those remaining in the country were actively in conspiracy, through *centros* in many of the principal cities. Rigorous censorship of the press increased the restive feeling. A bitter challenge to the Queen called "The Last Word" published in the Progressive *La Iberia* contained an invitation to the Unión Liberal to join in revolution as Dulce, a Unionist general, had urged the preceding September.⁸ Indeed, even earlier than September the foes of the Queen had agreed on common principles in conferences in Brussels and Ostend. It was at the latter city on August 16, 1867 that the basis of the liberal coalition to dethrone Isabel was decided. The liberals agreed that after a successful revolution a Cortes Constituyentes should be elected by universal suffrage and that Prim was to

⁸ Muñiz, I, 210, 194.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

be director of the revolution. Orense, Chao and García Ruiz of the Republican party attended the Ostend conference to lend the aid of the party. Dulce of the Unionists was in sympathy with the plan.

The Unionists and the Progressives insisted on the convocation of the Cortes and when González Brabo refused to call it, Serrano, President of the Senate since the resignation of Miraflores and also leader of the Unión Liberal since the death of O'Donnell, and Antonio Ríos Rosas, President of the Congreso, petitioned Isabel to call the Cortes in session.

González Brabo did not trust generals, as well he might not. In spite of this, his action was surprising in ordering the arrest of Serrano, Dulce and other generals high in the Unionist councils after the presentation of the petition. He had the captain general of Madrid search the Congreso and had the arrested generals exiled either to the Canary Islands or to provincial cities. There remained in the hierarchy of generals loyal to the Queen only a mere handful. Not only were the Progressives in open revolt but now the Unión Liberal as well. With most of the leaders of the army alienated, the Ministry courted more enemies, when, confident in the loyalty of Admiral Juan Topete, a favorite officer of the Queen, the Ministry sharply reduced the budget of the navy—another fatal mistake, for the army and navy were political organisms that reacted quickly to any blow aimed at them.

Despite the jealousy Serrano felt towards Prim, the Unionists affiliated themselves with the Ostend Coalitionists. Dulce had already been in communication with Salustiano Olózaga, the first of the Progressive leaders to declare himself anti-dynastic and whose home in Paris proved a center of the disaffected.

Even many of the Moderate leaders as early as May, 1868 believed hopeless the position of the Queen, although González Brabo appeared oblivious to the danger until the very end. Told of the rumor that Topete had been alienated, the Minister dismissed the thought as impossible. As for Prim, was not a spy in the employ of the Spanish Minister in London, where the Conde de Reus then resided, giving daily reports of his movements?

González Brabo soon turned his attention to the Duque de Montpensier, brother-in-law of the Queen, who was suspected of revolutionary sympathies, especially in view of his close connection with the

FALL OF THE BOURBON DYNASTY

Unionists. Reports of conversations held by the Duke with various persons reached the Royal Palace and the Ministry and on July 7 González Brabo ordered the Duke and the Infanta María Luisa to leave Spain, on the ground that their presence was encouraging revolutionary sentiment.

From Portugal the Montpensiers wrote Isabel a denial of the accusations. "We say to you: If unfortunate Spain is passing through difficult situations, which we heartily deplore, we are not the cause of them. . . . When people are agitated, they are afflicted with a critical illness; there are no individuals, nor names sufficiently powerful, to raise the flag of revolt, nor to take it from a nation that has raised it."⁹

The web of revolution was being woven with incredible speed by deft fingers. Montpensier actively aided the movement by courting Unionist generals, whose revolt he intended to finance. Cádiz, Republican in sentiment, was chosen as the point from which the web was to enmesh the Queen. José Paul y Angulo, a revolutionary Republican, became Prim's financial agent in southern Spain. There he expended money, incited the peasantry with Republican sentiment and spread sedition among the sailors.

Early in August Colonel Solís, aide-de-camp to Montpensier, visited Muñiz in Madrid and asked him what the attitude of the Progressive party was to the Duke's candidacy to the throne; adding, 'the attitude of the Unión Liberal is already known.' Muñiz replied, as did other Progressives the Colonel consulted, that his only instruction was to "impel the movement of action," and that nothing had been said as to the successor to the Queen. Muñiz promised to see Prim and bring a report as to his attitude toward the Duke.

Prim, who latterly had been in exile in London, had obtained permission of the Emperor Napoleon to take the waters at Vichy. On his return journey to London, the Marquis de Vallete encountered him at the railway station in Paris. Vallete delivered an important message.

"General," said Vallete, "I have corresponded with the Emperor regarding your conduct in France. After an unknown Spaniard visited you yesterday you left the baths, so vital to you, after only four days. Such action cannot be interpreted in any other way than that a revolution is imminent in Spain. Well then, so be it. The Emperor

⁹ *Ibid.*, I, 218; Vilarrasa y Gatell, I, 80; Castelar, *Historia*, II, 28. Doña María Luisa had advised Isabel to remove González Brabo.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

does not oppose it but demands that the Duque de Montpensier be not proclaimed king. On this condition, he will remain neutral."¹⁰

The "unknown Spaniard" was one of Prim's agents who had come to report that if the revolt could not be started in Andalusia by the ninth of September, the cause was lost.

Vallete's message was Prim's reply to Muñiz's request for an answer to the Duque de Montpensier.

Muñiz arrived in London August 20. There he encountered Praxedes Mateo Sagasta, who was to be the Liberal leader in the Restoration, Ruiz Zorrilla, who was to be King Amadeo's principal minister, and Prim. The latter told Muñiz of his conversation with Vallette and of his promise not to seek the throne for any individual. The revolution, Prim said, would have as its goal a Constituent Cortes and a majority of the Cortes would elect the ruler. This message Muñiz communicated to Solís on his return, assuring the Colonel that the revolting parties were monarchical in principle.

This was not wholly the case. Paul y Angulo was a Republican. To succeed, the revolution had to appeal to the Democratic South. Two of the parties in the movement were monarchical; but the third party was Republican. Paul regarded the final solution in the nature of a betrayal, as did the citizens of Cádiz. "The most important preparatory work of the Revolution of September was done by persons affiliated with the Republican party and they ran all the risks of the conspiracy," Paul complained. "The Progressives with certain exceptions gave us no more aid than timorous sympathy. The Unionists contributed only their distrust and more than once they dissolved the combinations."¹¹

III. THE REVOLUTION OF SEPTEMBER

The expulsion of the Bourbon dynasty had been stated as a goal of the revolution early in 1868 in a manifesto which declared: "We seek the definite, complete and perpetual expulsion of the Bourbon family." The nation should decide on the regime to succeed the Bourbons, Prim's manifesto said. The revolt originally had been planned to take place in June but this was prevented by the arrest of the Unionist generals. Dulce, who had proposed to Muñiz that the

¹⁰ Muñiz, I, 222.

¹¹ Paul y Angulo, *Memorias íntimas de un pronunciamiento* (Madrid), p. 80. Some of the Unionists called Prim a "good-for-nothing" general.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

representative of the people, had been denied; that the financial condition of the country was deplorable and that it was the goal of himself and of his companions to restore the legitimate rights of the people, with the throne functioning around the orbit of the constitution, with a Cortes Constituyentes and with the economic situation stabilized. Topete, a native of Mexico and justly popular in Spain, had fired the first round in the short but decisive Civil War.¹³

Prim the following day, September 18, issued a manifesto addressed to all of Spain: *"To arms, citizens, to arms! Enough of suffering! The patience of peoples has a limit of degradation; and the Spanish nation, which, if at times it has been unfortunate, has never ceased being great, cannot continue resignedly bemoaning its prolonged misfortunes without falling in its degradation."*

"The hour of revolution, then, has sounded; an heroic remedy, it is true, but inevitable and imperious, if the country is to be saved."

"Principles sufficiently liberal to satisfy present necessities and men sufficiently sensible to present and to respect the aspirations of the future would have been able to correct easily, without violent disruption, the transformation of our country; but the persistence in arbitrariness, the obstinacy in evil and the earnestness in immorality which soon penetrates the entire organization of society after having corrupted the government of the state, converting administration into a profit, politics into a market and justice into a form of amazing concealment, unfortunately these have made salutary concessions too late and impossible and have accumulated the tempest that, at this unhappy day, tears down in its current the dikes which have been until now an insuperable barrier to the march, slow yet progressive, that constitutes the life of peoples and that has isolated Spain from the general movement of the civilized nations of the globe."

"Finally, there is among the great communion of liberals nothing other than one proposal, FIGHT; a sole object, VICTORY; a single flag, THE REGENERATION OF THE NATION."¹⁴

Topete moved the fleet into strategic positions the eighteenth.

"Long live the national sovereignty!" cried Prim lustily in response to a few shouts for the Queen from the flagship "Zaragoza."

"Death to all the Bourbons!" cried many of the peasants on the shore.

¹³ Vilarrasa y Gatell, I, 174.

¹⁴ *Ibid*, I, 177.

FALL OF THE BOURBON DYNASTY

Prim's manifesto was subtle; it mentioned the fact that Generals Serrano and Dulce "should be found as I am among these illustrious sailors, who, impelled by the well-being of the nation, have initiated the movement within the national fleet; but an accident at sea, no doubt, has detained them, in spite of their, and my, desire to have them here."

The Unionists had been defeated in their plan to proclaim Montpensier king of Spain.

They accepted the *coup* with good grace. On the nineteenth, Prim and Topete landed in Cádiz. That evening, the Unionist generals landed in the rain from the "Buenaventura." Shortly afterwards they issued a joint manifesto to the nation in which it was promised that the liberals would guard against excesses in accomplishing their end. The manifesto was signed by the Duque de la Torre (Serrano), Juan Prim, Domingo Dulce, Francisco Serrano Bedoya, Ramón Nouvilas, Rafael Primo de Rivera, Antonio Cavallero de Rodas and Juan Topete. This was a celebrated roster of names, the most magical of which was Prim's.

The Revolution spread rapidly. Paul had intended arousing the peasants in the Province to a Republican revolt but the heavy rain at the time and the effective work of the peasants in destroying all the bridges prevented him from doing so. San Fernando, across the bay from Cádiz, joined the movement. Seville followed, a junta demanding the abolition of the death penalty, of conscription and other demands typical of the Republican program. But the Revolution was definitely in the hands of the monarchists. Serrano took command of the army while Prim sailed up the coast to arouse the upper provinces. Serrano readily enlisted an army from the peasants and marched towards Madrid. Pavía, the Marqués de Novaliches, interposed his forces but despite an appeal from Serrano not to cause bloodshed, a battle was had, resulting in a victory for Serrano at the Puente de Alcolea on the Guadalquivir.

This was on September 29. The road to Madrid was clear.

Madrid on that day constituted a revolutionary junta, which issued a succinct manifesto:

"The revolutionary junta of Madrid has associated itself unani-mously with the public's cry which has proclaimed:

"The sovereignty of the nation;

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

"The removal of Doña Isabel de Borbón from the throne of Spain;

"The incapacity of all of the Bourbons to occupy it."¹⁵

The government was powerless. González Brabo had resigned as President of the Ministry September 20 and Isabel had designated José de la Concha, the Marqués de Habana, as his successor. Concha, the loyal soldier, came to Madrid to oppose the advance of Serrano. None of the generals called on him. He was an isolated figure. The Conde de Cheste, hastily transferred to Barcelona, issued a vain appeal to the army to remain loyal. On the night of the twenty-ninth Pavía received at the bridge of Alcolea a telegram that the Ministry had resigned and that Madrid had pronounced.

Serrano made his triumphal entry into Madrid October 3. Prim arrived four days later. The cry of "Down with the Bourbons" was heard no longer in Spain. Isabel had been succeeded by a hierarchy of generals.

A monarchy?

A republic?

Spain had not yet achieved peace.

IV. ISABEL DETHRONED

Isabel paid the penalty for a century and a half of Bourbon misrule. She lost her crown September 29, at almost the exact hour that her father, Fernando the Hopeless, had died thirty-five years earlier. The Bourbon monarchy had in reality died with Fernando. For on his death had begun the Spanish state.

Isabel had left Madrid in August for the Vascongadas, where her summer residence was established at Lequeitio. On the way, in what was to be the final royal progress, the royal cortége stopped at El Escorial, in whose black marble vaults a place lay waiting for her on her final voyage from life.

She was received by the loyal Basque with something like the old enthusiasm. She heard disquieting reports of the coming revolt but she could not bring herself to believe that Topete was among the conspirators. When Topete's proclamation of the seventeenth reached the Queen her first impulse was to return to Madrid; but that was out of the question. Concha and González Brabo, advised against it.

Isabel on the thirtieth, the day after the defeat of Pavía, heard

¹⁵ *Ibid*, I, 320.

FALL OF THE BOURBON DYNASTY

from her disconsolate Ministry in Madrid. The message she received urged her to leave the nation. Isabel hesitated. When news came that Madrid had pronounced, she decided to leave Spain.

Isabel and the King Consort, together with the royal entourage, including Marfori, the Queen's favorite, boarded a train at San Sebastián for France. Isabel was dressed negligently, with a slight touch of nonchalance; and though her eyes were red from crying she had a brave smile on her lips. She wore no gloves; a gray cape was given color by a red feather on her straw hat.

In a short while the train carried her over the Bidasoa—from Spain to France, from queen to a citizen of the world. Napoleon at Biarritz greeted her as a queen. From Pau Isabel issued a formal statement to the nation which had ejected her:

"The monarchy of fifteen centuries of battles, of victories, of patriotism and of greatness, has not been lost in fifteen days of perjuries, of briberies and of treasons.

"We have faith in the future; the glory of the Spanish people has always been that of its kings; the misfortunes of its kings are always reflected in the people."¹⁶

The patient Prometheus among the nations of Europe, Spain, had broken its fetters. Now, perhaps, its glory might be that of its people.

¹⁶ *Ibid*, I, 241-253. See Pedro de Répide, *Isabel II, Reina de España* (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1932) for a modern, authoritative biography of Doña Isabel.

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE REVOLUTIONARY SETTLEMENT

I. "LONG LIVE SPAIN WITH HONOR!"

THE Revolution achieved with such ease, the leaders of the loosely-knit Coalition endeavored to govern while they settled the form of government. Their proclamation from Cádiz on September 19, signed by all of the Unión Liberal and Progressive leaders, exhorted all Spaniards to accept the new order, but it did not specify what the new order would be.

"Long live Spain with honor!" was their pious proposal.

The Republicans had been accomplices, not leaders, in the Revolution of September, so they were at the mercy of their allies. Castelar gave as the reason for the failure to proclaim the republic the fact that revolutions in the past that had been solely Republican had failed and as a result, the Republicans had to depend on the help of conservatives. Furthermore the Republicans had been forced to struggle in secret under the guise of the Democratic party and so the people were not prepared for the republic. Finally, it was necessary to carry out the Revolution with the aid of the military elements whose leaders believed the republic to be directed against the army.¹

If the Republican party had been forced to conspire in secret heretofore, the restraints had now been removed and the name "Republican" became an accepted one in Spanish political life. Republicans formed part of many of the revolutionary juntas throughout the country. The definite announcement of their aim divorced them from their royalist colleagues in the Democratic party. Rivero and Martos, leaders in the old Democratic wing of the Progressive party, now associated themselves with the revolutionary leaders and worked for a democratic monarchy. Castelar, Figueras, Salmerón, Pí y Margall and Orense became the leaders of the pure Republicans.

Serrano, charged with the task of establishing an interim government, drew up a Ministry which excluded the Republicans. Prim was

¹ Castelar, *Historia*, II, 45.

THE REVOLUTIONARY SETTLEMENT

assigned the Ministry of War; Lorenzana of Foreign Affairs; Romero Ortiz of Justice; Topete of the Navy; Figuerola of Finance; Sagasta of the Interior; Ruiz Zorrilla of Public Works and López de Ayala of Overseas.²

In order to silence Republican protests the Supreme Revolutionary Junta of Madrid drew up a program for the government designed to satisfy the Democrats: Universal suffrage; freedom of worship; freedom of meeting and of peaceful association; freedom of the press; administrative decentralization; jury trials in criminal cases; irremovable judges; and unified *fueros* (special privileges) for the entire nation.³

The *fueros* were an important problem. These were in the main the special exemptions that the Basque Provinces had won during the war of liberation against the Moors and to which they held zealously.⁴ The southern provinces particularly, regarded this situation as unfair to them. The Republicans had promised equality in exemptions and this had been one of their most forceful arguments in the South.

The Madrid Junta's program was announced October 8 and was a very definite herald of the coming elections for the Cortes Constituyentes. It represented the appeal of the Unionists, the Progressives and the old Democrats. The influence of the Progressives was most noticeable in the pronouncements of most of the juntas, the manifestos making their basic pleas for national sovereignty. The Republicans, of course, had ambitions to proclaim the republic and several attempts were made in this direction in the early days of the Revolution. Figueras and General Blas Pierrad did so at the town of Figueras but with little success. Significant was the adhesion of Pierrad, who was the first general to align with the Republican party. The Junta in Barcelona was markedly radical in tone but outwardly adhered to the Septembrists. Significant again was the salutation of the manifestos issued by the Barcelona Junta. They were addressed to the "Catalans." The Catalans were beginning to take their separate identity seriously and

² Miguel Villalba Hervás, *De Alcolea á Sagunto* (Madrid, 1899), p. 18.

³ Vilarrasa y Gatell, I, 368.

⁴ An interesting recent account of the origin of the *fueros* is in Pierre Harispe, *Le Pays Basque, Histoire, Langue, Civilisation* (Paris: Payot, 1929). The king was required to swear to observe these *fueros* on reaching the age of fourteen. The Carlistas gained much of their strength in the Basque land by promising to retain these special privileges.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

the development of regionalism in that prosperous section of Spain gained momentum in the harrowing days that were to follow.

The partisans of the Revolution were experimenting with possible solutions of the crisis they had provoked. Prim and the Progressives believed in a constitutional monarchy. The Unionists had no definite commitment but they were by history monarchical and sympathetic to the claims of Montpensier. The Democrats of the Progressive party were favorable to a constitutional monarchy that respected national sovereignty. The Republicans sought a republic and as we shall see shortly, a federal republic. There was little possibility of restoring to the throne Isabel or her son Alfonso, who was soon to undergo rigorous training for the kingship at various continental and English schools. Duque Enrique de Borbón, a cousin of the deposed Queen, had been deported from Spain by a Narváez Ministry because of his republicanism. Now he was in Paris, an interested spectator of the events of September, as was his cousin, the former Queen, who had established her residence in the capital of France. The Duque de Montpensier had not forgotten the object of his marriage to the Infanta and was willing to court the Unionists or any other party which might proclaim him king. The Duque de la Victoria, Espartero, was still a popular figure around whom a strong party might be rallied. All of these possible solutions to the Revolution created confusion in the ranks of those who found themselves masters of Spain.

The Unionists, the heirs of the Program of Manzanares, were in control outwardly with Serrano as Regent of the Kingdom. They faced a difficult problem at the outset in the strong anti-clerical tendencies of the South. Republican agitation had borne much fruit in the southland and simultaneous with manifestos of the Coalitionists were demands for the abolition of the religious orders. The Juntas of Madrid and of Barcelona immediately abolished the Society of the Jesuits while in other cities all of the religious orders were disbanded. Destruction of the religious orders or confiscation of their wealth, however desirable as a matter of national policy, at this time merely prolonged unrest. Serrano, in his first address in Madrid, urged the people to remain orderly; he pledged a program substantially that which the Junta of Madrid had announced. The intense excitement which swept over the cities might overthrow the power of the generals who had initiated the revolt. Serrano and his associate generals had enlisted their army

THE REVOLUTIONARY SETTLEMENT

from the peasantry and the peasantry, in the hands of smooth demagogues, could be incited to revolt easily. Sagasta followed Serrano's speech with a circular October 10 to the various municipal corporations demanding the re-establishment of order. The *Gaceta de Madrid* on this same day announced substantial promotions for all soldiers who had taken part in the revolt. Figuerola attacked the maze of Spanish finance but with indifferent success; substituting a poll tax for the tax on food then prevalent aroused indignation rather than approval. Greater resentment was aroused by the action of the Ministry in dissolving the juntas and ordering the municipal governments reconstituted in accordance with the laws of the Cortes of 1854.

Republicans, in particular, resented the order of October 20 by which the municipalities were to be reconstituted. Prim dissuaded a delegation of Barcelonese who had come to Madrid to register their firm opposition to this definite blow at republicanism, which indeed the order of the Ministry was, since it restored in great measure the old centralization to which the Republicans had always objected. The Junta of Cádiz also opposed the order and resisted the government actively.

When Cádiz resisted the effort to disarm the national militia and raised the cry "Long live the republic!" Spain was thrown into new alarm. Rumors of the purpose of the revolt were bandied everywhere. Some thought it was an effort to restore Isabel; others thought it a movement for the Duque de Montpensier. Others thought it a struggle between capital and labor. The government acted energetically. Martial law was proclaimed and a vigorous and bloody contest ensued, which was not won by the government until November 13.

The confusion of the nation regarding Cádiz was increased when Montpensier was discovered at Córdoba during the height of the Republican revolt. The government ordered his detention. Hearing of the revolt in Cádiz Montpensier had left Lisbon, where he was in exile, and had hastened to Spain. He explained when detained that he had come to offer his sword to the government against the partisans of the restoration; and did not learn of the Republican nature of the revolt until he had arrived in Spain. This rather specious statement created great amusement among the Spanish journals which ridiculed the Duke's *coup*, one journal terming it the "levity of an adolescent politician."

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

Montpensier's unfortunate attempt had added significance in view of the proclamation of the government late in October of the elections for the Cortes which were to be held January 15, 16, 17 and 18, 1869. The Cortes Constituyentes were to assemble February 11. The qualifications for voters were made very liberal, any Spaniard twenty-five years or older being permitted to vote. Montpensier's visit was interpreted therefore as a bid for the throne. The newspapers were generally very severe in their criticism, many of them calling him a traitor to the House of Bourbon, to which he was allied. The Duke on his return to Portugal issued on November 19 a lengthy letter defending his motives. The letter was published in *La Política*, a newspaper supporting Montpensier's pretensions to the throne.

The Duke repeated the manifesto he had issued to the provisional government on October 30 in which he said: "We find ourselves disposed to accept whatever resolutions emanate from the vote of the nation, as the legitimate fountain of political rights in free countries."

"As you will observe," the Duke continued, "in this frank and loyal manifestation there is not the least reserve: Spain, whatever be its form of government, will count on us in the number of its loyal citizens; we shall serve it, if we are able to be of use, and always and in every instance our heart will share in its happiness or in its misfortune."

Hearing many conflicting reports regarding the occurrence in Cádiz, the Duke continued, he considered it his duty to join the army of the provisional government at the "point of mobilization," there to receive orders of the government. Should order be re-established he would return to Lisbon without offering his service to the government.

"My premonition did not prove unfounded, for on arriving at Córdoba, I had notice that the situation at Cádiz was on the point of being settled satisfactorily. I learned also that there were no reactionary elements to fight; and not wanting to mix in the fights, which I deplore, of the liberal parties, I returned and re-entered Lisbon. . . . To those who have censured me I want to say only that, as a citizen, I exercised a right, and as a soldier, I have fulfilled a duty.

"It is necessary also to record that in 1866 when there were many agitations which now give no signs of life, the Infanta, in spite of danger to herself due to the state of her health . . . made a journey to

THE REVOLUTIONARY SETTLEMENT

the court to give liberal counsels and obtained only an order not to return to talk about politics."

The Duke denied that he and his wife were either fanatics or atheists. He concluded his letter by affirming that he was "clearly and definitely in conformity with those who proclaimed the Revolution and whom the nation recognized."⁵

The letter was an obvious bid for Unión Liberal support for his candidature for the throne but did his cause little good.

Shortly after Montpensier's letter had been published, Don Enrique de Borbón, the Republican member of the royal family, was heard from his place of exile in Paris, seeking re-admission to Spain—a request which was interpreted by the government as an offer of himself for the presidency of Spain.

The letter is a curious document, revealing the deep-seated animosity between Montpensier and the Bourbon Democrat which later ended in a duel between them in which Enrique was killed and which finally destroyed Montpensier's chances to gain the throne. Part of the letter, which was exceedingly involved, follows:

"When I observe the feverish ambition which devours the Duque de Montpensier, when I see it cause the explosion of his pretensions . . . contriving for so many years to gain possession of the monarchical power in Spain, a nation free and independent to which he came without honor, a fugitive from his father Louis Philippe when the latter lost his throne through a providential stroke which stamps punishment on the brows of certain kings; when everyone realizes that his sole title or rights to our country were those of the hospitality which all civilized people accord those who come as refugees when proscribed in their own countries; when I study this foreigner, this prince without recognized energy and without elevation of character and whom indeed, I recognize is so filled with vanity and egotism that he figures everyone owes him and no one in the world could refuse him the celebrated honor of being his courtier; when his excessive cupidity effusively accepted the gifts and favors of Isabel II and when at the very time he was working ungratefully and criminally toward a propitious time to usurp the post of his benefactress who trusted him completely. . . . I cannot do less than ask, What is the talisman and what are the privileges of this pretender?"

⁵ Vilarrasa y Gatell, I, 379-380.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

"I, who count more than twenty years of suffering and political persecutions of which Louis Philippe was the instigator; I, who being guiltless, find myself denied the sky of my country and of my home; I have been provoked as a Spaniard and as a member of the liberal party at the privilege, so unjust and so unpatriotic, which Montpensier enjoys.

"In the name of justice then, I, who have never sought the position which I occupy and for which the intriguer longs; I, who would consider myself very discredited if I bore his title of pretender because my aspirations are those of the honest citizen who knows the high price of abnegation; I, who esteem the glory of Washington far greater and far worthier than that of Caesar, request the provisional government of the nation to permit me to return to my country and to occupy humbly, as has been always my custom to live, my rented quarters in Madrid which contain what little I possess."

The Infante also stated that he did not want a crown "like Montpensier"; he requested that he be allowed to re-enter the navy from which he had been forced to leave "by the vengeance and by the tyranny of the Narváez Ministry."⁶

The Duque de Sevilla's letter, written from Paris December 21, did not obtain the expected favor. The Duke had long been identified with the Republicans and had at one time unsuccessfully proclaimed the republic. Both Infantes were unwelcome in Spain, seeking to express its national will on the subject of Isabel's successor.

II. THE CONSTITUTION OF 1869

The most striking feature and the most important political phenomenon of the nineteenth century in Spain was the appearance at the polls of the Republican party during the elections for the Cortes in January. No longer did the Republicans have to conspire in secret or masquerade as Democrats. Now their ultimate purpose could be proclaimed openly. Even though the Coalitionists had no sympathy for their aim, they could not deny their radical aids.

The Republicans sought a Cortes Constituyentes that would proclaim a republic in Spain. They did not seek a plebiscite of the people themselves for it was the tragedy of all the political experimentation of the century that the form of government was always determined

⁶ *Ibid*, I, 386.

THE REVOLUTIONARY SETTLEMENT

either by generals or by the elected representatives of the people rather than by the direct vote of the people.

The Republicans were given inspiration by a letter Victor Hugo wrote them on October 22. Once the greatest nation of Europe, Spain had been brought into degradation by two factors, Hugo said, the Pope and the king.

"Upon this torch the Popes have placed their tiara, tremendous extinguisher; and the papacy and absolutism have leagued to annihilate the nation.

"Today this nation is reborn from those ashes [of the Inquisition]. Will it be reborn small? Will it be reborn great? This is the question. Spain may regain her rank; she may be placed another time on the level of France and England. Immense gift of Providence! The opportunity is unique. Will Spain let it escape?"

"A republic in Spain will give the voice of vigilance to Europe and vigilance spoken to kings is peace. . . . Danger? Not any. Spanish citizenship is Spanish strength; Democratic Spain is the Spanish citadel.

"If Spain is reborn a monarchy, she will be insignificant.

"If reborn a republic, she will be great."⁷

The exhortation of the author of *Les Misérables* fell on ground already zealously cultivated by the Republican leaders of Spain. Now they could avow openly their goal. But what was that goal? a federal republic? a unitary republic? Socialistic or Individualistic? This grave schism inherited from the days of the polemics now required solution.

The matter was quickly resolved. On the eleventh of October the Republican group organized a Committee for Madrid at a meeting in the Circo de Price, then on the Paseo de Recoletos. Orense, the Marqués de Albaida, presided and proposed with Figueras and others that the meeting approve this petition:

"We demand that this meeting declare that the peculiar form of government of the Republican party is the federal republic."

This resolution, aided by the oratory of Castelar, had the effect of removing definitely the old Democrats with royalistic inclinations from the Republican ranks while it unleashed a final burst of polemics which

⁷ Sala, *L'Espagne et la République*, Réponse à Victor Hugo (Paris, 1868), p. 23; Rodríguez-Solís, II, 612.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

ultimately defined the federal criterion for the party, as we shall note in a future chapter.

While the Madrid Republicans were debating the federal republic the provinces had no hesitation: In Barcelona, in Valencia, in the provinces of Andalusia, wherever juntas met, they declared for the federated republic. The more than a score of Republican newspapers, with one notable exception, were Federalist. The Federalists restated the old propositions made during the days of the polemics and accentuated the cantonal or regional aspects of federation. "Government of the provinces by themselves" were golden words as propaganda—they spread through the southland as the Republican message of hope and the Republican promise of anarchy.

Sophistry after sophistry was repeated to be absorbed eagerly by the Spanish populace, scarcely more than three million of whom could read and write!

One or two Republicans in vain spoke against the onrushing tide. Thus Nicolás Salmerón, a lawyer and professor in the Central University of Madrid, told the Republicans at a meeting October 18 that federation if applied too rapidly could result only in disunion and dictatorship. Despite these protests the Federalists remained in control. A Directory was constituted in Madrid with Orense as President and with Castelar, Roqué Barcia, Figueras and others as Vice Presidents. This Directory was installed by Castelar on November 13 at a meeting of ten thousand Republicans in the Circo de Price. Castelar reiterated his belief that the republic only could solve Spain's dynastic problems. Freed from a foreign dynasty, Castelar continued, Spain could now resume her place at the council table of Europe. He seriously advised his audience that Spain should adopt a policy of non-intervention in foreign affairs and very wisely urged the nation to recognize its position as an American power by abolishing slavery and by granting autonomy to Porto Rico and Cuba. In Spain itself the revolution should break religious intolerance and administrative restraint. The Republicans should have as their object the separation of church and state in a federal republic.⁸

Absorbing the Democratic party the Coalition in power issued a

⁸ Castelar, *Discurso pronunciado en la noche del 13 de Noviembre de 1868* (Madrid, 1868); Nicolás Salmerón, *La Forma de Gobierno* (Madrid, 1868); Rodríguez-Solís, II, 614.

THE REVOLUTIONARY SETTLEMENT

manifesto to the electorate embodying common principles. This program, which was signed by Salustiano Olózaga, one of the older Progressives, Rivero, lately of the Democratic party, Dulce of the Unión Liberal, Martos and others, attacked the late "ungrateful and perjured dynasty," praised the Revolution as the "most glorious, the most legitimate and the most admirable of revolutions," and then stated beliefs that in the main were inherited from the Republicans and the Democrats: sovereignty of the nation; universal suffrage; individual security; inviolability of the home and of correspondence; right of meeting and of peaceful association; freedom of the press without deposit; liberty of thought; religious freedom; unified legislation and *fueros*; trial by jury.⁹

This program was akin closely to the Republican manifestos. The Republicans, however, were appealing to provincial prejudices through their federal propaganda. Castelar, Orense and Garrido carried the federal message to the South. Castelar, speaking in Saragossa, Barcelona, Alcoy and Reus, received an ovation and with his customary modesty described his success in his Autobiography: "An orator, not only loved but adored by the Spanish people, like O'Connell by the Irish people, he pronounced speeches under the new freedom in every part of the country. His reception was such as was given no other civilian in Spain." This statement is truthful; during the interim between the fall of Isabel and the election of Amadeo Castelar became one of the most popular figures of Spain, not only in the nation but abroad. This was reflected by the match sellers of the Prado, whose match boxes which once carried pictures of Isabel now carried those either of Castelar or Don Carlos, the Duque de Madrid, the Pretender.¹⁰

The elections were held in January and were fairly free of violence, thus permitting an expression of Spanish sentiment which had not been possible during the regime of Isabel. The Moderate party abstained from the election as it was not a party to the Revolution, and consequently it was not represented actively in the Cortes Constituyentes which met in Madrid February 11, 1869. The Republicans made the most noteworthy gains, with a membership of seventy, although this figure varies since some of the members of the party were on the bor-

⁹ Vilarrasa y Gatell, I, 392 ff.

¹⁰ John Hay, *Castilian Days* (London, 1903), p. 21.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

derland between Republican and Democratic. The voting strength of the party was around sixty; Castelar states that the party had eighty members in the Cortes and this figure is given as the maximum strength by most of the historians of the period. The Progressives returned the largest group, 130 members. The Unionists returned ninety, the Democrats forty-five and the Carlistas sixteen.

The presence of the Carlista Deputies was significant. Carlism was the Phoenix of Spain. It never died, despite the Pact of Vergara by which the Carlistas laid down their arms during the reign of Isabel. *La Regeneración* aptly phrased the Carlista view of the fall of Isabel: "Yesterday Her Highness the Infanta Doña Isabel, daughter of Fernando VII, passed the Spanish frontier." The "Infanta," not the queen, had been dethroned, in the Carlista view. And though the Carlistas were to resort to arms again shortly after the Revolution of September, a faction within Spain believed in attaining power through constitutional means, as evinced in a notable pamphlet published in Barcelona in 1869, *El desenlace de la Revolución española* by Luis María Llauder.

"Should the monarchical Catholics use force to triumph?" he asked. "We do not believe so, because it would be a great error; the same group who would commission the government would give it the *coup d'état*. . . . To use the same arms would be to lose all prestige, to be vitiated. If they [the parties] represent justice, the moral law, why do they need force? It cannot save Spain."¹¹

The Cortes Constituyentes was authorized by the Spanish people to designate the successor to Isabel II. It was authorized by the spirit of the manifestos issued by the generals initiating the revolt to give unfortunate Spain a modern government. The form of government was one of the four great problems facing this Cortes, which looked back on absolutism, forward to modernity. The other major problems were the head of the government, a new constitution to exemplify the aims of the Revolution and the now tremendous cross, the church-state.

The provisional government had already begun action to sever the close connection between church and state—the most dangerous step yet made in the maddening nineteenth century. Though the Papacy had remained lukewarm, a papal legate had been sent to Madrid. In the meantime Ruiz Zorrilla, the Minister of Public Works, began carrying out the order of the Ministry to confiscate church

¹¹ Vilarrasa y Gatell, I, 438.

THE REVOLUTIONARY SETTLEMENT

wealth. The seizure was made without untoward incident except at Burgos, where the people of the city attacked the governor making the search. The Ministry granted freedom of instruction. The religious orders were dissolved. The church was proclaimed free and the state refused to make the usual payments to the clergy.

The Cortes Constituyentes opened February 11 with all the glory of the Bourbon dynasty. At 1 o'clock in the afternoon all available troops in Madrid were marshaled to line the streets down which the President of the Council, Serrano, the Ministers and the commissions of the Assembly were to move. Serrano was dressed in the uniform of a captain general and wore the order of the Golden Fleece. Prim was dressed in the uniform of a marshal of Spain, while Topete was clad in his admiral's uniform. At 3 P.M. the government left for the Congreso. Preceded by the ushers and mace-bearers clad in their mediæval costumes, the government entered the chamber. Serrano read the message of the government in which he stated that the goal of the Ministry was to inaugurate a new era in Spain that would be the regeneration of "this generous people."

The Cortes opened "in the name of the nation."

"Long live the national sovereignty!" shouted Serrano.

"Long live the republic!" cried E. Gimeno, Deputy for Huesca.

"Long live the democratic monarchy!" weakly cried another Deputy.

"Long live the republic!" shouted General Pierrad, in answer.

An air of excitement filled the Assembly, heightened by this confusing shouting. Serrano, to restore a semblance of order, arose: "I ask the floor to give the only *viva* that ought to be given at this time: Long live the sovereignty of the Cortes Constituyentes!"¹²

Shortly afterwards Pierrad sought out Prim.

"Why, since you are a man of advanced views, do you persist in being royalist?" the Republican demanded.

"Because we have received everything from the monarchy; and if we have not been satisfied with the person we ought to be satisfied with the principle," replied the Conde de Reus.

"But they were Republicans who helped us win."

¹² Wilhelm Lauser, *Aus Spaniens Gegenwart*, Kulturskizzen (Leipzig, 1872); Vilarrasa y Gatell, I, 576. Lauser was the correspondent of the *Wiener Presse* in Madrid and his sketches are among the liveliest of contemporary accounts of the revolutionary period.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

"Rest assured that everything will remain regulated. It will be a monarchy, but with the principles of a republic."¹³

The Cortes was royalist by a comfortable majority. Rivero was elected President of the Assembly over the veteran Progressive Olózaga, one of the prime movers of the Revolution of September. The Republicans endeavored unsuccessfully to name one of their number as one of the vice presidents. They fought a losing battle in the Cortes. Figueras at the opening of the session criticized the government as "dictatorial." Without the Democratic party the Revolution could not have been achieved, he reminded Sagasta who had just stated that Spain, after seventy years of struggle, had at last thrown off the chains of lethargy. "There are then three parties," Figueras contended. "The one which gave the idea that proved strongest was excluded from the government."

The principal work of the Assembly, that of constructing a constitution, began March 2 when a Constitutional Committee was named, which included Salustiano Olózaga, Martos and others of the Coalition, the Republicans being excluded from membership.

The constitution as presented to the Assembly provided for a constitutional monarchy which Castelar apostrophized: "Chaos needs a form, I say; and its form is this monarchical project, without a monarch and democratic, without democracy."

Señor Pedro Mata, a member of the Constitutional Committee, explained the difficulty confronting the creators of the project: "The Committee has told you that we do not have the difficulties of 1812, of 1837 and of 1854. We do not have an invading army, a bad boy and a bad king and a people ignorant in the highest degree. We do not have a civil war as we had in 1836; we do not have a court inimical to liberties as in 1854. But in place of these we have a great obstacle which has caused us many conflicts. This is the composition of the forces of the Revolution. The Revolution has three elements not united but mixed and it is this fact which caused the combination originally. Isolated parties could not have overcome the situation facing them; all had to unite to overthrow the throne and they overcame it. But from that point they present three different elements in the assemblies. They ought to be represented in the provisional government and if they are not they will create difficulties by no means small.

¹³ Vilarrasa y Gatell, I, 578.

THE REVOLUTIONARY SETTLEMENT

"If you comprehend this situation thoroughly, you will see why no party is pleased with this constitution if it is not a part of it. If only one party had triumphed, it would tender you its constitution. But three having triumphed, the project has to be a diagonal, the resultant of three forces which have concurred in it."¹⁴

The Constitution of 1869 represented a compromise and therefore it came nearer being a fundamental charter of Spanish liberty than any constitution since 1812. Although the Revolution of September had been the climax to the series of pronunciamientos which had agitated the nation since the Revolt of La Granja, the Constitution consolidating the aims of the Coalition of generals more nearly exemplified their stated plan of regenerating Spain than any since 1812. Despite the furious assaults of the Republicans against creating a monarchy and against the maintenance of the church-state, the Constitution was adopted June 6. It was proclaimed by "the Spanish nation and in its name the Cortes Constituyentes, elected by universal suffrage, desirous of affiancing justice, liberty and providing for the well being of all living in Spain, do decree and sanction the following constitution." It guaranteed the inviolability of the domestic hearth, of property, freedom from arrest except for cause, freedom of speech and of press and of pacific reunion and of association and it prohibited the exercise of the right of petition by any armed force. It reaffirmed the cardinal basis of the Constitution of 1812 in Article Thirty-two which stated: "Sovereignty resides essentially in the nation, from which emanate all powers." Article Twenty-one, which provoked the most celebrated debate of the Constituent Cortes, obligated the nation to maintain the Catholic religion. Article Thirty-three, which also provoked the Republicans to fierce opposition, stated the form of government to be that of the monarchy. The legislature was to consist of a Senate and a Congreso which could not meet in each other's presence nor in that of the king. The Cortes was to assemble annually.¹⁵

The revolutionary settlement had provided the charter for the New Spain. The ominous silence of the Moderates, the revolutionary activity of the Republicans, the armed preparations of the Carlistas, the search for a king to consolidate the liberties guaranteed by the charter, all portended disaster to the New Spain.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, I, 598.

¹⁵ *Constitución de la Monarquía Española promulgada en Madrid el día 6 de Junio de 1869*, edición oficial (Madrid, 1869).

CHAPTER EIGHT

UNITY IN VARIETY: FEDERALISM

I. REPUBLICAN PROTESTS AGAINST THE CONSTITUTION

THE Republicans tried by every parliamentary means to introduce in the Constitution of 1869 their favorite doctrines. The Cortes rejected Castelar's proposal of amnesty for all political prisoners. The same fate met Garrido's effort to abolish conscription. When the constitutional project came before the Cortes, the Republicans sought to have the Assembly proclaim the republic.

"The monarchy to me is social injustice and for my country political reaction," Castelar declared in appealing to the Cortes May 20, 1869 to proclaim the republic. "The republic to me is social justice and for my country political liberty."¹

Castelar fondly believed that Spain would regenerate democracy in Europe. He quoted Bright's statement that the American regime would invade Europe, which, while retaining nationalities, would destroy economic differences that then separated peoples. Castelar hoped Spain would be the first country in Europe to found this United States. He had participated in the work of the League of Peace and Liberty, founded in 1867, which had for its object the establishment of a federation of European republics. Castelar was a member of the Central Committee of the League and the only Spanish member at the second international conference held at Bern in 1868.

"Republics are the governments of the most primitive societies and the governments of the most advanced," Castelar continued in his address of May 20. "They begin and end civilization. The republic is the historical destiny of all civilized institutions." Castelar rejected Ríos Rosas' example of England as a democratic monarchy for there the king was either a useless element or prejudicial. The idea of a Regency under Serrano was ridiculous: "The lot of General Serrano is that of a Regent awaiting the age of discretion of the Republican form," a statement even Serrano applauded. Spain ought to become a republic

¹ Castelar, *Discursos parlamentarios*, I, 346.

UNITY IN VARIETY: FEDERALISM

for only then could it comply with its destinies in Europe, only then could it lead the way to a Latin confederation of France, Italy and Spain.²

Orense likewise vigorously castigated the monarchical principle, citing historical precedents in support of his contention. "Among ourselves, gentlemen, the federal republic could be established easily, because the provinces are governed by themselves. . . . If you bring a French king, the sepulchres of the Dos de Mayo will come to life and cry out against you. If you go to search for him in Portugal you know now that he will not accept it, and he has good reason. If you go to get one in the north, one who does not know how to pronounce our idiom, he will become a Carlos V, who did not know Spanish and who had to surround himself with Flemings, thus producing great dissatisfaction."³

The Republicans submitted many substitute articles for Article Thirty-three. Orense proposed that the government of Spain be the federal democracy. García Ruiz introduced another: "The democratic republic is the form of government which the Spanish nation adopts." Sanchez Ruano, also a unitary Republican like García Ruiz, proposed: "The form of government of the Spanish nation is the republic." Paul y Angulo suggested that the nation be governed by a directory of five individuals who would be named by the Cortes every three years. Garrido sought an article making it mandatory that the "person who exercises the supreme power must be Spanish, a son of Spaniards and born in Spain."⁴

Despite the vigorous attacks on the proposed Article, the liberal constitutional monarchy as the form of government was adopted June 1 by a vote of 214 to 55. The Republican party, through its leader Figueras, announced that it would obey the Constitution but would not accept it. Five days later the Constitution was promulgated and the search for a king began in renewed earnest. Prim, facing a ministerial crisis in July, offered to take the Republican party into the government by offering Pí y Margall the post of Minister of Finance and Castelar that of Minister of Public Works. The Republican party re-

² *Ibid.*, I, 410.

³ Vilarrasa y Gatell, I, 685.

⁴ *Ibid.*, I, 687.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

jected the offer for it had nothing in common with Prim's affirmed royalist policy.⁵

Republican dissatisfaction with the monarchical solution expressed itself throughout the year 1869 in revolts in Cádiz, Málaga, Tarragona and Saragossa. Republican opposition hardened gradually. The Republicans of Aragon had signed the Pact of Tortosa May 18, declaring that the federal republic was the natural form of government for Spain. The organization of the party was arranged at Tortosa into juntas but the appeal to force was discountenanced, for the evils resulting from the institution of monarchy would then fall on its royalist authors. On June 12 Republicans of Andalusia, Extremadura and Murcia signed a federal Pact at Córdoba. Again the assembly advised the party to respect the Constitution without accepting it. Other pacts were signed at Valladolid, Eibar and Coruña and on July 30 Pí y Margall wrote a resumé of a national pact signed by the prominent provincial Republican leaders.⁶

The adjournment of the Cortes July 22 freed the parliamentary leaders of the party who went to the provinces to begin a national campaign for the proclamation of the republic. Orense in Castile, Paul y Angulo in Andalusia, Pierrad in Catalonia and Castelar in Saragossa attacked the monarchical settlement. The government thereupon issued a circular through Sagasta prohibiting demonstrations, although a collision had taken place already at Tarragona between the Republicans greeting Pierrad and the provincial authorities. Castelar and Figueras protested against the issuance of the circular as prohibiting the right of pacific meeting. Orense urged Republicans to appeal to arms. Castelar at Saragossa protested against the proposal to establish a kingdom on the ashes of the Bourbon dynasty.

II. THE DECLARATION OF THE PRESS

By October, 1869 when the Cortes reassembled most of southern Spain was in rebellion against the orders of Sagasta to disarm the national militia and the government as a result suspended the constitu-

⁵ Rodríguez-Solís; Lauser, *Aus Spaniens Gegenwart*. In July the government faced a severe crisis which Prim sought to resolve by a ministry of conciliation, finally compromising by including the Democrat Becerra as Minister of Overseas, the Conservative Ardanaz as Minister of Finance and the Radical Echegaray as Minister of Public Works. *La Gorda* (July 15, 1869).

⁶ Rodríguez-Solís, II, 630-638; Lauser, *Geschichte Spaniens von dem Sturz Isabel's bis zum Thronbesteigung Alfonso's* (Leipzig, 1877), I, 192.

UNITY IN VARIETY: FEDERALISM

tional guarantees. The Republicans through Castelar presented an ultimatum to the government October 5: The Republican minority would retire from the Cortes without voting the authorization to suspend the guarantees and they would remain away as long as the suspension remained in force. After the revolts had been suppressed and the government did not retire the suspension, Pí asked the party to return to the Cortes. The party re-entered the Congreso in November, and the Cortes rejected Pí's vote of censure of the government's conduct.

Not only the disarming of the militia and the "Volunteers of Liberty," both strongholds of the Republicans, aroused the anger of the Republicans but Sagasta's reorganization of many municipal councils in the manner of the *ancien régime* provoked just protest. Castelar on December 11 declared that all municipal councils dissolved by the Ministry which had not been proceeded against within thirty days should expel the acting councils and resume their former positions. The Cortes was thrown into confusion and uproar. Castelar proceeded in his denunciation of Sagasta, charging the Minister of the Interior with trying deliberately to suffocate the Republican party by such measures as the prohibition of the display of Republican banners and the giving of cries for the republic. While Prim was succeeding in restoring royalist prestige at the expense of Republicans, Castelar continued, he was losing conservative support (Topete, Ardanaz and Silvela, Unionists, had retired from the Ministry in November because of the candidature of the Duque de Genova, of which they disapproved); and if Prim had not lost the regent Serrano, it was because he was imprisoned in a cell of gold.⁷

The cleavage within the Republican party between the Federalists and the Unitarians became a matter of discussion early in 1870. A national Republican party Assembly was held in Madrid March 6, 1870, to which each province sent three delegates. Pí y Margall was elected Chairman and charged with the writing of a manifesto declaring that the federal form of government should be the sole form for the party. The Assembly named a national Directory consisting of Orense, Pí, Figueras, Barberá and Castelar. This was the first national organization of the Republican party.⁸

⁷ Castelar, *op. cit.*, II, 264, 276.

⁸ Villalba Hervás, *op. cit.*, p. 98; Rodríguez-Solís, II, 662.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

The action of the Assembly would seem to have resolved the cleavage within the party but such was not the case. The Unitarians, although a very small element within the party, were represented in the press by *El Pueblo*. When the Assembly approved the federal form of government, the Unitarians became active.

Many Federalists, too, were concerned at the adoption of the Assembly report because they believed that Pí's federalism did not represent the federalism of the majority of the party. The Assembly had in effect adopted the Catalan theory of confederation as the policy of the Republican party of Spain, whereas in reality the real Federalists were opposed to confederation.

The cleavage became more noticeable as the result of discussions on the meaning of federalism in the Ateneo following the meeting of the Republican Assembly. A pure Federalist, Manuel de la Revilla, a Madrid journalist, recognized the peril facing the party in approving a "headless government." There were two schools of federalism, he saw: the Federalists of Nicolás Salmerón y Alonso and the confederationists of the Catalan school of Pí y Margall and Proudhon. The former, in Revilla's view, believed the nation to be an organic whole which contained particular individualities like the person, the family, the municipality and the province, "free in their spheres and in them of equal value and dignity as the nation itself." Thus the Federalists hoped to achieve at the same time the greatest national unity and the greatest autonomy of the municipality and the province. Figueras, Salmerón and Castelar were partisans of this theory. The confederationists were partisans of paradoxes "sustained by Proudhon and founded in the capricious constructions of Hegel," and "understood that the ideal of government is anarchy and that the individual is the principal entity, the middle and the end of all political organisms. Reviving at the same time the discredited errors of Rousseau, they judge that society is constituted by a pact or contract." The pactists would form the municipality from a union of individuals, the province from the union of cities, the canton or State from the provinces and the federal state from the cantons. These independent cantons or States would form a confederation ruled by a central government competent only in international affairs. Pí y Margall had sustained this theory alone, Revilla declared, but now his viewpoint seemed to dominate the party.

UNITY IN VARIETY: FEDERALISM

Revilla discussed the anomaly with Sanchez Ruano and Tubino, the latter the director of *La Andalucía* of Seville. As a result all three agreed that in reality there was little separating the Unitarians from the traditional Federalists. They were in fact the same Republicans bearing different names. Persuaded of this, they agreed that what was needed was a clarification of definitions. The three selected thirty representative Republicans who met March 27 in the office of the Secretary of the Cortes. A second meeting was held March 29. It was agreed that a democratic republic was not incompatible with a federal republic and that both had much in common. Recognizing the cleavage between Socialists and Individualists, which was held not to be as grave as that between the Federalists and confederationists, the committee decided to interpret all social questions as they arose according to the Declaration of the Thirty. The committee condemned demagoguery. It named a committee of twenty representing various Republican newspapers to formulate the beliefs discussed by the larger group and to evolve a definition of federalism satisfactory to the party and one that would eliminate the cleavage. The smaller commission entrusted the task of summary to Revilla, Sanchez Ruano and Tubino. They formulated the celebrated Declaration of the Press.

The Declaration stated the definition of the federal republic as one maintaining the national unity while it recognized and guaranteed under this unity the complete autonomy of the municipality and the province in that which touched their interior administration. "It is not a confederation of independent states, united merely by pacts and alliances," the Declaration stated. "The right of insurrection may only be exercised in the case of a complete and systematic violation on the part of the government of natural rights or the laws of the country, a violation of which cannot be remedied in the courts." Sanchez Ruano presented a definition of the unitary republic which was adopted and published: The Unitarians "defend the unity of political power, of legislation and of local privileges; and the integrity of the national territory and recognize and consecrate the independence of the city and the province in whatever refers to their regime and interior government."⁹

The terminology of federalism and unitarianism was thus seen

⁹ Revilla, *Historia y Defensa de la Declaración de la Prensa republicana* (Madrid, 1870).

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

to be practically the same. It appeared for a while that this grave schism in the party would be solved in sensible fashion and in a manner satisfactory to all. Revilla submitted the Declaration to various members of the Cortes belonging to the party and particularly to Figueras and Castelar. Figueras expressed his agreement with the Declaration and added that it was certain "there are in Catalonia separatists or confederationists." These, he said, were the smallest and the worst part of the Republican party. Castelar was not as frank. The first great mistake he made was not approving the Declaration. Instead, he told Revilla that he would remain neutral, since he did not want to challenge the leadership of Pí, now President of the national Republican party.

A third meeting of the smaller committee was held April 20 when the reception of the definitions was reported. The work had been done quietly but reports had reached the Madrid press and from there Barcelona, where Pí expressed alarm at the apparently subversive movement. Pí tried to secure Figueras to his cause by having him disown the entire project of the Declaration but this his fellow Catalan declined to do. In view of this attitude the committee decided to sign the Declaration as representing the newspapers of which they were staff members. The Declaration was signed May 6 and made public in the morning newspapers of Madrid the following day. Its first reception was cordial but it soon was brought before the Directory of the Republican party.¹⁰

Never was a determined leader so needed as now to combat the insistent Pí, leader of the confederationists. Castelar, the logical choice, continued neutral. He did so probably as much from the fact that he really did not perceive the dangers of confederation as from fear of offending Pí. He had replied to an accusation of Sagasta in the Cortes December 18, 1869, denying the latter's charge that federalism meant disunion, by stating: "A party that aspires to a European federation; a party that aspires to unite disunited peoples; a party that wants to efface that abominable word war, cannot aspire to disunite people joined by tradition and by right. . . . I always want the federal republic; I will ever defend the federal republic, for I am a Federalist." Consequently Castelar permitted Pí to carry his opinion as that of the Directory of the party. On May 10 the national Directory

¹⁰ *Idem.*

UNITY IN VARIETY: FEDERALISM

issued this statement: "The Declaration of the Republican Press published on May 7 is solely the expression of the newspapers which signed it. This Directory will not accept it. This Directory aspires to constitute the Spanish into a group of true States, united by federal pact, which is the expression of its unity, the safeguard of its general interests and the most solid guarantee of individual rights. The Directory is not disposed to sacrifice to circumstances the principles constituting the dogma of the party."¹¹

The Republican party had succumbed to the domination of Francisco Pí y Margall and the confederationists.

III. THE THEORY OF FEDERALISM

Europe was moving towards unity. United Spain was moving towards disunion. Federalism, the most original concept introduced into Spanish politics since the sixteenth century, had won over the Republican party. Few Republicans sensed the dangerous differences between federalism and confederation. Those few, like Revilla, were a minority whose voices proved ineffectual against the dominant personality of Pí y Margall. The Unitarians, few though they were, fought strenuously for a unitary republic and their words had the ring of prophecy. But federalism remained the mistress of the Republican party and through it, the Republic of 1873 perished.

The clearest statement of the aims of federalism—or, in reality, confederation—was made in 1869 by the Catalan newspaper *El Estado Catalán*. Federalism, contended the writer, is the natural form of liberty. "*All systems of government, monarchical or republican, in which the power is concentrated, will always destroy liberty. Only in those systems in which the power is divided is liberty found in conditions favorable for the struggle which sooner or later will end by opening the path to liberty.*"

"*The word federalism is synonymous with alliance, for by a federal government we understand a government founded on alliance. The alliance is a contract for whose formation it is necessary that there exist contracting parties with sufficient power or capacity to make a contract. If those who celebrate the contract are towns or States, the capacity to contract is the sovereignty; from this is deduced the fact that the federal contract can only be celebrated by sovereign peoples.*"¹²

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 26; Rodríguez-Solís, II, 664.

¹² *Idea exacta de la Federación*, por el Director de *El Estado Catalán*, (3d ed., Barcelona, 1873), p. 4.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

Sovereignty, then, remains with each State. A federal coercive power would be formed by the delegation of certain rights by each sovereign State. As Spain was not divided into States—being at this time divided into forty-nine provinces by royal decree made in 1833—arbitrary divisions would have to be made and declared independent. These would delegate certain administrative rights to the federal government. "The Federalists, in effect, do not seek to divide Spain into two nations but want to solidify the national unity by establishing it on the solid base of variety, which is the most just."¹³ By the Catalan's proposals, the army would be a federal army under the command of the central government and church and state would be separate.

This was a restatement of the federalism Pí y Margall had advocated since 1849. "*Federation realized, in my view, the autonomy of diverse groups in which humanity has been discomposed and reconstituted by revolutions and by the stimulus of interests; it realized the principle of unity in variety, the constitutional form of beings, the law of the world,*" Pí wrote in his *La República de 1873*. Federation, he explained in *Las Nacionalidades*, "*is a system by which diverse human groups, without losing their peculiar and particular autonomy, are associated and subordinated in conjunction with those of their kind for all common ends.*"¹⁴

Pí "*considered it as the organization most adequate to the disposition of our country, a nation formed of provinces which were, in another time, independent kingdoms and which are even today separated by that which removes one city from all other cities, law and custom. This nation presents in all the great crises through which it has passed in this century the special phenomenon of its provinces making haste to seek their salvation and their force within themselves, without having compromised or lost the view of the unity of the fatherland.*"

Although he accepted the doctrine of federalism, Castelar did so from somewhat different motives than those which actuated Pí and Garrido. Freedom being the natural state of man, Castelar sought to create a state which would protect men's rights. The centralized state constantly intervened to destroy individual liberty, especially in the matter of removing at will municipal authorities.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

¹⁴ Pí y Margall, *La República de 1873*, p. 7; Pí y Margall, *Las Nacionalidades* (3d ed., Madrid, 1882), p. 113.

UNITY IN VARIETY: FEDERALISM

He was not ready to go as far in advocating individual autonomy as Pí or Garrido. Like Pí Garrido subscribed to the theory of individual sovereignty in his definition of the democratic, federal and universal republic which he defined as being "*the direct government of the people by themselves and the federation of all peoples. The democratic, federal and universal republic has for its base individual sovereignty, origin of all its rights; for its objective, the moral and material perfection of man; for means, equality, fraternity, work and high quality; for guarantee, the federation of all the peoples reunited in an imperishable fraternity which will make impossible the rebirth of the thrones, with their odious privileges, monopolies, armies, fortresses and scaffolds. The republic . . . is the institution called for by the inflexible law of progress to put an end to the terrible violation of institutions, monarchical, feudal and semi-barbarous which divide peoples by force, as flocks confined to their pens.*"¹⁵

Castelar rather based his autonomy on the municipality. In his address to the Cortes on May 11, 1870 on the organic municipal laws, Castelar explained what he understood by federalism:

"The state ought to be organized rationally, with the essential attributes of all democratic society—the municipality, the province, the nation—to the end that the central state, always inclined to tyranny, has the least direction possible. This is the law of variety in unity." Federalism was the surest guarantee of the municipality and of nationality, he said. "Without decentralization, democracy remains a dictatorship." "I do not want political centralization or economic centralization or administrative centralization or any inflexible system," he declared. Castelar admired the federation of city states of the Middle Ages as seen in Holland or Germany. "It is impossible to establish liberty if it is not founded on decentralization and it is impossible to secure decentralization if the municipality is not automatically established."

Castelar looked upon the municipal independence in the United States as ideal. "Every city in New England, for example, is a republic; if the nation is an incorporation of the United States, the State is the union of the municipalities," he explained.¹⁶ Within the affairs of the city and the State the citizen should concern himself to the full-

¹⁵ Garrido, *La República democrática federal universal*, p. 56.

¹⁶ Castelar, *Discursos parlamentarios*, III, 201, 204, 206.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

est extent possible. Trial by jury made every man a magistrate, he added. "For me," he had said in 1866, "the popular jury is the social conscience; for me universal suffrage is the social will."¹⁷ The citizen should have free access to credit to gain his economic independence. Spain, being essentially an agricultural nation, should make it possible for the peasants to introduce modern machinery to aid their farming. To obtain this end he suggested the establishment of agricultural banks which should lend money for the development of farming and, incidentally, he thought these banks would extinguish usury.

This was a bold program to apply to a nation in which barely twenty per cent of the inhabitants were literate. In his early propaganda Castelar did not concern himself with the details of the federal system, his first interest being to arouse a love of democracy and liberty in the Spaniard. He was quite honest in his propaganda—as were Pí, Garrido, Figueras and Salmerón—for neither he nor the ultra-Federalists would have believed that their doctrines would result in national disunion. This vagueness of his federalism was typical of the romantic idealist.

When Sagasta in the Cortes Constituyentes of 1869 chided Castelar for not advocating federalism until after the Revolution of September, Castelar replied that he had known federalism from 1848 and had advocated it from 1854. "I have continued the propaganda of the federal republic in two newspapers. I have defended it as the most proper form of government as a professor, studying the two great currents of Spain, that of separation into provinces because every province has its glorious history, and the current of our unity, which has formed this great nation."¹⁸

Pí remained Federalist but Castelar recanted after the career of the Republic. In a speech before the Cortes on February 7, 1888 he declared: "I have corrected my conception of federalism for experience has told me that federalism is a retrocession in respect to the order of nationality; federations may be contained in nationalities already formed but federation cannot be introduced into a nation without risk of dividing and destroying it."¹⁹

¹⁷ Castelar, *Fragmentas de sus Obras*, p. 34

¹⁸ Castelar, *Discursos parlamentarios*, II, 16.

¹⁹ Castelar, *Discurso* (February 7, 1888), p. 39.

UNITY IN VARIETY: FEDERALISM

IV. THE GERM OF CONFEDERATION

The Federalists advocated a federal State system in which the governors of each State and the local assemblies would be elected directly by the people. Here they were following the general scheme of the federal Constitution of the United States. However, we must note this difference between Spanish and American federalism: In Spain, the Republicans generally interpreted the word federal as an alliance of independent States. "By a federal government we understand a government based on an alliance," the Catalan Federalist said. Spain would be reduced to a confederation like the short-lived American Confederation. This interpretation of the federal Constitution of the United States in the light of confederation led to the American Civil War. In the history of the United States only one independent State was admitted in the manner sought by the Spanish Federalists, that State being Texas which was an independent Republic previous to its admission.

In the construction of the American constitution of 1787 the contest was over two points, James Bryce wrote in his *The American Commonwealth*: "The extent to which the several States should be recognized as independent and separate factors in the construction of the national government and the quantity and nature of power which should be withdrawn from the States and vested in that government." It was over the first of these that the struggle came, for the experience of the country had established already the second point. Bryce declares that "every State on entering the Union finally renounces its sovereignty and is now for ever subject to the federal authority as defined by the constitution."²⁰ The Spanish Federalists, on the other hand, meant literally Orense's interpretation of the federal republic: "The government of the people by the people, or more clearly, the government of the provinces by themselves."²¹

The Federalists of Pi's school would have the provinces now a part of United Spain declare themselves independent and then relinquish certain rights to a federal government. Such an expedient would be dangerous even in a nation in which all the populace was literate. In Spain, without previous experience in self-government, with a small percentage of the people literate, with traditions favoring the acceptance

²⁰ James Bryce, *The American Commonwealth* (3d ed., London, 1893), I, 312-313.

²¹ José María Orense, *Ventajas de la República federal* (2d ed., Madrid, 1869).

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

of law from above rather than from below, the experiment was charged with the greatest danger to the nation.

V. THE UNITARIAN THEORY

Eugenio García Ruiz, with almost uncanny prescience, pointed out in his propaganda for the unitary Republicans the difficulties which would beset the Federalists. In his newspaper *El Pueblo* and in pamphlets he contended that federalism had failed in Latin countries and quoted the tumultuous histories of Colombia and Guatemala as proofs that a division into semi-independent States was disastrous.

"I refuse to follow my party on the path to which some senselessly seek to conduct it in order to have a federal republic, because, given the present situation of Spain and of Europe, that would be nothing else than the most horrible anarchy and would bring to pass in a very short time the dismemberment of our country or, what would be the greatest and most disastrous dishonor, the restoration of the Bourbons," he wrote in 1869.

The tendency of Europe was to unite, as seen in Italy and in Germany and yet, he said, Spanish Republicans who then possessed a united country wanted federalism, which must result in disunion and the proclamation of small, petty republics and cantons. In a federal State, Toledo would be at the mercy of the neo-Catholics, Navarre would drive out the liberals—the federal republic would be a veritable Pandora's box.

"Our moral state refuses the federal form of government because we lack the customs which in other countries accommodate one to the laws or better them; because there is not the respect due to property that we see with pleasure and almost with astonishment in other peoples; there is not the tolerance which we ought to have and which will exist with us in time, to be mutually long suffering with our defects and to accommodate ourselves to the weaknesses and faults of other people."

Federalism would destroy religious freedom, it would destroy the growing industrial life of Catalonia, for United Spain allowed free trade which could not exist under forty-nine cantons. A federal state is born, not made, he declared trenchantly. National credit would be injured for the national debt would be endangered in the disunion bound to follow in the wake of a federated republic. Chili, a unitary Republic, was prosperous, he pointed out, while federated republics

UNITY IN VARIETY: FEDERALISM

underwent many vicissitudes. Mexico, he continued, was a failure as a federal state.²²

It was no argument against the unitary republic, he insisted, that unity was achieved by conquest. "Another famous argument in favor of federation is that there are in Spain three or four languages which differ essentially from Castilian. Precisely because the interest, not the national pride, requires that the beautiful Castilian language should be planted in the entire country, unity ought to be preserved." Proudhon, he said, was the father of Spanish federalism. A unitary republic was a guarantee of progress for it insured freedom of thought and belief, would keep the nation intact and would enable the completion of the railway system which a federal republic could not do, he concluded.

"What damage have you done to the cause of the republic with this fatal adjective!!" he lamented.

²² E. García Ruiz, *La República democrática unitaria y la República federal* (Madrid, 1869), p. 3 ff.

CHAPTER NINE

UNITY TO VARIETY: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

I. THE FREEDOM OF THE CHURCH

ALTHOUGH the Republican party had been frustrated in its attempt to proclaim a federal republic as the solution of the Revolution of September, a greater degree of success attended its struggle for freedom of conscience or, as Republicans described it, "freedom of the church."

Republicanism was the most characteristic mark of the approach to the New Spain. Its protagonists conceded that Spain had declined as a great nation; they wanted to revive it. They realized that Spain no longer exercised influence in the world of affairs commensurate with its history and right; they wanted to create a new society and so restore the respect of the world to their nation. They proposed federalism as the incentive to political regeneration; they sought freedom of the conscience as the guarantee of intellectual revival.

It was the struggle for religious freedom which precipitated the most famous address in the history of Spanish parliamentary life, that of Emilio Castelar in reply to Canon Vicente de Manterola in the Cortes Constituyentes of 1869. It was the herculean effort to proclaim religious freedom, the separation of church and state, which accentuated the end of feudal Spain and the beginning of New Spain.

The Catholic church was the richest and the most powerful institution in Spain. Even more so than the monarchy it represented the thread that tied the diverse nationalities comprising Spain into a unified whole. Just as the Republicans proposed to destroy the political union through federalism so did they propose to cut the spiritual union by permitting man to worship as he pleased.

The Pope had long exercised an influence in Spanish affairs greater than that of the king. Now, in 1869 the struggle resolved itself around the challenge of the young and aggressive Republican party to the most conservative of modern Popes, Pius IX, the handsome Count Mastai-Ferretti. Now seventy-seven years old, Pius IX had set

UNITY TO VARIETY: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

his face against the modern age, whether it was represented in politics, science, education or modern living. Once he had been tempted to look with some favor on liberal political institutions in the Papal State of Rome. When it had required the armies of Austria, France and Spain to restore him to the Vatican after that experiment, he resolutely turned from further experimentation with the dread heresies. He shut himself in the bitter shell of reaction. He it was who gave the highest sanction to the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin Mary. He it was who within several months was to declare the Pope infallible. Pius IX was the mitred ruler of Spain.

The basis of the Catholic church in Spain at this time rested on the Concordat concluded with Pius in 1851. This Concordat declared that "the Catholic Apostolic Roman religion, to the exclusion of every other cult, continues to be the sole religion of the Spanish nation and will be conserved always in the dominions of His Catholic Majesty with all the rights and prerogatives which it ought to enjoy according to the law of God and that ordained by the sacred canons."¹

The state contributed to the maintenance of the Catholic clergy. No other faith could publicly profess its doctrines. Education both public and private must conform to the church. Marriage was a sacred rite which must be performed by the church. Burial of Protestants even had not been permitted until a royal decree in 1831 made it possible. Much of the wealth of Spain was concentrated in the coffers of the church. As Spain from year to year became poorer, the church either grew in affluence or retained its financial strength. Monasteries and religious institutions were in every city and hamlet. Schools, on the contrary, were few and in the main, poor.

Pius IX, to recapitulate his displeasure at the trend of modern society, had emphasized his divorce from his era in the celebrated Syllabus of 1864, issued December 8, supplemented by condemnation of "errors"—practically all the advances of modern civilization. Pius condemned as "dangerous errors" socialism and communism. He reiterated the dogma of the church that the Catholic religion was the only true religion. He reaffirmed that education must be that approved and given by the church. He opposed civil marriage, the separation

¹ Pedro Salgado, *Observaciones sobre las Cartas dirigidas por el Sr. D.E.C. al Ilmo. Sr. Obispo de Tarazona* (Madrid, 1865), p. 6.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

of church and state. He approved again the temporal power of the church.²

Thus the church was not the goal of the road to progress. As early as the beginning of the century a spirit of questioning could be discerned. "Superstition and hypocrisy are the natural and necessary consequences of intolerance," Nicolás Salmerón observed in 1865.³ In 1822 J. Blanco White, ordained a Catholic priest, later an Anglican priest and then a Unitarian minister, had remarked this same result of unified religion in his interesting *Letters from Spain*: "Religion, or, if you please, superstition, is so intimately blended with the whole system of public and domestic life in Spain, that I fear I shall tire you with the perpetual recurrence to the subject. . . . If, however, you wish to become thoroughly acquainted with the national character of my country, you must learn the character of the national religion. The influence of religion in Spain is boundless. It divides the whole population into two comprehensive classes, bigots and dissemblers. Do not, however, mistake me. I am very far from wishing to libel my countrymen. If I use these invidious words, it is not that I believe every Spaniard either a downright bigot or a hypocrite; yet I cannot shut my eyes to the melancholy fact, that the system under which we live must unavoidably give, even to the best among us, a taint of those vices. Where the law threatens every dissenter from such an encroaching system of divinity as that of the Church of Rome, with death and infamy—where every individual is not only invited, but enjoined, at the peril of both body and soul, to assist in enforcing the law; must not an undue and tyrannical influence accrue to the believing party? Are not such as disbelieve in secret, condemned to a life of degrading deference, or of heart-burning silence? Silence, did I say? No; every day, every hour, renews the necessity of explicitly declaring yourself what you are not. The most contemptible individual may, at pleasure, force out a lie from an honestly proud bosom."⁴

Blanco White sought refuge in England from the doubts which arose in his bosom in 1800. The Republicans remained in Spain to confront the all-powerful church. Practically all of the great Repub-

² *L'Osservatore Romano* (Sabato 24 Dicembre, 1864), anno 4, num. 295, p. 1169.

³ Antonio Llopolis y Pérez, *Historia política y parlamentaria de D. Nicolás Salmerón y Alonso* (Madrid, 1915), p. 748.

⁴ Leucadio Doblado (J. Blanco White), *Letters from Spain* (2d ed., London, 1825), p. 7.

UNITY TO VARIETY: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

lican leaders opposed the coercion of conscience, some of them like Castelar, doing so not from the basis of belief but from determined opposition to union of church and state. The Republican party as a whole opposed the Catholic church solely from its political dogma, not from its dogma of faith.

Although he regarded himself a true Christian, Castelar came early to quarrel with the church. No other Republican leader proclaimed his beliefs on such a high moral plane as Castelar, who began his brilliant crusade for toleration in his newspaper with his *Letters to a Bishop upon the Freedom of the Church*. These letters were the logical conclusion to his lectures in the Ateneo on "Civilization in the First Five Centuries of Christianity," both in their style and thought. Catalan Republicans had published a *Democratic Almanac* at Barcelona in 1864 and in March of that year issued a defense of it in a pamphlet *Los autores del Almanaque democrático a sus conciudadanos*. The writers of the folleto included Francisco Suñer y Capdevila who shocked sedate Catholicism with his cry of "War on God!" and Juan Tutau, both prominent Republicans. The Bishop of Tarazona took offense at the Almanac and asked the Queen to invoke the civil power to protect the church against such attacks. In their folleto the Catalans had written regarding the restrictions of the church: "We are free thinkers, because we are men, because we have not abdicated to any person the right of thinking for ourselves."⁵ Castelar made the Bishop's protest the occasion for appealing for toleration. He addressed his letters to the Bishop, partly in reply to the latter's protest to the Queen and partly, to escape the press censorship.

The restriction of individual liberty as made mandatory by the Concordat of 1851 was distasteful to Castelar. Christ had preached toleration, he often repeated. While admitting the necessity of religion, Castelar contended that evil results had attended the state religion in Spain, because its power lay, not in the conscience, but in the law, not in the spirit but in the state.⁶

"The Divine Cross represents a renovation in the entire life of humanity," he had written in 1859. "For the family it is the instrument in which the tyranny of the father ended and in which woman

⁵ Rodríguez-Solís, II, 560.

⁶ Castelar, *Cartas á un Obispo sobre la Libertad de la Iglesia* (Madrid, 1864), p. 20.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

recovered her lost dignity.”⁷ The church had been free in its best days and should become a church eminently national now, he said. “The Pontificate cannot be a Pontificate without having temporal power.”⁸ Castelar believed the temporal power to be damaging to the Papacy, for from it kings derived their idea of divine right. Spain’s support of Papal temporal power was a hindrance to her prestige in Europe. “Our European policies are null and impotent because they are saturated with the neo-Catholic virus.”⁹ He thought the neo-Catholics had done most damage to the religious spirit of the country. Writing in the *Letters* he declared: “This school does not try to restore that which is immortal in religion; no, it tries to restore the feudal castle, the privilege which equality has devoured, the monstrous codes of the Middle Ages.”

“Is there the right today to impose religion by force? Omar says yes; Christ says no!” he wrote the Bishop. Castelar declared that it was impossible to coerce the conscience. There were three solutions open to the problem: The state might submit to the church, with a theocracy resulting; or the church might submit to the state, and an autocracy remain; or both might be declared free and independent of each other. Castelar demanded the last solution in the *Letters*: “To practice liberty in its sphere, the church ought not be in politics, either dominating or dominated, neither the mistress of the state nor its servant; *nec regnum nec instrumentum regni*.”¹⁰ He did not see any reason why democracy and the church should not be compatible in such circumstances, for “from all Christian arts one deduces a great political truth, that Christianity is the religion most democratic.”¹¹

The Republicans like Castelar were always anti-clerical in Spain, a natural result of the support accorded the Catholic church by the throne as well as the maintenance of the power of the throne by the church. Clerics had always occupied a position of great power at the court and attained their greatest ascendancy during Isabel’s reign when Sor Patrocineo and Padre Claret held control of the court’s spiritual destinies. John Hay, the Secretary of the American Legation in Ma-

⁷ Castelar, *Recuerdos y Esperanzas*, I, 16.

⁸ Castelar, *Miscelánea de Historia, de Religión, de Arte y de Política* (Madrid, 1874), p. 5.

⁹ Castelar, *Cuestiones políticas*, II, 113.

¹⁰ Castelar, *Cartas*, p. 8, 40.

¹¹ Castelar, *Recuerdos y Esperanzas*, I, 39.

UNITY TO VARIETY: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

drid in 1870 wrote of the power of the clergy: "The respect shown for the priesthood is marvelous, in view of the profligate lives of many. And it needs but a glance at the vile manual of confession called *The Golden Key*, the author of which is the well known Padre Claret, confessor to the Queen, to see the systematic moral poisoning the minds of Spanish women must undergo, who pay due attention to what is called their religious duties. If a confessor obeys the injunctions of this high ecclesiastical authority, his fair penitents will have nothing to learn from a diligent perusal of Faublas or Casanova."¹²

Castelar's lectures in the Ateneo had been criticized by Juan Manuel Ortí y Lara, Professor of Philosophy in the Institute of Granada, as reflecting the pantheism of the German philosophers, of whom he thought Castelar had become too devoted a disciple.¹³ Ortí piously dedicated his book to the "Purest Virgin Mary, Mother of God!" Pedro Salgado, once editor of *La Razón Católica*, attacked Castelar's lectures in a pamphlet, revealing the real fear of the neo-Catholics in his statement that the logical result of the emancipation of reason, as sought by Castelar, would be the introduction of Protestantism, "that devastating plague."

When the Syllabus of Pius appeared in December, 1864, other Republicans were aroused to protest. Salmerón in *La Revista Democrática* declared that "It is an uncontestable certainty that Spain succumbed miserably under the lethal breath of theocracy." "From that moment in which a free and inviolate conscience is recognized, raising the human personality to the sublime ministry of reason, new ends will be announced in the horizon of life."¹⁴

The Republican party was as a whole Catholic in spirit. In the sphere of politics it was eminently anti-Catholic. The Revolution of September was believed by the Republicans of the South to have ended the absolute political control of the church. Protestant schools and churches were opened in certain cities like Seville. Monasteries were

¹² Hay, *Castilian Days*, p. 41. A modern biography of this remarkable woman, Sor Patrocineo, appears in "Vidas Españolas y Hispano-Americanas del Siglo XIX" by Benjamín Jarnés, *Sor Patrocineo, la monja de las Llagas* (Madrid, Espasa-Calpe). Juan Ortéga Rubio in his *Historia de España*, Vol. VI, reproduces many letters exchanged between Isabel and the nun, pp. 386-437.

¹³ J. M. Ortí y Lara, *La Sofistería democrática, o Examen de las Lecciones de E.C. acerca de la Civilización en los cinco primeros Siglos de la Iglesia* (Granada, 1861), p. 3.

¹⁴ Llopsi y Pérez, *op. cit.*, p. 745.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

closed, church property was confiscated and religious orders were disbanded.

Although the provisional government of 1868 undertook to procure for Spain a measured freedom in religion, the Constitution of 1869 proposed the continuance of the church-state in Article Twenty-one, which stated:

"The nation is obligated to maintain the faith and the ministers of the Catholic religion;

"The public and private exercise of whatever other faith remains guaranteed to all foreigners residing in Spain, without other restrictions than the universal rules of morality and of right;

"If other Spaniards profess a religion other than the Catholic they shall be accorded the same treatment as provided in the foregoing [paragraph]."

It was this Article which created the celebrated debate between Manterola and Castelar.

II. THE GOD OF TOLERATION

The church resisted strenuously all efforts to dislodge it from its pre-eminent position. The decrees of the provisional government October 18, 1868 dissolving the Holy Orders brought sharp protest from the bishops. The Bishop of Córdoba called attention to the contradictory attitude of the government which made religion free and at the same time repressed it. The Bishop of Barcelona protested because the nation, essentially Catholic, was losing the force of religion offered "to woman to elevate her from the frivolities and vanities of the world."

The church through its lay organizations actively entered the campaign for the election of Deputies to the Cortes Constituyentes of 1869. The Catholic Junta of Madrid urged that only Catholics loyal to the church be elected to the Cortes so that "we will win the elections, the majority of the Cortes will be Catholic and Catholic unity will be assured and we will have saved the eternal principles that are fundamental to all society and particularly that of Spain."

"*In Spain,*" wrote a number of noted Spanish women to Serrano, "*there are none who believe in false gods; all of us adore the true God, all of us are Catholics; the government over which you preside has recognized it and confessed it on various and repeated occasions. The national will rejects consequently every impious doctrine, every sect. If*

UNITY TO VARIETY: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

*your Excellency, if the provisional government destroys the Catholic unity and gives liberty to false creeds, you will destroy violently the national will which you have proclaimed as the motto on the flag you have unfurled."*¹⁵

As a result of all this activity, thousands of protests were sent to the Cortes Constituyentes and a petition containing three million names was presented demanding that religious toleration be not granted.¹⁶

The Republicans on their part had not been inactive and they called a meeting in the Campos Elíseos January 31, 1869 to discuss religious toleration. Castelar echoed Republican sentiment when he urged: "Don't ask for toleration, take it!"

The debate over Article Twenty-one of the Constitution was at times bitter. Garrido's clearly spoken agnosticism brought remonstrances from the President of the Cortes; García Ruiz's exposition of his belief in a unitary God brought tart response from loyalist Catholics. Pí y Margall gave a philosophic definition of God as "the eternal unknown of the intelligence." Even liberal Catholics were outraged when the atheistic Suñer y Capdevila denied the original purity of the Virgin Mary, asserted that Jesus Christ had brothers and was not Divine and when he shouted defiantly "*¡Guerra á Dios!*"¹⁷

The church had taken exception to Castelar's statement November 13 of the preceding year at the Circo de Price that between liberty and the Faith he had elected liberty. The Carlista Deputy, Canon Vicente de Manterola was offended at remarks Castelar made March 7 in an address against the constitutional project. Toleration in any form was extremely distasteful to the Canon of Vitoria. He believed that "liberalism consists in the rebellion of society against God. Liberalism in political society is tantamount to Protestantism in individuals." His ideal of government was Carlista absolutism which would not be despotic because it would be Christian. "Less politics, more Christianity," was his political formula. To the puzzled Canon, Spain, with its impious demands for toleration and democratic government, was a "great den of maniacs."¹⁸

When Manterola April 12 expressed his displeasure at Castelar's

¹⁵ Vilarrasa y Gatell, I, 495 ff.

¹⁶ La Fuente, II, 321; Villalba Hervás, p. 42.

¹⁷ Vilarrasa y Gatell, I, 618-635; Villalba Hervás, p. 44.

¹⁸ Manterola, *El Espíritu carlista* (Madrid, 1871), p. 7.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

references to the Papacy and the church, the Republican orator replied with a speech that thrilled Spain, even though it did not persuade.

Castelar began his speech by welcoming the presence of the clergy in the Chamber as the expression of the new tolerant democracy. He admonished Manterola to remember St. Paul's dictum: *nihil tam voluntarium quam religio*.

"The state does not have, should not and cannot have, a religion," he stated. "The state does not confess, it does not commune, it does not die!"

Manterola appealed to the coercive support of the state in the name of Catholicism and of Christianity. History has never realized its two great dreams, one nation and one religion for all, Castelar said. The Manterolas sought to return to the theory of the pagans—to make the church an instrument of fear. Castelar regretted the expulsion of the Jews and denied Manterola's insinuation that they did nothing for Spain. He gave as examples of the Jews of Spanish origin who achieved fame: Disraeli, Manin and Spinoza. "Does Señor Manterola believe that the Jews of today are those who crucified Christ? I do not believe it; I am more Christian than that. I believe in justice and in the Divine mercy."

His peroration was fervid and eloquent.

"Great is the God on Sinai; the thunderbolt precedes Him, lightning accompanies Him, fire envelops Him, the earth trembles, the mountains crumble. But there is a God far greater, far greater still, who is not the majestic God of Sinai but the humble God of Calvary, nailed on a cross, wounded, bruised, crowned with thorns, with gall pressed to his lips, saying despite this: 'Father, pardon them, forgive them that torture me, forgive them that persecute me, for they know not what they do!'"

*"Great is the religion of power but greater by far is the religion of love; great is the religion of implacable justice but even greater is the religion of merciful forgiveness; and in the name of the Evangel, I come here to ask that you write in your fundamental code religious freedom, which is liberty, fraternity, equality among all men."*¹⁹

Tense Deputies became delirious with enthusiasm. They rushed forward from all parts of the Chamber, some to congratulate the orator, others to embrace him. Other Deputies wept, so moved were they.

¹⁹ Castelar, *Discursos parlamentarios*, 1, 267, 270, 288.

UNITY TO VARIETY: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

Ministers applauded frantically. The Conservative Posada Herrera embraced Castelar, crying fervently "in forty years of parliamentary life I have never seen such a triumph." Topete's eyes were filled with tears. Some newspapers published special editions with the speech and descriptions of its effects. One newspaper described the speech as a bomb destroying with one blow the enemy's camp.²⁰ The reactionary *La Gorda* said: "Señor Castelar, eager to despoil the Catholic church, was applauded in a manner as exaggerated as if by the most fanatic Protestants."²¹

Although Article Twenty-one was adopted, a greater measure of toleration was assured. Thus the Catholic faith of sixteen million Spaniards was sacrificed to foreign whims, sighed *La Gorda*, and through one who said the most barbaric things against the Faith. The Ministry had already issued a permit to open a Protestant church in Madrid. In Seville more than four hundred students attended a Protestant school. Madrid booksellers under the new dispensation displayed and sold Bibles.²² But the new order was to find its progress slow: Even in 1873 a Spanish newspaper suggested that Protestants were stealing Catholic children.²³

Dimly seen on the distant horizon of Progress of the New Spain was the God of toleration.

²⁰ Lauser, *Geschichte Spaniens*, I, 153; ¡*El Triunfo!* Notas críticas al discurso más aplaudido del Sr. Castelar en la Cuestión Religiosa (Madrid, 1870), p. 3. Castelar in his speech to the Cortes February 7, 1888, p. 41, says that the speech "was heard among the acclamations of that Assembly which will always sparkle in its annals."

²¹ *La Gorda* (April 15, 1869).

²² Augustus J. C. Hare, *Wanderings in Spain* (5th ed., London), p. 128, 218.

²³ Hay, *op. cit.*, p. 204.

CHAPTER TEN

IN SEARCH OF THE "KING X"

I. POSSIBLE CANDIDATES

THE revolutionary generals encountered greater difficulty than they had anticipated in seeking a king for Spain. While the debates on the constitution were going on, they were seeking from among the royal families of Europe an acceptable prince.

There were many claimants. From the dynastic viewpoint Don Alfonso, son of Isabel, had strongest claim to the throne. Though he was the candidate of the Moderates, it was yet too early to talk of his restoration. Don Carlos VII had a twofold claim, one based on the fact that the long-observed law of the Bourbons had been the Salic succession, the other on the fact that the Queen, Isabel, had left Spain. There were two other Bourbon claimants or possible candidates. Don Enrique de Borbón was a Republican and so was out of the question. He was killed in a duel with the Duque de Montpensier, Antonio de Orleans, who himself laid claim to the crown through his wife, Isabel's sister. The Unión Liberal was cordial to Montpensier. Prim sought a liberal monarch either in Portugal, as a pan-Iberian, or in an established royal family. There was an element wanting Espartero, the Duque de la Victoria, to be king. Some voices were raised to restore Isabel.

The leaders of the Revolution were not agreed on who should be king. Isabel had not as yet abdicated her rights and this added to the confusion. Serrano, the Regent, was at one time reported not to be averse to establishing a Serrano dynasty. The Regency was too important to be the private possession of any one party; this jealousy showed itself in the search for the king, when both the Progressives and the Democrats made it known that they shared in the Regency.

When the Bourbon legitimists admitted that there was no probability of restoring Isabel to the throne, the Queen renounced her rights in favor of her son, the Infante Alfonso, who was now in training for the kingship in France, and later, in Sandhurst, England. In a dig-

IN SEARCH OF THE "KING X"

nified statement June 25, 1870 Isabel recounted her misfortunes and the strange destiny that had found thousands of heroic soldiers acclaiming her name when a child and that had ended her career after thirty-five years an exile, the result of party strife. Isabel declared she would retain control over Alfonso's education until such time as he would be proclaimed king by a government and a Cortes named by the legitimate votes of the people.

"Alfonso XII will be from today your real king; a Spanish king and the king of the Spanish, not the king of a party. Love him with the same sincerity with which he loves you; respect and protect his youth with the unbreakable strength of your generous hearts, while I, with feverish petition, pray the Almighty to give many days of peace and prosperity to Spain and to grant my innocent son beneficence, wisdom, prudence, rectitude in government and greater fortune on the throne than that acquired by his unfortunate mother, who was your queen, Isabel," the renunciation concluded.

The decree accompanying it stated that Isabel was renouncing the throne of her free will, without coercion and that she had been Queen "by the grace of God and by the Constitution of the Kingdom of Spain promulgated in the year 1845."¹

A fortnight prior to Isabel's abdication, Prim told the Cortes that he would never, never consent to the restoration of Don Alfonso. "Has anyone been able to figure that I aspire to be the Monk of the restoration? I, gentlemen, want to be the Monk of liberty."

Isabel's restoration was out of the question; Alfonso's was very doubtful; shortly before Isabel's renunciation Montpensier killed Don Enrique and so removed himself as a claimant for the throne. Duque Antonio had held a very unsatisfactory conference with the Unionists early in February, 1869 when he made his appearance in Madrid. Later, Castelar bitterly assailed him for retaining the rank of captain general. Topete, in replying to Castelar, stated that he preferred Montpensier to a republic. Don Enrique's hatred of Antonio could not be contained and on March 7, 1870 he issued a bitter attack on his enemy. The "arrogant French pastrycook" challenged his wife's cousin as a consequence. The two Bourbons met in a duel on the morning of March 12 in the meadows of Carabanchel. Enrique fired and missed. Montpensier fired, the bullet lodging in Enrique's right temple. En-

¹ Vilarrasa y Gatell, II, 98.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

rique's stormy and unhappy life was over. Montpensier, filled with vain regret, tearfully flung himself over the fallen duelist's body, vowing to care for the Bourbon's two children.

The Carlistas began renewed activity. Isabel's departure had vacated the throne she had held illegally, in their view. At the worst, the Revolution could pave the way for a republic which in turn would yield to the Catholic and legitimate monarchy, that of Carlos. Aparisi y Guijarro raised the question of Carlos VII's right to the throne in a folleto called *The Dynastic Question* and in another *The King of Spain*. Aparisi regarded Carlos as the choice of the legitimists but insisted that the throne be attained without a civil war—a vain hope. The young Pretender, Don Carlos, Duque de Madrid, was the grandson of Carlos V.

Aparisi recounted a conversation with the Pretender that indicated that Carlism had not advanced with the times but was still the anachronism characteristic of so much of Spanish politics.

"To be king of Spain requires the co-operation of all men of probity and merit," Carlos told Aparisi.

"If I am king, I will not permit either directly or indirectly the faith of our fathers to be attacked. The church will be free. The doctrines of the Evangel ought to refresh our institutions and our laws. Were I English or French it is clear that I would admit or preserve freedom of beliefs or religious toleration; but having it in Spain is absurd. I do not think there are Protestants in Spain; and if there are any, they are such within their homes, doubtless because the dwelling of the Spaniard is very respectable and every Spaniard is a king within his home.

*"I am very young; I have studied history more than I have the political sciences and I have need of the experiences and ideas of all; although I am convinced that to establish a fundamental law I must convene the Cortes of the kingdom. This I promised in my letter to the sovereigns. The fundamental law obligates all and primarily, the king; but it is necessary that the king be king and not the editor responsible to the parties."*²

It was not long before the partisans of the soft-spoken Pretender were shedding the blood of fellow Catholics to restore him to the throne of San Fernando and so restore the Middle Ages in Spain.

² *Ibid*, I, 445.

IN SEARCH OF THE "KING X"

The Republicans incessantly kept up a furious assault, not only on the monarchical principle but upon the candidatures themselves. Castelar, leading oratorical foe of the royalist parties, had mentioned his opposition to kings in letters to Prim during his period of emigration. In a letter to Prim September 29, 1866 he had said that Montpensier was impossible because he "is French, Bourbon, married to the Infanta, brother-in-law to the Queen, a conspirator and a revolutionary."³ An English prince would not do, he continued, because of his Protestantism and also because, as a shrewd French observer had remarked, an English prince would make his entry into Spain through Gibraltar. Ceaselessly in speeches in the Cortes Castelar reiterated his intense opposition to the kingship. "The king we will never accept!" he told the Cortes June 7, 1869. He had made a notable attack on the monarchical institution in his speech in connection with the civic festivities of Madrid on the Dos de Mayo, 1869. Republican demonstrators paraded the streets of the capital and when they reached the Puerta del Sol they greeted the flag of the United States flying from the balcony of the American Legation with cheers and when the American Minister appeared, waving a small flag, the people became frantic and called for Castelar to speak. Then as always that year, he denounced the monarchy and appealed for a republic. The crown of Spain was too large to be worn on the head of one man, he told the Cortes. While agreeing with the Progressives in their efforts to unite Spain and Portugal, he declared that the method of doing so should be by the federal republic, a plan desired by both countries.

II. THE CANDIDATURES

Prim, real force of the Revolution of September, thought at first of obtaining a prince from England but this candidature proved untenable to his partisans and never reached the stage of a proposal to Queen Victoria. Dom Luis, King of Portugal, was next approached but Luis refused the offer. Fernando de Coburgo, former Regent of Portugal and consort of Queen María was then considered and a commission was being prepared to make a formal offer when Fernando telegraphed the Portuguese Minister at Madrid that he could not accept the crown if it were voted him nor would he receive the commission. The Portuguese union appealed to some Progressives so much that they considered a union like that of Austria and Hungary, by

³ Castelar, *Historia*, II, 333.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

which the king could remain in Lisbon. This, of course, would have been an impossible arrangement to the Spaniards, proudest of Europeans.

The Portuguese candidatures had been broached in 1869. Late that year Duque Tomás de Génova, a youth of fifteen years, was suggested. At once, the problem of who would be the regent, Serrano or the leaders of all three parties, became of vital importance. A regency of Serrano, Prim and Rivero was suggested; others proposed that Tomás marry a daughter of Montpensier and allow the Duke to serve as a regent, along with Serrano and Rivero. The question of the regency did not reach the point where it involved the parties of the Revolution in quarrel. A meeting of the majority of the Cortes on October 1, 1869 revealed the divergence of opinion existing among the parties. The Unionists voted against Tomás. The Progressives voted for him. On October 30 another census was taken, at which Prim urged that the youth of the candidate was to his advantage, since it would enable him to learn Spanish customs and become in reality Spanish before reaching his majority and that he came from one of the most liberal families in Europe. The proposal again was greeted with marked acerbity by the Unionists. If a child must be chosen king, Ardanaz declared, he preferred Alfonso. Francisco Salmerón y Alonso, brother of Nicolás Salmerón, declared for Espartero. Another Deputy spoke for Montpensier. The Progressives prevailed, however, and Tomás received 120 votes to 52 against him. At the October 1 meeting there had been 78 votes cast against him and only 117 for him. These votes were informal and not the official action of the Cortes. The Progressives prepared to win the provinces to the Duke's candidacy. Ruiz Zorrilla spoke in several of the provincial cities but as he approached the South he encountered strong Republican opposition, while at Barcelona a bomb was thrown at his carriage as he proceeded from the railway station to the city hall. In the meantime the *Times* of London stated that the Conde de Rapallo, Tomás's father, was opposed to having Tomás occupy the Spanish throne. Prim attached no importance to the statement. Later, Rapallo himself stated that the *Times* had been correct.

The Genovese candidacy thus ending in refusal, the Progressives turned again to Portugal. Dom Luis had been most explicit in his previous rejection: "I am born Portuguese and I want to die Portu-

IN SEARCH OF THE "KING X"

guese." He revealed the same type of mentality that actuated the ultra-Spanish patriots. Dom Fernando, who likewise had stated positively that he did not want to be considered, was urged again to become king. But Fernando, whom Castelar called Fernando the Impossible, refused as firmly as in the previous instance. The Progressives then suggested to Dom Luis that his eldest son be chosen king of Spain, with Fernando as regent. This proposal was rejected. Finding no sympathy for their offer at the court, an attempt was made to arouse the Portuguese peasantry in favor of the union but the serious disorders that followed caused the press of Portugal to protest furiously. The Portuguese government demanded of Fernández de los Rios, the Minister at Lisbon, a disavowal of any intention to force union through rebellion in their country, while the Portuguese Parliament unanimously rejected union. Spain was forced to deny that it had had any part in the disorders of May 19, 1870, thus confessing that the Portuguese candidatures were finally at an end.

Baldomero Espartero, the Duque de la Victoria, formerly regent of the Kingdom, to whom Isabel had sought to turn for aid at her first alarms during the Revolution of September and to whom for the moment she had contemplated entrusting Alfonso, was now advanced as a serious contender for the throne when thirty-eight Democratic members of the Cortes, including Francisco Salmerón and General Contreras, later to be president of the Spanish Federation set up in opposition to the Republic of Madrid, appealed to the nation to elect Espartero king. Espartero was now seventy-seven years old and for a number of years had been living in retirement.

The manifesto referred to him as the "anchor of salvation." "Espartero alone will be able to wear the crown of Spain with the applause of the nation, for the world is satisfied with his valor, history with his virtues and the Revolution with his prestige." This manifesto was issued May 30, 1870.

The venerable Duke, however, replied again as he had answered Adolfo Seirullo, who, in a folleto *Spain for Espartero* published in 1868, had urged the nation to call the soldier to the throne: "With your affectionate letter of the tenth I have received the well-written folleto that you have published and I give you the most expressive thanks for your favors; but all the world knows that personal vanity has al-

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

ways been foreign to my nature and that my ambition has never known other motive than the well-being of the nation."

Salazar y Mazarredo, a widely traveled man and acquainted with many princes, had advanced the candidacy of Leopold Hohenzollern Sigmaringen, member of that branch of the Hohenzollern family which had supplied King Charles of Rumania to European harmony. Leopold was thirty-five years old, a devout Catholic and a man of culture. In his favor also was the fact that he spoke Spanish. In his disfavor was the fact that he was a grandson of Napoleon Bonaparte's sister who had married Joachim Murat. And Leopold as king of Spain would unconsciously have reminded his subjects of that unpleasant era when Murat commanded a French army occupying Spain. Finally, the Spaniard on the street could not pronounce "Sigmaringen" and that was fatal. Salazar was commissioned by Prim, however, to negotiate secretly with the young Prussian. In Germany the question was finally settled favorably for Spain when William I, to whom the matter came as a "bolt from the blue," consented to treat the matter as one concerning the Hohenzollern family rather than the state. Karl Anton, Leopold's father, demanded that the election be by a two-thirds to a three-fourths majority of the Cortes. He insisted also that security against national bankruptcy be given and all anti-clerical legislation be passed before Leopold ascended the throne.

Salazar's indiscretion destroyed his good work. Overjoyed with the news of Leopold's tentative acceptance, Salazar hurried back to Madrid. Prim was absent from Madrid at the time but the enthusiastic emissary told several parliamentary leaders the news and thus it was known all over Madrid before Prim was aware that a favorable answer had been given. At the same time, Princess Mary of Baden, Leopold's aunt and an ardent friend of the Carlistas, telegraphed her nephew's decision to Don Carlos's wife in Paris; and the Carlistas quickly announced the news to France. Napoleon III, who had regarded the Montpensier candidature as directed against himself, considered that of Leopold as directed against the French nation.

When Mercier, the French Minister, presented Napoleon's objections to Prim, the latter in great disgust cried: "Take a *Gotha Almanac* yourself and see if you can find an acceptable prince in it!" It was as Prim had told Castelar: "Finding a democratic king on earth is like finding an atheistic king in heaven!"

IN SEARCH OF THE "KING X"

Napoleon had approached Bismarck in March regarding the rumors of the Hohenzollern candidacy but Bismarck had then replied that neither the King of Prussia nor the Prince's father were favorable to the project. When the Cortes adjourned in July, Prim had assured the Deputies that he had no candidate in view. Prim and Salazar alone were privy in Spain to the conduct of the negotiations. Despite the furore aroused, the Council of Ministers accepted Leopold's candidacy unanimously when it met July 4. France protested energetically to Prussia and to England. The Spanish Cabinet was not concerned by the European dismay. Sagasta sent a circular letter to the diplomatic representatives of Spain, expressing great satisfaction at the conclusion of the arduous search for a king and stating that the government had great hopes that the Cortes "would name him king by a great majority, thus closing the glorious constitutional period that began in September, 1868." The Ministers were preparing to summon the Cortes for a vote on the candidate when it was announced July 12 that Leopold had withdrawn his name from consideration.

"El Rey X" was thus indirectly the cause of a war between France and Prussia. And once again, European powers had intervened against the best interests of Spain. In many ways, Leopold would have been the best solution to the problem of establishing a new dynasty from the monarchical viewpoint. Despite the just resentment the Spanish government felt toward France for its interference, Spain obtained no satisfaction.⁴

III. ELECTION OF AMADEO

Prior to the Hohenzollern candidature and after the failure of the second Portuguese negotiations, Prim had approached Amadeo, Duque de Aosta and son of Victor Emmanuel of Italy. The proposal was dropped when the Italian King did not look with favor on it. Now the question was reopened and pushed to a quick conclusion.

Francisco de Paula Montemar, the Spanish Minister at Florence, pressed for a favorable answer early in August, 1870. Victor Emman-

⁴ Muñiz, Vol. II; Vilarrasa y Gatell, Vol. II; Castelar, *Historia*, Vol. II; Septenville, *Le Portugal e l'Unité Iberique* (Paris, 1873), p. 20; Villalba Hervás; *Correspondence of William I and Bismarck* (London, 1903), I, 123-127; Maisson, *Le Parti Hispano-Prussien* (Paris, 1871), pp. 10-14; Lauser, *Geschichte Spaniens*, I, 221-224; Léonardon, *Prim*; Dr. Hermann Hesselbarth, *Drei Psychologische Fragen zur Thronkandidatur Leopold's von Hohenzollern* (Leipzig, 1915); Seirullo, *España por Espartero* (Madrid, 1868), p. 29.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

uel demanded a poll of the Powers, lest he be thought ambitious. Prim then obtained favorable answers, since the Powers were interested in retaining the monarchical principle in Spain. The provisional French government replied that it would be satisfied with the action of the Cortes, while Prussia repeated that it did not intend to interfere with the internal affairs of Spain, as France had done prior to the Franco-Prussian War.

Victor Emmanuel conducted a plebiscite of the princes of his house. On October 31 Montemar was able to telegraph Prim that Amadeo had permitted his name to be advanced as a candidate for king of Spain. On November 2, 1870, the formal text of Amadeo's acceptance was received in Madrid: "With the assent of the King, my father, I authorize you to reply to Marshal Prim that he may present my candidature, if he thinks my name can unite the friends of liberty, order and the constitutional regime. I will accept the crown of Spain if the will of the Cortes proves to me that this is the will of the nation."⁵

Amadeo's acceptance ended Prim's long and arduous search for a king. The difficulties he faced in Republican opposition and conservative querulousness did not deter him. Prim would not hear of a republic. "It is very difficult to create a republic in a country where there are no republicans," he told Castelar in the Cortes.⁶

Opposition to the new Italian candidate was carried on in the same fashion as against Prim's previous ventures. The Marqués de Miraflores presented a petition to the Cortes containing fifty-nine names, principally those of notables, protesting against Amadeo's candidature and presenting the name of Alfonso, Prince of Asturias. "Dynasties which do not have their origins in the history of a country and are not the expression of right or of universal sentiment, appear condemned by God to debility and impotence and rarely attain a long life," the petition warned.⁷

Prim greeted Amadeo's consent with relief: "We have a king for the well-being of the country and of liberty," he said on November 3, on notifying formally the Cortes of the candidature of the Duque de Aosta.⁸ On that night Topete pleaded for Montpensier; Contreras de-

⁵ Muñiz, II, 121-171; Vilarrasa y Gatell, II, 266-297; Villalba Hervás, p. 97.

⁶ Villalba Hervás, p. 102.

⁷ Miraflores, *Candidatura del Duque de Aosta* (Madrid, 1870), p. 8.

⁸ Cordero y Caravantes, *Sagasta* (Madrid, 1884), p. 11.

IN SEARCH OF THE "KING X"

clared he would not vote for a foreign king. Castelar, immediately following Prim's speech presenting Amadeo's name, moved a vote of censure on Prim's policy.

Castelar bitterly deplored Prim's various excursions in hunting a king. "What do you say of a nation which in the month of July has a German king and in the month of October an Italian king?" he asked scornfully. He portrayed the difficulties facing the young man: The clergy would not obey a king who was the guarantor of religious liberty; the monarchy could not be stable, for a younger generation was growing up, educated under Democratic influence; legitimists would not support him, for they were divided between Carlos and Alfonso; even the liberal royalists were divided, some wanting Montpensier, others Espartero.

"If your king had been born of a victory, if your king had brought an aggrandizement of the country, if your king had resulted from the suggestion of popular will, your king might inspire that moral respect which we would be unable to break down. But when your king represents a diplomatic cabal, the intrigue of a party, when he has no national, no democratic, appeal, no appeal to glory, we are unable to avoid the coming revolutionary punishments, the fate of institutions which forget reason and right."

Having pointed out the deficiencies of the new monarchy, Castelar predicted its fate: "When the foreign king steps on Spanish soil even the pavement stones will take up the cry 'Long live the republic!'"⁹

Castelar's speech was the culmination of Republican attack against Amadeo which had begun in August when the national Directory issued a manifesto declaring that a foreign dynasty was impossible in Spain. On the proclamation of the French Republic September 4, the Federalists of Madrid made preparations for a popular manifestation of sympathy and on September 8 Castelar aroused his fellow Republicans by appealing to them to follow France as a republic and so take the first step towards a United States of Europe. In order to prevent the establishment of the Italian dynasty, schemes were proposed in Madrid to replace Prim with a purely Republican ministry under Figueras; and to arouse support in France, Castelar went to Tours, where the provisional government of France was then sitting, to secure

⁹ Castelar, *Discursos parlamentarios*, III, 351, 363-365.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

Gambetta's co-operation. From a balcony in Tours Castelar pleaded for a federation of Latin republics. Orense, Pí and Paul y Angulo conferred with other French Republican leaders. Keratry, the French emissary, talked with Prim in regard to Spanish aid and to Prim's co-operation in proclaiming the republic. Prim replied: "I have preferred the position of Monk to that of Cromwell and while I live there will be no republic in Spain." Republican newspapers on November 9 launched an attack against Amadeo. Paul y Angulo proposed to the Republican Directory that the Cortes could not vote on the monarch, for this was for the people of Spain to do; and that all who did vote for the foreign king were traitors to Spain.¹⁰

Despite this, the Cortes on November 13, 1870 elected Amadeo King of Spain. Although requiring only 173 votes for election, Amadeo obtained 191. Sixty Republicans voted for a federal republic; two (García Ruiz and Sanchez Ruano) for a unitary republic, and one Deputy voted simply for the republic. Montpensier received twenty-seven votes, Espartero eight, Alfonso two and the Duquesa de Montpensier one.

A commission under Ruiz Zorrilla, President of the Cortes (so elected at the January, 1870 session) was sent to the Italian capital, Florence, to notify Amadeo of his election.

While the "Villa de Madrid" was carrying the future Radical Minister across the Mediterranean, Republican extremists in Madrid were crying "Death to the thieves!" and Paul y Angulo promised in his revolutionary paper *El Combate* that "force would be met with force."

¹⁰ *Glorias Republicanas*, pp. 290-307; Rodríguez-Solís, II, 668; Villalba Hervás, p. 98; *El Combate* (November 9, 1870).

CHAPTER ELEVEN

THE KING "WHO WENT ON STRIKE"

I. AMADEO'S TASK

THE thankless task of resolving Spain's Revolution had fallen on an honorable but mediocre young man, Amadeo Fernando María, second son of Victor Emmanuel, whose fate was sealed from the day he accepted the throne. Circumstances far too weighty to be overcome by the fearless honesty of one man, and that man a foreigner, held unhappy Spain in relentless clutches. When the fertile genius of Joseph Bonaparte, with specious promises and Bourbon benediction, had failed in 1810, it was hopeless to expect the turbulent Spain of 1871 to accept more willingly a twenty-six year old cadet of the royal house which had humiliated the Papacy.

The liberal traditions of the Savoy dynasty, associated as they were with the circumscription of Papal power, were damaging. And even had Amadeo been a genius or a statesman, he could not have overcome the aversion which Spaniards felt toward him as a foreigner. He was never the ruler of a united nation; he never won the love of his subjects and he left Spain as he came, without arousing hope or despair. When the Republicans called him the "King of the 191" and the "Foreign King" they appealed to the most innate prejudice of the Spaniard who rejects the idea of foreign domination with scorn. The nobility insulted the King and his Queen by the most petty but effective means possible, by withdrawing from social life altogether. Few of the grandees of Spain entered the Royal Palace during Amadeo's reign and the Palace became a cruel prison for its unhappy occupant. The church could not support a King who obeyed a Constitution which admitted the abominable heresy Protestantism. Queen Victoria, Amadeo's wife, was greeted courteously but never warmly by the Spanish; and she alone seemed to possess the ambition to attempt resolving the problems facing the dynasty.

The death of Prim removed the one adviser who might have saved the liberal monarchy. On December 27, 1870, just when Prim

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

was preparing to leave for Cartagena to welcome Amadeo, a number of men whose identity was never learned, held up Prim's carriage as he left the Congreso and shot him. He died almost the same instant that Amadeo stepped on Spanish soil. The "Washington," as the Masons called Prim, of the liberal monarchy had died.

The Republican party suffered some persecution as a result of Prim's assassination. The direct action section of the party, led by José Paul y Angulo,¹ kept up a bitter attack on the Progressive leader following the election of Amadeo. Ricardo Muñiz, Prim's confidant, declared that Prim told him and Moreno Benitez on his death-bed that he recognized the voice of Paul cry "Fire!"² Paul wrote an unconvincing pamphlet claiming the only evidence against him was this statement. Six men, arrested November 15, 1870 for an attempted assassination of Prim, declared they had been paid by Solís, Montpensier's secretary. Paul never cleared his name of the crime but it cannot be said that he directed or participated in the killing of his former employer in the Revolution of September.

Paul was Prim's agent in Cádiz during the Revolution. Later he became leader of the direct action Republicans and edited *El Combate*. The paper published violent attacks on Prim calling him a dictator, as did *La Gorda* and other newspapers. On November 13, 1870, the day of the election of the new king, *El Combate* said that force would be repelled by force. Five days later it urged "Down with Prim y Prats!" An article signed A. D. de K. on December 6 said that "History reserves a horrible and shameful page for General Prim." The newspaper grew more violent. In its issue of December 10 it declared that Amadeo had been elected by 191 traitors. Six days later it said "Down with Prim y Prats and his blackguard!" In its issue of December 20 it said: "The miserable cowardice of D. Juan Prim has no limits." The government suppressed the paper which declared in its last issue on December 23: "*El Combate* must not have declared in vain war without quarter on traitor Prim and his Cortes Constituyentes, accomplices of a national crime, and on his salaried terrestrial god, on this foreign tyrant called Duque de Aosta. . . .

¹ Paul was born in Jerez in 1838, the son of relatively wealthy parents. After receiving an excellent education he entered mercantile life. He was elected a Deputy to the Cortes in 1869. Paul founded *La Igualdad* in which first appeared his *Memorias Intimas*. He sacrificed much of his fortune to the Republican cause.

² Muñiz, *op. cit.*, II, 194.

THE KING "WHO WENT ON STRIKE"

"Is there any Spaniard who doubts and vacillates before the *coup d'état* of this little dictator? To battle! Down with everything! Long live the revolution!"

And finally: "Force is not repelled with the pen but with force."³

Paul in a duel had killed Felipe Ducazcal, whom he called the leader of the Spanish "blackguards." In the Cortes, speaking in defense of his paper, Paul called the Congreso an "unworthy farce."⁴

Prim's friends had become alarmed at the violent attacks and attitude of Paul. On December 26 Bernardo Garcia, editor of *La Discusión*, handed Muñiz a list of names of persons who intended to do mischief and at the head of the list was the name of Paul. Two days later, the editor met Muñiz again and urged him "for God's sake, arrest the remainder!" when only one had been arrested. Acting on the editor's intimation, police on the twenty-seventh had visited the offices of the newspaper but found only the owner, Rispa y Perpiñan, who was placed in confinement.⁵

After the session of the Cortes on December 27 had concluded, Prim jovially chided several Republican Deputies, asking why they did not go to Cartagena to welcome the King. When Paul y Angulo crossed over to him, Prim remarked that Paul was of the opinion that Prim possessed a very hard hand.

"General," retorted Paul, "every hog has his Martinmas."⁶

Prim left the Congreso, stepped into his carriage, ordered the coachman to drive to the Ministry of War, and in a moment more was driving down the narrow Calle del Turco. The secret police, not hearing the order and observing only the well-known signal of the walking stick,⁷ which Prim carried this night in his right hand, indicating he would turn right, scurried to guard the exit. The carriage rolled away in the opposite direction. Before the police could note the mistake,

³ *El Combate*, dates cited. Roqué Barcia was equally insulting in *La Justicia Federal* (Muñiz, II, 191). He was later arrested with General Pierrad as a suspect but released. *La Justicia Federal* was fined by Castelar during the Republic for its violent attacks on the regime.

⁴ *Glorias Republicanas*, p. 343.

⁵ Muñiz, II, 193.

⁶ *Glorias Republicanas*, p. 360; Rodríguez-Solís, II, 669.

⁷ There had been two attempts to assassinate Prim. Thereafter he had two signals to inform the secret police the direction he would take on leaving the Congreso. More than seven hundred persons were interrogated in the vain effort to discover those guilty.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

the carriage had been stopped by a small group of cloaked men, and shots told Spain that its Washington had been wounded desperately.

Ruiz Zorrilla next day made insinuations against the editors of *El Combate* for complicity in the crime—although Roqué Barcia, Pí y Margall and other Republicans had been bitter also in their attacks—and it was not until January 4, 1871 that Paul replied to the charge with a letter to the editor of *La Discusión*: "When I learned of the words pronounced by the President of the Cortes on the events which took place on the Calle del Turco and when I read in various newspapers the same insinuations which they publish, I thought it opportune to maintain complete silence, denying with the most absolute scorn that which those who know my character and my antecedents will call the infamous weapon employed by the miserable beings which are called in public men."⁸

Amadeo entered Madrid on a bitterly cold day, January 2, 1871. Madrid received him with formal courtesy, showing little enthusiasm, although many admired the sternly upright young man who with dignity sought to win the approval of his new subjects. His first official act was to visit the bier of him who had been his staunchest advocate, Prim.

Actors at the Teatro de Calderon made pointed references to the Italian King in the new piece *Macarroni I*. A Madrid newspaper called him King of the Cortes. The high church party issued a manifesto to the nation stating that without temporal power the freedom of the Catholic religion was threatened. Its inference was obvious. The Republicans were the sworn enemies of the dynasty. The Moderates were in retraimiento.

Awaiting the later arrival of his wife, Amadeo was indeed alone among sixteen million subjects.

II. CASTELAR'S BENEVOLENCE

When Amadeo swore to observe the Constitution of 1869 the Republicans remained away from the Cortes, as did Montpensier, the Conde de Cheste and other notables. Soon thereafter Amadeo heard bitter things said about himself by the Republicans. The Directory of the party on February 1, 1871 arraigned the royalists for not taking a

⁸ *Glorias Republicanas*, p. 368. Paul speaks accusingly of the Unionist generals in his *Les Assassins du Maréchal Prim et la Politique Espagne* (Paris, 1886), and of their hostility towards Prim. After 1873 the judges knew who the assassins were, Paul says. Among those in prison, he says, was José María Pastor, chief of Serrano's secret police.



FROM A CONTEMPORARY PRINT

AMADEO DE SABOYA

KING OF SPAIN

THE KING "WHO WENT ON STRIKE"

plebiscite of the country. "Spread the capital idea of this critical period, the constitutional destitution of the dynasty," the manifesto advised the electors.

In order to strengthen their position the anti-dynastic groups, the Carlistas and the Republicans, joined in February by the Alfonsinos, united in an unholy coalition to contest the elections, it being understood that only one candidate from the coalition would stand in each district. The result of the election was an increase in Carlista representation, sixty-two members being returned, and a decrease in Republicans, who had only forty-eight Deputies in the new Cortes. It was an extraordinary coalition with the atheistic Suñer y Capdevila aligned side by side with the devout Papist Nocedal, with the Alfonsinos working for the election of their bitter rivals, the Carlistas, and all working together with the Republicans who had nothing in common with the other parties except a desire to destroy Amadeo.

Castelar assumed the parliamentary offensive of the Republicans in Amadeo's first Cortes. He aroused pandemonium when he declared in the Assembly April 20, 1871: "I am as inviolate as the king!" García López added to the confusion by stating that the King was a public employe and nothing more. Two days later Castelar gave his ultimatum: "I tell you, we have declared an implacable war on the dynasty." He continued by saying that the first aim of the Republican party was to destroy the monarchy.⁹

Two months later, on June 22, Castelar delivered a verbal pronunciamiento.

When Serrano, President of the Council of Ministers, asked Castelar that day what would be the attitude of the Republicans toward a Radical Ministry, the tribune replied that the party would lend its benevolence. The monarchy, Castelar continued, was not taking root in the country, for it attracted neither conservatives nor democrats. The republic alone could give adequate representation to all parties. The Ministry in power satisfied no one, for it could not exist either for the conservatives or for the Radicals.

"I have grades of opposition," Castelar informed Serrano. "As a result, without promising to support unconditionally any government,

⁹ Castelar, *Discursos políticos dentro y fuera del Parlamento en los Años de 1871 á 1873*, p. 38, 56.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

or to form a part in any majority, I would assist, though not support, a Radical government by my benevolence.”¹⁰

The immediate object of the speech, Castelar remarked later, was to break the coalition existing between the Unionists and the Radicals. The orator claimed for it a greater effect in a letter to South American newspapers June 29, 1873, when he wrote: “Thus it is that my benevolence to the Radical party, my benevolence criticized at the time as weakness, was really the cause of the King going, unable longer to support a semi-Republican policy; and the Radical party, unable to compound now with any monarchy, consequently came to the republic. We constitutionally destroyed the Savoy dynasty.”¹¹

Four days earlier than this Amadeo had seen bands of men parading Madrid streets carrying banners and shouting “Death to Pius IX, long live liberty!” Many houses, on the contrary, displayed banners acclaiming the “King-Pope” and “Long live the Syllabus!” This emotional outburst on June 18 was occasioned by the observance of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the exaltation of Pope Pius IX. Candido Nocedal had increased popular fervor when he introduced a proposition that the Cortes viewed with satisfaction the anniversary “in spite of the unheard-of persecutions the Pope has suffered.”¹² The turmoil served to emphasize how alien Amadeo, whose father had humiliated Pius, was in the nation of his adoption. As a result, a projected royal progress was made in order to create affection for the dynasty in the provinces but the journey revealed how apathetic the people were. Castelar advised the people of Saragossa to receive the King with respect, much to the disgust of the aged Orense. Amadeo, though commanding respect by his upright demeanor, made little effort to appeal to the people. He was a “king who did not speak.” Victoria, the Queen, was more affable and aroused greater respect.

Two days after Castelar’s offer of benevolence, on June 24, Serano’s Ministry fell when the Radicals and Republicans united in a vote of censure of the government’s colonial policy. Amadeo then called Manuel Ruiz Zorrilla to form a Ministry—an extraordinary procedure for a king of Spain.

Ruiz Zorrilla was leader of the Radical party which succeeded the

¹⁰ Castelar, *op. cit.*, p. 173.

¹¹ *La Igualdad* (October 14, 1873).

¹² Vilarrasa y Gatell, II, 396; Villalba Hervás, p. 138.

THE KING "WHO WENT ON STRIKE"

Progressives as the party completed the absorption of the Democrats. When Amadeo called on him he was calling on a politician who was more divorced from the conventional parties than any other minister who had occupied the presidency in Spain during the parliamentary system of government. Ruiz Zorrilla had declared in a speech aboard the "Villa de Madrid" that "administration should not be at the service of politics." He had participated in the Revolution of September and had been Minister of Public Works under Prim, carrying out the orders of the Ministry relative to the church with determination. He had sought to introduce educational reforms and to legalize civil marriage. He was a "revolutionary by necessity," he said.¹³ He had had as his political objective union of the men who made the Revolution of September. Neither he nor Prim believed Napoleon's warning that the two solutions to the Revolution were either Montpensier or the republic.¹⁴ Amadeo had asked Ruiz Zorrilla to form his first ministry but he had refused, Serrano then doing so. Now, called on a second time, Ruiz Zorrilla accepted the task for fear that the Radical party would break-up, the extreme left going to the Republicans, the right to the Unionists.

Thiers regarded the appointment of Ruiz Zorrilla as a fatal mistake on the part of Amadeo. The President of the French Republic thought the first mistake had been made by Victor Emmanuel in allowing his son to accept the throne, "an error similar to King Leopold's in authorizing his son-in-law Maximilian to accept the throne of Mexico. The young King Amadeo, courageous and intelligent, who, in order to follow in his new country the excellent examples of King Leopold and King Victor Emmanuel, had gone too far in this path when he chose Republican ministers such as M. Zorrilla and his friends."¹⁵ Ruiz Zorrilla long was a subject of bitter controversy in Spain and Spanish judgment was long obscured by the fact that in the Restoration he became a revolutionary Republican. The fact was that Ruiz Zorrilla was Spain's first modern statesman. Both he and Amadeo had arrived on the political scene a score of years too soon.

¹³ Ruiz Zorrilla, *Á sus amigos y á sus adversarios* (Madrid, 1882), pp. 142-143.

¹⁴ *Ibid*, p. 34.

¹⁵ *Memoirs of M. Thiers, 1870-1873*, translated by F. M. Atkinson (London, 1915), p. 306. The Unionists were alarmed at Ruiz Zorrilla's appointment and some of the Unionist generals resigned. Pirala, *El Rey en Madrid y en Provincias* (Madrid, 1871), p. 107.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

Ruiz Zorrilla announced a Radical program, including a promise to institute trial by jury. Then he adjourned the Cortes until October 1. It was in the interim that Amadeo made his royal progress. When the Cortes reassembled in October, the Minister-President's candidate for the presidency of the Cortes, Rivero, was defeated by the crafty Sagasta. Ruiz Zorrilla resigned. Amadeo then offered the presidency to Espartero, who refused on the grounds of ill health. Madrid was restless; students of the Central University paraded the streets, crying for the return of Ruiz Zorrilla. Finally, the King induced the patriotic Admiral Malcampo, Sagasta's friend, to form a Ministry, which, however, announced that it would continue the policy of the previous one. The Malcampo Ministry fell during the discussion of the Internationale and Sagasta agreed to form a cabinet.

III. THE INTERNATIONALE OUTLAWED

"A spectre is haunting Europe—the spectre of communism."

That spectre which Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels painted so graphically in 1848 in the now immortal *Manifesto of the Communist Party* gave promise in 1871 of rearing its head in Spain.

The industrial revolution had created a new class, the laborer, a class that found little or no representation in government and that met with sullen resistance as it progressed. The demand for labor organizations could not be quieted despite this opposition, as evidenced when the First International Workingmen's Association was established. The Barcelona unit became one of the most powerful in that much-feared organization. Strikes, destruction of machines and riots followed.

Marx laid down ten principles in his *Manifesto* as being applicable in the most advanced countries. These were:

Abolition of property in land and confiscation of ground rents to the state;

A heavily progressive income tax;

Abolition of inheritance;

Confiscation of the property of emigrants and rebels;

Centralization of credit in the hands of the state, by means of a national bank with state capital and an exclusive monopoly;

Centralization of the means of transport in the hands of the state;

Extension of national factories and instruments of production, cul-

THE KING "WHO WENT ON STRIKE"

tivation and improvement of waste lands in accordance with a general social plan;

Obligation of all to labor; organization of industrial armies, especially for agriculture;

Combination of agricultural and industrial labor in order to remove the distinction between town and country;

Free public education for all children. Abolition of factory labor for children in its present form. Combination of education with material production, etc.¹⁶

The Internationale urged workers in the field of politics to organize the nation into autonomous provinces and to distribute the wealth of the nation equitably so as to achieve real "equality." Many of the principles of the *Manifesto* were urged for Spain by the Spanish section.

There was never a clear delineation in Spain between the Internationale and Bakunin's International Fraternity and later, the Alliance of Socialist Democracy. A third extreme left organization was created when the Socialists of the League of Peace and Liberty organized the International Democratic Social Alliance. Garrido had been one of the representatives at the London conference in 1864 of Bakunin's International Fraternity, which was a secret organization. Later Bakunin complained that his organizer in Spain, Fanelli, an Italian, had confused the Alliance of Socialist Democracy with the Internationale and was organizing the latter with the program of the former.

Fanelli continued his work mainly for the Internationale and through Republican friends gained admittance to the Fomento de las Artes, where young workingmen were instructed. Finally, by December 21, 1868, he had been able to establish a chapter of the Internationale in Madrid with twenty-one members. On January 24, 1869 an organization meeting of the Internationale was held, creating the nucleus of the group in Spain. It was not until July, 1869 that the group accepted the task of organizing the Internationale itself in Spain. In Barcelona the Internationale met with quicker response. The Federal Center of Workers Societies was formed in October, 1868 and Fanelli came from Madrid in January, 1869 to continue the work with

¹⁶ Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, translated by Lily G. Aitken and Frank C. Budgen (Glasgow).

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

the aid of his Madrid friends. In February, 1870 the Barcelona group became the local center of the Internationale. In August appeared the Internationale's newspaper organ *La Federación*. By 1870 the Internationale claimed 15,000 members with 153 sections. Barcelona, with approximately ten thousand members, had more than three times the adherents of the Madrid sections. At the congress of the Internationale in Barcelona in June, 1870, 150 industries and occupations were represented in the membership. Another conference was held at Valencia in 1871 but it did not have the full attendance Barcelona had had, only thirteen delegates attending. This hardy group, however, sturdily resolved that the "true democratic federal republic is collective ownership, anarchy and an economic federation." Eventually, the Internationale numbered from fifty to seventy thousand members in Spain.¹⁷

A proclamation of the Geneva Internationale on October 21, 1868 had urged the Spanish workers to proclaim the republic, based on a federation of autonomous provinces (thus creating a state similar to the federated Russian Soviet Republics of the twentieth century).

Sentinon, the principal leader of the Internationale in Spain, in a letter from Barcelona April 10, 1870, clearly explained the objects of the Internationale in Spain:

*"The Spanish workers want to see justice established as soon as possible, in five or six years. It is of little importance to us whether Spain has a king, emperor or president of a republic, for we know in advance that they are the same dogs with different collars. However, all Spanish workers are not imbued with this conviction and you see a great part of them going to political clubs."*¹⁸

The Federal Council of the Spanish region of the Internationale in a manifesto to Ruiz Zorrilla in August, 1871 outlined more specifically the aims of that organization:

"Having destroyed the old aristocracy and placed in its stead the middle class, the proletariat, which suffers pain from the weighty burden of both over its wearied shoulders, expects every one to recover completely the fruit of his labors; more clearly yet, Citizen Minister, that he who wants to consume or to possess, be obliged to produce in

¹⁷ Max Nettlau, *Bakunin und die Internationale in Spanien, 1868-1873* (Vienna, Leipzig, 1913), p. 248.

¹⁸ Oscar Testut, *L'Internationale et le Jacobinisme au Ban de l'Europe* (Paris, 1872), I, 412.

THE KING "WHO WENT ON STRIKE"

proportion to what he consumes. Thus would be realized our formula, 'no more rights without duties; no more obligations without rights,' which contains the most severe criticism of the past and of the present and the most consoling promise of the future.

"The Spanish Regional Federation is as free within the International Federation of Workers as Spain would be, in spite of its concert and solidarity with European nations.

*"We want to change completely the bases of this society of slaves and gentlemen, substituting for it a single class, that of the free producers, in order to realize over the well-cultivated earth the eternal principles which constitute justice. But we know that it cannot be realized with fruitless disorders or with ephemeral political revolutions. Only with propaganda and active discussion of our principles do we propose to win the unity of aims necessary for its practice to be a fact in the social world."*¹⁹

The program of the Alliance of Social Democracy was much more radical. The collectivist *El Condenado* published in Barcelona on August 12, 1872 the beliefs of the Alliance: Complete abolition of classes and of private property; equal opportunity for both sexes; and "the Alliance declares itself atheistic, seeking the abolition of all beliefs, the substitution of science for faith and human justice for divine justice."²⁰

The question of the Internationale became of major importance in the reign of Amadeo. Catalonia was a fertile field for such propaganda for there lived the new working classes, whereas in the rest of Spain most of the population was agrarian. The Internationale precipitated a strike at Alcoy which was attended with bloodshed and endeavored to draw Barcelona into the cantonal movement, but both plans failed.²¹ Though many Republicans belonged to both organizations, the Internationale and the Alliance, none of them belonged in the class of leaders. But the party, posing as the friend of the workingman, could not permit the proposal of Jove y Hévía to outlaw them to go unchallenged. The leaders of the Republican party participated in the lengthy debate long celebrated in Spanish parliamentary annals, notably Salmerón, Garrido, Pí and Castelar. Speakers of all parties

¹⁹ *La Ilustración Republicana Federal* (Madrid, August 20, 1871).

²⁰ Ascondi, *Guerra á la Demagogia* (Madrid, 1872), pp. 11-26.

²¹ Friedrich Engels, *Kommunismus and Bakunismus: Die Bakunisten an der Arbeit. Denkschrift über den Aufstand in Spanien im Sommer 1873* (Berlin, 1920), pp. 117-122.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

presented their views and the debate was particularly interesting for the great number of speeches delivered.

Castelar presented the problem as a constitutional one, declaring that the right of association was involved. The problem confronting Spain, he said, was to ally order with liberty and the Internationale was less an attack on the security of Spain than were the Republicans and the royalists.

"The poor workers of the Internationale have a higher idea of human solidarity than a Minister of the Interior," he declared.

Replying to objections raised by Nocedal to the Internationale, Castelar said: "I prefer to be a Spaniard to any other nationality; but it is accidental that I am Spanish or Russian, just as it is accidental that I am called Castelar or some other name. Works founded in human nature are eternal works."

When Castelar stated in an article written at this time that "the worker is the king of nature but the slave of society,"²² he was expressing the sentiment of the majority of the Republican party.

Garrido declared that the "worker is the foundation of all society" and demanded: "What did Jesus Christ preach if not communism?"

"This is not the place to discuss Jesus Christ or the New Testament," Garrido was warned.

"This is the occasion because here there are new Jesus Christs who want to redeem the world."

In Belgium and in England, Garrido declared, the government had not attempted to outlaw the Internationale "because these governments are genuinely conservative, not demagogues clothed as conservatives, as they are here.

"More than three hundred co-operative associations have been created in Spain since the Revolution as the result of my propaganda and this proves that I am not the man who wants to incite a class war between the laborer and the capitalist," Garrido concluded.

There had been strikes before the Internationale fomented the Alcoy strike, Pí y Margall affirmed, since strikes are older than the workshop. He traced the growth of the organized labor movement in Spain: How the cotton weavers had formed a union in Barcelona in 1840, following which other unions had been formed in Catalonia. It was but a step to organize a central committee. These workers' organi-

²² *La Ilustración Republicana Federal* (August 27, 1871).

THE KING "WHO WENT ON STRIKE"

zations produced the strikes of 1854 and 1855, general strikes of all workers (and forerunners of the general strike characteristic of Spain in the modern era).

"The strike of 1854 did not disturb the country very much because it occurred at the time of the Revolution when minds were preoccupied with political affairs; the strike of 1855 was so important that it attracted the attention not only of the government but of the nation as well," Pí declared. The Cortes Constituyentes of that time wanted to destroy the workers' associations of Catalonia, Pí continued, and wrote the project of a law upon the manufacturing industry in which it was proposed to establish a mixed jury of officers and masters.

In the many speeches made on the subject of the Internationale none had the brilliance or weight of analysis of that of Nicolás Salmerón. He demonstrated that society was changing and pleaded for that change to develop openly.

"It is necessary, it is urgent, that the representatives of the nation be permitted to expound every novel idea and even every utopia as well as every reactionary tendency, so that these can be exposed to the light of day and can be propagated in the public plaza without appealing to the secret machinations of conspiracy and sedition which impede measured movements by threatening the destruction of the existing order and rendering pacific construction of the future impossible," he urged.²³

By the exact number of votes with which Amadeo had been elected King—191—the Cortes voted to outlaw the Internationale in Spain. The Radicals of Ruiz Zorrilla abstained from voting. Sagasta issued a circular letter January 17, 1872 to the governors of the provinces against "this communistic sect, a real social conspiracy against the existing order," and commanded the governors to consider the organization outlawed and under the criminal code.²⁴

IV. THE TREND TOWARD THE REPUBLIC

Events in Spain now moved quickly towards the fall of the Savoy dynasty. The year 1872 became one of turmoil throughout the nation. The Republican party showed itself increasing in strength, a significant commentary on the failure of Amadeo's reign to find a foothold in Spanish affection.

²³ *Legalidad de la Internacional* (Madrid, 1871).

²⁴ *Gaceta de Madrid* (January 17, 1872).

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

Proclamation of the French Republic reacted powerfully on the Spanish Republicans and the struggles of the Paris Commune evoked sympathy in the Spanish party. The party Directory held regular meetings in Madrid while in the provinces a constantly stronger organization was being created. In April the Directory named a committee to construct a federal Republican constitution, a committee which included Pí y Margall, Castelar, Salmerón, Roqué Barcia and Eduardo Chao.²⁵

The Republicans had won their most striking victory in their history in December, 1871 in the municipal elections. The party gained complete control in spite of "the coercion and threats of which we have been victims" of nine provincial capitals and majorities in the councils of fourteen others. They dominated the municipal councils of Granada, Jaen, Palencia, Huesca, Orense, Castellón, Coruña, Teruel and Córdoba. In Barcelona they elected eighteen councilmen and won majorities in Badajoz, Almería, Salamanca, Valladolid, Alicante, Avila, Palma de Mallorca, Huelva, Oviedo, Saragossa, Valencia, Santander and Zamora.²⁶

The Republicans were not the only source of worry to Amadeo. Don Carlos issued a manifesto April 15, 1872 declaring war on Amadeo and recalling the Carlistas from the Cortes. Don Carlos could count with greater sympathy among the royalists of France for on February 4, 1867 he had linked his fortunes with those of the French Pretender through his marriage with Princess Marguerite de Parma, daughter of a sister of the Comte de Chambord.

The Carlistas represented the great majority of Spanish people, Carlos said in his manifesto issued from Geneva. The revolutionary government had closed the door of apparent legality it had established.

"There remains now to the Duque de Madrid and the Carlista party no other recourse than to appeal to arms to defend the honor, the dignity, the national independence," declared Emilio de Arjona, the Infante's secretary.

The Carlistas had not waited for formal declaration of policy of

²⁵ Nicolás Salmerón y Eduardo Chao, *Proyecto de Bases de la Constitución republicana-federal de España* (2d ed., Madrid, 1873).

²⁶ *La Ilustración Republicana Federal* (December 16, 1871). Enrique Rodríguez-Solís, historian of the Republican party, was editor of this weekly and called the victory a "magnificent triumph." It is analogous to the municipal elections held April 12, 1931, in which the Republicans won most of the cities of Spain.

THE KING "WHO WENT ON STRIKE"

their leader since as early as April 7 Carlista revolts occurred in Catalonia. The Basque Provinces and Navarre were soon in turmoil. Don Carlos himself entered the Basque Provinces at Vera on May 2.²⁷

The government acted energetically. Serrano was named chief of operations and left Madrid April 27 to assume active command. The revolution was broken for the time when General Moriones won a decisive victory over the Pretender at Oroquieta, taking eight hundred prisoners and a thousand rifles. Serrano, as a result, was able to conclude an accord with the Carlistas at Amorevieta, by which full pardon was granted to all who would abandon the Carlista cause. Carlos, however, had not surrendered and the revolt continued intermittently, degenerating into guerrilla warfare in Catalonia, the battle cry being "Down with the stranger!" The Carlistas effected a working agreement with Catalan Republicans by which neither would oppose the other, since their goal was the mutual one of destroying the Savoy dynasty.

Sagasta's conduct of the elections for the Cortes which met in May created a scandal. The municipal elections of the preceding December indicated a strong Republican trend. The results of the elections for the Cortes resulted in an overwhelming victory for the Ministry. Gonzalez Alegre averred in the Cortes that in a town of 400 electors where only 320 voted, the ministerial candidate received 2,626 votes! Castelar opposed the confirmation of Sagasta's election from the Republican stronghold of Seville, declaring that Sagasta's policies were "the most disastrous Spain has had since Calomarde." There were other scandals. Two million reales collected for bounty money for the volunteers in the Cuban war disappeared. The Ministry refused to answer Moreno Rodriguez's demand for an explanation, and won a vote of confidence with its strong majority in the Cortes. Popular resentment soon forced the Ministry to resign.²⁸ Amadeo called on Serrano to form a Ministry.

The circle of men on whom Amadeo could call to assume the presidency of the Council was narrowing. Sagasta and Ruiz Zorrilla had both shared in the Revolution of September, both had accompanied Prim from London and both contested for the leadership of

²⁷ Vilarrasa y Gatell, II, 533 ff.

²⁸ *Gaceta de Madrid* (May 2, May 28, 1872).

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

the Radicals.²⁹ Sagasta represented the conservative tendencies although in later years he himself introduced some of the reforms his more radical rival now sought to give Spain.

Serrano chose as his Ministers members of the Unión Liberal and turned his attention to the growing unrest disturbing Spain. Newspapers were unbridled in their criticism of the government and dynasty, incendiary speeches were delivered in the clubs, and as Serrano viewed the situation, the monarchy was threatened. He therefore proposed, and the Ministers unanimously approved, a decree suspending the constitutional guarantees. Serrano presented the decree to Don Amadeo.

"I oppose it," replied the King.

Serrano thereupon resigned, his Ministry having served but sixteen days. His retirement meant that the last element of conservative support for the King had vanished. The Unionists ceased being partisans of the Revolutionary monarchy. Don Amadeo had obeyed the Constitution to the letter and in its spirit. The Spain of the pronunciamiento and the retraimiento was not prepared for such rectitude.

General Sickles, the American Minister, in a dispatch to his government June 8 observed that in parting with Serrano the King "has unfortunately alienated the friendship of the party that placed him on the throne. . . . The Republicans are kept tranquil by the firm attitude of their leaders. . . . The indications at this moment incline me to the opinion that the present dynasty has seen its best days. It will be probably succeeded before long by a provisional government in which the Republicans largely re-inforced from the ranks of the Radicals, will contend with the partisans of the young Prince Alfonso for supremacy."³⁰

The mutual sufferance of Spain and its King was nearing the breaking point. As early as January *El Tiempo* had observed bitterly: "The house of Don Amadeo is governed very badly. . . . The Italian counsellors who have accompanied the Piedmontian Prince and the

²⁹ Pirala, *op. cit.*, p. 110. Ruiz Zorrilla had tried to have Sagasta enter his cabinet but the latter refused. Pí y Margall, *Amadeo de Saboya* (Madrid, 1919), p. 12. Sagasta, says the author of *La República y los republicanos* (Madrid, 1873), p. 8, proved the most disturbing element at this time, for he deserted the Radicals to destroy Ruiz Zorrilla's Ministry.

³⁰ Whitehouse, *The Sacrifice of a Throne* (New York, 1897), p. 139. Whitehouse was an attaché at the American Legation in Madrid.

THE KING "WHO WENT ON STRIKE"

foreigners of other origins who have surrounded him have converted the Palace of Don Amadeo into a veritable hell."³¹ How mutual the feeling was could only be known by Doña Victoria and Victor Emmanuel, to whom Amadeo confided alone the weight of his crown of thorns.

V. THE "CROWNED MANNEQUIN" RESIGNS

Ruiz Zorrilla, who had withdrawn from the Cortes in protest against Sagasta's methods, was recalled to form a Ministry on June 13. He dissolved the Cortes and called for elections for a new one in August. He issued the election program of the Radical party, declaring that the time had come to realize the often-stated aims of the liberals, such as establishing trial by jury, reorganizing the army on a national basis so as to abolish conscription, maintaining religious freedom and ending the rebellion in Cuba which had broken out anew.³²

It was such a program which Castelar must approve and Serrano or Sagasta repudiate. The Radical party had moved so closely towards the Republicans that it was difficult to distinguish often between the two parties. Ruiz Zorrilla professed his loyalty to Don Amadeo, however, and appealed to the nation as a dynastic Ministry; Doña Victoria however, disliked the Minister, principally because of his attitude to the church.

Talk was heard openly of the necessity of assassinating the King and Queen. Such an attempt was discovered the night of July 18. On the following day Don Amadeo and his Queen made their progress through the streets while redoubled guards watched. On the Calle de Arenal the King and Queen heard the whip of bullets past them. It was all over in a few seconds. Amadeo and Victoria escaped unharmed but the Civil Guards killed one person and captured several others, accused of the attempt. There was immediate disavowal by almost all parties of responsibility for the attempt and for a brief while there was a wave of sympathy discernible for the occupants of the Palacio de Oriente.³³

Ruiz Zorrilla conducted his electoral campaign zealously but the field was clear to him and the Republicans. The Carlistas were in revolt; the Moderates and the Unionists abstained from the polls. The

³¹ *El Tiempo* (Madrid, January 10, 1872).

³² *Gaceta de Madrid* (June 26, 1872).

³³ *Amedeo, Duca d'Aosta*, storia della su vita privata, politico e militare (Roma, 1890), p. 363.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

Republicans abandoned their benevolent attitude, already a source of bitterness in party ranks, and openly opposed the Radicals.

Although Castelar had given his benevolence to the Radicals, he had not given it to the monarchy itself. In a speech at Seville in April he declared that "the monarchy dies and in exchange the republic is born."³⁴ The party itself seemed more and more inclined to intransigency under the impetus of Garrido and Pí. The intransigents in the party meeting June 30 in the Circo de Price had been bitter in their attacks on the dynasty. The party had not given whole-hearted approval of benevolence and in February Garrido had proposed substituting the retraimiento for it. Castelar, in a letter to Garrido, attempted to dissuade him, saying that as a systematic law of conduct it would result in suicide for the party.³⁵ Salmerón also did not approve of benevolence, calling it immoral. The new party Directory elected in May included two direct action Republicans, Nicolás Estévez and General Juan Contreras, the latter formerly a Moderate army officer. The new Directory members accommodated their differences and issued a manifesto which declared that the party would have no dealings with the Carlistas, with whom they had nothing in common, and that "nothing will ever unite us to the dynastic supporters. Let us follow a policy of attraction."³⁶ Castelar outlined the course the party should follow in the new Cortes in a speech at Alicante September 18. The death of the monarchy was near, he predicted, and as a consequence division in the Republican party was insanity. Amadeo's reign was merely of the character of a prolonged interim. Monarchy and democracy were incompatible and since the Radicals still believed that the two were compatible, the Republicans should work independently for the republic, he said.³⁷

When should the party seek the final victory? he asked. Either when the forces then under the monarchy decided to revolt or when the agreement between the liberals and the monarchy was broken completely.³⁸

In spite of their resolution to combat the Radicals, the Republicans were at some loss to find ground for attack. Ruiz Zorrilla had placed

³⁴ Castelar, *Discursos políticos*, p. 324.

³⁵ *El Combate* (February 6, 1872).

³⁶ *El Combate* (May 14, 1872).

³⁷ Castelar, *op. cit.*, p. 453.

³⁸ *Gaceta de Madrid* (November 20, 1872).

THE KING "WHO WENT ON STRIKE"

the Republicans in a compromising position when he began to propose legislation which the anti-dynastic party had advocated.

The results of the election left the Cortes wholly in the hands of the Radicals with their two hundred Deputies. The Republicans with eighty Deputies reached their greatest strength thus far. Ruiz Zorrilla described the Cortes as "independent and devoted to the throne and to the person of the King. In no other Assembly has there been so few employes and proselytes."³⁹

Ruiz Zorrilla began the enactment of laws designed to carry out his election promises. He found Republican support for his law creating the mortgage bank especially designed to aid agriculture. The Republicans enthusiastically supported the Radical bill freeing Porto Rican slaves,⁴⁰ a law which was enacted finally by the first Republic. The government once again anticipated Republican desires when it proposed to abolish conscription for the navy. The Republicans attempted to defeat the Ministry's proposed draft of 40,000 men, introducing seventeen amendments in nine days.⁴¹

Nicolás Salmerón in October invited Ruiz Zorrilla to submit to the republic.

"Before being a liberal, a Spaniard and a Minister I want to be a decent and honorable man and I will not follow the path you suggest," the Minister-President replied. The Republicans, he warned, must elect between the dynasty and its Constitution of 1869 and the restoration of Don Alfonso.⁴² In May Ruiz Zorrilla had stated positively that he was not in sympathy with the Republican movement. "We are not Republicans," he said, speaking for the Radical party. "We have never been and I hope that there is no motive or reason to cause my party, which loves liberty so much, to be Republican in the future."⁴³

However loyal Ruiz Zorrilla might be (and despite asseverations to the contrary, the Radical Minister remained true to his royal master to

³⁹ Ruiz Zorrilla, *op. cit.*, p. 52.

⁴⁰ Castelar made a notable address on the abolition of slavery which Sickles asked permission of his government to transmit by cable in its entirety, according to *El Cohete* (December 29, 1872). *Diario (Castelar)*, p. 24) said that he had heard Castelar say that with a single speech he had freed 200,000 Negro slaves. Although the Republicans claimed the credit for abolition of slavery in Porto Rico, that honor really belongs to Ruiz Zorrilla and his Radicals.

⁴¹ *Gaceta de Madrid* (October 27, 1872).

⁴² *Ibid* (October 15, 1872).

⁴³ *Ibid* (May 23, 1872).

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

the end), the monarch he was serving had been considering the possibility of renouncing the throne. At best, he was only a "crowned mannequin" as a Parisian publicist wrote Castelar.⁴⁴ His dynasty had not taken root in Spain. He himself had been a passive instrument, lacking the imagination necessary to resolve the difficulties encircling him. He spoke Spanish with an Italian accent and privately continued the use of his native tongue. He did not endeavor to capture the Spanish imagination and kept to his Palace, which Spanish society avoided. His motives of economy to aid the depleted Treasury were misinterpreted by Madrid as evidence of meanness. He was sincerely desirous of giving Spain constitutional government but his effort to become a national ruler failed when the anti-dynastic Republicans drew the Radicals away from their understanding with the conservatives.

The victory of the Radicals had been too complete, for now Amadeo had recourse to no other party except the Republican.

Two incidents, one involving policy of state, the other concerning the royal family, fixed his resolution to resign the throne—the first king to go on strike, as Friedrich Engels declared.

The royal family was expecting the birth of a child late in January. Don Amadeo summoned Serrano to the Palace January 13, 1873 to ask if the Duchesa de Tetuan, wife of the Palace chamberlain, would stand as godmother to the child. After obtaining Serrano's promise to ascertain whether the Duchess would do so, Don Amadeo asked the Duque de la Torre why it was he refused to participate in Spanish affairs.

"Señor," replied Serrano, "I have no personal resentment toward you, nor does any politician have, nor could have. My retirement arises from the necessity of protesting, in the least ostentatious manner, against the development of the Radical policy which in a short time will have ended all that remains of the old Spain."

Serrano continued by stating positively that he could not re-enter ministerial life under the monarchy.⁴⁵

By his own words the Duke had condemned the goal of the Septemberists and had admitted that the Revolution of September was nothing more than another pronunciamiento.

⁴⁴ De Fonvielle, *Lettre adressée à Don Emilio Castelar*: Amédée et la République Espagnole (Paris, 1873), p. 8.

⁴⁵ Vilarrasa y Gatell, II, 621.

THE KING "WHO WENT ON STRIKE"

Don Amadeo received shortly after the conversation a letter from Serrano, giving the refusal of the Duchess to serve at the christening.

This was the determining incident—or insult. However, another, equally vexing, was agitating the Cortes. The aristocratic artillery corps resented the appointment on November 9 of Marshal Hidalgo as captain general of the Vascongadas. They resigned as a body in the face of the Carlista enemy, on the pretext that Hidalgo had participated in the Mutiny of the Sergeants on June 22, 1866. The action was highly treasonable.

Hidalgo was a friend of many of the Revolutionary generals, and when Ruiz Zorrilla decided to support the appointment, he was defending the Revolutionary settlement. General Córdova, Minister of War, declared that Hidalgo had no responsibility in the San Gil massacre and Ruiz Zorrilla absolved the Marshal from blame. The President of the Council did not take immediate action against the revolting officers, although unofficially he suggested a commission composed of artillery officers and friends of Hidalgo, to investigate the charges. Under Republican challenge the Minister-President decided to make the Hidalgo matter a question of confidence in the Ministry and in the dynasty, against which he declared the artillerists were protesting. When González, at the instigation of Figueras, brought up the Hidalgo affair February 8 when the reorganization of the artillery corps was being discussed, Ruiz Zorrilla appealed to the Chamber for a vote of confidence. One hundred and ninety-one deputies, the number fate seemed to design for Amadeo in Spain, voted for the resolution of confidence and two against it, the Republican minority voting with the government.⁴⁶

Don Amadeo, who had supported the Ministry in its reorganization of the corps, according to Ruiz Zorrilla, called the Minister-President to him and heard the account of the Cortes' action. He likewise called Beranger, the Minister of the Navy, who gave a similar account. Amadeo charged Beranger to express to the Congreso his satisfaction at the happy termination of the incident.

It was a wearied, disgusted King who so charged Beranger. At every public gathering his isolation became more pronounced, the life of the court more difficult. There had been great confusion on the visit of members of the diplomatic corps and members of the Cortes Jan-

⁴⁶ *Gaceta de Madrid* (November 17, 1872, February 8, 1873).

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

uary 30, to felicitate the King on the birth of a son, Luis Amadeo José María Fernando Francisco, born that day. The King, tired and dejected, had kissed the boy and then retired to his rooms, instructing the chamberlain that the formal presentation of the Infante would have to be later that day. Ruiz Zorrilla protested; the diplomatic corps, the Deputies, were there according to arrangement.

The bitter message came back from Don Amadeo that he was King at least in the Palace.⁴⁷

Therefore, it was not surprising that on February 8, after hearing the Hidalgo reports and meeting the Council of Ministers, Amadeo detained Ruiz Zorrilla to tell him that he was renouncing the throne. The astounded Minister endeavored to dissuade him in vain from his decision, offering to resign so that the King might form another ministry. The King refused, saying that he had no other way of reconciling the parties which had placed him on the throne. The artillery question had shown him the impossibility of restoring peace to Spain, he said.

"He told me of the disunion of the parties, of the lack of respect of the press, of the extreme ideas of the Chambers, of the Carlista War and of other factors less important," Ruiz Zorrilla says of the interview.⁴⁸

Amadeo finally consented to consider the matter further for twenty-four hours, the matter to remain as between the two.

The next day, February 9, Ruiz Zorrilla returned to find that the King was inexorable. The Council of Ministers was dumfounded. The rumor that the King intended to resign caused tense excitement in Madrid. Malcampo, Topete and other conservatives endeavored to turn Don Amadeo from his purpose. At 1 o'clock on February 10, the Ministry met with the King to receive the formal announcement of

⁴⁷ Vilarrasa y Gatell, II, 623. The son is the present Duke of Abruzzi in the Kingdom of Italy. Luis had two older brothers, Manuel Filiberto, Duke of Aosta, who died July 4, 1931 at Turin and Victor Emmanuel, Duke of Turin. Duke Manuel commanded the Third Italian Army in the world-war. *A B C* (Madrid, July 5, 1931).

⁴⁸ Ruiz Zorrilla, *op. cit.*, p. 62. Amadeo in arriving in Spain had offered Ruiz Zorrilla the title of duke which the latter refused. Six days before resigning Don Amadeo offered his Minister the Order of the Golden Fleece, in celebration of the birth of Don Luis. Again Ruiz Zorrilla refused. He was a genuine democrat and liberal and unlike Sagasta, he never compromised his convictions in the Restoration of the Bourbons. Amadeo had some time earlier notified his father, the King of Italy, of his intention of resigning.

THE KING "WHO WENT ON STRIKE"

his resignation. Later, Martos and Ruiz Zorrilla came to the Palace to receive his message to the Cortes.⁴⁹

On February 12 the dignified renunciation of the crown of Spain was read to the Cortes.

"Great was the honor I received of the Spanish nation in electing me to occupy its throne; such an honor the more to be appreciated because of the perils and difficulties which must follow the enterprise of governing a country so profoundly disturbed," stated the renunciation. Amadeo continued by saying that he had hoped to bring peace to all Spaniards but that he knew now that he had failed in his desire.

"Two crowded years have I worn the crown of Spain; and Spain still lives in a constant quarrel, going each day further from peace and from the path I had so ardently desired. Had the enemies been foreigners, I would have been the first in fighting them, leading those soldiers, so valiant, so long-suffering; but all who stir up and perpetuate the ills of the nation with sword, with pen, with words, are Spaniards, all invoking the soft name of the fatherland, all struggling and agitating for its good.

*"In the noise of combat, the confusion of parties and the opposing manifestations of public opinion, it is impossible to ascertain that which is true, and more impossible still, to find the remedy for such great ills. I have sought it in the law and have not found it. I have not sought the remedy outside the law I have sworn to observe."*⁵⁰

Indifferent to the agitation that possessed the Madrileños surrounding the Congreso with threatening demands for the proclamation of the federal republic, Don Amadeo prepared to leave the Royal Palace whose marble stairway had proved a *via dolorosa*. On the morning of February 13 he waited on final preparations for the departure. Amadeo, the *rey neutro*, had decided no longer to "impose himself" on Spain. The Royal Palace from whose windows Amadeo and his Queen had viewed so often the cold, barren Guadarramas on the one side and the unfriendly city of Madrid on the other, was practically de-

⁴⁹ Ruiz Zorrilla, *op. cit.*, p. 66.

⁵⁰ *Diario de Sesiones de la Asamblea Nacional* (Madrid, 1873), pp. 28-29. The authorship of the renunciation was subject of much discussion at the time, some ascribing it to Salustiano Olózaga, others to his brother José. Don José, however, in a letter dated February 16, 1873 written to *La Correspondencia de España* (quoted by Villarrasa y Gatell, II, 630) declares that he himself, yielding to the importunities of friends, wrote the letter.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

sented. Only a few of the royal household were present. There were a few of the National Assembly there to bid him adieu. At last, Doña María Victoria, the lovely and faithful Queen whose ambitions for her husband had exceeded his ability, was brought from her apartment on a litter, for she was still too weak to walk after her period of confinement.

Don Amadeo turned away from the small group of politicians, including Ruiz Zorrilla, and embraced his Queen fervently. Don Nicolás María Rivero, President of the Assembly, shook hands with Don Amadeo and promised to protect the King's servants. Then the royal carriages rolled out of the courtyard of the Palace.

A special train was waiting at the North Station to carry the royal passengers to Portugal. In a second class coach were the members of the Civil Guard commissioned to accompany Amadeo and María Victoria to the frontier. A first class coach was provided for the King and Queen, a bed for the latter easing the long journey. A few baggage vans completed the train.⁵¹

It was at 6:30 in the morning that the train steamed from the North Station, carrying with it the hopes of a liberal monarchy for Spain. As for Amadeo, now the Duke of Savoy again, the train was carrying him away from prison to freedom—to Italy and to home!

⁵¹ Vilarrasa y Gatell, II, 641.

BOOK TWO

THE REPUBLIC OF WIT AND POETRY

CHAPTER TWELVE

SELF-GOVERNMENT REALIZED

I. THE REPUBLIC PROCLAIMED

THE traditional monarchy died with Fernando VII; the parliamentary monarchy with Doña Isabel; the democratic monarchy with the renunciation of Don Amadeo de Saboya. No one has destroyed it; it has died a natural death. No one has brought the Republic; circumstances bring it. Gentlemen, we salute it as the sun which rises of its own force in the sky of our country!"

It was Castelar speaking in that historic session of the Cortes which began Monday February 10, 1873 and continued until the morning of Wednesday February 12, adjourning only a few hours before Don Amadeo himself left the Royal Palace for Portugal. All about the orator were Deputies nervously debating the destiny of Spain. Now and again one of the Republican leaders like Castelar, Pí y Margall or Figueras would leave the Assembly for a window facing the Plaza and shout to the mob surging there to be calm for the republic would be proclaimed surely.

Scarcely five years had passed since Spain had sought true liberty through representative government. Generals of the army with the help of the people had dethroned the Bourbons. It seemed that the sinews of the people had broken the threads of that "lengthy decadence" which had begun with Carlos I of Austria and which had continued without stay under the Austrian and Bourbon rulers. "We were a nation of warriors and priests," Castelar, high priest of Spanish regeneration explained. "We began by expelling the Jews who were our first industrialists. We followed by burning in the bonfires of the Inquisition the great thinkers who were showing us new values in life and were exhibiting new ideas in our conscience. We ended by cruelly expelling the Moors who were our great farmers and who would have ended by being great citizens."¹ Three of the greatest Jews of modern times were lost to Spain by the "evil policy" of the

¹ Castelar, *Un Año en Paris* (Madrid, 1875), p. 168.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

Austrians: Disraeli, the statesman; Spinoza, the philosopher and Manin, the Venetian liberator. "The impossibility of a Luther being originated among us in not the race, it is in our history," Mariano Calavia declared.² The destruction of Spain which the Austrians had begun with their European policy the Bourbons had continued with their ineptness. Now this decadence, so painful to all true Spaniards, would surely be ended. A charter to that end had been laid in the Constitution of 1869. A King to assure the goal of the New Spain had accepted the task. And now, on February 11, the Cortes of that constitutional monarchy that was not Austrian or Bourbon but modern was waiting for formal word from the King that representative government in the monarchy was not possible for Spain.

There was no other alternative that historic February 11 but real self-government, a republic.

Perhaps the men most actually conscious of Spanish decadence, the Republicans, could restore a vital, a New Spain, with their policies, their doctrines. No greater group of idealists had ever before dominated Spanish politics—Castelar, Pí y Margall, Figueras, Salmerón, Orense—than this Pleiades of idealism in public life. They had what Amadeo did not have, fiery principles. They were ready to conquer not with cannon but with ideas.

The path of progress beckoned Spain.

The rumor that Amadeo had renounced the throne persisted in the Congreso and as the Council of Ministers failed to take their places on the Blue Bench the restlessness of the Deputies increased. Toward evening on February 10 Estanislao Figueras, the parliamentary leader of the Republican party, sought the right to speak.³

"I believe all of the Deputies comprehend, I think the President in his exalted position understands, and I believe the nation itself will comprehend on learning of it, that what is occurring in this Assembly is deplorable," Figueras began.

"We are in the midst of a grave and profound crisis in which perchance the liberty of the nation may be lost . . . ; we are orphaned of our government. . . . When everyone knows that the institution of

² Mariano Calavia, *Reflexiones acerca de la Gloriosa Revolución de Setiembre de 1868* (Madrid, 1868), p. 23.

³ *Diario de Sesiones de la Asamblea Nacional* (Madrid, 1873). No further citations to this *Diario* will be given when the date is shown in the text.

SELF-GOVERNMENT REALIZED

monarchy is undergoing a crisis, it is truly calamitous that the government is not at hand to reply to interpolations which Deputies have the right and ineluctable duty of directing to it.

"This is not the hour to play with the destiny of the country; therefore I ask the President of the Congreso to direct the government to come here to reply in the presence of the national representatives; and if it does not come, I know that we ourselves, who are the representatives of the primary sovereignty of the nation—which is higher than any other sovereignty—may deliberate and decide for ourselves."

"I did not understand clearly one thing you said," replied Rivero, President of the Congreso. "Please repeat it. If you are so disposed, what for?"

"To summon the government to come here to take its seat on the Blue Bench."

"Enough! I have called the government a number of times already and this will be the last," Rivero declared peremptorily.

"My question has two extremes," persisted Figueras.

"Tell me, what is the other?"

"The other extreme is this: Are we disposed to open discussion upon the actual circumstances which are passing in Madrid and which are known to all of Spain already, so that the Cortes may adopt the resolutions they believe adequate to save the supreme interests recommended to it, which are none other than those of liberty."

As Figueras was speaking members of the government entered the Assembly and took their places. Ruiz Zorrilla requested Figueras to repeat his question. In reply, the Minister-President complained that Figueras seemed to think that there was but one Assembly, forgetting the Senate. Then he continued:

"And now we come to the official question. His Majesty the King day before yesterday, after the meeting of the Council of Ministers, had the condescension to state to the President that he was resolved, most firmly resolved, to renounce the crown of Spain. The President of the Council of Ministers, as all of you know, told him that he did not know what to say to the Chamber; there was no reason for it."

The speaker was interrupted momentarily.

"There was no reason for it; and do you know why? Because I have been the defender of liberty ever since being a member of the government. And if the dynasty disappears, I must be the last soldier

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

of the Savoy dynasty, because in it I have believed that my country would find order and liberty."

Ruiz Zorrilla then recounted how he had urged the King to reconsider his decision; how he had described the King's obligations to the nation; how he had offered to resign and permit the King to select another ministry from the majority of the Chamber; how, if Amadeo wanted it, a change of policy in the government could be made. While his decision was irrevocable, Amadeo had agreed in view of the condition of the country to consider for twenty-four hours longer, or, at the maximum, forty-eight hours. In view of this, Ruiz Zorrilla demanded, why was the Chamber so impatient?

"Isn't the King in the Plaza de Oriente? Is there not here a responsible government? Are there not two Chambers discussing and deliberating? What are they going to demand?" Any action now would force the King to "march." "We would be the most miserable of men if we would consent to, or tolerate, this," he declared, to the applause of the Cortes.

As the Minister-President continued his speech, the Chamber became more and more impatient. Finally, after several interruptions, in one of which Figueras said several words not audible to the speaker, Ruiz Zorrilla declared impatiently: "As Señor Figueras is not of the majority and as I am speaking with it, I do not believe he has reason to interrupt me."

A parliamentary battle, led by Figueras for the Republicans, followed. Figueras introduced a resolution declaring the Cortes in permanent session. The Republicans by parliamentary means were routing the royalists, uncertain where to turn.

In the debate that followed, discussion grew more acrimonious. Figueras was interrupted by the Vice President of the Assembly, seated in the President's chair:

"I ask you that on speaking of the dynasty. . . ."

"There is no dynasty!" interrupted a Republican Deputy.

"There is always!" retorted a Radical.

"If it has abdicated, what dynasty is there here?" demanded another Deputy.

"Prove to me there is none!" exclaimed Ruiz Zorrilla.

"The Minister has said so."

Figueras continued in support of his resolution. "Forty-eight

SELF-GOVERNMENT REALIZED

hours, at a time when the nation is dying!" he exclaimed dramatically. Cristino Martos, Foreign Minister of Amadeo, stating that he feared the King's resolution would be unchanged, and that in view of the publicity the renunciation had received it would have to be irrevocable, supported the resolution.

"If in the end King Don Amadeo de Saboya takes the resolution he has announced," the Minister continued, "no dynasty or monarchy will be possible here now. Here there is nothing else possible than a republic!"

Cristino Martos, a Minister of the King, had elected the republic.

"I want no interruptions that go to exhaust my strength!" he warned Deputies of the left. "In place of interruptions I want reasoning; I want someone to tell me if I have not had reason to appraise in this manner the situation of my country, even though that person to tell me be Señor Castelar, whose eloquence, whose word, is the most terrible instrument that I know."

Thus summoned, Castelar arose.

"Without provocation from anyone, the King, the permanent King, the life-King, the hereditary King, has publicly and solemnly announced to the nation his resolution to fling to the pavement the crown of Spain!"

"That is untrue," interrupted Ruiz Zorrilla.

The King's reconsideration was impossible, Castelar warned. In a similar crisis under a republic, the vice president would step into the resigning president's place.

"I am a patriot, a Spaniard, who, before everything else, wants to save the nation!" Castelar cried.

The Republicans had won their first victory. The Assembly voted to remain in permanent session and at 9 A.M. February 11 adjourned until 3 P.M., at which time Don Amadeo's renunciation was read.

Rivero then proposed that the Senate be invited to join with the Assembly. The Senate, under the presidency of Laureano Figuerola, agreed to the union. This was the first of the unconstitutional steps taken by the Republicans towards proclaiming the Republic. Article Forty-seven of the Constitution of 1869—under which the nation was still ruled—prohibited the two Chambers from meeting together. The unconstitutional nature of the proclamation of the Republic caused the Republicans some remorse. Figueras in September wrote a friend

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

in Havana: "The Republic was made illegally by an Assembly which had no mandate for it and which should have been dissolved after accepting the renunciation of Don Amadeo."⁴ Pí y Margall said the proclamation was a revolutionary act, for the fusion of the two Chambers was unconstitutional.⁵

It was at 3:30 P.M. February 11 that the Senators, preceeded by two mace-bearers, entered the Congreso.

Rivero addressed the two Chambers briefly. Because of his seniority, he declared, he would remain as President of the National Assembly (created by the unconstitutional union of the two legislative chambers). The King's renunciation was read again. Martos, stating that Ruiz Zorrilla was unable to address the Assembly, declared that the King that morning had given his decision as final. Then Martos presented the resignation formally of the Ministers.

"The sovereign Cortes, do they accept the renunciation which Don Amadeo de Saboya has made of the crown of Spain?" asked Rivero.

"It is accepted," replied the Secretary of the Assembly.

"The sovereign Cortes, do they accept the resignation of the government?"

"It is accepted."

The message of the Cortes to Don Amadeo and Doña María Victoria, written by Castelar for the commission named for the purpose by the Cortes, was then read.

"The sovereign Cortes have heard with religious respect Your Majesty's eloquent message, in whose noble words of rectitude, of honor, of loyalty they have witnessed a new testimonial of the elevated tokens of intelligence and of character which ennoble Your Majesty, and of the generous love for your second country, which—generous and valiant—jealous of its dignity to the point of superstition and of its valor to the point of heroism, cannot forget that Your Majesty has been chief of state, the first authority within its laws and cannot ignore that the honor and nobility of Your Majesty honor and ennoble the nation itself.

". . . The Cortes unanimously declare that Your Majesty has been faithful, the most faithful, guardian of the respect due the Cortes;

⁴ Quoted in Villalba Hervás, p. 379.

⁵ Pí y Margall, *La República de 1873*: Apuntes para escribir su historia. Libro primero—Vindicación del autor (Madrid, 1874), p. 15.

SELF-GOVERNMENT REALIZED

loyal, the most loyal, guardian of the oath you made on accepting the throne.

"Well may Your Majesty say in the silence of your retreat, in the bosom of your beautiful country, in the heart of your family, that if any human being were able to dominate the insurmountable course of events, Your Majesty with your constitutional education, with your respect for constituted right, you would have surmounted them completely and absolutely."

The Cortes, the message continued, was seeking to dominate the situation, as had that Cortes of 1810 which knew "that the Spanish nation had not degenerated."

"When the dangers are conjured; when the obstacles are conquered; when we are rescued from the difficulties which each epoch of crisis and of transition creates, the Spanish people . . . have to give you all respect, all the loyalty, all the consideration possible while you remain on their soil, because Your Majesty merits it, because your virtuous wife merits it, because your innocent children merit it; and though they will not be able to offer you a crown in the future, they will offer you another dignity, the dignity of the citizen in the heart of a people free and independent."

When these words had been read, Pí y Margall presented a resolution of the greatest importance to Spain:

"The National Assembly resumes all powers and declares the republic as the form of government of the Spanish nation, leaving to a Cortes Constituyentes the organization of this form of government."

"An executive power is to be named directly by the Cortes, which will be removable and responsible to the Cortes itself."

Pí y Margall, who represented the confederationist school of federalism, had not dared propose a federal republican form of government. The majority of the Cortes—the overwhelming majority—had been elected as Radical royalists. In the despair and enthusiasm of the moment the Radicals were being converted into Republicans—but it was not federal Republicans into which they were converted. The Marqués de Sardoal declared that, while the Radicals were royalists, at this juncture they considered the salvation of the nation paramount. The royalists required a king to symbolize the institution; and the King having gone, the Radicals were willing to accept the republic.

Pí y Margall's resolution was approved by an Assembly which a

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

few hours before had been legislating for a monarchy. Two hundred and fifty-eight votes were cast for the resolution, while only thirty-two voted against creating the Republic.

It was not the kind of Republic the old Republicans wanted. "What Republic was proclaimed?" asked Pí y Margall. "Neither the federal nor the unitary."⁶ Yet at no time during this early period could the voice of Pí, of Castelar, of Figueras be heard pleading for a federal republic. The first Republic was to arrive by compromise with the royalist Radicals.

II. THE COALITION GOVERNMENT

Having proclaimed the Republic, the Assembly proceeded rapidly to form a "transition government." Martos was elected President of the National Assembly, replacing Rivero. In his speech of acceptance, Martos optimistically declared that the fusion of Radicals and Republicans would "give new form to the life of Spanish society."

How dependent the Republicans were on their Radical colleagues was demonstrated when the National Assembly named the first Executive Power, which was responsible to it and removable by it: Estanislao Figueras (Republican), President; Emilio Castelar (Republican), Foreign Affairs; Nicolás Salmerón y Alonso (Republican), Justice; Fernando Fernández de Córdova (Radical), War; José María Beranger (Radical), Navy; José Echegaray (Radical), Finance; Francisco Pí y Margall (Republican), Interior; Manuel Becerra (Radical), Public Works; and Francisco Salmerón y Alonso (Radical), Overseas. The President of the Executive Power did not serve as president of the Spanish Republic.

Four Republicans, each at some time to be President of the Executive Power, thus constituted the party's representation on the transition Ministry. Four of the Radicals had been Ministers in Don Amadeo's last Council of Ministers. It was an able Ministry, however, and quickly sought to adjust itself to the tremendous problems facing it.

Castelar had assured the Cortes of 1872 that, in the event of the republic, he would neither form a ministry nor become a minister; yet he accepted the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs without feeling a twinge of conscience. His election to that post was a most happy one to the new Republic. Martín de Olías, a Deputy in the Cortes, said

⁶ *Ibid*, p. 13.



FROM A CONTEMPORARY PRINT

ESTANISLAO FIGUERAS Y MORAGAS

FIRST PRESIDENT OF THE EXECUTIVE POWER

SELF-GOVERNMENT REALIZED

that to foreign governments Castelar seemed a symbol of stability.⁷ The relations with France, next door neighbor, were not satisfactory at the start of the Republic's history for M. Thiers, President of France, refused to recognize the Spanish Republic.

Thiers, however, was pleased to see Castelar in the Ministry. "Happily, in eloquent M. Castelar, we found a Minister of the greatest ability and wisdom, our relations with whom were excellent and the cabinets of Europe were very grateful to us for our behavior at this juncture," Thiers observed.⁸

The United States alone (and later Switzerland) recognized the Republic, assuming the beneficent spread of the principles of American republicanism had aided in the establishment of the Spanish Republic. On March 3, both Houses of the American Congress passed resolutions of congratulations to the new Republic, upon the "efforts to consolidate in Spain the principles of universal liberty in a republican form of government." When Castelar read the message transmitted by General Daniel Sickles felicitating the Republic on the "glorious destiny reserved" for it, Castelar, with delirious enthusiasm declared that "This act is truly religious and should elevate our spirits and our hearts to the sky to pray the God of Columbus and of Washington to bless our work."

The "glorious destiny" was causing concern to Pí y Margall.

"Scarcely had I put my feet in the Ministry of the Interior when I began to receive notices of municipal governments destroyed and of revolutionary juntas established in many cities of the peninsula," he said.⁹

The Assembly Deputies were besieged with similar complaints and daily more and more protests were made to the Ministry against the almost wholesale destruction of municipal government. In other parts of the nation anti-clerical riots were reported while rumors of disturbances in Barcelona were heard.

The nation had interpreted the unconstitutional fusion of the two Chambers as a revolutionary act, Pí observed in explaining the wave of disorder sweeping over the nation. "It is true that the Republic was not born in combat or tumult; but it is none the less true that it

⁷ Martín de Olías, *Emilio Castelar*, p. 70.

⁸ *Memoirs of M. Thiers*, p. 307.

⁹ Pí y Margall, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

owed little of its origin to the law. Towns, failing the intelligence given individuals, have an instinct that rarely deceives them. They saw in the proclamation of the Republic a revolutionary act. They comprehended that the fusion of the two Chambers was not constitutional nor could these change the form of government without violating the fundamental laws of the state."¹⁰ Despite the orders of Pí suppressing the juntas and ordering municipal councils to remain in power, disorder continued to spread, increasing in magnitude and seriousness as the Republic progressed and in the same ratio as the Carlista danger gained momentum, thanks to the disunion observed within that part of the nation under the allegiance of the Republic.

The popular manifestation of the juntas revealed the mortal sickness of Spain. We have observed that in the days of Isabel II when the Moderates ruled, no other party could share in the government; that when the absolutists ruled, they ruled solely for the absolutists. Parliamentary government thus had been purely a fiction. Under Don Amadeo the situation had been somewhat better except that the parties not sharing in the Revolution of September had remained aloof from the government. It had been the often-stated goal of Castelar and other Republican leaders that the Republic would offer full freedom for all political opinion to be freely expressed, although the nation as a whole was not prepared for representative government. Now that the Republicans theoretically ruled the nation, however, many Republicans clamored that the nation should be governed exclusively by Republicans. Soon leaders like Pí y Margall were to lend themselves to this *representative dictatorship*.

The Coalition government set about quickly to achieve the major goals of the old Republicans. The King's Guard was dissolved. Titles of nobility were abolished. Conscription was abolished February 15. Nicolás Salmerón proposed the abolition of the death penalty in the session of February 20. Manuel Becerra presented for adoption a law proposed during the monarchy to safeguard labor, providing that children under eleven years should not be permitted to work in any factory in which hydraulic or steam engines were used, that the maximum hours for children from eleven to fifteen years should not exceed eight hours if they attended school, while children under fifteen who did not attend school might work ten hours; night work was to be prohibited

¹⁰ *Idem*.

SELF-GOVERNMENT REALIZED

for children under fifteen years of age.¹¹ Volunteer recruiting for the army was instituted, a volunteer army of eighty battalions being sought. Extension of the telegraphic system was authorized March 7.

The grave problem of concentration of land in the hands of a few wealthy owners and of wealth in the hands of the church was brought to the attention of the Cortes by Ricardo Decoroso Vasquez Gomez of Quiroga in Lugo who on March 15 questioned the government on the steps it would take to make a just division of such property. "In view of the evils of the great centralization of proprietorship, from which are resulting the great disturbances to which various Deputies have alluded, and in view of the fact that some of the Ministers are Socialists, does the government intend to introduce legislation to organize and to give a base to this ownership?" he demanded. Salmerón replied that such a change would be dependent on a reform in the Constitution.

Pending fundamental reform, the Republic was proceeding under the Constitution of 1869, except in such Articles as referred specifically to the monarchy, Figueras informed the Assembly.

No steps could be taken towards stabilizing the budget until a fundamental charter was drawn up. The budget for 1872-73 prepared by the monarchy was in practice the budget the Republic was following. It called for the expenditure of 591,950,971.40 pesetas, of which one-sixth, or 104,266,914 pesetas, was for the Minister of War, while 234,340,704 pesetas was to be applied to the funding of the national debt. Only *one-hundredth part* of the budget was designed for education, the total being 5,579,059.25 pesetas, and only 3,255,355.73 pesetas for the support of the church. Spain was spending twenty times more on the maintenance of her generals and soldiers than she was in educating her citizens.

The Republican policy of separation of church and state would be carried into execution, Salmerón assured the Cortes. He made the statement in the session of March 10, following discussion of the relations of the Republic with the church. Jove y Hévía, whose activity had resulted in part in outlawing the Internationale during Amadeo's reign, demanded what the government intended to do to prevent removal of clergy and teachers who refused to take the oath of allegiance

¹¹ *Diario*, February 15, 1873, Appendix 8. The law was proposed October 20, 1872 but was not presented until this session.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

to the Republic. Certain persons not subject to removal had lost their positions, Jove said. Was the government disposed to let such persons return to their positions? Salmerón replied that only those specified in the laws could do so.

Suñer y Capdevila broached the matter of paying the clergy a subsidy. "We are, gentlemen, in a state of civil war, initiated and sustained principally by the Spanish Catholic clergy," he accused.

Pidal, an ultramontane, attempted to interrupt the speaker, but Suñer disregarded him: "I say, gentlemen, that we are in a state of civil war, initiated and sustained by the Spanish Catholic clergy. I ask the Minister of Justice and I ask the government of the Spanish Republic, now that we are in full liberty, in full right, in full equality, in full justice, if he is going to consent and we ourselves are going to consent, to continue subsidizing this clergy, so that with this great wealth which we are sending them they can sustain the civil war."

Separation of state and church was assured, Salmerón declared. "The Republic certainly would be unable to exist without making the independence of church and of state a definite fact; without having the state respect equally all beliefs and all religious communions; without achieving finally the truly happy day in which laws can be written without invoking the spirit of any positive religion, a fact which until now has served more to divide than to unite men."

This provoked Jove to protest that "a prosaic question in the name of destitute beings has given occasion to the Minister of Justice to deliver a speech giving voice to the deplorable ideas that seem to be in great majority among the federalists of this Assembly. . . ."

Interrupted by the Vice President of the Assembly, Jove nevertheless continued by protesting against any separation of church and state.

"You cannot continue in this manner," Jove was warned. "If you want to ask another question, you can do so. Nothing more."

"Does the Minister think to carry the separation of church and state to a point to which no other great nation of Europe has reached? To separate these two powers is to separate, as I said on another occasion, the heart from the body."

There were protests audible from many parts of the Assembly as he continued despite warnings from the President to desist:

"I understand that you do not want to hear the voice of a Catholic, after having heard the voice of a Minister who condemns all religions!"

SELF-GOVERNMENT REALIZED

III. THE BREAK WITH THE RADICALS

Jove y Hévía's temper reflected the growing dissatisfaction within the Assembly and within the government. The union of the Radicals and the Republican minority was distasteful to both. Figueras wanted a homogeneous ministry; Castelar on the other hand opposed a break with the Radicals in the government.

Events in Spain were belying Castelar's optimistic circular letter to the Powers of February 26 in which he had declared that "Spain has passed from the monarchy to the Republic and it has passed peacefully, legally and in the full exercise of its authority and sovereignty," and that the principal task of Spanish diplomatic representatives was now to dissipate the "false idea that our people are ungovernable and unchangeable."¹² The Radicals regarded themselves as the guardians of public order and they could not help but being alarmed at the increasing unrest visible in all parts of the nation, the acts of Republican volunteers, the dispossession of Radical city governments by overawing Republican juntas, the events in Barcelona, the growing Carlista menace, the increasing hostility towards the church.

The Radicals constituted the majority of the Assembly from which, they felt, emanated all authority. The government of the Republic was responsible to the Assembly, or in other words, to the Radical party. The Republicans—who had created this situation through Pí y Margall's Resolution of February 10—were restless under this restriction. To them there could be but one party, that being the Republican. In the provinces and notably in Barcelona, the advent of the Republic was hailed as the end of the domination of Madrid in the provinces. The Republicans in the provinces wanted a democratic federal republic. The Republic of February 11 was neither federal nor unitary; neither democratic nor conservative. It was merely marking time until a Cortes Constituyentes could be called.

Under the Constitution of 1869 the Cortes should have adjourned immediately on receiving the renunciation of Don Amadeo and a Cortes Constituyentes should have met May 11 to determine the form of government. Continuance of the National Assembly, which in itself was a defiance of the Constitution, furthered the reign of unconstitutional practice.

Had the Radicals themselves been converted in the few short hours

¹² *Gaceta de Madrid* (February 27, 1873).

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

intervening between the news that Amadeo had renounced the throne and the fact of the proclamation of the Republic? It did not require a great change in their convictions to accept the Republic. It did appear ungrateful, to say the least, for former Ministers of Don Amadeo within the short space of a few hours to become Ministers in the Republic succeeding his monarchy. Ruiz Zorrilla had remained loyal but his following had yielded to expediency. Normally, the Radicals could have proclaimed a regency. In the present instance, however, there was no dynasty, since Don Amadeo had not abdicated, he had renounced for himself and family, all rights to the throne. The Radicals could do nothing else except vote for a Republic. But the Constitution of 1869 was in part their charter and they should have insisted that its provisions be observed. Had they done so, the history of the next few months might have been far different.

The Republicans now discovered themselves in the same position that the Radicals had found themselves in the last Cortes of Don Amadeo. They were now the prisoners of the Radical party, just as in the preceding Cortes the Radicals had been the prisoners of the Republicans.

Republicans and Radicals continued wrangling in a National Assembly that satisfied no one, which had authority to do nothing and which commanded no confidence of the nation. The Radicals tired early of the anomaly. They harassed the government with frequent questions regarding the unsettled state of Spain. With canny, practiced skill, they exposed the vulnerable points in the government's armor.

The Cabinet was making frantic efforts to resolve the many problems it had inherited and which were being created anew every day. The army had taken literally the long-promised relief from conscription, and discipline had disappeared in the army. Whole companies left the army, the soldiers returning to their homes at will. The government demonstrated singular lack of shrewdness in its appointments of military leaders, notably in that of General Juan Contreras, a former Moderate general, assigned as captain general of Catalonia. Contreras was an intransigent demagogue who in October, 1872 had helped form a Provisional Council of the Spanish Federation which urged the Republicans to revolt against the constitutional monarchy. Although a member of the national party Directory he had attempted to pro-

SELF-GOVERNMENT REALIZED

nounce in November, 1872 in the South. From extreme conservatism Contreras had veered to extreme intransigence. He was dangerous to any government.

The Radicals sensed the danger in such appointments. Figuerola, formerly President of the Senate, drew for the Assembly the parallel of Spain under the domination of generals like Contreras to that of the Paris Commune. "When I see some of these intransigents with the palm of victory go to occupy the captain generalship of a district, I do not believe that discipline has much security," Figuerola declared. "They have given the soldiers of the Madrid district liberties incompatible with discipline.

"We should know the limits of the democratic Republic and the limits of the demagogic Republic, because it is well known that the defect inherent in republics is demagoguery, just as in monarchies the defect is favoritism."¹³

When Figuerola denied that the rumors of indiscipline in the army were false and affirmed that demagoguery was rearing its head in Spain, the Assembly was thrown into intense excitement.

Castelar revealed himself completely deceived in his reply for the government.

"Disorders, gentlemen! and they want to impute these disorders to the Republic and the recently established government? a government with such great moral authority that it has been able to dissolve all of the revolutionary juntas with some few telegrams, a government that has been able to obtain recognition of its authority which emanates from this Assembly.

"Gentlemen, they have published many false notices, knowing that these would alarm all Europe. Ah! we speak much of our originality, we talk much of our autonomy and we ignore completely the prudent and measured character of the Spanish nation. Thus, as there are Jacobins in France, so it is thought that there are Jacobins in Spain."

Castelar professed the most complete and sublime confidence in Contreras. "I have had great discussions with him," he continued. "I say to Señor Figuerola and to the Congreso that this General has given his word of honor to sustain the government and the authority of the Assembly in Catalonia and I say that this General is a gentleman, a gentleman of his word, who would die to keep his word of honor."

¹³ *Diario*, p. 241 ff.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

The Assembly was moved to frantic applause.

"I will say no more. I ask Señor Figuerola to say no more. I ask him not to augment the fears of those who do not have this distrust. . . . All that is necessary [to maintain order] is that your prudence accompany our resolutions."

Prudence! Resolutions! General Narváez's dictum of Spain's need for a hard stick to keep the nation in order was never so cogent as now and yet a Minister of the government denied that the nation was in disorder and pleaded for prudence to sustain resolutions, when force and daring were needed to save not only the Republic but Spain as well!

Thirteen days after the Coalition government received its commission from the National Assembly it resigned its powers. The acerbic criticism of the Radicals and the lack of homogeneity in the Cabinet determined Figueras to resign, despite the protests of Castelar. The National Assembly on February 24 was charged again with the task of selecting a government. Martos, President of the Assembly, urged naming a homogeneous ministry composed of old Republicans.

However, the Republicans were distrustful of their Radical colleagues. Several days previous to the resignation of the government the *tertulia* of the Radical party had urged all of the Radicals in the Assembly to remain in Madrid to aid in saving the nation. When Figueras resigned Martos named General Domingo Moriones captain general of Madrid on his own authority. His reason was plausible: Madrid was in ferment, mobs of men crowding the streets and the Plaza in front of the Congreso. The suspicions of the Republicans, profoundly aroused by this exercise of power, were multiplied when Figuerola and Becerra, both Radicals, proposed to the Assembly that Martos be invested with all the faculties of the Executive Power during the interim in which the Assembly should name a new government.

Figueras was startled.

"Clothe the President of the Assembly with all the powers?" he demanded indignantly. "Why? With what motive? with what object? Is it necessary to clothe the President of the Assembly with extraordinary powers and to create this phantom of dictatorship which would do more damage to those who name it than to have hordes of bandits scattered about Madrid and over Spain?"

SELF-GOVERNMENT REALIZED

Whatever his intentions, Martos knew too well the temper of Madrid to attempt the exercise of a dictatorship. Voted the dictatorial powers by the Radical majority of the Assembly, he immediately renamed the members of the Executive Power to continue in their posts until a new government could be elected. Martos then urged the election of a homogeneous Republican government. A ministry composed exclusively of Radicals, he told the Assembly, would mean a bloody battle in Madrid. He suggested wisely that immediate elections be held for a Cortes Constituyentes which should assemble April 20. In the meantime, he proposed, a permanent commission should be named to function on behalf of the Assembly.

Figueras was re-elected President of the Executive Power, his government consisting of Republicans with but two exceptions. The Radicals retained control of the two important military branches of the government, the Ministries of the Army and the Navy. The Minister of War had an important prerogative of almost equal value with that of the Minister of the Interior. The latter, being responsible for the civil government of the nation, had at his command telegraphic communication with practically all parts of the Republic. The Minister of War possessed a similar privilege. In this attribute lay the significance of a Radical appointment as Minister of War. Castelar, Pí y Margall and Salmerón were re-elected to their posts, new Republicans being Eduardo Chao as Minister of Public Works, José Cristobal Sorní as Minister of Overseas and Juan Tutua y Berges as Minister of Finance. The two Radical Ministers were Juan Acosta, not a member of the Assembly, as Minister of War and Jacobo Oreiro y Villavicencio as Minister of the Navy. Castelar, seeking to resign because of the break with the Radicals, remained in the government at the insistence of Figueras. The dissidence between Castelar and Pí, already noticeable within the government, was constantly becoming greater. The break in part with the Radicals had been due to Pí's insistence on creating the Republic for the Republicans.

IV. THE REPUBLIC IN CATALONIA

Barcelona gave the government its first experience with the federal temper. Catalonia, of which it was the capital, was one of the oldest sections of the Iberian peninsula. It had belonged in its more modern history alternately to France and to Aragon, and at times it had been independent. Felipe V, first of the Bourbons, deprived in 1714 the

Catalans of their representative institutions, particularly their Cortes. During the later years of Isabel's reign the constant interference of the government in Catalan internal affairs, the veto of public improvements in Barcelona, the suppression of labor organizations, the arrest without cause of Republican leaders, all fostered a revival of the spirit of independence which had once been Catalonia's. The Catalans accepted federalism as the doctrine of salvation. It meant the government of the provinces by themselves. It meant the end of Madrid's domination over Barcelona. It meant progress. As Castelar had once said, it had been Spain's yoke of laws which had made the Catalan a revolutionist.

News of the proclamation of the Republic evoked tremendous enthusiasm in Barcelona. On the city Consistory appeared this sign:

"Autonomous cities.

Federal sovereign states.

Democratic federal republic.

*'Viva' the Spanish confederation!"*¹⁴

The red and white flag of the Catalan Federalists flew above the building, with its white triangle superimposed on the field of red, and the red letters *Democracia* imposed within the triangle.

Eduardo de la Loma, Civil Governor of the Province, issued the proclamation of the Republic with the warning that no changes in the junta or corporation of the city could be made without authority of the Republic. This provoked the resentment of the Provincial Deputation, which issued a statement in effect challenging the Governor's order, which reflected too much of the old centralization of the monarchy to satisfy the federals.

The Provincial Deputation agreed to:

"Accept the fact of the proclamation of the Republic realized by the National Convention and to proclaim it in the Province of Barcelona;

"Direct to the National Convention and to the Provincial Deputation of Catalonia the following telegram:

"The Provincial Deputation of Barcelona accepts the proclamation of the Republic carried to a head by the National Convention, offers it all of its support to realize the consolidation of liberty, the

¹⁴ *Glorias Republicanas*, p. 531.

SELF-GOVERNMENT REALIZED

death of reaction and the definite triumph of the constant aspiration of this body, which is the federal democratic republic.”¹⁵

Catalonia had reverted to the phraseology of 1700, to the independence of that era. Figueras, himself a Catalan, suspecting the temper of Barcelona, telegraphed Rubau Donadeu, the Deputy from Llobregat that preservation of order was of utmost importance. “Charge all good Republicans with the greatest prudence, for any disorder will destroy the Republic which has cost so much to achieve.”¹⁶

The Rambla was filled with workers who wanted shorter working weeks and the immediate establishment of the federal Republic. They wanted the Carlista War being fought all too near them, ended. They suspected General Eugenio de Gaminde, captain general of Barcelona.

The National Assembly in Madrid heard but imperfectly what was agitating Barcelona. Castelar on the twentieth of February replied to a question concerning events in that city: “Persons of authority, of prestige, of great shrewdness, have telegraphed us saying that the troops had intended pronouncing in favor of Prince Alfonso but that they have acclaimed the Republic instead, fraternizing enthusiastically with the people.”

The army fraternizing with the people! Would this not have reasonably alarmed any minister charged with maintaining order? But not Castelar or his colleagues; they were not as yet at the mercy of an army of anarchy.

“Telegrams,” Castelar continued after reporting that two columns of troops had entered Barcelona, “have been received from all the civil and military authorities of the peninsula who say that all of Spain is tranquil, except those parts occupied by the Carlistas.”

Echegaray, Minister of Finance, continued the optimistic recital the next day, February 21. The rumors of disorder in Barcelona were “not only exaggerated but basically and completely false.” He then explained that Gaminde had been replaced by Contreras who was *en route* to Barcelona with Brigadier Posas, a former Carlista who had pronounced for the republic in Ferrol, October 11, 1872. Gaminde had in the meantime resigned his command to General Andía who resigned his post in turn. Castelar, amplifying Echegaray’s explanation, declared that “Catalonia is one of the most faithful and patriotic

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 533.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 535.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

regions we have under our flag. The entire people, the nation, recognizes the government; let us support it ourselves."

The presence of additional troops in Barcelona February 20 designed for the Carlista War gave rise to a rumor which quickly convinced the city that General Gaminde intended to pronounce for Don Alfonso. It was on the eve of the carnival, with holiday spirit filling the streets with gay, carefree people, eager for excitement. At 10 A.M. the twentieth the Havana Battalion marched into the Plaza de la Constitución and, forming in front of the Palace of the Provincial Deputation, gave *vivas* for the federal Republic. The soldiers then broke ranks and mingled with the numerous groups of federals who surrounded them. Other battalions joined in the fraternization during the afternoon. Gaminde, seeing that discipline was hopeless, resigned his command to Andía, second in command, who, being without prestige, also resigned.

The prolix Provincial delegation informed the Barcelonese that "reaction intended a *coup de main* in Barcelona." The Deputation praised the Havana Battalion as having saved liberty by placing itself at the disposition of the Provincial authorities. In a circular to the local and Provincial Republican committees, the Provincial committee of the federal party declared that the "great spectacle" the people had witnessed that morning had dissipated "the final peril which threatens the Republic;

"Glory to the Republican army! Glory to the soldiers of an idea!

"Citizens: Salute them and give them a fraternal embrace! To them is owed the destruction of the latest plans of the Alfonsinos."¹⁷

The Provincial Deputation, awaiting the arrival of Contreras, named an acting captain general who telegraphed the Minister of War: "Adhering enthusiastically to the proclamation of the Republic, the Barcelona garrison has fraternized with the people. No disturbances or misfortunes of any kind have occurred, the most complete order reigning."

The victory of the federals was completed when Loma resigned the civil governorship to his secretary.

The carnival spirit reached its climax. Speeches were made from the balcony of the Provincial Palace, including a petition to the Deputation asking for the immediate convocation of a Catalan convention

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 542.

SELF-GOVERNMENT REALIZED

to declare the Catalan State. This petition was withdrawn in view of the momentarily expected arrival of Contreras.¹⁸

Lagunero, who had been named in the meanwhile captain general in place of Contreras, who was advanced to chief of operations against the Carlista enemy, arrived in Barcelona February 25 and order was temporarily restored. Contreras issued manifestos to the citizens and to the army, appealing to the one to obey the laws, to the other to preserve discipline in the face of the Carlista enemy.

To guard against a *coup d'état* which was still rumored, the Barcelonense established a commission to seek arms from the government with which to equip Republican volunteers. The European Powers were becoming alarmed at the persistent reports of disorder in Barcelona, Olózaga notified the government from Paris.¹⁹ Word reached the government that the Barcelonense intended establishing a Catalan State March 9. Pí, on hearing this, telegraphed responsible leaders to desist while Figueras himself visited the Catalan capital to prevent a *fait accompli* of the extreme federals.²⁰

Although the proclamation of the Catalan State was prevented, the Catalan Deputation continued the exercise of its newly found powers by dissolving the army in the Province March 9 and converting it into an army of volunteers.

Catalonia, after two centuries of eager waiting, had tasted liberty again.

V. THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ENDS

The government was making no progress in restoring order to troubled Spain. Its appointment of intransigent demagogues was in part responsible; the continuance of Pí y Margall as Minister of the Interior also contributed to prolongation of disorder. The demagogues believed in a confederation of Spanish cantons; to them disorder was but the realization of revolutionary aim. Pí y Margall believed in government of the provinces by themselves. He was not the one to restore order with force. And it was impossible to believe that Spain, repressed for centuries under the monarchy, could overnight enter the most difficult of all tasks, self-government, without a transition period.

¹⁸ Miguel González Sugrañes, *La República en Barcelona: Apuntes para una crónica* (Barcelona, 1896), p. 78; Pí y Margall, p. 21. González was elected Popular Mayor of Barcelona August 24, 1873.

¹⁹ González Sugrañes, *op. cit.*, p. 107.

²⁰ *Idem*; Pí y Margall, pp. 22-24.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

Garcia, a Deputy, drew a doleful picture of the state of Spain in the session of March 6. "We have armed absolutism in all of the northeast zone of the peninsula. . . . In Catalonia it has only been an act of Providence which has prevented the repetition of the incendiarism which in the year just past devastated the capital of France. . . . There the people dispose of all armed force and recognize no authority other than the Provincial authority." In the cities of Andalusia, he continued, semi-anarchy prevailed.

It was in such a charged atmosphere that General Rafael Primo de Rivera, a Radical, proposed to hold the elections May 10 to 13 for the Cortes Constituyentes to meet June 1. Primo, who introduced his resolution on behalf of the government, would continue the unicameral legislature, would name a permanent commission from the National Assembly to advise with the government in the interim, and would permit any male past twenty-one years old to vote. The resolution was voted March 8.

The Radicals asked the government unpleasant questions regarding disorders. Vasquez Gomez inquired March 15 whether the military leaders who had violated both civil and military laws would be subject to courts martial.

"Gentlemen," replied Castelar, the optimist, "the truth is that a chamber does not do what this Chamber is doing. It does not create a government to spit on it thereafter, to calumniate it, to insult it and to villify it."

He was interrupted by a burst of applause. "Long live the Republic!" cried Primo de Rivera.

"If you do not like this government, gentlemen, if this government does not inspire your confidence, if you believe that its ideas cannot appease the torments [of the nation] and if its members do not offer you the guarantee necessary to preserve order, dismiss it; but do not destroy its authority and immediately demand force of it."

"Vote the dissolution now!" cried various Deputies.

"Señor Presidente!" demanded Vasquez Gomez.

"No! no!" many Deputies interrupted him.

Pí y Margall, meanwhile, found his plans to introduce federal reforms stultified by the reluctance of the government to face an avowedly Radical (and therefore unitary) Assembly. Pí wanted to change the municipal system principally by instituting universal suf-

SELF-GOVERNMENT REALIZED

frage. Under the monarchy municipal government was closely under the supervision of the national government through the Minister of the Interior. The Republicans rightly wanted to alter that situation by making the base of the nation as representative as the Cortes. It was their misfortune that the Constitution of 1869 had not been observed for then the Republicans might reasonably have hoped to have instituted their reforms in a chamber favorable to their principles.

The National Assembly abolished slavery in the Island of Porto Rico March 22, the law being transmitted by cable to the Island. It was not a Republican measure, having been introduced by Ruiz Zorrilla, although Castelar often claimed credit for its passage.

The National Assembly, as unconstitutional as the Republic, was on the eve of ending. An emotional outburst recalling Castelar's celebrated speech for religious freedom greeted the passage of the law abolishing slavery. *Vivas* for the nation and the Republic could be heard everywhere. The Radicals on March 19 had named Francisco Salmerón y Alonso President of the Assembly and now, on March 22, at the request of the Republicans, they named a Permanent Commission, a watch-dog over the government in which the Radicals had a majority. Figueras, ending the session, promised to hold free elections. At 2 A. M. Sunday, March 23, the National Assembly closed.

The first phase of the Republic—the quarrel between the Radicals and the Republicans—had not ended.

VI. DISSOLUTION OF THE PERMANENT COMMISSION

The naming of a Permanent Commission was the third major violation of the Constitution of 1869, the other two, as we have noticed, being the proclamation of a Republic by an Assembly not having constituent powers and the illegal union of the Senate and the Congreso. Articles 110 and 111 of the Constitution provided that any fundamental change in the Constitution should be submitted to a Cortes Constituyentes to meet within three months after the prorogation of the Cortes in which such change was proposed. The Constitution proposed immediate dissolution of the chamber. The Permanent Commission was in violation of the Constitution, although it was provided for in Primo de Rivera's Resolution. This Commission under Primo's law had the right at its own behest or that of the government, to reconvene the Assembly should extraordinary circumstances warrant it.

The Executive Power of the Republic had been responsible di-

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

rectly to the National Assembly. The Permanent Commission, which considered itself the Assembly with fewer members remaining in session, regarded the government as being responsible to it. Thus, under this interpretation, Figueras and his Ministers would be as responsible to the Permanent Commission as to the Assembly. But the members of the Executive Power were of another mind. They accepted as a precedent the Permanent Commission of the Cortes Constituyentes of 1869, which General Prim rarely consulted. Since both groups owed their origin to the National Assembly itself, the relations between the Commission and the government were not likely to be happy.

This was the fundamental difference which made harmony between the two groups, mutually suspicious, mutually considering themselves the supreme power in the absence of the Assembly, difficult, if not impossible.

The members of the Commission, over whom presided Francisco Salmerón, brother of Nicolás Salmerón, Minister of Justice, continued the heckling of the government which had characterized the Radicals in the Assembly. The Commission remaining in session throughout the interim, the government had decided to have one of its members report at each of the meetings the state of the nation. Figueras was the first representative of the government to confer with the Commission. He was subjected to a severe cross-examination as to the progress the government was making in curbing disorders, in solving the question of the artillery corps—a question still before the Republic and one inherited from the reign of Don Amadeo. Castelar, at the next meeting, likewise was questioned closely and skeptically by the Commissioners.²¹

Not all of the members of the Commission were of this critical attitude. In the closing hours of the Assembly, a group of Radicals and Republicans had formed a party of conciliation, whom Labra represented on the Permanent Commission.²² Estéban Collantes represented the Alfonsinos, Salmerón, Rivero, Martos and the Marqués de Sardoal the Radicals.

The Radicals determined to form a unitary Republican party and to this end a directive Junta was formed April 6 under Salmerón's

²¹ *Diario de Sesiones de las Cortes Constituyentes*, I, 636, July 9, 1873, statement of Sorní.

²² *Ibid.*, I, 644, statement of Labra.

SELF-GOVERNMENT REALIZED

leadership, with members being Figuerola, Izquierdo, Echegaray, Sardoal, Mosquera, Becerra and Martos.²³

As the month of April advanced, with disorders continuing unabated in the provinces, with the nations of Europe remaining aloof and with the nation's finances growing worse daily, as a result of the Carlista War, Martos and Becerra conferred with Serrano, Topete and other Unionists who were in Madrid, as to the possibility of substituting a unitary government for the government in power.²⁴ Francisco Salmerón conferred with Manuel Pavía, captain general of Madrid, to ascertain what support the Permanent Commission would have from the army in the event the Assembly were recalled. Pavía consulted his officers and reported that they regarded the Assembly as being the supreme authority of the nation and that they would accept the orders of the Permanent Commission as final. Acosta, Minister of War and a Radical, likewise inquired of the officers and reported the same temper.²⁵

Pí y Margall met with the Commission April 17. The Commissioners rigorously questioned him regarding the anarchy prevailing in the nation. At the close of the session Salmerón handed Pí a communication from the Commission requesting the presence of all members of the government at the next meeting, Wednesday, April 20.²⁶ The government decided that the order was too peremptory and not in keeping with its dignity. When the Permanent Commission reassembled April 20 in the seventh section meeting room of the Congreso, José Cristobal Sorní, Minister of Overseas, came alone to represent the government.²⁷

Describing the scene to the Cortes Constituyentes July 9 Sorní declared: "I will not give you a description of what passed there, of the manner in which we were treated, of the sharp recriminations, of the terrible charges they made to us of what they characterized as disobedience and disrespect, because all the members of the government did not attend that session."

Sorní, partisan of conciliation and a member of the Permanent

²³ *La Igualdad* (Madrid, April 7, 1873); Villalba Hervás, p. 271; A. Houghton, *Les Origines de la Restauration des Bourbons en Espagne* (Paris, 1890), p. 44.

²⁴ Vilarrasa y Gatell, II, 681.

²⁵ Houghton, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

²⁶ *Diario*, I, 636, statement of Sorní; *La Igualdad* (April 18, 1873).

²⁷ *Diario*, I, 637, statement of Sorní; Pí y Margall, p. 26.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

Commission of 1869, stated that the government did not feel obligation to attend in a body but in deference to the Commission, the members of the government would do so if invited. Again the invitation was issued, this time for April 23. Despite the fact that the wife of Figueras had died April 20 the Commission proceeded with its plans for the meeting. Pí y Margall whom Figueras had named interim President of the Executive Power decided not to attend. Pí was not to be caught unawares again. The night of February 23, when Martos had taken command of Madrid, he had slept in the Ministry of the Interior, to awaken in the morning to find the building guarded by the Civil Guard owing allegiance to Martos. This time, hearing of plans for a Radical *coup d'état*, he remained at his office to assure himself that the forces at his command would dominate the situation. Estévez, Governor of Madrid and a former soldier in the Union army of the United States, was a shrewd master of tactics. He arranged the Republican militia, organized under a decree of February 14, around the Congreso and on the streets of Madrid. Around the Plaza de Toros, where the Radical militia had congregated presumably to initiate the Radical revolt he placed artillery under the command of Hidalgo.

The Permanent Commission in the meantime remained oblivious to this. The Marqués de Sardoal, with the aid of the Popular Mayor of Madrid, had assembled the old Radical militia, which was concentrated in the Bull-ring, awaiting the arrival of Serrano to disperse the government.²⁸ Radical soldiers guarded the Banco de España while others were stationed at the palace of the Duque de Medinaceli. The following day, April 23, the Permanent Commission met with the members of the government.

Nicolás Salmerón and Sorní had in vain visited Francisco Salmerón the night of April 22 to dissuade him from his course.²⁹ The older brother refused to yield and when the troops sent by Pí came to guard the Congreso, Francisco Salmerón ordered them to leave. All of the members of the government except Pí were at hand for the fateful interview. Madrid was filled with idle and curious people, with soldiers of Radical sympathy and Republican zeal. Within the Congreso the debate began. Questioned by the government as to

²⁸ Pí y Margall, p. 29; *La Igualdad* (April 24, 1873); Vilarrasa y Gatell, II, 681.

²⁹ Vilarrasa y Gatell, II, 682.

SELF-GOVERNMENT REALIZED

the cause of the Radical militia being under arms, members of the Commission replied that the Mayor of Madrid had called them out for review, a rather specious statement in view of the fact that it was a working day when few of the militiamen were free from their daily tasks. Rivero, opening the discussion for the Commission, declared that the state of affairs had so changed from the day in which the Radicals had voted the Republic that the Commission felt it imperative to summon the National Assembly. Castelar replied that it was impossible to reconvene the Assembly. The discussion grew more acrimonious as the day advanced.

Sorní, who had left the meeting to obtain a cup of broth, returned accidentally through the opposite hall of the Congreso from that in which the meeting room of the Commission was situated. He was startled to observe in several of the meeting rooms crowds of soldiers and more surprised when the Marqués de Sardoal himself came from one of the rooms.

"Why are the Republican volunteers assembled, if they do not have an order from the Mayor?" Sardoal asked, in counter-query to Sorní's as to meaning of the soldiers in the Congreso.

"They are meeting at the orders of the government," sturdily replied Sorní. "These others are meeting behind our backs and without the knowledge of the government."

Sorní informed the Marquis that the Republicans were anticipating trouble at the Bull-ring and for that reason had armed their soldiers.

Sorní hastened to the room where the Permanent Commission and the government were near checkmate.

"Let us get out of here!" he cried. "We are betrayed."

The session of the two governing bodies had begun at 2 P.M. in the afternoon and the government retired shortly after 5 o'clock. The Permanent Commission continued its discussions until 2 the next morning.

It was not long before the artillery placements of Hidalgo were dispersing the soldiers in the Bull-ring, despite the efforts of Topete, Sagasta and others to encourage them to "preserve order." The members of the government had reassembled at the office of the Interior Ministry. There Pí was taking energetic steps to suppress the incipient rebellion. He called in the Mayor, upbraided him and replaced him

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

with one known to be loyal. He dismissed Pavía and ordered soldiers loyal to the Republic to be placed at strategic points of Madrid. The curious crowd of earlier in the day had become a dangerous mob. Its fury soon knew no restraint. The mob broke into the Congreso, driving the Permanent Commission from their retreat. Only the quick intervention of Castelar, Sorní and other members of the government saved the lives of some of the better-known Radicals. The members of the Permanent Commission thus had to flee from popular wrath. Turning from the Congreso the mob invaded homes of many of the Unionist leaders, including that of Serrano who fled. Topete was arrested but released later.³⁰

The government the following morning decreed the dissolution of the Permanent Commission, which, stated the decree, had converted itself into an element of disturbance and disorder by its conduct and tendencies. The Commission sought to prolong the interim, to interfere with the election of members of the Cortes Constituyentes, and to usurp the powers of the government by assembling troops and naming their commander, a function belonging to the government.³¹

Madrid enjoyed the sport of it all. ¡*Qué corrida!*

The final break with the Radicals had been made. The Radical members of the Permanent Commission issued a manifesto to the nation May 6, protesting against the decree of dissolution, denying factionalism and protesting that "they declare with hand placed over heart and on their word of honor that in all of their acts they have adhered strictly to the limits of the mandate imposed by the Assembly."³²

Not only were the royalists abstaining from the elections for the Constituent Cortes which were to give Spain its charter for self-government but the Radicals, already tested in self-government, repeated the "bloodless revolution" of monarchical days, the retrainmient. The conditions of the monarchy were repeating themselves. The party that had announced with pride that it had achieved the greatest revolution in the history of Spain had yielded to its environment.

³⁰ Pí y Margall, pp. 29-30; *La Igualdad* (April 24, 1873); Vilarrasa y Gatell, II, 681-683; *Diario*, I, 659, July 10, 1873, statement of Pí y Margall; *ibid*, July 8, 1873, p. 618, statement of Estéban Collantes; *ibid*, July 9, 1873, p. 637, statement of Sorní; Sandoval, *Emilio Castelar*, p. 35; Sanchez del Real, p. 277.

³¹ *Gaceta de Madrid* (April 24, 1873).

³² Vilarrasa y Gatell, II, 692.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

TOWARDS ANARCHY

I. INTOLERANCE OF THE LEFT

THE first election for a Republican Cortes found the Radicals and most of the royalists abstaining. The elections of May, 1873 resulted consequently in a Cortes overwhelmingly Republican. Only twelve monarchical adherents were elected, two of the better known being Estéban Collantes and Romero Robledo. Within the Republican party the division into right and left wings proceeded rapidly, the former accepting Castelar as leader, the latter Orense. It was not long before a third division further complicated the political situation of the party, for a center division was formed with Salmerón and Pí y Margall as nominal leaders.

The opening of the Cortes Constituyentes June 1 was greeted with a salvo of twenty-one cannon. Figueras, President of the Executive Power, read the address of the government, written by Castelar:

"We arrive at the longed-for-moment of seeing the Spanish nation united in the Cortes, legitimate authority by its origin, constituent by its mandate, loved by all for its traditions; the people at the same time legislator and sovereign, founding government, institutions, in perfect consonance with the temperament of our character and with the spirit of our time."

Graphically he described the sad situation of the nation: "Having received the sad inheritance of many centuries of monarchy, aggravated by four years of revolution, material and moral; minds agitated, passions exalted, parties dissolved, administration disorganized, the Treasury exhausted, the army distrusted, the Civil War gaining way rapidly and credit declining greatly," the Republic nevertheless had arrived without shedding "a drop of blood and without sustaining any of those great conflicts which, in circumstances less difficult, have sadly stained the annals of our history."

Europe was hostile to the new settlement. "Entire Europe—the most solid and conservative governments—announced publicly they

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

would not recognize the Republic if it was not confirmed by sanction of a constitutional assembly." Though Europe was skeptical, the Republic was "purely Spanish in character, devoid of any revolutionary propaganda and of all territorial aggrandizement." America had welcomed the Republic, Figueras stated.

The army and the navy had remained loyal. Diplomats had remained at their posts. The administration of justice was unimpaired. Municipal corporations elected under the monarchy had been maintained by the Republic at great risk to order "solely by the moral authority of the government." Provincial deputations, in the main hostile to the new situation and "addicted to the old," were secure and were being permitted to work out their destinies with free expression of ideas.

Although some members of the Executive Power bemoaned the break with the Radicals, Figueras assured the Cortes the break was inevitable. The sole function of the Commission was to convoke the Assembly. "The government always represented legality because it wanted to comply with the law of the Assembly while the Commission represented illegality since it wanted to place artificial obstacles to the will of the Assembly and to fulfilling the laws solemnly given by the Assembly."

The government faced a tremendous task. It had two wars to carry on, one against the Carlistas, the other against the Cuban rebels. It had to solve its financial problem since the Republic found the Treasury empty and payments suspended the day it became a reality. All resources were used up. As a result, financial reform was imperative, Figueras warned. The military career should be made a true profession. Although discipline had improved in the army, "do not equivocate, it is necessary to give advantages to the soldier." Firm and "feverish activity" was necessary to conquer the "evil" of Carlism. Reorganization of the judicial system and improvement of prisons was needed. Church and state must be separated. Municipal government must be reorganized by popular elections.¹

Such an address contained much on which any friend of the Republic well might ponder. It required wisdom and discipline on the

¹ *Diario de Sesiones de las Cortes Constituyentes de la República Española* (Madrid, 1874), Vol. I, June 1, 1873. Hereafter there will be no footnote citations to the *Diario* when dates of sessions are given in the text.

TOWARDS ANARCHY

part of the more than three hundred and fifty Deputies of the Cortes. Such unity never existed. Castelar described the situation correctly when he said that "the right sees in each member of the left a demagogue and the left sees in each member of the right a traitor."² Members of the left, imbued with the ardor of the French revolutionists, were impatient to achieve the goal of the Republic. They could not understand why the more conservative members wanted to wait until the fundamental charter of the Republic had been adopted before making organic changes. Orense's complaint in the session of June 14 was typical of that attitude. He declared that the government was proceeding in economic reform just as the old governments had done. "I want the Spanish people to go forward but to do this, the first thing there is to do is to remove the fetters," he stated. He would have done with the monopolies and the lottery, "in a word, with everything that contributes to the public poverty." In view of the slowness with which the government was introducing reform Orense asked whether he should not retire to private life.

Even the forms of the old regime were repugnant to the left. Castelar had abolished the old orders of nobility and now members of the left began the use of the terminology of the French Revolution in their parliamentary intercourse. Forasté, for instance, in asking a question of the government in the session of June 18 used the salutation "citizen minister" in addressing the Minister of Justice. When Palanca, the Vice President of the Cortes, replied addressing him as "Su Señoría," Forasté retorted: "I am not Su Señoría, Citizen Presidente. . . ." When the article of the revised Republican rules of order applying to terms of address was read, Forasté declared in triumph:

"Here, then, there are only citizens, there are no *señorías*."

Palanca was unyielding. "I call the Señor Diputado to order for the second time," he said severely.

Most of the left were firm believers in direct action. Thus Luis Blanc proposed on June 4 that as soon as the form of government had been determined, Deputies of the Cortes be permitted to mobilize such of their electors as offered themselves to fight the Carlistas, the Deputies to assume active command of these forces. His suggestion was greeted with protests from the right but Blanc sturdily urged the Deputies to give the "most dignified and noble example" to the nation.

² *Ibid*, July 8, 1873.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

Three days later Toribio Valbuena offered an ultra-federal solution in event of disorder. If any part of the army proved insubordinate, the Cortes should suspend their session, leaving the affairs of the Chamber in the hands of a permanent commission consisting of the members of the financial and constitutional committees and a Deputy from each province, the remaining representatives returning to their districts where, in event that communication either by telegraph or by railroad be interrupted with the government at Madrid, the representatives should become the sovereign power in the various provinces.

It was Torre Mendieta who was distressed by the number of visitors Estévez, Minister of War, entertained in his office during working hours.

"All the world has the right to come to the offices of the Ministry of War and I can do no less than receive them with pleasure," replied the intransigent Minister.

"The nation comes before all," retorted Torre Mendieta sententially.

"I can hardly lower myself to becoming porter!" quickly replied the Minister.

The left was intolerant and its members were in reality the Carlistas of the Republican party. Araus in the session of June 18 opposed the proposed law reorganizing municipalities on the ground that it was anti-Republican.

"Take into consideration, Deputies, that if we are here as the representatives of the majority of the nation and that if we compose the Constituent Assembly, we cannot consent, we ought not consent, to the domination in the country of any criterion distinct from ours."

II. "WHO IS PEDREGAL?"

Orense, elected President of the Chamber June 7, pressed the matter of proclaiming the federal Republic. A group of Southern Deputies proposed that "The form of government of the Spanish nation is the federal democratic republic." Only García Ruiz and Sainz de Rueda, the former a unitary Republican, opposed the resolution, which was approved by acclamation. Various Deputies in the excitement of the moment sought to have the vote declared unanimous. Figueras told García Ruiz that his opposition was "completely useless." "We will lose time by a roll-call," he added, despite the fact that the regulations of the Cortes provided that a law, to be voted finally, required a roll-

TOWARDS ANARCHY

call. The final vote on the federal Republic was taken on June 8, therefore, when the Cortes decided to abide by the regulations. The final vote was 219 for the federal Republic and 2 against, García Ruiz and Ríos Rosas voting against it.

The revolt of a great part of General Velarde's division facing the Carlistas at Igualada and a disastrous collision between the Republican authorities and the people of Granada were two incidents which determined the mild Figueras to resign. Rafael Cervera on behalf of the right suggested as Figueras's successor in the presidency of the Executive Power Pí y Margall who would be empowered "to propose to the Chamber the individuals who are to form the Executive Power." Figueras, in announcing his determination in the session of June 7, declared Spain required a "strong, energetic government" and he hoped that the Chamber would name a man to form a government which would have unity of thought and action. Cervera represented Pí as one of the old Republicans who was "most convincing, most inflexible, most honest."

Pí was the proposal of the right. The left through Eduardo Benot opposed the form in which Pí's name was presented, since it went against the revolutionary spirit. "The Revolution which began in September," Benot said, "and which has terminated in the happy proclamation of the Republic, was the dethronement of the dynasty of the Bourbons in the region of acts; but in reality and in the region of right, it was the dethronement of all dynasties, of all personal powers. It was a call of the people because it is known that no human force can gain-say it since it represents the co-operation of all classes. It was a call to the fourth estate to public life."

There was danger, Benot insisted, that Spain might follow in the path of France and elect a Napoleon III. The left, as a matter of policy, wanted the Assembly to elect the members of the Executive Power, while Cervera's resolution charged Pí with that power.

After heated debate and a declaration from Pí that the Chamber was free to accept or reject his Cabinet, Cervera's resolution was carried by the vote of 142 to 58 against.

The homogeneous government, selected after long deliberations in which Castelar was the principal spokesman of the right, was announced to the Cortes shortly after 9:30 P.M. June 8. Pí y Margall retained his position of Minister of the Interior, combining it with the

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

presidency of the Executive Power. His Cabinet consisted of Cervera as Minister of Foreign Affairs, Manuel Pedregal as Minister of Justice, Estévez, an intransigent, as Minister of War, Eduardo Palanca, another intransigent affiliated with the right, as Minister of Public Works, José de Carvajal as Minister of Finance, Jacobo Oreiro as Minister of the Navy and José Cristobal Sorní as Minister of Overseas.

The stormy debate which followed the announcement of the Ministers revealed the cleavage that was to waste the strength of the Cortes. The Ministry was not accepted, falling under the furious criticism of the left.

"Who is Pedregal?" Thus Timoteo Alfaro indicted the government as a collection of unknown men and placed the debate on the plane of personalities.

"I cannot approve [the ministry]," Alfaro said, "since signs may be placed on the street corners asking 'Who is Pedregal?'. . . . Who is Pedregal? Who are the others? I refer to Cervera and Palanca, persons like the first one named, well known and respected by me."

Figueras, the parliamentarian, tried to stop the vigorous debate which followed. "Are circumstances so favorable that we may prolong this question which may envenom more the divisions beginning to surge in the Republican party and which, I warn you, may be the death of the Republic in Spain?"

Fernando Pierrard y Alcedar, an intransigent, pronounced some words inaudible to the speaker.

"Raise your voice and speak out loud; the Chamber will decide!" Rubau Donadeu, a friend of Figueras, warned Pierrard.

When Figueras had concluded his speech, Pierrard declared he could not "tolerate the charge that the extreme left are losing the Republic."

The debate accelerated. There was discussion whether the vote should be on the Ministry as a whole or as individuals.

It was near midnight. Many Deputies were on their feet and confusion and recrimination made it almost impossible for one Deputy to hear another. The announcement that the Cortes had accorded the vote on the Ministry as a whole was greeted with cries of "No, no!" and "Yes, yes!"

"Comply with the regulations and vote by ballots for each one," urged Deputy Llorente.



FROM A CONTEMPORARY PRINT

FRANCISCO PÍ Y MARGALL

SECOND PRESIDENT OF THE EXECUTIVE POWER

TOWARDS ANARCHY

"Order, Señor Diputado; no one has conceded the floor to you," he was warned.

"I have asked for it many times but have not obtained it, despite the fact that you have conceded it to the entire world," sourly replied the upbraided Deputy.

The left cheered, the right protested, when Pí retired his Cabinet. Some Deputies proposed a secret session.

"I am opposed to a secret session; the nation has the right to know all," declared Castelar.

"Were the conferences with Señor Pí public, so that the whole world might know?" indignantly demanded Olave, a former Radical now a member of the left.

Many Deputies began rising from their seats and walking toward the center of the Chamber. Figueras gained recognition to urge that the Chamber itself name the Ministers, since it could not afford to pass through another such scene as it had just witnessed, for it would destroy the Republic. He approved a secret session which was agreed upon; at 11:45 that night, the Assembly went into secret session, from which it did not emerge until 4 the next morning.

Figueras again held the reigns of government while the Cortes attempted the difficult task of selecting a government. Pí faced almost insuperable difficulties in the formation of a satisfactory government since Figueras, Salmerón and Castelar would not form a part of it. The alternative to a government of the right seemed to be a government of the left over which Orense would preside. Salmerón was agreeable to a government with Pí as President but Castelar urged Figueras to form a ministry of conciliation. Figueras declined, stating that he intended to retire from political life because of his broken health, made worse by grieving over the recent death of his wife. Castelar then suggested that Salmerón be made President of the Cortes to replace Orense, whose resignation—because of deafness—had added to the confusion of the Assembly. He also proposed that Carvajal, who later became Minister of Foreign Affairs in his own cabinet, be made Minister of Finance. Figueras would remain as Minister-President. Salmerón agreed to this proposal but Carvajal asked for more time.

Figueras, upon learning that Pí had been offended by the apparent preference of the Cortes for him, decided that he would not stand as an obstacle in the way of reunion. Pí in fact stated his feeling to Fi-

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

gueras. The latter reached out his hand and Pí apparently hesitated a second. That decided Figueras. He placed his resignation in the hands of Palanca, Vice President of the Cortes, and secretly left Madrid for France. "I sincerely think this the greatest act of my life: to sacrifice knowingly my reputation, destroying a public life of more than thirty years," Figueras wrote a friend. Figueras had lacked the firmness necessary to bring order from the chaos existing in the Assembly. He felt keenly Pierrard's charge that he was ambitious—a ridiculous charge against one "who did not even give commands in his own home!"³ Figueras, despite the failure of his ministries, was a noble figure in the history of the Republican party. He had long been the parliamentary leader of the party in the days when it was in opposition. With biting humor and fine irony he had led in masterful fashion the assault on the Radicals in the session of February 11. He had remained a friend of conciliation under the influence of Castelar. By his own personal influence he had in all probability prevented Catalonia proclaiming itself independent. His flight therefore at a time of great stress within the Assembly and of acute disorder in the nation, proved a severe blow to the right, preventing for the time the formation of a government.

The scenes outside the Chamber were just as stormy as those within. The government had heard that Contreras and Pierrard intended seizing Madrid with the Volunteers of the Republic and proclaiming immediately the federal republic. Pí, as Minister of the Interior, had taken precautions to see that the Republic was not surprised with a revolt in the capital. Loyal troops were placed at strategic points in the city and around the Congreso.

The secret session of the Cortes ended with a spirit far different from that one of fury and jealousy with which the public and the members of the diplomatic corps had been regaled the previous evening. There seemed to be a spirit of fraternity, however short-lived. A vote of confidence in the Executive Power was proposed by the left and voted. Diaz Quintero, an intransigent, cheered for the Executive Power.

"Long live the federal Republic!" cried another Deputy.

³ Villalba Hervás, pp. 381-387; *La Igualdad* (June 30, 1873); Pí y Margall, *op cit.*, p. 38. Pí always insisted that he had not hesitated when Figueras offered his hand nor had he sought to offend Figueras.

TOWARDS ANARCHY

"Long live the union between the federal Republican elements!" shouted other Deputies.

Orense formally presented his resignation as President of the Cortes June 9. On the eleventh the Ministry of Figueras formally resigned, thus marking the end of the final Ministry of conciliation. The Cortes then elected an Executive Power, in which Pí was President as well as Minister of the Interior. Other Ministers elected were Estévez as War, José Cristobal Sorní as Overseas, José Muro López Salgado as Foreign Affairs, Frederico Anrich as Navy, José Fernando Gonzalez as Justice, Teodoro Ladico y Font as Finance and Eduardo Benot as Public Works.

This was neither a strong nor a homogeneous Ministry. It included Estévez and Benot, bitter partisans of the intransigents. It contained none of the distinguished names in the Republican roll of honor, except that of Pí. It was not the kind of government to resolve the crisis or to save Spain. Pí recognized its weakness, although officially he announced an energetic policy opposed to the partition of the nation. Privately, he thought differently. He resented the failure of the great leaders of the party to share in his government. "What kind of a government was constituted, Castelar, Salmerón and Figueras refusing to have a part in it?" he demanded in his *Memoirs*. "The old Ministry would have been the best bulwark against every kind of ambition; discomposed and without the possibility of reconstituting it, there was aroused greed of authority and aspiration for power in many obscure men who were beginning to enter political life. What an error was ours! I did not share to this point in the ideas of my companions; but I will repent all my life of having followed them, permitting myself the night of June 7 to be charged with the formation of a ministry."⁴

Not only did he have a Ministry some of whose members were heartily in sympathy with the cantonal movement, then rearing its head all over Spain, but he was facing a Chamber bitterly factious. A bold energetic policy, aimed against the Republican as well as against the Carlista rebels, would have the greatest difficulty of approval not only in the Cortes but among the Ministers themselves.

Pí made the best of the situation in his brief address to the Assembly on the eleventh, when his new Ministry was seated. Somewhat un-

⁴ Pí y Margall, p. 38.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

certain as to the policies of the Ministers themselves, he himself advocated a bold policy against the enemy. "I have abandoned the firm resolution I had to retire to private life after agitating the country with the Republican flag in hand for twenty years. I take my place at the head of the government in spite of knowing that the task is far greater than my strength. . . . What will be the program of the Ministry? I cannot say just now what it will be because it is necessary that we reach agreement among the Ministers; I can tell you at once that the government comes today to solve the question of public order. . . . Insurrection not only should be illegal but indeed, it is a crime—one of the gravest crimes one can commit. . . . This is the hour of work, not of talk."

In stating the program of the compromise Ministry on Friday, June 13, Pí explained the difficulties besetting the government. It could not expect co-operation from the royalists who had abstained from the previous elections. "You understand what electoral abstention signifies in Spain," he warned. "First, conspiracy; later, war." The Republic had the power to quell all disorder but on one condition—that it did not waste time discussing sterile questions. "If we divide ourselves into bands, do not complain of conspirators; the foremost conspirators will be yourselves." Pí asked for unified action of the Cortes, for cessation of the intensely personal attitude of the Deputies. The imperative task facing the government was the ending of the Carlista War. To do this required the restoration of discipline in the army through punishment not only of refractory soldiers but of officers as well. He promised justice for the army, assuring all soldiers and officers who fought loyally for a year against the enemy recompense from the government. Still insisting on a volunteer army, Pí declared a new law of recruiting soldiers was needed and a reserve should be created in which youths of twenty years could volunteer.

It was impossible to preserve for Spain the rights of a nation living in peace, Pí continued; therefore the Ministers sought extraordinary powers—a request that was greeted with applause.

The President presented a dismal picture of the Treasury. "It is easy for you to understand the grave and difficult state of the Treasury if you think that at the end of the month of June the deficit of the Treasury will reach 546,000,000 pesetas, or 2,200,000,000 reales; if you know that the maturity payments this same month reach 153,000,000 pesetas

TOWARDS ANARCHY

and that we do not have resources more than in the sum of 32,000,000, resulting in a deficit of 121,000,000." (This condition, it might be added, was made worse by the policy of inflation the government had been pursuing, due to the issuance of paper money which not only frightened capital but was placing the banking system in jeopardy.)

It was impossible to make a budget or to apply the budget of the previous year, Pí declared, since the form of the government had not been established so that the obligations of the various divisions of government could be ascertained. He promised the most frugal administration but the enormous floating debt still would terrify the nation. He urged the Cortes to proceed slowly in following the Republican policies of lower taxes and rents, lest the Assembly be forced to re-introduce those same taxes as the Cortes Constituyentes of 1855 had been forced to do following the abolition of the food taxes in 1854.

Reforms Pí suggested included: Complete separation of church and state; free and compulsory primary education; preservation of territorial integrity; complete abolition of slavery, since it was impossible to retain the allegiance of the colonials, who, educated in the "free air" of the universities of the United States, returned to their native land to find a "regime completely distinct"; settlement of labor troubles by mixed juries; proper safeguards of labor, as well as prevention of persons too young working in factories.

Pí recounted the difficulties previous ministries had met in endeavoring to enforce free education. "We encountered grave difficulties because we were told that a father could not be obligated to educate his children. Vain sophistry that is easy to destroy! For do not all the laws of the world obligate parents to feed their children? So are they obliged to give them instruction. Does man feed by chance on bread alone? Does he not need material, intellectual and moral food, attaining his triple nature? We are decided to do everything possible to establish free and obligatory instruction."

Inasmuch as Pí was the first Spanish Prime Minister to give detailed consideration to the relations of labor and capital, as well as the first to approach them from a social viewpoint, his proposals regarding them merit detailed attention. He proposed arbitration in 1873 as the most logical way of settling labor disputes. He believed in lifting up the laboring man, so the child would not have to be deprived of as many of life's advantages as had been his father.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

"From political reforms we turn to social reforms," he continued. "I suppose, gentlemen, that you are acquainted with the character of political revolutions; all carry in their wake an economic revolution. Political revolutions, basically, are a war of class against class; that is to say, an effort of the inferior classes to gain the level of the superior classes. What has been that large series of political struggles which consumed the strength of the Roman Republic during seven centuries? Nothing more than the desire of the plebeian to elevate himself to the level of the patrician. What has been the great struggle of the communities during the Middle Ages that continued disturbing all Europe during two centuries? Nothing other than a war of the middle classes against the aristocratic classes; that is to say, the desire of the middle classes to be raised to the level of the nobility. This revolution had its supreme crisis in 1789 and from then the fourth estate took life. The laboring classes today have the same instinct, the same desires, the same aspirations that the middle classes had.

"Of course we cannot solve by ourselves all of these great problems; but who doubts that we can do something towards this goal? Who doubts that we can at least realize reforms which certainly cannot be called utopian, proved as they are by other peoples? None of you are unacquainted with what is happening today in Europe; between laborers and capitalists there is a struggle visible in various ways but revealed principally by strikes, a medium essentially disturbing which in itself creates great alarm; a medium which does no more than complicate the problem, for supposing that production is made more difficult, wealth diminishes and it is turned against those who employ it. Have we not the power to convert this struggle into another, more legal and pacific? Let us substitute for strikes mixed juries, composed of laborers and manufacturers, to resolve all the problems relating to the conditions of labor. These juries have been born spontaneously in our people; we have them established in various places; we have nothing more to do than sanction the work of social spontaneity.

"We also ought to guard that children are not victims, either of greed or of the misery of their parents; we ought to avoid atrophying and enervating them in factories by not letting them enter factories before the age necessary to tolerate their rude tasks. We have to dictate the conditions for children who enter factories and above all, to pre-

TOWARDS ANARCHY

vent work impeding the intellectual development that unfortunately is often the case in the working classes.

"No nation in the world can be desirous of the degeneration of its race; on the contrary all countries of the world are interested in the conservation of the races and the augmentation of their power and their courage, so that men can be useful citizens and active members of the great human family. And this is not possible to achieve without laws which defend children against the abuses of their parents."

Spain's first Socialist Prime Minister boldly and courageously approached a problem which the old regime had avoided. It was the misfortune of the nation that he was unable to realize his advanced social program. The very element of his character that caused him to advance such an humanitarian program at the same time assured the doom of his government. Pí was a minister of conciliation. He was a theorist, a philosopher. However wise his program and however humanitarian, Pí required courage and firmness as well in another direction—the firmness to suppress his colleagues of the left who were even at the moment fanning the flames of destruction in the provinces.

III. DON CARLOS VII

We have had occasional glimpses of the state of Spain as we have sat with the government in the heated air of the Congreso. We have seen that all was not well with the Spanish Republic. If the Treasury was depleted, that was no fault of the Republican government, for it was an inheritance. If the Carlista army was ravaging the northland, that was not chargeable to Republican doctrine, for Don Carlos warred against all impious doctrines of liberalism and was merely continuing the war his grandfather had launched in 1833. If the nations of Europe remained cold—all but Switzerland—it was due more to fear of the spread of republicanism than to the danger of the Republic itself. Europe was just completing a great era of national unification. Italy was realizing its goal of a united Kingdom. Prussia had knit together an Empire and was now proceeding conservatively under the able direction of Bismarck. France was experimenting gingerly with its third Republic under the Conservative Thiers. Austria-Hungary had completed its last trial of liberalism and under Francis Joseph was living a good, conservative life. England was in the apogee of Victorianism. Europe was royal and unsympathetic towards radical ideas. There was not a liberal great nation in Europe. Europe wanted to settle down

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

after a period of war and adjustment. Spain alone had embarked on an adventure of liberalism. Spain alone seemed to go against the trends of Europe—it was liberal, it was anti-national. Italy and Germany were completing their great works of unification. Spain was beginning to undo the work of centuries. It was no wonder that Europe remained skeptical and foreboding.

Oblivious to the threat against the Republic promised in the attitude of the intransigents, Pí y Margall sought to end the Carlista War. In less than four years the Carlista War had become a Civil War of ever-growing threat to Spain. After years of failure, the cause of Carlism at last seemed assured of success. Since the miserable failure of Don Carlos V, the first Pretender, the Carlistas had had varying success. Don Carlos VII was born March 30, 1848 at Laibach, Austria, while his brother Don Alfonso was born later in London. The mother, a daughter of the Duke of Modena, was a pious woman who reared her sons carefully. The family led a roving career. The revolutionary events of 1848 had caused Don Juan de Borbón, the father, and Doña María Beatriz, the mother, to flee from Venice to the Austrian court. Later, the family lived successively in Prague and in Italy, where María Beatriz sought to rear Don Carlos as an Italian. But Don Carlos talked on every occasion with Spaniards, who reminded him that he was the Pretender. He had a striking fondness for the common man and an adventurous spirit. Don Juan, father of Don Carlos, effected a reconciliation with Doña Isabel, the deposed Queen, and recognized her as the head of the House of Bourbon October 3, 1868, although he resigned any rights there might remain to Don Carlos. Efforts to effect a restoration through parliamentary means had proved a failure and after the scandals during Don Amadeo's reign Don Carlos ordered his partisans to abstain from the elections. The young Pretender had allied himself by marriage with the Pretender to the French throne and found this alliance of considerable help to him when he launched the Civil War in 1869.

Don Carlos did not have a Cabrera, a Zumalacárregui, to lead his troops. Instead he had the venerable Joaquin Elio, Dorregaray, his own youthful brother Don Alfonso, the opportunist *guerrillero* Savalls. These were men of ability but not of superior ability. Don Alfonso was in supreme command of the earlier operations but gradually, dissidence



FROM A CONTEMPORARY PRINT

CARLOS DE BORBÓN
THE PRETENDER

TOWARDS ANARCHY

entered the Carlista councils, reaching a climax when Savalls declared he would obey Don Alfonso but not Don Carlos. These difficulties were obviated by compromise.

Now, in 1873, the time for a Carlista victory was opportune. The royalist generals who constituted the real leaders of the army of the constitutional forces were in voluntary retirement. The few able generals of the Republic coped with a situation greater than they could control. Discipline had been abandoned; entry into the army was voluntary and by the same token, so was retirement. The Republican leaders were quarreling among themselves. The intransigents were beginning to revolt. Cantons were being proclaimed here and there. Churches in Barcelona and other cities were entered and looted by ardent Republicans. The red flag flew here and there as an insult to the church. Don Carlos was the great crusader. He had come to save the church for Spain and so save Spain for itself. Priests became leaders of his army. Cities were fined by the victorious Carlista troops. Here and there liberals were assassinated as the crusade grew more bitter.

The great drive toward Madrid had begun with the advent of the Republic. First Berga in Catalonia fell, in March, 1873. Rapidly other cities fell, climaxed by the capture of Estella, which Don Carlos made his capital in August. The capture of this important city marked the end of the first period of the invasion. Don Carlos set up his court and ruled as king of Spain. He made a veritable triumphal procession through the northern provinces. The Basque Provinces, Navarre, northern Catalonia, part of Aragon, owed allegiance to him. Successively Moriones, Gaminde, Pavía, Velarde, commanding the armies of the Republic, met with indifferent success. The Republic did not know whom to trust and the command of the army was being changed constantly.

Instead of completing the drive towards Madrid and thus assuring himself of success, Don Carlos continued the campaign in the North. The bold strategy of Zumalacárregui might have realized his goal. And thus Don Carlos sacrificed his brilliant opportunity. His forces threatened Bilbao on the Atlantic coast and later captured Castellón on the Mediterranean Sea. Despite the push toward the heart of Spain, Don Carlos had missed his chance to take advantage of Pí y Margall's difficulties.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

IV. A TURN TOWARD THE RIGHT

A danger equally as grave as Carlism was disturbing Spain by the end of June. It was the cantonal movement.

The Federalists and particularly the Federalist Deputies belonging to the intransigent wing in the Cortes regarded federalism as government of the provinces by themselves. They made haste to set up cantons because the federal government was being achieved too slowly.

There had been many instances of insubordination reported, of commanding officers shot by their soldiers. Various cities had been disturbed by mutinies. But it was not until June 25 that the first of the cantons came into being. The government had evacuated practically all of the garrisons from Andalusia for the Carlista War in the North and in Catalonia. As a result the large cities of Andalusia were garrisoned with but few men. Seville had but seventy members of the Civil Guard and as many excise police. A committee of public safety was formed in that city by intransigents, the forces of the government were attacked and the available arms and ammunition captured, consisting of two thousand rifles without locks, a thousand revolvers and two thousand sabers.

The movement thus begun spread with incredible rapidity. Soon Cádiz, Córdoba, Málaga and other of the principal cities of the South were in rebellion against the central government, establishing cantons and accepting the rule of committees of public safety. In many instances the cantons were established by Deputies of the Cortes.

It was obvious that the condition of Spain was most serious. Disorder and ensuing poverty threatened the very heart of society. Spain was as near a breakdown as a nation could be and still retain the name of nation. Tax collections practically had ceased in the North. In the South there was no authority to assure collections for the government, while the new cantons frequently set aside distasteful taxes. Train service to the French frontier was frequently interrupted by the Carlistas. Education had ceased being effective. As Montero, a Deputy from the Province of Jaén, described the state of education in his Province, so it could be described in the rest of Spain: "Public instruction, as everyone knows, is found in a tragic condition in Spain, especially since the mis-named Revolution of September. In my province, and I think it is true in others, teachers are literally dying of hunger, the schools are an arid desert and I do not think we can continue in this situation, for the

TOWARDS ANARCHY

interest of public instruction and of the teachers and for the decorum of the nation."⁵

This statement was the most signal confession of the breakdown of government, for as Benot, Minister of Public Works, replied, the teachers were paid by the municipal corporations and the state could only urge these corporations to pay the salaries.

Despite the gravity of the situation, the compromise Ministry sought to give life to the program Pí had announced. It presented various projects for laws: the renovation of municipal corporations by universal suffrage of all men over twenty-one years of age, this law being passed June 23, designating elections to be held July 12, 13, 14 and 15; the selection of a commission of twenty-five members to draft the constitution of the federal republic; the abolition of the Legation to the Vatican, since "It is not convenient to sustain for longer time a diplomatic representation of an essentially religious character"; a modern workmen's law providing safeguards for children and mixed juries in the arbitration of labor difficulties;⁶ the reorganization of the diplomatic and consular services, to make them attractive careers.

The disparity in viewpoint of his Ministers elected by the Cortes caused Pí y Margall to confess to the Assembly June 21 that the secret of the Executive Power's weakness lay in the origin of the Ministry. A strong government required the complete confidence of the Cortes. This statement precipitated the long-pending struggle between the right and the left. The Cortes took in consideration Castelar's resolution authorizing Pí to resolve the crisis by naming ministers he believed would merit the approval of the Cortes. Defeated by a vote of 185 to 45, the left nevertheless sought to frustrate the aim of the right to assume the government. Diaz Quintero, one of the bitterest of the intransigents, opposed Castelar's resolution and declared that there had

⁵ *Diario*, I, 190, June 18, 1873.

⁶ This law was similar in purpose to that proposed to the National Assembly by Manuel Becerra. Benot's law, slightly modified, was adopted. Boys under thirteen and girls under fourteen were not permitted to work more than six hours and children so employed should be divided into two groups, so that each section would be free for its members to attend school a half day. Boys from thirteen to seventeen and girls from fourteen to seventeen could not work more than ten hours a day. Children under seventeen were not allowed to work at night. Factories more than four kilometers from a populated place were required to establish and support a school for children and to have a physician on hand to furnish medical attention, provided such establishments employed permanently eighty or more workers.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

been no change in the Cortes since the Assembly had given Pí a vote of confidence ten days before. "Señor Pí may count on the adulation and endearments of those who aspire to be ministers but the ambitious who remain defrauded will some day turn to war," he prophesied bitterly. While the left had extreme confidence in Pí, it nevertheless was opposed to concentrating power in the hands of one person. Casaldueiro, also an intransigent, told the Cortes that if Castelar's proposition was urgent, "the constitution could be had in five days and this would resolve all crises."

A Deputy of the right referred to the president.

"There is no president of the Republic here!" cried a voice from the left.

"If there is no president of the Republic, because the organization of the government is not complete, create something that gives the appearance," replied the first Deputy.

Castelar intervened in the debate to give the first indication of the conservative program which was gradually forming in his mind. Stating that he feared the Republic might be lost because of the temerities of the Republicans, Castelar continued: "If the Republic triumphs over disorder, if it affiances justice and authority, if it conserves the national unity, if it gives liberty with the federation, I would want the gratitude of my fellow citizens; but if unfortunately the Republic should be the ruin of all liberties, ah! may God forgive me and history forget me!"

The left defended Pí for his Socialistic ideas, the right because he represented the totality of the Chamber, Castelar continued. "I, who am accustomed to sacrifices, because I have made them, must make this sacrifice also: to sustain a government and to support a Republican in spite of not finding myself in conformity with various of his social ideas. . . . I want to prove that I do not belong to that number of men solely disposed to defend ministries of which they form a part. I want to prove that authority is compatible with the Republic and order with liberty. This Chamber ends by giving a great spectacle. This discussion has not left the limits of a parliamentary discussion; here everyone has spoken with dignity, with the highest aims, without personalities, majority and minority, right and left. Let us continue in this same spirit; let us arise to the height of our responsibility. Let us behold the fate of the nation; let us remember that all of Europe looks on

TOWARDS ANARCHY

us without confidence; let us give guarantees that whatever may be one's ideas, that no one fears ideas. . . ."

The vote of confidence was to Pí personally and not to his Ministers. Though the government continued for a week longer to withstand the attacks of the left, the Ministers had decided to resign June 26 and Pí announced their decision June 28. He also proposed a Ministry of the right: himself as President and Minister of the Interior; Eleuterio Maisonnave as Minister of Foreign Affairs; Joaquín Gil Berges as Minister of Justice; Eulogio Gonzalez as Minister of War; Frederico Anrich as Minister of the Navy; Ramón Perez Costales as Minister of Public Works; Francisco Suñer y Capdevila as Minister of Overseas and José Carvajal as Minister of Finance. Disclaiming any discord with the Ministers who had resigned, Pí explained he had sought ministers for his new cabinet from the various groups in the Cortes, although least from the left, since that group had refused him a vote of confidence. He assured the left that he did not have the least hostility to it. "All who know me know my spirit is eminently conciliatory," he said in a statement significant of the entire weakness of the ministries of this otherwise most able Republican. Pí declared his program could be told in two words: "Order and progress."

A number of intransigents June 27 caused to be read a resolution which would declare the Cortes a National Convention "from which emanates a junta of public safety, which will be the executive power of the republic." Angel Armentia, sponsor of this revolutionary proposal, roundly condemned the Republic. "What have we done in the days since the Republic was established?" he asked. "What have the two Ministries we have had done? Your conscience and that of the nation has to answer, not I. What propositions, what means, what projects of laws have the Ministers introduced who have sat on the Blue Bench—I almost think we ought to have its color changed! We come to seat ourselves on these benches, yet they are found empty in the main the greater part of the sessions; and it is sad to say and confess it, you do not see seated in these benches around a half dozen Deputies. . . . I, for my part, assure you I am ashamed to call myself a Deputy, seeing that we do nothing."

Armentia's resolution, defended with such rustic frankness, was defeated.

Pí y Margall had been the one continuous element in the various

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

ministries of the Republic. He had been Minister of the Interior in all of the cabinets thus far. Under him had begun the dissolution that in a week more was to reach a climax. Under him had begun the literal interpretation of the propaganda which he and Castelar had so fluently preached. He had been a member of various ministries of conciliation; he had now done with the left, with the group in which lay his sympathies; he had turned to the right. But his heart had not turned. He was still the minister of conciliation, as he had indicated so bluntly in his address June 28.

V. SALMERÓN'S PROGRAM

Conciliation could no longer save Spain.

Castelar and Salmerón had been reaching that conclusion slowly and by different roads of approach. Both men were intellectual Republicans. Like Figueras and Pí, they were students of philosophy; they were idealists. Both were university professors who saw in the Republic the Utopia. Salmerón was a man of the greatest intelligence and of the greatest courage. His was one of the great minds Spain produced in the nineteenth century; his disciplined reason taught him that the program of the left in action could not be his.

Salmerón had enunciated his program in his speech on June 13 on accepting the presidency of the Cortes, to which he had been elected that day. His address was strikingly similar in spirit to that of Castelar ten days later.

"Make the Cortes, that until now appear exclusively the representation of the federal Republican party, the Cortes of the Spanish nation and make the conservative classes congratulate us on having supported their proper interests as well as if they had here a strong and powerful representation," Salmerón urged. *"What mission more holy, more august, has ever been recommended to any political party?"*

"Democracy does not represent either the predominant or the inferior arbitrariness of any class or state, however numerous, for or against, the others. It is necessary, it is indispensable, that with hand placed upon our conscience and our reason fixed in the eternal idea of justice we seek the republic for Spain."

"Social reforms ought to be tempered to particular conditions," Salmerón advised the Socialists. *"In this sense, then, I favor saying from this high position to the conservative classes: Do not fear that the federal Republic goes to break the unity of the country or to injure*

TOWARDS ANARCHY

unjustly the interest they represent." A strong majority and a strong minority, both disciplined, were needed in the Parliament. The minority should refrain from force, the majority should be prudent and moderate.

Castelar, who had been a professor in the Central University of Madrid at the same time as Salmerón, had progressed to the right more rapidly than had Salmerón. As he explained in the Restoration: "When I saw on one side of me the complete development of demagoguery and on the other the great development of Carlism I decided (having had a certain revolutionary fibre in my youth of which I am now completely repentant) to sustain within legality the constant aspirations of my principles, without change of ideas, without change of party."⁷

Castelar and Salmerón watched sadly as Pí prepared to quell the cantonal tornado devastating Spain.

⁷ Castelar, *Discursos en la Restauración*, I, 216, speech on March 17, 1876.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

PÍ'S GOVERNMENT OF CONCILIATION

I. PÍ GRANTED DICTATORIAL POWERS

WITH the exhilaration of madness the intransigent Republicans erected their cantonal republic during the short but disastrous government of conciliation which Pí y Margall began the latter part of June. Seville, Granada, Alcoy, Murcia, Cartagena, Alicante, Cádiz, Salamanca, Burgos—like a geographical directory of Spain star after star in Spain's firmament fell from the flag of the Republic, all spurred on by "true republicanism," the republicanism preached by Castelar, by Pí, by Orense. Throughout the throes of that government of little more than a month, the helplessness with which it sought to cope with a situation beyond its control aroused the frenzied anguish of Republicans of the right and the applause of members of the intransigent left. Centuries of work in uniting Spain were undone in little more than a week.

Pí was not satisfied with his Minister of War, whom he suspected of opposing his program. He was not in union with the aims of Maisonnave who belonged to the right. He was in harmony with Francisco Suñer y Capdevila and others of the center who were firm advocates of conciliation, and with whom he now found himself aligned. Conciliation in the first days of the Republic was the program of statesmanship, for it would have insured the participation of political parties nominally royalist. Now conciliation was far too late. It required the "stick" of General Narváez. Pí was not the man to wield that stick.

From June 26 to July 18 Spain ceased entirely to be a nation in any unified sense and reverted to the city-state era of the Middle Ages.

Málaga had from the proclamation of the Republic existed in a state of semi-independence under the leadership of Francisco Solier, a Deputy of the center, who was the delegate of the government as well as the Civil Governor of the Province. Aiding Solier in his work of cantonalizing Andalusia was Eduardo Carvajal, a Deputy of the left, to whom the Volunteers of the Republic in Seville appealed for help

PÍ'S GOVERNMENT OF CONCILIATION

when conflict with the troops of the government seemed inevitable. Seville was "over a volcano" as General Pavía described the situation; Carvajal arrived there, the threatened conflict was averted and order was "restored."

Rio y Ramos, a Deputy of the right from Seville, questioned the government regarding the situation of Seville and warned that Carvajal intended to proclaim the independent federal canton of Andalusia without waiting for action of the Cortes.

"They do well!" cried Forasté of the left.

"They do badly!" retorted Deputies of the right.

Did the government intend to take steps to restore order, inquired Del Rio, and did the Ministry intend to use all means dictated by law against the persons affected by the canton, including the despot Carvajal?

Pí's reply is characteristic of all those he made with one exception—that of Alcoy—to complaints regarding the state of disorder. The situation was remedying, Pí declared, and a junta of party "notables" manifested a disposition to come to the support of the government. The government, he continued, was sure that it could restore order.¹

A measure often discussed in the compromise Ministry but never accepted was proposed now by the government. Pí asked for extraordinary powers June 30 to deal with the Carlistas.

It was a surprising request, doubly surprising and discomfiting to the left. It had not been very long before that Amadeo had given an example to Spain in refusing to accede to Serrano's request for extraordinary powers in dealing with the Carlistas. And it was the general opinion that had Amadeo agreed to Serrano's request, he might have prolonged his reign. But the conditions existing in 1873 were considerably different. The Carlistas were threatening even Barcelona. Telegrams and mail from Barcelona to Madrid were from a day to two days late regularly. The Basque Provinces and Navarre lived under special laws, as Justo María Zabala, a Deputy from Navarre, declared in the Cortes. Zabala's analysis of the conditions of Navarre was typical of the condition of the north country. The people were essentially democratic and lived practically autonomously, he said. There were other factors to make Navarre and the north country the prey of the Carlistas. These were "the spirit of religious intolerance, the fanaticism,

¹ *Diario*, I, 318, June 25, 1873.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

the ignorance, the topographic position of the country. The truth is that this country I love, in which I have lived and in which I want to die, has more *amour propre* than patriotism. . . . Patriotism does not exist, rather a great egotism, a great intolerance, religious preoccupations and fanaticism, joined with an avaricious and provincial spirit." The result was that the provinces of the North, instead of being "bulwarks of liberty" were "constantly converted into a bulwark of absolutism."² Pí said that Spain was practically incomunicado from the rest of Europe as the result of the war. "The Carlistas have interrupted our railways, destroyed our telegraph system, penalized commerce, discouraged industry and reduced the revenue of the state."³

Catalonia like Navarre was in dismal condition. In a masterful address June 30 Antonio Orense described how the Carlistas and certain Republican elements were destroying that rich Province of Spain. Savalls dominated part of the Province and many cities paid tribute to him. Other cities were blockaded. Martínez Campos, highly praised for his activity against the Carlistas, found his work disrupted by a rebellion in the ranks, Orense declared. The superior officials placed the rebels at liberty instead of supporting the general. As to the situation in Barcelona it was understandable that the Provincial Deputation should have acted when it suspected General Gaminde, long hated by the Republicans and bitterly opposed when named captain general in Amadeo's reign. "But what is incomprehensible is that the Provincial Deputation and a committee of public safety should continue in Barcelona in complete insurrection against the government of Madrid. This committee gives its counsel to the military authorities, this committee receives the reports of the committees of the other towns and generally either destroys authority or approves the conduct of the committee of the rural towns." So serious was the condition that military authorities in many towns dared not quarter their troops there overnight, lest the citizens provoke revolt against the officers. "And these towns are distinguished by their exaggerated republican spirit," Orense declared.

Orense referred to a factor that was contributing materially to unrest in the army, the frequent promotions of Republicans over regular army officers whose earned promotions were ignored. Under Fer-

² *Ibid*, I, 403, June 28, 1873.

³ *Ibid*, Vol. I, June 30, 1873, Appendix 2.

PI'S GOVERNMENT OF CONCILIATION

nando Pierrad, Acting Minister of War after the April 23 *coup d'état*, these advancements were so numerous that they aroused sharp protest. To disregard meritorious advancement was dangerous, Orense declared.

"In what country in the world, in what society, have people shamelessly defended assassins?" Orense demanded. "Where? in Spain!

"The country is lost, lost also is the Republic, and it is lost because you have come here to demonstrate that when the Bourbons lived here, when there were reactionary governments, no one dared to raise his head and all were humble servants, whereas now that we have been given the Republic, all dare to rebel."

Pí's request for extraordinary powers, applauded by the right, ended in the retirement from the Cortes of the extreme left, led by José María Orense, now one of the most intransigent of the Republicans.

Ramón Cala of the left presented an amendment that in no case should the individual guarantees of the Constitution of 1869 be suspended. Cala raised a suspicion present in the minds of members of the left regarding the amendment, designed primarily against the Carlistas. Why had the government not used the ordinary powers at its disposal? The state of the war was unchanged. "Then against whom are we going? Against what factions? I do not know indeed."

"Yes, yes," interjected Deputies of the right.

"The project of the law doesn't say," Cala replied. "Perhaps the power may be used against the Carlistas and perhaps against the Republicans."

"They go against all factions," Salvany assured him.

"Under the law, a revolt, a tumult, a simple Republican agitation in any point in Spain, may be repressed by this tremendous law."

Suñer y Capdevila, Minister of Overseas, rejected the amendment "for a very simple reason: . . . not only is it not the intention of the government to suspend the individual guarantees with relation to the Republicans, which is the fear that my friend Señor Cala has expressed here, but it is precisely as the project of the law presented the Chamber says, that the suspension is applicable solely to those who sustain the Civil War. Is there any Republican in Spain who sustains the Civil War?"

"Yes," cried a Deputy.

"No, I do not see him. There are from day to day in Spain no

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

Republicans who sustain civil war, if we give the word the acceptance it ought to be given."

The amendment rejected, discussion began upon the first article of the resolution. Lafuente demanded before debate began why troops had been placed around the Congreso. Diaz Quintero declared that the speed with which the law was being discussed went against the spirit of the regulations, which were designed to prevent the Chamber from being caught by surprise. He rebelled, he said, against this "species of craftiness." Called to order by Pedregal for quarreling with the Mesa in giving the project for the law preference in the order of the day without consulting him (he was a Vice President of the Chamber) Diaz Quintero openly defied Salmerón who ascended the presidential chair and himself called the Deputy to order.

"I rebel against this species of autocracy that the President wants to arrogate to himself, even reducing the freedom of speech."

"Señor Diputado, I call you to order for the first time," warned Salmerón.

Diaz replied that the President might call him to order for the thousandth time.

As Deputies of the left prepared to leave the Chamber, Salmerón appealed to their loyalty: "I ask the Deputies to occupy their seats. I appeal to their patriotism and supplicate them to take into account the spectacle we are giving the country."

The climax to that long and bitter parliamentary battle between the two extreme wings of the Chamber had been reached.

"To the street, to the street!" cried some Deputies of the left.

"Let us get out of here," shouted others.

The sound of Salmerón's bell was lost in the uproar.

"To your benches, let us go on discussing with order," urged various Deputies of the right.

When order in the Chamber had been restored, Diaz declared that the people were applying merely the doctrines that the Republicans in opposition had preached—a wholesome truth that Castelar and Salmerón already had begun to recognize.

Orense then forcibly presented his doleful picture of the situation of Catalonia. He demanded of Diaz Quintero: "In what situation does a province rebel because it has not elected a Deputy, because a governor has not been named to it, because it has not been given some appoint-

PÍ'S GOVERNMENT OF CONCILIATION

ment? These Republican towns have the customs open, these cities so Republican are protecting the contrabandists and meanwhile the nation does not get its income. This is robbery."

Orense was one of the first Deputies with the courage to expose the menace of the intransigent Republicans, who were led by his own father, José María Orense. "Gentlemen, before everything, I am Spanish. I love my country and I tell you plainly, if the army is not disciplined quickly, if all the worthy and punctilious officers of the army are not put in their rightful places, if the chiefs are not given support, if dignified generals are not placed in command of the provinces, if force is not given quickly and immediately to our government, alas for our country!

"Upon you will fall an eternal malediction and I at least will have a clear conscience and will say: I have fought for the Republic. I have not taken rewards the Republic has given me and I have announced to it that one day the nation may be lost."

Colubi of the left expressed the displeasure of the intransigents. "Gentlemen, I confess that on seating myself on these benches I never expected to hear an expression sounding so badly, intentioned so badly, so calumniating, as Señor Orense has spoken."

The intransigents made haste to reply to Orense. Díaz Quintero declared that since 1835 he had participated in all the liberal revolts but that he had not revolted once since the proclamation of the Republic. Antonio Galvez y Arce, Deputy of Murcia who later was to be the instigator of the Canton of Cartagena, retorted to an interruption by Salmerón that "this Chamber that appears Republican is monarchist." Casaldueiro declared with bitter irony that the Assembly had to convert itself into an absolutist Chamber to conquer the absolutists. "The battle is not being waged in the North, it is being waged in Madrid. In order to be Republican it is necessary to be absolutist. Suppress the press; restore the Inquisition; bring on the gag. . . ." Violent agitation interrupted him. "Citizen Pí is not here in spite of the fact that we are discussing a project of such importance. This authorization is your death warrant. Do you know why? Because strong governments do not need authorizations; they always work." The authorization, he assumed, was to be used in Seville and Málaga. "You dare not deny it because you yourselves do not know whether this authorization is designed for you."

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

The right retorted as bitterly. La Hidalga declared that "Señor Casaldueiro has invoked the Inquisition. He does not have to search far; visit the cure Santa Cruz and be completely satisfied." He referred to Santa Cruz whose operations in Guipúzcoa aroused the fear and resentment of all liberals because of the ferocity with which the priest pursued the war. Zabala stated that the Republicans of Navarre and the Basque Provinces wanted the individual guarantees suspended. That was the only way to combat Santa Cruz "who robs and assassinates soldiers."

The authorization to exercise extraordinary powers was approved, the first section by 135 votes to 17 and an amendment of Olave limiting application of the law to the three provinces overrun by the Carlists was rejected, while another proposal to limit the authorization to Pí's government alone was accepted.

On July 1 the intransigents renewed their opposition with greater vigor. This time a decree of Hidalgo, the Civil Governor of Madrid, requiring persons not belonging to the Volunteers of the Republic, to retire to their houses in the event of disorder in the capital, provoked the attack. Not only did the intransigents object to that section of the governor's decree but with some justice they objected to the second section of it which provided: "All citizens are obliged to open their doors to the agents authorized by me to maintain order, when, for their best defense, it is necessary to quarter troops in various houses."⁴

Cala proposed that the Governor be declared guilty of violating the Constitution. Such a decree had not been issued even under the most "ominous domination" of Spain. As to the second clause, "Where is the inviolability of the home, I ask you?"

Pí, defending the decree, said that order was being menaced and indications were that there would be more disturbances in the capital.

"How is it possible that Señor Pí y Margall, this respectable figure of democracy, defends principles so undemocratic?" demanded Lafuente, who branded Hidalgo as a traitor to liberty and the decree a "ukase."

Maisonnave, speaking on behalf of the government, retorted:

⁴ The first section provided: "From the moment that public order is disturbed all persons not belonging to the Volunteers of the Republic will retire immediately to their houses, leaving the streets free, it being understood that those not doing so will be considered as disturbers and treated as such."

PI'S GOVERNMENT OF CONCILIATION

"Who are they who speak of blood, who say that the government pretends to exercise a terrible dictatorship? They are the same persons who demanded a few days ago that the Chamber be declared in Convention and a committee of public safety be established; who, with a flourish of ink, would blot out all laws. The same persons pretend to exercise here the most terrible and tyrannical dictatorship that can be exercised among peoples."

When Cala's resolution was rejected, José María Orense arose.

"I ask the floor solely to state that in view of what the Chamber sanctions and in view of the conduct of the government, the minority retires from these benches."

The seventy-year old "Dean of the Republicans" marched from the Chamber and with him went the members of the intransigent left. It was a sad ending of a career of one of the first Republicans of Spain. Orense belonged to one of Spain's oldest families whose marquise dated from 1605 and whose grandeeship from 1780. He was one of the first of the nobility to embrace republicanism. But he was an extreme individualist, practically an anarchist, as were the members of the intransigent left who believed in literal individual autonomy. Leaving the Chamber was a revolutionary act against the Republic. If any encouragement needed to be given the intransigents in the South, Orense, now the chief demagogue of Spain, had given it.

II. CASTELAR'S PROGRAM

Pí's government was to withstand another battering ram in the Parliament, this time from an interpolation of José Navarrete y Vela-Hidalgo, a member of the left from the Province of Cádiz and one of the most brilliant orators of the intransigent group, and from an interpolation of Francisco Romero Robledo, a Moderate and later Prime Minister in the Bourbon Restoration. In these interpolations the entire history of the five disheartening months of the Republic passed in review. Out of the interpolations grew the statement of policy made by Castelar which was to mark the government during the rest of the life of the federal Republic.

People saw in the federal republic decentralization "and in decentralization the application of moral and material prosperity," Navarrete explained July 2. The federal Republic would stop the tribute of the poor to the "insatiable Chamber digestive of Spain that has as its name official Madrid." The synthesis of the doctrines of the left he

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

described as: "In the religious sphere no more fanatics; in the political region no more doctrinaires; in the social camp no more egotists." Pi's government meant the appearance on the horizon of governmental politics "the first shadow of reaction." "Every day the relations are more cordial between the gentlemen of the extreme right and the unitary Republicans of February." Navarrete who was a member of the artillery corps had a simple solution of the military problem which Abarzuza interrupted him to call a "ridiculous paradox." Navarrete, acting on the supposition that officers were conservative, the troops Republican, would have the Deputies of the Chamber as representatives of the highest power of the nation themselves urge the soldiers to be loyal to the Republic. In financial affairs he proposed a moratorium in the payment of Spain's debt.

Navarrete's suggestion regarding the question of the Treasury was one of many that were being broached constantly. Tutau when Minister of Finance proposed the issuance of paper money and so, through inflation, to stabilize finance. Ladico, his successor, proposed the leasing of the Philippine tobacco rights. Another proposal still being considered was the elimination of payment to those on the retired lists of the various ministries. Luis Fernández Benítez de Lugo, the Marqués de Florida, who was the president of the commission on estimates, replied to Navarrete in his capacity as Deputy, suggesting the employment of revolutionary means to resolve the financial crisis. Including the money obtained from the sale of national goods, Spain could depend on an income of 1,900,000,000 reales, of which sum only 200,000,000 would be available for operating expenses of the government. The floating debt of more than 2,000,000,000 reales should not be considered alone, for there was the perpetual debt on which since 1866 no interest had been paid. "There is no other remedy as I see it—although I am willing to accept a better plan—than to consider all the actual debt amortizable at its nominal capital and to declare it without right of interest, showing in the estimates the sum of from five to six hundred millions of reales to go towards amortizing all the capital." Carvajal, Minister of Finance, replied that though Spain's debt situation was grave, it was not hopeless and that the Marqués de Florida spoke only as an individual (as indeed, he had stated) and not as the president of the committee on estimates. Spain, Carvajal declared, intended to pay its debts. "We will pay all that the Spanish nation can

PI'S GOVERNMENT OF CONCILIATION

pay," he stated. Tutau supported this view, saying that there were many Republicans who believed that the Republic should not recognize the debts contracted by the monarchy. It was the nation, not the government, which contracted debts, he warned. Tutau asked the members of the left why they were opposed to his plan of issuing paper money to pay the debt, if they themselves proposed funding the debt by a paper issue.

Abarzuza, later a leader of Castelar's Possible Republicans, concluded the conservative defense by upholding Castelar's condemnation of the minority abstention and presenting Salmerón's policies as contained in the address of June 13 as the "only tablet of salvation for the Republic."

Romero Robledo's interpolation of July 3, like Navarrete's, was a complete criticism of the Republic, except from the conservative viewpoint. As one of the few royalists who had taken a seat in the Assembly, his speech was listened to with the greatest attention. The Chamber, he insisted, was not a representation of the national will, since the elections for it were not free and "as a result this Chamber is the exclusive representation of one political party, of a minority of the country." While the Assembly should therefore logically dissolve, since that was impossible, it should exercise moderation. No one in the Assembly had been surprised at the departure of Amadeo. No one arose to urge him to stay. Instead, the Assembly "closed the book of the Constitution" and by a *coup d'état* created a dictatorship. The Republican party had obtained the naming of a permanent commission from that first Assembly and "in consenting to this commission, Señor Castelar belied his perspicuity." The Permanent Commission represented legality and its dissolution was a *coup d'état*. The lack of discipline was a cancer and it was imperative to reorganize the army. "Who commands in Málaga? Who commands in Sanlúcar? Who commands in Seville? Who commands in the North? Who commands in Catalonia? Where do you command? It is necessary to know. Is the federal Republic going to be the dissolution of the national unity?" It was useless, he insisted, "to concede extraordinary facilities to a government which has demonstrated it does not want to use ordinary powers."

"We have a Civil War," Romero Robledo continued, "and do not have soldiers to put at the front. We are nearly bankrupt and almost

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

without resources to satisfy our obligations. The principal provinces of the old monarchy do not obey the central government and the central government does not have the means of making them obey. Public order is profoundly disturbed, many families are emigrating from their respective homes, capital is fleeing, proprietorship is perishing, all of the political parties are dissolved and this unfortunate country does not know where to turn for salvation."

Spain was a "confused Babel." He had heard many enthusiastic acclamations of the federal Republic but no definition. "I suppose that were I to ask each of you individually, I would obtain a rich and abundant collection of definitions," he said ironically.

"Demonstrate that the Republic wants to be the custodian of the family, the shield of property, the base of order, the bulwark of liberty, the support of justice, and the most firm protection and guarantee of the right of everyone, without intending to sacrifice anything to any pretended social interest." Do that, he said, and the monarchists would applaud. The only recourse for Spain at this juncture was the Republican party.

Castelar, stating that the Republic during its five months history, was under review, appealed to the Chamber to discuss that history from all viewpoints. He himself promised to review the history in all its aspects and to give his opinions of the solution. Castelar's speech indeed was the most eagerly awaited. The great orator of Spain had become the shield of the conservative Republicans. His request made on July 4, he did not make his address until July 8.

In the meantime a series of notable addresses were made in reply to Castelar's request. In one of the most cogent speeches in the Cortes Constituyentes of 1873 Agustín Estéban Collantes, a Moderate and proponent of Don Alfonso XII, declared that the Constitution of 1845 was the only one he recognized. In a masterful summary that brought applause frequently from his Republican auditors, Estéban Collantes criticized the destruction of the Permanent Commission of which he had been a member, and the evolution of Republican policies. "You have no classes. You have no clergy, whom you have treated unjustly and badly. You have no conservative classes. You have no army. You have nothing more than our weaknesses and our divisions," he declared. If the Republic meant order, the good of the nation, peace and happiness to the country, he would submit; if not, he presented Alfonso

PI'S GOVERNMENT OF CONCILIATION

XII as the innocent prince who would come to redeem Spain from its sad situation.

As to the Permanent Commission: its members had not conspired against the government. They were actuated only by a desire to discuss all the problems of the government. Had the Commission wanted to do so, it could have reconvened the Assembly April 21 instead of waiting until April 23, he declared. "The Permanent Commission represented the right and its dissolution by the government was a *coup d'état*."

Europe, Estéban Collantes continued, had not had qualms in recognizing other governments. France obtained such recognition, regardless of whether it was a republic, dictatorship, empire or provisional government. Italy was recognized despite the dethronement of princes and kings to accomplish its unity. Germany, united without the aid of universal suffrage, was recognized. England had always protested against the union of Spain and Portugal yet it permitted the dismemberment of Denmark by Prussia. England "opposes only us because it believes us weak and submitted to the influence of anarchy."

"Revolution has dominated in all the peoples of Europe; the right of force has dominated. Governments *de facto* have prevailed over governments *de jure*; Europe has recognized all, has sanctioned all—usurpations, dethronements, invasions, results of wars, results of force. The only one it does not sanction is the Spanish Republic, because this is no republic, because this is anarchy."

Sternly, like Romero Robledo, he charged the Republicans with disuniting the country. "You are dismembering a united state; which is the greatest madness. You are destroying the work of our nationality and of our glories. You are destroying the work that has cost us so many centuries in constructing. It does you no good to deny it. This same denial proves that your projects are detestable; because if they were good and patriotic, you would defend them and not deny them.

"We are isolated in the middle of Europe and in a situation truly exceptional and deplorable. . . . In a word, the Republic makes optical instruments without crystals. The Republic fears the old army and the new ruins it and does not give it peace. . . . We have no allies, no army, no navy, no roads, no construction, no peace, no liberty, no disciplined parties. No one is content.

"I demand of the Republican government that it have and practice

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

the only conquest of civilization which is *equality before the law*, the true reform of the Revolution of 1789.

"The law suspending the guarantees is a defeat for the Republic; for it is a law against the rebel Carlistas and not against the rebel Republicans; it is a law of races. If you cannot govern with the law, retire. That is your duty. Imitate the King elected by the Revolution."

As to federalism: "You are completely alone in the world; you are retrogression, anarchy and the most complete anachronism. . . . You are unique in the world; you go against the current of Europe; your opinions are against modern civilization.

"Do not work on your constitution because it will be one more cypress planted in the cemetery of our constitutions." Were the Republic unitary it might have a greater chance of success. The federal Republic was impossible without force, he stated. The Republic worked as though it were a restoration. "Restorations are lost because they want reactions. The Republic ought to be reformative, not restorative."

Eugenio García Ruiz on July 7 continued the Republican discussion of Romero Robledo's interpolation. "Civil War is desolating the north of Spain. . . . Catalonia is lost, offering in all parts bloody scenes; blood in Ripoll; blood in Berga; blood in Igualadad; blood in Barcelona; the greater part of its factories paralyzed, commerce reduced to nothing. . . . Málaga is ruining Catalonia with its scandalous contraband, spilling the blood of its mayor—and this is what is called federal; Málaga throwing from his palace a venerable prelate of seventy or more years and the nuns from their convents, an offense that dishonors the Republic. . . . Cádiz offering a spectacle little less than Málaga; Seville irrigating its streets with the blood of its citizens and of the individuals of the meritorious Civil Guard; Granada doing the same, sprinkling its streets with the blood of its citizens and of the brave excise police; and all of Andalusia, or at least a great part, seized by the Internationale.

"And this Chamber, gentlemen! What is this Chamber? Is it federal or what is it?"

"Federal," replied various Deputies.

"Is it federal? Let us see. I know well that the federal Republic was proclaimed, that all the Deputies less two voted for it. But some fifteen days ago the National Convention was voted by eighty-two fed-

PI'S GOVERNMENT OF CONCILIATION

erals and a committee of public safety was asked. That is to say, that fifteen days ago eighty-two federals declared themselves Jacobins, terrorists, like Robespierre, Saint Just and Barère.

"Two days ago my old friend Señor Castelar told you: 'The situation of the country is serious. And I want to hear the orators of all parts of the Chamber. I want to hear my old friend Señor García Ruiz, who always has defended liberty, who always has defended democracy, who always has defended the republic, and *almost* is my coreligionist.'

"I say to Señor Castelar that we are coreligionists in *everything*, absolutely, in everything. What does Señor Castelar want that I do not want? Does Señor Castelar want communism or socialism? Certainly not. Nor do I. Does Señor Castelar want liberty? So do I. Does he want democracy? I, too. Does he want decentralization? I do too, ample, extensive. . . . A single word, a single adjective that I am sure has caused him much sadness and, I am afraid, many tears, as it has already caused the nation, separates us, this word *federal*.

"If I asked all and each of the Deputies what they understood by federal and why they wanted it, they would answer me immediately: 'We want a great decentralization.' Is the Chamber federal? I believe that here there is not more than one federal and that federal am I. I am happy that you laugh; but I am going to prove to you that the only *federal* is myself and that you. . . . are *federifragos*, that is to say, I am federal which comes of *foedus foederis* and consequently signifies union, alliance and, being a unitary Republican, I am a partisan of this pact, of this union that constitutes the true Spanish nation; and you are partisans of breaking this pact, seeing that its name comes of *frango, is* (to break) and of *foedus, eris*, the pact, union, established alliance. . . . Why were Washington and other great men of his time like Hamilton, Jay, Marshall, called *monarchists* and *tories*? Because they were federals, that is, unitarians, partisans of federation which ended in making the United States; whereas Jefferson and Madison were called separatists, because they were almost, lacking only a little of not being so. And to this extreme, unfortunately, has come Spain."

The federal Republic, he declared, was a negation of government. And bitterly he asked, referring to the cantonal movement, was Spain retroceding to the fourteenth century?

Malo de Molina, one of the Deputies who voted for the National

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

Convention, continuing the debate July 8, referred to the Republic as the "platonic Republic, the innocent Republic."

It was on this day, July 8, that Castelar delivered his notable address reviewing the progress of the Spanish Republic and suggesting the program acceptable to the right. It was a speech that turned the policies of the Spanish Republic from the path of intransigence to conservatism.


He prefaced his four-hour speech with the statement that in the Assembly all were intransigents—the monarchical conservatives, the Alfonsinos, the unitary Republicans and the federals, all proceeding as if they were the only party in the Republic.

He denied the allegation that elections were not free. There were no official candidates, he declared. "By a long education, the public was initiated in the habit of electing its candidate from the hands of the governor; and in the same moment in which the people have gone to the governor and have discovered that he did not have a candidate, from that moment you have said: 'No, you do not vote for the conservative candidate.'"

Castelar criticized the monarchical parties for their electoral abstention (although it should be remembered that he himself at one time had strongly advocated electoral abstention). Combinations of the various parties would have been permissible. He himself had united in the days of Amadeo with the Carlistas "and I do not repent."

"I believe that no Assembly in Spain since 1812 has given such service to liberty as that great and luminous Assembly gave," he said, referring to the National Assembly. "Conscription had always existed in Spain and the Assembly suppressed it; the naval registry that enslaved the waves and the wind it abolished; always the chains under the sun of the tropics oppressed the slave and it, thousand times blessed, broke those chains; always we lived under a monarchy and that holy Assembly proclaimed the Republic." Castelar admitted though that the Assembly had committed irregularities, like prolonging the session unconstitutionally. Once again he affirmed his regret at breaking peace with the Radicals. Had he been able to do so he would have left the government after February 24, he declared.

"With our tactics, with our dexterity, we divided, we separated the monarchical parties, making them quarrel with each other, and as a result the monarchy was destroyed. If we follow the same road, the



FROM EL MOTIN

"AFRAID OF HIS SHADOW"

A CONTEMPORARY REPUBLICAN SATIRE ON CASTELAR

PÍ'S GOVERNMENT OF CONCILIATION

result will be the same, the consequences identical. We have a pure Republican government; we have a pure Republican Assembly; we have a situation like the Radical situation. We have everything: we are the government; we are the ambassadors; we are the Ministers; we are the directors; we the Deputies; we the majority, we the opposition. We are everything. We enjoy all the effluence of power; but if we do not cure ourselves of this egoism, we will enjoy it for a short time only.

"I know that this makes me unpopular. I know that the Republican party proscribes me for it. I know that it will engender many mistrusts; but do you want me to deceive you by praising you, to deliver the honor of my conscience? No, never! I am sincere in not wanting to be in the government.

"Why did we proceed as we did proceed against the Permanent Commission? Because the Permanent Commission did not give a vote of censure but instead conspired. A Minister of that government . . . went to see an individual of the Permanent Commission on the morning of April 23 and this individual of the Permanent Commission, who would vote against us, said to the representative of the government: 'This is a question of knowing who has the cannons.'"

A distinguished diplomat had told Castelar: "If the government of the Republic is not recognized in Málaga, how do you expect Saint Petersburg to recognize it?" To obtain recognition it required obedience to the Assembly and to the government. It required a stable government, a government not in daily danger of being destroyed by the Chamber. "There is a mania to devour all governments" in the Assembly, he declared. "The day on which the [Executive] Power has stability and personification, on that day the Spanish Republic will be recognized by all European governments." All the diplomatic representatives, including Russia's, had remained in Spain because they wanted this stability, he said.

Castelar still affirmed his faith in the federal Republic, as indeed he did ten days later when the project of the federal constitution was presented, which was principally his work. It could be no other type, he asserted. "It ought not be. The party doesn't want it, the nation doesn't want it to be any other name.

"Gentlemen, what is a federal republic? It is that form of government by means of which all autonomies exist and co-exist as the stars exist in the sky without combating each other." In the federal

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

Republic everything individual pertained to the individual, everything municipal pertained to the municipality, everything regional pertained to the State and everything national to the nation.

Castelar declared he would "never, never, never support or defend a unitary republic."

In a speech at Alicante in 1872 Castelar had declared that it was necessary to educate the people before a federal Republic would succeed. But he had come to agree with Pí at least that the matter of the form of government was now a pressing question. Nevertheless he believed that the transition from a highly centralized state to a federal republic must proceed slowly. He replied to Navarrete: "You believe that the Republic came as the result of electoral abstention and revolution; we believe that the Republic is the product of this Chamber, of peace, of discussion."

He prefaced his program with the warning he had given the people of Madrid from the doors of the University in 1868: "People of Madrid, when I was in opposition I said that reaction is the revolution, democracy peace; if now we are in peace, tremble for the Republic; the first shot that is fired in Spain will wound the heart of the Republic!

"Place before any nation the alternative of choosing between a dictatorship and anarchy and it will elect every time the dictatorship."

Castelar's program was designed to destroy the anarchy and avoid the dictatorship. First he demanded that a republic should be founded constitutionally and a true federation established which would convince Europe that it could not be destroyed from within or from without. Church and state must be separated. In order to regain the five provinces completely separated from Spain by the Carlistas it was necessary to have a strong army, voluntarily recruited after the manner of the Civil Guard. The infamous era of military pronunciamientos should be ended forever. The artillery corps should be reorganized and its cannon restored to it. The command of the army should be entrusted to generals of all parties. Military discipline should be restored. Lawless elements had been let loose when Republicans were armed and royalists disarmed. These groups must be suppressed. Every Spaniard between the ages of twenty and forty years owed military service to the nation. In restoring the credit of the nation, it was necessary to levy a graduated tax, whereby the poor paid less, the rich proportionately more. Finally, in the matter of government, all parties should

PI'S GOVERNMENT OF CONCILIATION

be called upon to participate in the administration. Castelar promised to support any government which established this "policy of amplification," of sustaining the Republic.

It was a masterful address. It was the first address of a responsible party leader in the Republic which made definite suggestions towards solving the troubles that beset Spain. Heretofore those in power dealt in generalities, for fear of offending the susceptibilities of the left. Salmerón had spoken of the principles of moderation but he had refrained from making his suggestions concrete. Castelar, with the terrible spectre of Spain in anarchy, could with honor do but one thing—retrace the steps he had taken on the path of progress. His address was, in reality what Estéban Collantes declared it to be—"the funeral oration" of the federal Republic.

III. THE ALCOY DISASTER

The scenes of the French Revolution were being repeated in Spain nearly a century later. The Deputies of the left, awaiting impatiently the realization of their reforms, decided not to wait for Parliament to complete the work of the Republic. Instead they themselves brought "the consummation of federation" as Casaldueiro declared in the session of August 8.

Pí had been aroused to action by the decided sharpening of the attitude of the right. Members of the right had met in the Senate June 30 at which time Pí's policy of doing nothing was sharply criticized by Castelar. It was as a result of that attack that Pí had asked for extraordinary powers.

Andalusia to Pí was the hope of the Republic against the future reaction, although now it was a danger to the Republic. "The problem," Pí declared in his Memoirs regarding the restoration of order, "was more complex than my successors thought. The difficulty was in reducing them [the cantons] to obedience without killing their Republican spirit, that is to say, to remove the peril of today without losing the hope of tomorrow."⁵

Pí, belonging to the center which created a parliamentary organization following Castelar's speech of July 4, was now pursuing the policies of the left. He knew, he declared, that the government should not consent to anarchy. Rather, it should destroy anarchy. "I wanted to dominate it principally by means of the Cortes, by the rapid constitu-

⁵ Pí y Margall, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

tion of the country, by the immediate enactment of reforms.”⁶ This was exactly the manner in which Casaldueiro, who belonged to the Madrid committee of public safety, would have “dominated” the situation. By continuing with Pí’s program, Casaldueiro declared in the session of August 8, the cantonal movement would have perished immediately, since the objects of federation would have been attained. It was only when the right hardened its opposition that the cantonal movement broke into full fury, he said.

Pí was taking such steps as were consonant with his policy of conciliation to curb disorder. He considered the first step in pacifying Andalusia to be the restoration of order in Málaga. To that end he instructed the governor sent there in June to prepare the people for the peaceful entry of the Civil Guard who had been ordered out of the city by Solier, the delegate of the government. After the Cartagena revolt, Pí endeavored to organize an army of operations in Córdoba and charged General Ripoll with that task. Ripoll proceeded to organize a small army in the South. General Velarde, in command at Valencia, was able to quell the Alcoy rebels.

The members of the intransigents who had left the Congreso July 1 issued a manifesto the following day to the nation in which they stated that the Spanish people had lost their natural rights, that they could no longer walk on the streets or close their doors against the soldiers. The government of the Republic, the manifesto continued, was defending monarchical legality.⁷

While many of the intransigent Deputies remained in Madrid, others returned to their respective cities to lead the cantonal revolt. Málaga had since the proclamation of the Republic been profoundly disturbed by Solier, a Deputy of the Cortes. Eduardo Carvajal had also since the latter days of June been provoking disorder in Málaga and in cities of Andalusia. The incipient dissolution of the nation being thus fomented gained strength daily from Pí’s weakness. It required the Alcoy disaster to awaken even Pí from his lethargy.

The communists had been active in many cities of the South. In Sanlúcar a group of the Internationale proclaimed a commune. The climax of their activities was reached in Alcoy.

On July 9, the day following Castelar’s speech, occurred two major

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 44.

⁷ *Glorias Republicanas*, p. 656.

PI'S GOVERNMENT OF CONCILIATION

disasters to the Republic. One was in Alcoy, the other was in the North. Brigadier Cabrinetty, one of the ablest of the Republic's leaders against the Carlistas, with his vanguard marched into a trap set for him at Alpens by Savalls and lost his life while his force was captured. It was a major disaster with serious repercussions in Barcelona where, on July 14, a group of workers paraded the streets demanding immediate search of all houses in that city to seek those favorable to the Carlistas.⁸

On the morning of July 7 a group of Internationalists, aided by allies from France, declared a general strike at Alcoy, demanding shorter hours of work and higher wages. This innocent beginning soon took on political significance. The strikers demanded on July 9 that the municipal corporation resign in favor of a junta they would name. Agustin Albors, Mayor of Alcoy and a member of the Cortes Constituyentes of 1869, refused to accede to the request. He was given three hours to yield. At the expiration of that time, Albors remained firm in his refusal.

Cans of kerosene were brought forth, the Casa de Ayuntamiento was surrounded and set afire. Albors and others of the municipal officers attempted to escape, the Mayor being killed as were several of the other officials. The strikers continued to burn buildings, destroying part of the central section of the city. More than twenty people were killed in the disorder.

The government for the first time professed horror. Aura Boronat in the session of the Cortes July 12 declared Alcoy had been transformed into a "veritable orgy of crimes." Maisonnave, replying for the government, was deeply moved. Since receiving the news, he said, "I have not been master of myself." The situation was "more deplorable than you can imagine." Velarde, captain general of Valencia, had been ordered to proceed immediately against the city, Maisonnave assured the Deputies. He reported also that a number of prominent citizens of Alcoy had petitioned the government for leniency in dealing with the strikers so that a grave conflict would be avoided. Maisonnave declared that the government was acting with resolution. It could not do otherwise since, in the Minister's own words, officials of Alcoy had been "chased down the streets like mad dogs and killed."

It was to counteract the demands for leniency that a resolution was introduced in the Cortes stating that the Assembly had heard "with

⁸ *Ibid*, p. 666.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

profound indignation" the relation of the "horrible events" of Alcoy and ordered the government to proceed with "inexorable energy" against those who dishonored the Republic by causing such perturbations.

The resolution gave rise to a debate in which the philosophy of the Republicans came to the fore. Romero Robledo, opposing it, stated that he favored the spirit of the law but that it was not sufficient to be effective. Why should such a request be made of the government unless the Chamber expected the government to comply with its duties and its program? Daily similar notices were received and the government lamented them all.

"With lamentations the ills of the nation are not cured," declared Romero Robledo.

The resolution was really a vote of censure, in view of the terms, Melchor Almagro, its author used, Romero Robledo continued. "The present government has not told us either spontaneously or a single time what state the Civil War is in; it is necessary to secure such information by questioning."

If the Assembly did not stop living in a dream world and adopt a practical program, "I tell you the triumph of Don Carlos is inevitable. If there is no army to oppose the Carlistas; if the Carlistas organize their army as they are demonstrating and one day rout the column of Castanon and another that of Navarro and another that of Cabrinetty, the day he is least expected Don Carlos will enter Madrid."

The government was now definitely on the defensive. Maisonnave replied that the government was taking steps to restore order and was now forming an army in Andalusia.

Payela revealed the "dream world" of the Republican party when he insisted that the resolution meant the restoration of the scaffold in Spain. It was a "renunciation of one of the most essential dogmas" of the party to "restore the most barbarous of punishments, judicial assassinations."

Pedregal y Cañedo replied with the greatest truth that had the death penalty been applied just once, the nation would not now be at this deplorable extreme.

Despite Carvajal's objection that the word "order" in the resolution might be interpreted by the nation as an indication that the government was weak, the resolution was approved.

PI'S GOVERNMENT OF CONCILIATION

What firmness could do with disorder was amply demonstrated in the ease with which Velarde's troops entered Alcoy. They encountered no resistance. And on July 14 the town was under the control of the government.

IV. THE CANTON OF CARTAGENA

Between the hours of 6 and 7 on the morning of July 12—three days after the Alcoy disaster—the most extraordinary phenomenon of the many phenomena of the Republic was seen in Cartagena, in the Province of Murcia.

From the watchtower of the Castillo de Galeras overlooking the harbor from its volcanic hill, flew the flag of Turkey—its red field with the white crescent proclaiming not the reconquest of Spain by Mohammed but the triumph of the disciples of the natural rights of man.

That morning the fortress was occupied by representatives of the Junta of Public Safety which that day proclaimed the Canton of Cartagena. These men were trying to find a red flag. In the tower of the fortress were the flags of all nations. The only flag which answered their purpose was that of Turkey, which they raised in place of the flag of the Spanish Republic.⁹

The venerable city which had been the headquarters of Hamilcar presented a scene of the greatest activity. The fortresses were occupied quickly while practically all the ships of the Spanish navy which were lying in the harbor were likewise seized. In the Casa de Ayuntamiento the Municipal Corporation was resisting the effort of the newly formed Junta of Public Safety to compel its resignation. At 5 that afternoon the Civil Governor, Altadill, arrived in Cartagena and conferred with the officers of the city. He advised them to resign. Altadill then entrusted the government of the city to Antonio Galvez Arce, intransigent Deputy, and to the municipal Junta.

Galvez and other intransigent Deputies had left Madrid at the time of the retirement of the left from the Cortes and from the Republican clubs had been agitating the people to proclaim cantons. Galvez had summoned to his aid General Juan Contreras, a former Moderate and a member of the Madrid committee of public safety. Contreras was *en route* on the twelfth from Madrid, going on an express train for the South. When he arrived, he assumed direction of the operations of the cantonalists and completed the occupation of the ships in the har-

⁹ *Diario*, II, 772, Prefumo's explanation.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

bor. Contreras, though elected to the Cortes, had never taken his seat in it. Long suspected by the right for his demagoguery, as evinced during the National Assembly when he had been sent to Barcelona, Contreras had never been molested by the government.

The slowness with which the government acted in preventing the proclamation of the Canton of Cartagena forms one of the saddest chapters in the history of the Republic. Once again Pí's policy of conciliation was driving another dagger into the heart of the Republic.

Cartagena marked the downfall of the government. The Spanish Republic was destroyed July 12 by the Deputies of the left. "You have burned the federal constitution in Cartagena," Castelar truly told the Cortes January 2. Pí was inexcusably lax in preventing the consummation of the plans of Galvez. He had been warned frequently by José Prefumo, Deputy from Cartagena, who had informed him many times during the preceding ten days that Altadill, the Civil Governor, had met with the Committee of Public Safety in Murcia and that he was not to be trusted. Furthermore, though the government knew of the state of Cartagena by 2 P.M. July 12 it was not until after midnight that Anrich, Minister of the Navy, was dispatched to Cartagena to quell the disorder. Orders to arrest Contreras were not carried out and that demagogue safely reached Cartagena. Anrich was powerless to accomplish anything, for the prize ships of the Spanish navy were already in the possession of the rebels. Furthermore there were two regiments of the Iberian troops in Cartagena waiting to be embarked on the "Almansa." These could have been brought into action against the rebels any time during the twelfth but by the thirteenth the revolutionary fervor that spread through the seaport had contaminated their loyalty and it then was too late.

Cartagena quickly constituted itself as an independent government. It declared itself the Canton of Murcia. It was ruled at first by a Junta composed of Pedro Gutierrez, a tobacco seller of Havana; José Banet, a silversmith; Pedro Roca, a secretary; José Ortega, café owner; Juan Cochacos, a packer; Pablo Mendez, a carpenter; and others representing the fourth estate. Later an Executive Power of the Spanish Federation was established with Contreras President. A paper money with compulsory acceptance at its face value was issued. With a navy and an army, with a government which set itself up as a rival to the central government of Madrid, the members of which were later declared

PI'S GOVERNMENT OF CONCILIATION

traitors by Contreras, Cartagena proved to be the one Canton which overtaxed the strength of the Republic.

The cantonal movement, receiving such powerful impetus, spread rapidly. Contreras and Galvez Arce, supported by other Deputies of the intransigent group, sought to bring the rest of Múrcia under the sway of Cartagena. Alicante was forced to yield to Galvez Arce who laid siege to the city with the frigate "Victoria" July 20. Galvez Arce notified the then President Salmerón that "Alicante with all its fortresses pronounced for us spontaneously." He did not add that the city had been ordered to pay 12,000 duros to Cartagena.¹⁰

Like a plague the movement spread. Seville, Cádiz, Valencia, Almansa and Torreveja declared themselves independent Cantons on July 19. Valencia reported to the Madrid government that it declared itself a Canton "by necessity." The long period in which there had been a ministerial crisis in Madrid, the laxity in enforcing the laws aroused the volunteers who had restored order in Alcoy to create disorder in Valencia, it was explained. On July 20 other cities pronounced as Cantons: Castellón under the leadership of the intransigent Deputy Gonzalez Chermá who telegraphed the Madrid government that "the army and civil guard are fraternizing with the people. Great enthusiasm. Tranquillity." Granada also yielded to the cries of "Long live the Canton Granadino! long live the social federal republic!" On July 22 Salamanca, the Athens of Spain, was proclaimed a Canton under the leadership of the intransigent Deputies Pedro Martin Benitas and Santiago Riesco y Ramos. Their manifesto is typical of the confused reasoning of the federalists. The Assembly having proclaimed the democratic federal Republic, the manifesto said, the Canton Salmantino was declared in obedience to their conscience, in accord with the mandate of the Cortes and of the sovereignty of the people. In the proclamation of the Canton, they were merely translating into a fact the propaganda of the Republicans.

"All of our propagandists and leaders have agreed, without contradiction, that in the cantonal State is found every class of political and administrative attribution. . . . Salamanca, imitating Cádiz, Málaga, Seville, Alicante, Valencia, Castellón and other provinces of great importance, erects itself into a Canton; not to remove strength from the

¹⁰ *Historia del Sitio de Cartagena* (Madrid, 1874); Gimenez, *Cartagena* (Madrid, 1875); *Gaceta de Madrid*; *Glorias Republicanas*; *Diario*.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

*Assembly but to give it; not to despoil authority but to strengthen it; not to deny resources but to duplicate them; in a word, the federal Canton of Salamanca places at the disposition of the Constituent Assembly and of the government of the nation all that belongs to it in the balance of justice, to the end of alleviating the oppressive weight of our debt and of terminating quickly the fratricidal war that is dishonoring us."*¹¹

The Salamanca Canton was short-lived for the cantonal movement had its most vicious strength in the South. Other Cantons were those of Orihuela which was captured by Colonel Pernas of the Cartagena Canton who notified the Madrid government that he had taken it easily, Bailén and Andújar in the Province of Jaén and Tarifa and Algeciras. The Torrevieja Canton had as its leader a woman, Señora Concha Boracino.¹² The Almansa Canton was proclaimed by the intransigent Deputies Alberto Araus, Perez Rubio and Alfaro.

Accompanying this manifestation of federalism was the frenzied disorder in the army. Many battalions raised the red flag and declared against the government.

V. PÍ'S INCOMPETENCE

The government of conciliation was doomed. The disintegration of Spain had reached a point after Cartagena where the right could no longer tolerate it. Pí drew more and more to the left while the right and center were insistent on a government under Salmerón.

Prefumo bitterly attacked Pí in the session of July 14 and accused him of laxity in not preventing the establishment of the Canton of Cartagena. He presented a resolution requiring the government to explain the state of affairs in the Province of Murcia. Pí was not present in the Chamber but Prefumo stated that he would explain his resolution nevertheless, since the President of the Executive Power knew that he was going to introduce it.

Pí had had sufficient warning of the impending change in Cartagena, Prefumo declared. He had been notified of the demand that the municipal corporation resign on the morning of the twelfth through the military governor.

"And what did the President of the Executive Power do? As

¹¹ *Diario*, III, 1685, August 20, 1873.

¹² *Glorias Republicanas*, p. 690.

PÍ'S GOVERNMENT OF CONCILIATION

usual, he folded his arms and tore his beard. A great way of keeping order!" cried Prefumo furiously.

"The hours advanced; the train carrying a Deputy of the minority charged with leading the revolt which had left here the night of the eleventh, arrived in Cartagena." Prefumo referred to Contreras.

The old Municipal Corporation continued deliberating in the chapter room of the Casa de Ayuntamiento in Cartagena while on the ground floor the newly formed Junta of Public Safety functioned. The Mayor communicated with the Civil Governor Altadill in the telegraph office of the railway station and was told to resist and not resign, but also, not to provoke bloodshed.

"In truth, I do not know how an insurrection is resisted; I have never seen an insurrection resisted with biscuits and sweets. Insurrections resist as they ought to be resisted," Prefumo continued.

Altadill conferred with Galvez Arce and then went to the Municipal Building to tell the Municipal Corporation to resign in order to prevent a conflict. Pí sanctioned the action of the Civil Governor, Prefumo stated; and that action was treasonable, sanctioned by the President of the Executive Power. There were two battalions of troops in the port ready to leave for Málaga and these were ordered by Altadill not to enter the city. Cartagena thus passed under the rule of Don Juan I, Prefumo declared.

When Prefumo had warned Pí ten days before that Altadill was not to be trusted, that he had met with the Committee of Public Safety of Murcia when the Deputies of the minority visited that Committee, Pí replied: "What? What do you tell me? I will inform myself."

"Señor Pí needs to be informed!" Prefumo observed sarcastically.

Carvajal declared that he had received a telegram from Pí at that moment in which the President stated he could not come to the Chamber and would entrust the government's defense to him. "Occupied at the telegraph by serious matters. . . ."

"He is conspiring!" said Sainz de Rueda (although later, the Deputy explained that he was questioning rather than stating a fact).

"He is not conspiring," retorted Suñer y Capdevila.

Carvajal then continued the government's defense. Anrich, Minister of the Navy, had been dispatched to Cartagena. The government did not know that Altadill had dismissed the Municipal Corporation illegally.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

Suñer y Capdevila, Pí's closest adviser in the government, confessed the impotence of the government in dealing with the situation when he said:

"I am disposed to fight tooth and nail against the Carlistas; I am inclined to punish relentlessly the assassins and incendiaries of Alcoy. But when it is proposed to shed the blood of my friends and coreligionists, I confess that my heroism does not go that far."

"And if they are factious?" demanded a Deputy.

"But you will be factious. . . ." Suñer continued, only to be interrupted with protests. "There are only two policies with regard to our coreligionists: either a policy of resistance and of attack or a policy of concessions and consideration. . . . I am a partisan of my coreligionists in Cartagena and wherever they may arise. I am a partisan of the policy of concession."

Pí himself came to the Assembly to defend his course in regard to Cartagena. After sending Anrich to Cartagena, Pí held a telegraphic conversation with Altadill and when the latter told the President what he had done, Pí told him that he censured his conduct.

"What was my surprise, what was my grief, on seeing what was happening in Cartagena," Pí declared. "From the time that I entered the government I was working to prevent this happening in any part of Spain." Pí recounted how he had prevented the proclamation of the independence of Barcelona; how an ardent telegram he had sent had prevented the declaration of the independence of Andalusia. And this time he had sent a telegram which he requested Altadill to read to Cartagena's most notable men. Altadill read the telegram to sixty responsible men of that city and then telegraphed Pí: "I am without forces of any class; I do not have the Civil Guard, I do not have Volunteers of the Republic who want to support me and when I called four companies I had in Murcia loyal to the government they replied: 'Though they deplored what was occurring they were not able to fire against their brothers.'

"I had a moment of weakness; I committed a great error. I thought I was saving the situation when I compromised it more; yet, in justice to me, what could I do?" Pí confessed.

Prefumo again returned to the attack on the government. From 5 o'clock in the afternoon until 1 that night, the government made no effort to give orders to the military governor, he declared. The next

PÍ'S GOVERNMENT OF CONCILIATION

day it was too late, for by then the troops were affected with the virus of cantonalism.

Pí in defense said: "It is true that there was conspiracy in Cartagena but where are they not conspiring?" Even in Catalonia there were conspirators seeking the independence of that Province.

Prefumo concluded with the statement that if the governor was not responsible to the cabinet "I do not know why it is called a government or where it governs!"

Several resolutions of censure were introduced but none was brought before the Chamber for discussion, much to the annoyance of their proponents. The government in the meantime had gone into one of the periodic "crises" which added to the disturbance of Spain. Pí sought support from the right but could not obtain it, for a policy of concession as confessed by Suñer was not only dangerous but even treasonable, in view of the fact that it was in reality a conspiracy with the cantonalists to destroy the national unity. Rebuffed by the right, Pí sought aid from the left but the Deputies of the minority preferred a government under Orense. With the possibility that the Deputies of the center would divide, part of them going over with Suñer y Capdevila to the left, the minority prepared to return to the Assembly and to endeavor capturing the government.

The crisis endured two days, during which time the Assembly was extremely restless. On July 15 there were not enough Deputies present to hold a session. On the seventeenth Gonzalez Alegre demanded that if Pí could not resolve the crisis, he should resign. Canalejas demanded whether the "political incapacity" of the Chamber and of the government would continue longer.

"No, no," replied various Deputies.

When Pedregal, the Vice President, declared the question out of order, a Deputy cried: "When the fatherland is in danger, everything is legal."

Canalejas made his request to ascertain if any aid would be given Bilbao, threatened by nine thousand Carlistas.

"Bring the government here this moment," demanded a Deputy. "And if there is none, let us constitute one."

When Pedregal asked the Deputies to respect the regulations of the Chamber, he was interrupted by a Deputy who cried "There are no regulations."

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

Garrido¹³ suggested that a committee be appointed to see Pí. García Alvarez proposed a secret session so that an energetic government might be chosen but this proposal was rejected. Maisonnave arrived then and announced the government would shortly present its solution.

The anxiety of the Assembly was increased when Maisonnave confirmed the rumor that Don Carlos had entered Spain the fifteenth and was now in command of the troops besieging Bilbao.

The next day, July 18, Pí resigned. He declared a government in accord with the Assembly was required, one that could cope with the war and "repress the movement of disintegration which has begun in various provinces."

"It has not been possible for me to realize it," he said.

In view of the manner in which he had been calumniated, he feared that if he remained longer in the government, an ambition he did not possess would be attributed to him.

José Moreno Rodriguez then proposed, following the acceptance of Pí's resignation, that another Deputy be designated by secret vote to form a cabinet with the same faculties accorded Pí y Margall. By the close vote of 111 to 101 the proposition was taken into consideration. Juan Fernández Latorre of the left proposed the resolution be not considered. If the Chamber voted Pí its thanks, then why not let him form the Executive Power again? he demanded. Latorre's proposal was rejected by the close margin of ten votes.

The Deputies of the "reformist left" had returned to the Chamber, eager to establish a government of the left under José María Orense. Casaldueiro, opposing Rodriguez's motion, declared that the time had come when the Assembly must decide for the Republic or against it. Pí had failed because the right wanted him to govern with its principles and against the ideas Pí had held all his life.

"What have you done to Pí?" he asked.

"You yourselves know what!" cried Gomez Sigura.

Casaldueiro warmly defended Pí. The right had made the mistake at the outset in not conferring the powers of government on Salmerón or Castelar, he thought. The left, he declared, intended bringing the forty Deputies it had in the provinces and with them, it would have a majority and could form the next government.

¹³ Miguel Garrido Perez, not Fernando Garrido.

PÍ'S GOVERNMENT OF CONCILIATION

"These Deputies are not in Madrid and we will explain why they are not," he said.

"We know why already!" interposed a Deputy.

Casalduero proposed a government presided over by Orense.

"We want a cabinet which realizes the federal Republic; because with the federal Republic comes order."

Despite his able address and his measured reasoning, Casalduero was still the unrepentant intransigent who formed part of the committee of public safety of Madrid.

"I firmly believe," he declared, "that there is no Republican who conspires against the Republic."

Aura Boronat demanded of him whether the Republicans of Cartagena were not conspiring against the Republic.

"No, no," replied many Deputies of the left.

Cala, also of the intransigents, declared the minority wanted to make the Republic for all Spaniards.

"I say with satisfaction," he said, referring to the lack of discipline in the army, "that Spanish soldiers are Republican soldiers and will not obey when they are commanded to shoot at. . . ."

"Spanish soldiers will obey the law," Cervera, the Vice President of the Cortes, interrupted.

Pí y Margall, Sardá said, had attempted a policy of impossible conciliation. Castelar declared the left made a mistake in believing that they alone were homogeneous and that addresses delivered that night had indicated the left, too, had different viewpoints, a statement which Orense challenged. "What we need is a government, yours or ours," declared Castelar. "It matters little which; we need a government which can bring order and legality to the nation."

After the Assembly had approved the resolution permitting the naming of a president, the left pleaded for more time, in order that they might bring the absent Deputies to Madrid but this was denied. The left then united on Pí y Margall as their candidate. Salmerón, the choice of the right and the center, received 119 votes while Pí received 93.

A shot heard on the streets threw the Chamber into tumult. The doors of the Assembly being closed, Casalduero demanded how the Assembly could vote "if we are imprisoned."

The return of the intransigents, therefore, did not herald peace in

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

the Cortes or a restoration of national unity through conciliation and discussion.

VI. THE FAILURE OF AN IDEALIST

Pí y Margall had followed mistaken policies in his administration but even his severest critics no longer claim he was in conspiracy with the cantonalists. He proceeded from deep-seated ideals which did not permit him to face realities.

Pí was forty-nine years old. He was a native of Barcelona, where he was born April 29, 1824, the son of humble parents who nevertheless gave him a good education. Of great brilliance, he wrote plays and poems at the age of fourteen, studied jurisprudence at the University of Barcelona and read Hegel, his favorite philosopher. At twenty-two years of age he published his *Historia de la Pintura*. From the year 1849 he had been affiliated with the Democratic party. In 1854 he wrote his celebrated *La Reacción y la Revolución* in which he anticipated by four years the pact theory of Proudhon.¹⁴ He was too much the idealist to be an executive and his selection as President of the Executive Power and as Minister of the Interior were major errors of the Republic, for at least the Ministry of the Interior required a man of the greatest firmness and resolution.

His judgment of Salmerón and of Castelar who succeeded him reveals the reason why Pí could not save Spain, why it was that during his administration the Republic was destroyed.

"By the path which my successors followed, not only was the Republic lost, ending in a dictatorship, but also the liberal principle was placed in danger of death."¹⁵

His attempt to form a cabinet of all parties had failed. "I encountered an invincible resistance in the right, which was for homogeneity and energetic policies, that is to say, those of force; and comprehending that a ministry composed solely of the center and of the left would face such a formidable opposition that it would be retarded at least in the execution of its design, and for this reason would be sterile, after various incidents that were many and vexing, I resigned the presidency of the Executive Power July 18."¹⁶

¹⁴ Rodríguez-Solís; Correa y Zafrilla, Noticia Biográfica in Pí y Margall's *La Federación* (Madrid, 1880).

¹⁵ Pí y Margall, p. 44.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 72.

PÍ'S GOVERNMENT OF CONCILIATION

He dissuaded the Valencian Deputies Guerrero and Soriano on the seventeenth from declaring the Canton of Valencia; but immediately after he resigned, he says ingenuously, the revolution spread.

Pí y Margall had said that federation realized unity in variety. Pí had supplied the variety during his five weeks' presidency; it remained for Castelar to supply the unity.

CHAPTER FIFTEEN

SACRIFICE OF THE REPUBLIC TO SAVE SPAIN

I. SUPPRESSION OF THE CANTONS

SPAIN had had five months of the application of Republican theories—or rather federal theories—and five Ministries applying them. There had been the two Ministries of Figueras, the complaisant philosopher and the oldest of the four Presidents of the Executive Power (he was fifty-four years old). One of these Ministries had been that of the Radicals and the Republicans. This coalition had yielded to a Ministry of the old Republicans. By destroying the Radical Permanent Commission the second Ministry destroyed all hope of a true representation of Spain in the Cortes Constituyentes; and by failing to proclaim itself federal in fact, irritated the intransigent Republicans in the South. Pí y Margall, the disciple of Hegel, who had dominated the policies of Figueras' cabinets and who succeeded Figueras when the latter fled to France, had proposed a ministry representative of the Cortes but it had not been accepted. The Cortes itself named the Ministers from the membership of the right and the center. This Ministry applied the conciliatory principles of Pí so well that the unity of the nation was threatened. The literal interpretation of Pí's doctrines regarding federalism had forced Pí to resign. His successor was like the other Presidents, a philosopher, a student of Kant, but a man far different in temperament than his predecessors.

Nicolás Salmerón y Alonso, the third President of the Executive Power of the Republic, was also the youngest, being only thirty-four years old when he accepted the tremendous assignment of rescuing Spain from the doctrinaires. While Figueras and Pí were natives of Barcelona, Salmerón was born in the Province of Almería, in Alhama la Seca, April 10, 1838. (Some historians have confused him with his brother Francisco Salmerón y Alonso, the Radical leader.) Though a student of philosophy and a lecturer in philosophy at the Central University of Madrid, Salmerón was also a lawyer, as were many of the members of the Cortes Constituyentes. When he was twenty-six



FROM A CONTEMPORARY PRINT

NICOLÁS SALMERÓN Y ALONSO
THIRD PRESIDENT OF THE EXECUTIVE POWER

SACRIFICE OF THE REPUBLIC TO SAVE SPAIN

years of age, he became Professor of History in the University of Oviedo, leaving that chair to become Professor of Metaphysics in Madrid in 1866. Like Castelar he was active politically while a professor and as a result was imprisoned for five months in 1867. Salmerón was a man of remarkable ability, keen judgment and judicial temperament. He was sincerely loyal to the principles of the Republican party, although in 1868 he had very sensibly urged the application of federalism gradually, a feeling that had been strengthened during the life of the Republic. In his speech before the Democratic reunion of Madrid October 18, 1868, Salmerón declared that he did not believe the federal form of government immediately suitable for Spain, because the people had not conquered all of their natural rights.¹ Salmerón was a true Federalist, in that he believed in the distribution of the powers of the nation as opposed to the relinquishment of those rights. Consequently his election to the presidency of the Executive Power did not indicate that Spain was to abandon the federal form of government. It meant rather that an effort would be made to establish real federation instead of confederation.

Salmerón selected his Ministry principally from the right. Unlike Pí y Margall, he did not combine the post of Minister with the task of the presidency. Instead, he entrusted the Ministry of the Interior to Eleuterio Maisonnave, a Deputy of the right who had been Minister of Foreign Affairs in the preceding cabinet. He retained José Carvajal as Minister of Finance and Eulogio Gonzalez Iscar as Minister of War. He named Admiral Jacobo Oreiro y Villavicencio, a former Radical and Minister of the Navy in Figueras' second cabinet, as his Minister of the Navy; Santiago Soler y Plá as Minister of Foreign Affairs; Pedro José Moreno Rodriguez as Minister of Justice; José Fernando Gonzalez as Minister of Public Works and Eduardo Palanca as Minister of Overseas.

It was a resolute, homogeneous Ministry, as Salmerón assured the Cortes July 19 in outlining his program. Palanca alone represented compromise with the intransigents, for he was a Deputy of the center in sympathy with the cantonal movement, at least as it was expressed in Málaga, from which city he was a Deputy.

Salmerón's address aroused the fury of the intransigents, although it promised them the reforms they sought. Salmerón welcomed the re-

¹ Salmerón, *La Forma de Gobierno* (Madrid, 1868), p. 20.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

turn of the members of the left, asking them to "discuss with us but do not raise the flag of rebellion." He expressed his appreciation of the fact that the small royalist representation in the Assembly had recognized its "imperious duty" of taking part in the election of the President of the Executive Power. Indeed, Romero Robledo, Ríos Rosas and others of the small group of conservatives had participated in the election, voting for Salmerón.

Salmerón promised the Assembly that he would keep them informed of the state of the nation. It would be necessary no longer for the members of the Chamber to question the government; instead, the Minister of the Interior would read the telegrams recounting the progress of the various wars in which the nation was then engaged. This promise was received with applause.

Not only was the new government determined to proceed against the Carlistas but it likewise intended to apply the full rigor of the law to intransigent rebels—a statement that was heard gloomily by Deputies of the left. Salmerón referred to the "true delirium" of the cantonal movement that was "breaking the unity of the nation," and lamented the fact that some of the rebels were "profaning the noble investiture of Deputy." All the rebels were "offending the sovereignty of the nation." Since the cantonal movement was interfering with the work of federation, it was necessary that work on the constitution—which had been presented for consideration July 17—be hastened.

Salmerón declared he was a Federalist and that his government would sustain federation and the Republic. The government was not in any sense reactionary. Rather, its sole aim was to "re-establish the rule of law in all parts, against whomever it may be, at whatever cost, at whatever sacrifice."

Those who refused to accept the rule of law would "have to suffer inexorably the punishment of their crimes." It was as necessary, Salmerón affirmed, to apply the same severity of the law to the Republicans as to the Carlistas. It required absolute legality for all, he said amid great applause.

Salmerón stated that he was approaching the task of government in the spirit of true conciliation. Consequently he intended to introduce the reforms all Republicans wanted. While approving the amelioration of the conditions of the fourth estate, he believed such reforms should be made "pacifically and gradually."

SACRIFICE OF THE REPUBLIC TO SAVE SPAIN

"As to the re-establishment of order, this government is resolved to be inexorable with those who intend to break the law; and first—note it well!—first with the Republicans; because it is necessary that we have the respect and obedience of those who think as we, whose aspirations have to be realized and complied with before the aspirations of those who profess other principles."

Restoration of discipline in the army was of paramount importance. Discipline would be re-established without respect to classes or groups. Furthermore the courts martial and punishment in accordance with the military ordinances would be re-established—a statement that was greeted by protests of members of the left. "The ordinances are law," Salmerón continued, speaking particularly to those who had protested. "Reform them yourselves if they are infamous or vicious." The army must be the army of the nation and the army of the fatherland. Therefore the government would search for military leaders that inspired confidence in their ability to quell all factions and to conquer all classes of rebellion. Those who refused to accept the call of duty would be removed from their ranks, Salmerón promised.

Vexed finally by the frequency with which Deputies of the minority interrupted him, Salmerón urged them to vote censure if they did not approve his program or his conduct. But, he continued, they could depend that while he was in power "no human consideration, absolutely none, will suffice to turn me from the purpose I have had the honor to indicate to the Chamber."


Salmerón's was a bold, a statesmanlike, program. With three wars to carry on—with the Carlistas in the North, with the intransigent rebels in the South, with the insurgents of Cuba in the colonies—only a policy of firmness could hope to overcome the obstacles that were on the verge of destroying the great nation of Spain.

Salmerón quickly applied his program.

Maisonnave read the disheartening telegrams he had received during the preceding twenty-four hours, telegrams recounting the apparently inexorable march of the Carlistas, the break-up of the nation in the South and the new menace of the Spanish navy under the control of Galvez Arce and Contreras.

Oreiro issued a circular to all officers of the navy instructing them to restore order and to apply the ordinances. He expressed as his opinion that it was inadvisable to destroy the admiralty courts, a proposal

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN



SACRIFICE OF THE REPUBLIC TO SAVE SPAIN

the Cortes had under consideration. Oreiro also issued a note declaring the sequestered Spanish ships at Cartagena pirates and, while reserving the ownership to Spain, authorizing the ships of friendly powers to capture them.²

Salmerón in the meantime had called Manuel Pavía y Rodríguez de Alburquerque for a conference. Pavía was a rare figure in the Spanish army, entirely devoid of personal ambition, and loyal to his principles. He had been a staff officer of General Prim and had shared exile after the failure of the revolutionary movement of 1866. He had served loyally under Don Amadeo and under the Republic, taking part in the campaign against the Carlistas and later, as captain general of Madrid, supporting the contention of the National Assembly as the supreme representation of the national will. He had entered into communication with Francisco Salmerón, President of the Permanent Commission. When that Commission had been destroyed by the government, Pavía resigned. On July 19 he responded to Salmerón's request for an interview.

The President of the Executive Power described faithfully and accurately the scenes taking place in the South. Despite the fact that General Ripoll was in command in Andalusia, no progress was being made against the cantonalists, principally because the government of Pí did not want to shed blood of fellow Republicans. Salmerón then offered the command of the army of Andalusia to Pavía.

"If you can get one soldier to fire his rifle against a cantonalist, you have saved order," Salmerón declared.³

Pavía accepted the task. On July 21—on the very day that the cantonal movement reached its apex—he left Madrid for the South with a battalion of Zamora, composed of four hundred men, four companies of engineers, consisting of three hundred and eighty men, and a few other soldiers. He took his small army in two trains and left for Córdoba where Gonzalez Iscar had ordered General Ripoll to remain. Pavía was compelled to route his train through Ciudad-Real, because in Despeñaperros intransigent groups controlled the railroad.

Pavía's description of the state of Andalusia when he took command is a sad commentary on the cost to Spain of the idealistic Pí y Margall, with his theories and his policy of conciliation:

² *Gaceta de Madrid* (July 20, July 21, 1873).

³ Pavía, *Pacificación de Andalucía* (Madrid, 1878), p. 23.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

"Málaga was the first to revolt against the authorities, expelling the garrison from the city, disarming a part of it, and constituting itself into a Canton under the command of Solier, who opposed allowing the army to garrison the city. This Canton was constituted officially. Solier was the Civil Governor, a Deputy of the Cortes and the delegate of the government. The Canton obeyed the constituted government under the condition that no troops remain in the garrison. And the Canton of Málaga had its support in the Council of the Ministry, in Minister Palanca, who was the chief, or the most influential of the parliamentary center, and, as the right of the Chamber did not count a greater number of votes than the left and the center of the Assembly, Palanca, defender and protector of the Canton Malagueño, was the arbiter of the governments.

"Between the popular forces of the Canton of Málaga, those who had the artillery, arose a serious disagreement. Carvajal, in charge of part of those forces, sought to dispute the chieftanship of the Canton with Solier. He made numerous trips at the head of his forces to various cities of Andalusia and on returning to Málaga fought with the protection of the government. The forces of Solier and Carvajal came to blows on the streets of Málaga, blood flowed on both sides, and Solier was victorious. . . . The example of the Canton of Málaga, officially constituted, and everything that occurred in that city, was the cause of the total discomposition of Andalusia.

"Seville followed the example of Málaga. . . . All of the population took arms, considerably augmenting the popular forces that were armed with the rest of the people who had no arms. . . . They constructed three lines of barricades, sowing these throughout the interior of the city. . . . Cádiz followed in proclaiming its Canton, the brigadier commanding general and a regiment of foot artillery taking part in the insurrection. . . . Only Jerez and Utrera did not follow the movement.

"The forces found under the command of General Ripoll were encountered in complete discomposition. Discipline did not rule and conspiracy reigned in the ranks. . . . The carabineers and the Civil Guard were anti-Federalists; the cavalry, for the most part, likewise; and the infantry and the artillery were those who had sympathy for the rebels. The corps distrusted each other. . . .

"Andalusia was completely in arms. Moreover, thousands of rifles

SACRIFICE OF THE REPUBLIC TO SAVE SPAIN

*which were found in the power of the people, organized in battalions with their corresponding artillery before the general insurrection, had been seized by the rebels in parks, arsenals and tobacco factories. They seized the arms in the barracks and military establishments when the garrisons left the cities, and these weapons were distributed to the populace to arm them for combat."*⁴

Solier was the Deputy from the second electoral district of Málaga, while Palanca, who had been Minister of Public Works in Pí's abortive cabinet in the early part of June, and who was now Minister of Overseas, represented the third electoral district of Málaga. His father had been a well-known physician of that city and he himself had actively participated in the revolutionary movement of 1868. Solier remained in Málaga as the Civil Governor and delegate of the government, occupying his seat in the Cortes only in the session of January 2, when he voted against Castelar's government. Solier's acts generally had the approval of the government and no action against him was ever taken. Charges were brought against Carvajal, however.

Pavía's account of the condition of Andalusia—the "hope of the future" of Pí y Margall—revealed the difficult task before him. With a small army he was called on to quell an uprising of a people.

While Pavía was *en route* to Andalusia, Salmerón was taking other steps to end disorder. He removed Antonio Altadill, the Civil Governor whose criminal blundering had permitted the Canton of Cartagena to become a reality. He ordered dissolved the regiment of Iberia at Cartagena because it had refused to obey the government's orders. Salmerón ordered Contreras' rank and decorations removed. He named General Arsenio Martínez Campos, who later pronounced for Alfonso XII at Sagunto, captain general of Valencia, relieving General García Velarde.⁵

Cartagena, meanwhile, retorted to the declaration of the government regarding piracy by declaring the members of the Executive Power at Madrid traitors, and commanding their capture. With the greatest effrontery, Contreras declared that if the central government did not yield, he would convoke a Cortes of the Deputies of the left in Cartagena.

Other intransigent Deputies joined Contreras and Galvez Arce. These were Alberto Araus, Alfredo Sauvalle and Roqué Barcia. The

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 11 ff.

⁵ *Gaceta de Madrid* (July 21, July 23, 1873).

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

Canton declared its independence of Madrid and so notified the consular representatives of the Powers in Cartagena. It began the regular publication of an official Gazette, *El Cantón Murciano*. At first the Canton was governed by a Directory of intransigent Republicans but on July 27 a government of the Spanish Federation—as opposed to the Spanish Republic—was named by the Directory. Contreras was made President of the government, with the following Cabinet of Ministers: General Felix Ferrer, War; Alberto Araus, Interior; Antonio Galvez, Overseas; Eduardo Romero, Public Works; Alfredo Sauvalle, Finance; Nicolás Calvo Guayti, Foreign Affairs and interim Minister of Justice. Thus, in addition to the separate government loyal to Don Carlos VII in the North, there existed an independent government in the South which issued its own money and which had in its possession part of the Spanish navy.⁶ In addition to the navy, the Canton possessed one of the best fortified cities of Spain. Cartagena was practically impregnable from either sea or land. The port was guarded by the two fortresses of Las Galeras and San Julian, while on the landward side it was protected by the Castillo de los Moros, while within the city were two other fortresses. In addition to many pieces of modern artillery the Canton had also many rebel soldiers under its command, notably the regiment of Iberia, commanded by Colonel Pernas.

Contreras, having arrogated to himself all the powers of the President of the Spanish Republic, began an active campaign to bring the cities of the South to submission. Alicante had been entered and a fine of thirty thousand duros demanded. On July 29 the "Victoria" and the "Almansa" bombarded Almería for twelve hours when the Municipal Corporation of that city refused to accede to the demand of the cantonalists that it pay a fine of one hundred thousand duros and that it dismiss the Civil Guard. Almería repulsed the attack without suffering much damage. A Prussian and an English warship followed the two cantonal ships from Almería to Málaga, where the commander of the Prussian ship warned Contreras to return to Cartagena and to make no further sallies.⁷

The government of Madrid in the meantime was worried with other problems. Workers of Barcelona declared a general strike for

⁶ *Historia del sitio de Cartagena*, p. 13 ff.; Vilarrasa y Gatell, II, 776; *Glorias Republicanas*, p. 693 ff.

⁷ *Historia del Sitio*, p. 11 ff.; *Diario*.

SACRIFICE OF THE REPUBLIC TO SAVE SPAIN

the purpose, it was explained, of demonstrating their solidarity of opposition to the Carlistas. Later, when the strike was abandoned, six thousand laborers enlisted for the Carlista war.⁸ The Carlistas were continuing their triumphant progress. They captured Cirauqui, and Dorregaray attacked Estella, where he was repulsed by the brave resistance of the garrison.⁹ Savalls on July 20 entered Igualada which was defended by only four hundred soldiers. Villaviciosa in Oviedo was taken July 28, the civil registry was burned and the town fined five thousand duros.¹⁰

Pavía, on reaching Ovejo *en route* to the South, learned that General Ripoll had abandoned Córdoba and that that city was going to proclaim itself a canton. Pavía detrained, since the railway line was constructed no farther than Ovejo and proceeded rapidly overland for Córdoba, where he arrived at 8 A.M. July 23, at almost the same instant that the popular militia was assembling in the Plaza near the building of the civil government to declare the canton established. His arrival surprised and discomfited the cantonalists already assembled while other companies marching to the Plaza dissolved on seeing that the government had control of the city. Pavía garrisoned Córdoba thoroughly so that the militiamen coming from Málaga and Granada to fraternize with the new cantonalists would be unable to enter the city. The Malagueños and Granadinos, learning that the Córdoba canton had perished at birth, abandoned their march.

Córdoba was the key to Andalusia. From it Pavía directed his campaign of pacification. He proceeded with energy, recalling Ripoll whose troops, he noted, were disaffected and untrustworthy. The cantons, Pavía reasoned, would decide the future of Spain. He must take Cádiz but he did not know how far his troops would go in the attacks on the cantons. Since Cádiz was heavily fortified, he decided to proceed first against Seville. The new civil governor of the Province who had accompanied him from Madrid co-operated in disarming the volunteers. By July 26 most of the volunteers of the Province of Córdoba were disarmed. On that day Colonel López Pinto departed from Córdoba with the advance guard and on July 27 Pavía himself pro-

⁸ *Diario*, II, 812, July 21, 1873.

⁹ *Ibid*, II, 813. The Carlistas forced their way into the town but were beaten off by the 220 defenders in the fortress of San Francisco. The attackers numbered a thousand men.

¹⁰ *Ibid*, II, 902, July 28, 1873.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

ceeded towards Seville. The attack on that city began July 28, Pavía's army being divided into five columns to force the entry and to consolidate the victory more readily. One column had attacked on the Calle Santa María la Blanca but made little progress against the barricades. Another attempted to enter at the orchard of Espantaperros, near the tannery, while the third column directed its attack at the Gate of Carmona, aiming to join the second column at the Plaza de la Alfalfa, from whence both columns would proceed to the Ayuntamiento. The fourth column attacked the Gate of Osario while the fifth proceeded against the garrisons near the Puerta del Sol. The night of July 29 the attacking troops saw the first signs of victory—flames in various parts of the city marking the retirement of the rebels. At 2:30 o'clock the morning of July 30, Pavía's five columns began a concerted movement on the city designed to give him control of its center. The cantonalists opposed the advance half-heartedly with their cannon and rifles. The artillery of the Cuartel de la Trinidad opposed a vigorous resistance to the fifth column, but in the meantime the first column fought its way down the Calle de Santa María la Blanca, reaching the Ayuntamiento at 11:30 A.M. The second column advanced as far as the Plaza de la Alfalfa where it encountered fierce resistance. The third column was unable to take the Carmona Gate while the fourth and fifth columns were repulsed. Pavía recognized the gravity of the situation. The enemy had far superior artillery not only at the various gates but also at the barricades within the city. To add to the General's alarm he received notice that Utrera and Jerez were being threatened by the cantonalists and desperately needed cannon and munitions. Appealing to the government for aid and notifying the authorities at Utrera and Jerez of his intention to take Seville first, Pavía concentrated his attack on the batteries at the Gate of Carmona, which he took, changing the situation completely. The city was now in his power. The fifth column was able to enter by the Puerta del Sol and the Puerta de la Maracena. On the night of the thirtieth Pavía had telegraphed Maisonnave: "These rebels are bandits and incendiaries. They have kerosene with them and when they abandon a position they set fire to it and at this moment, at 11 at night, I see fires at two or three points of the city. . . . Be tranquil that tomorrow Seville will be mine." Once the city had been entered, the rebels gave weak resistance, retiring rapidly before the advance of the government's

SACRIFICE OF THE REPUBLIC TO SAVE SPAIN

troops. By 2 P.M. July 30 the city was in Pavía's hands and the bells of the Giralda were proclaiming triumphantly the conquest of the Canton. Pavía reported that he was received with cheers by the citizens of Seville. None of the monumental buildings of the city like the Cathedral or the Alcazar were damaged in the siege.

Pavía next relieved the sieges of Carraca and Jerez. On August 3 he left Seville and began the march to Cádiz, having received notice in the interval from San Fernando that the cantonalists had abandoned Cádiz.¹¹

The capture of Seville had broken the heart of the cantonal movement in Andalusia. San Fernando yielded to the government August 3. Sanlúcar surrendered the same day and the red flag was hauled down from the Ayuntamiento. The revolutionary juntas of Arahal, Marchena and Paradas in the Province of Seville were dissolved that day. The Canton of Salamanca in the East was dissolved August 4. On that same day the factions in Cádiz began street fighting and in view of the danger to the city, the consular corps in the city protested. An English fleet had entered the port that day and there were warships of other nations in the harbor. Fearing that foreign troops would land on the peninsula, the Junta of Public Safety met with the consuls and presented the resignation of its members. A provisional junta was named with Manuel Rancés y Villanueva as president. The consuls designated Brigadier Tacon as military governor of the city. The action of the rebels in Cádiz caused Maisonnave to gloat when he announced the fact to the Cortes. "As you will observe," he stated gleefully in the session of August 5, "those who invoked the national honor to attack the government for having declared the rebel ships pirates, themselves have consigned their power to a junta of foreign consuls." Pavía entered Cádiz without difficulty and telegraphed the Cantons of Algeciras, Tarifa and San Roque to adhere to the government.

Granada alone remained a Canton in Andalusia, while Málaga witnessed a battle July 23 between Solier's forces and those of Carvajal, in which Solier was victorious. "The authority delegated by the government continues in free and perfect exercise of its functions," Maisonnave reported to the Cortes. Granada, Pavía learned, was in a state of anarchy and had been abandoned by most of its substantial citizens, who were compelled to contribute to the cantonal funds. Solier,

¹¹ Pavía, *op. cit.*, p. 24 ff.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

alarmed at the success attending Pavía's march, telegraphed the General to inquire whether he intended to disarm the volunteers of Málaga. Pavía replied that such was his intention; that, as soon as he had disarmed the volunteers of Granada, he intended to march on Málaga. Granada was taken August 12 without a shot being fired.

Pavía remained in Granada until August 23. He arranged with the captain general of Cádiz for ships to proceed against Málaga in event that city opposed his entry. The military commander of Málaga notified Pavía that he did not command a soldier; all men under his command had been expelled from the city, which was given over to the cantonalists, under whose rule the contrabandists flourished. When Pavía reached Antequera and Loja, Solier sent the General a "monstrous" telegram, to which Pavía replied "sharply and energetically." Solier posted a notice in Málaga that the volunteers there would continue under his command and that the forces under Pavía would not enter the city. In this attitude he had the support of Palanca, the Minister of Overseas in Salmerón's Cabinet. Due to Palanca's power in the parliamentary center, Salmerón supported the veto Palanca had given to Pavía's march on his native city. Salmerón entered into a telegraphic debate with the General in Chief of the Army of Andalusia but Pavía, not considering these telegrams official, continued his preparations to enter Málaga. Thereupon Salmerón peremptorily ordered him not to enter that city. Pavía resigned but the government refused to accept his resignation. Again followed an interchange of telegrams. Pavía stated that he understood perfectly Salmerón's position—that were he to permit the destruction of the Malagueño Canton, the center would destroy the government. Pavía felt, and justly, that Málaga should be entered. Solier had declared the Canton independent, despite the fact that he was the official delegate of the government. Pavía felt that it had been the example of Málaga that had inspired the cantonal movement in Andalusia. Had the Cantons of Andalusia been permitted to remove the Civil Guard and the excise police and all the military elements representing the government as had Málaga, they too might have been obedient to the government, Pavía telegraphed the President. If Málaga was protected as a Canton by the government, then the bloodshed in Seville had been in vain, he protested. Salmerón yielded in part to the exigencies of the General and named a new delegate of the government in place of Solier and or-

SACRIFICE OF THE REPUBLIC TO SAVE SPAIN

dered the Civil Guard to enter the city. Meanwhile rumors reached Pavía that Salmerón intended to resign and that he would be succeeded by a government of the left. Pavía thereupon returned to Córdoba, from which city he believed he would be able to prevent public disturbances in such event. This rumor, together with the long telegraphic debate between the General and the President of the Executive Power, increased the restlessness of the pacified cities and there was grave danger that the cantonal revolt might break out anew. With the substitution of Castelar for Salmerón order was assured, except in the case of Écija, where a Socialistic revolt required Pavía's soldiers to suppress it. Once again Pavía prepared to march on Málaga and this time Castelar, also dependent on the support of the center, opposed. Pavía again resigned and again his resignation was not accepted.

Solier, the late master of Málaga, himself gave the excuse for Castelar to order Málaga occupied. He obtained permission from the central government to take his forces to the Carlista front. Pavía guarded the railway station at Córdoba and prevented Solier from detraining in that city on his way through.¹² Solier arrived in Madrid without incident but there the actions of his volunteers aroused great public indignation. The cantonalists marched from the railway station to the Prado where they "camped," despite the order of the government that Solier take his troops immediately to the North Station and there entrain for the North. Eventually, after several encounters between Malagueños and the militia of Madrid had been averted narrowly, Solier and some six hundred of his soldiers left for the Carlista front, while almost a hundred remained in Madrid. These were returned to Málaga by the government.¹³ Seizing the opportunity of the spectacle offered by this demonstration, Castelar instructed Pavía to enter Málaga at once. "Go to Málaga without losing a moment," Castelar commanded him. Pavía entrained for Málaga September 18 and at 3 the following afternoon entered the city without encountering resistance.¹⁴

General Martínez Campos had laid siege to Valencia and after a vigorous cannonade, the revolutionary Junta, which had been meeting in the Cathedral, fled. Martínez Campos entered the city August 8 without conditions. Three days later he entered Murcia. Maisonnave

¹² *Ibid*, p. 85 ff.

¹³ Vilarrasa y Gatell, II, 724 ff.; Pavía, p. 107.

¹⁴ Pavía, p. 108 ff.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

then announced that "Cartagena is the only city which remains in the power of the rebels." He ignored the fact that Málaga remained a Canton, for political reasons.

The cantonal movement was broken. Cartagena alone remained to harass the government with its ships and with its forays on land, such as to Chinchilla and to Hellín, near Albacete, where thirteen thousand duros were taken from the municipal treasury. Prussian, English and French ships watched the occasional adventures of the pirate ships which continued to play up and down the Mediterranean coast, bringing terror to the coast cities, which were gradually being deserted by the conservative elements. As Maisonnave stated in his memorandum to the Cortes on January 2, the insurrection from September 15 to January had cost 100,000,000 reales. The insurrection of Seville cost the government 25,000,000 reales, the Conde de las Alménas stated, while the damage to the fleet in possession of Don Juan I of Cartagena was estimated at 120,000,000 reales.¹⁵ There were many claims for damages, such as that presented August 1 by Prussia for 60,000 duros for damage at Almería.¹⁶ Commerce had ceased almost entirely in the South, factories were closed, people fled from the cantonalists, practically no customs duties were collected from the Mediterranean ports, tax collections were irregular. Virtually a bankrupt nation, Spain was paying a great price for experimenting with the theories of Pí y Margall, José María Orense and the intransigents of the left.

II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROJECTS

Why had the cantons sprung into being? Why was the unity of Spain destroyed with such vehement quickness? Why did the intransigent Deputies of the left defend the cantons?

There were many reasons advanced as the first Spanish Republic careened madly to its end. Pí y Margall had declared that it was due to the proclamation of the federal Republic on the part of the Cortes Constituyentes.¹⁷ But neither Pí nor those who thought as he did opposed in any manner the proclamation of the federal Republic, which was made by an almost unanimous vote of the Assembly. Pí, in fact,

¹⁵ Conde de las Alménas, *Veinte años en el poder* (Madrid, 1881), p. 20.

¹⁶ La Fuente, *Verdades contemporáneas: Retrato político de la República Española de 1873* (Madrid, 1878).

¹⁷ *Diario*, Vol. IV, September 6, 1873, Pí's speech.

SACRIFICE OF THE REPUBLIC TO SAVE SPAIN

was urging the Chamber to vote a federal constitution. The provinces, he reasoned, tired of waiting on the Assembly, themselves executed the federal constitution. They did it simply and effectively. They proclaimed cantons.

The cantonal dementia was a Socialistic uprising in the South. Members of the left, with the notable exception of Orense, were principally Socialists. They were insistent on effecting reforms they had advocated so many years when in opposition. Castelar and the leaders of the right believed in applying these reforms slowly. The intransigent Deputies wanted to reform Spain immediately; the conservatives wanted to reform Spain in the manner experience dictated.

The first Spanish Republic was a laboratory in which political theory, enunciated for the first time in the long history of Spain, was tested. It was tested with the most destructive thoroughness. It left the Socialists exultant; it left the conservative Republicans chastened and humiliated.

The Republic was proceeding under the laws of the constitutional monarchy of Amadeo with certain modifications. The failure to eliminate monopolies and the hateful institutions of the old regime infuriated the intransigent Socialists. Irreconcilable monarchical laws that failed to harmonize with the spirit of the Republic halted the progress of reform. It was to meet the insistence of Pí y Margall and to satisfy the threatening demands of the intransigents that the constitutional commission of which Castelar was president, presented the draft of the proposed federal constitution of Spain to the Cortes Constituyentes July 17, just two days before Salmerón became President and just at a time when Pí was experiencing one of his chronic crises. The federal project which Castelar wrote in twenty-four hours¹⁸ did not satisfy the intransigent members of the commission and Francisco Diaz Quintero and Ramón Cala presented an alternative draft, providing for the cantonal system for Spain. It was the principle this draft represented that was interpreted literally by many cities of Spain.

The crisis of Pí's Ministry and the consequent shift of the government to the right, as well as the bitter necessity of lending all resources to combat the Carlistas and the intransigents delayed discussion of the two projects. Finally, after Deputies of the left had insisted vigorously on bringing up the projects for discussion, the Cortes began their

¹⁸ Martín de Olías, *op. cit.*

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

consideration August 11, when Leon y Castillo, an Alfonsino Deputy, attacked the federal project with great ability. Becerra later presented the Radical, or unitary Republican, objections to the projects. Although it had been proposed that the greatest latitude be given the discussions, the pressure of work facing the Cortes, such as the passage of laws, and the length of the debates on almost every matter brought up, prevented its further discussion. The first Spanish Republic ran its entire course without a constitution.

The two projects differed radically in the manner in which they would reconstitute Spain. Prior to 1833, the nation was composed of provinces consisting of the ancient kingdoms and principalities that had existed on the peninsula before the union. By a royal decree in that year the thirteen provinces were reconstituted into forty-nine. This greater division increased the ease with which the provinces could be controlled by Madrid, since in each of them was a civil and a military governor directly responsible to the Ministry in Madrid. The Progressives early had begun to oppose the new provincial system on the sound basis of economy. The Republicans were faced with a grave problem in drafting their projects. They advocated a federal republic. But should it be a federation of the present provinces of Spain, and if so, would these small States be able to exercise all the functions that properly belong to a State? If the provinces were destroyed, how could the Republic be sure that it would not injure profoundly the susceptibilities of the provinces themselves? To obviate this difficulty (and it was a great one, for there were geographical barriers to unity and there were strong local customs and prejudices that prevented harmony among many provinces) Castelar and the majority of the commission proposed to return to the old State division of the kingdoms, adding as additional States the islands and colonies belonging to the Republic. Castelar's project proposed that the nation consist of seventeen States, as follows: Upper Andalusia, Lower Andalusia, Aragon, Asturias (which had been named the Province of Oviedo in the subdivisions of 1833), Balearic Isles, Canary Isles, New Castile, Old Castile, Catalonia, Cuba, Extremadura, Galicia, Múrcia, Navarre, Porto Rico, Valencia, Basque regions. Diaz Quintero and Cala proposed, on the contrary, the preservation of the present provincial division. The intransigent draft would simply convert the existing provinces into cantons. Castelar's draft proposed that the matter of the provinces could be left

SACRIFICE OF THE REPUBLIC TO SAVE SPAIN

to the discretion of the States themselves. There were three fundamental organisms in Castelar's project: the municipality, the regional State and the federal state or the nation. Diaz Quintero likewise had three fundamental organisms: the municipality, the canton and the federal state.

The intransigents proposed a most complete draft in which the Socialistic viewpoint was expressed with the greatest clarity and completeness. It provided the fullest protection for man in all the phases of his life. It guaranteed to the new industrial civilization then coming into being in Spain humane government. It realized the oft-expressed beliefs of the Republicans of all schools. In many respects it was a noble statement of the rights of man as they should be in any nation in which man may claim his natural rights and in which he may develop his personality without hindrance. It was a constitution, that, if applied, required a *transition*. The intransigents, however noble their intention, sought to convert Spain in a day from a nation dominated by the conservative institution of the church and the powerful political force of the army, as well as the unifying institution of the throne, into a nation in which neither physical nor spiritual coercion would exist. It was demanding of the nation that on the one hand it forget the dull weight of the centuries that had blunted the political sense of the Spanish people through the oppression of the clerical party, and that on the other hand it escape the keen knife of the army, ever ready to cut down when it was not pleased.

Castelar's project was more conservative, more in the spirit of the Constitution of 1812. It, too, was a noble statement of aims and of rights. But it, too, was a federal project. Could such a project be applied *immediately* to the highly centralized state of Spain? Experience in the cantonal uprisings answered that question at least later to the satisfaction of Castelar. The bill of rights in Castelar's project guaranteed to every Spaniard:

"The right to life, to security and to the dignity of life.

"The right to the free expression of thought and to the free expression of his conscience.

"The right to the diffusion of his ideas through instruction.

"The right of reunion and of peaceful association.

"The freedom of work, of industry, of interior commerce, of credit.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

"The right of proprietorship, without faculty of entailment or amortization.

"Equality before the law.

"The right to be juryman and to be judged by juries; the right of defense when tried; the right, in case of falling in crime or transgression, of correction and purification by means of punishment.

"These rights are prior to and superior to all positive legislation."

The bill of rights of the intransigent proposal was divided into personal and social rights. The personal rights were described as: "To life; to the liberty of the person and his security; to the election and inviolability of the home; to the freedom of beliefs; to the emission of thought and the inviolability of correspondence; to instruction; to the freedom of education; to that of petition, popular action, denunciation and complaint; to that of movement, vocation and freedom of work for the perfection of the individual and of society; to that of the proprietorship of the income of labor but without the faculty of amortization." Social rights of the individual were those "of reunion and peaceful manifestation; of association for the ends of human life; to the established advantages or those to be established by the laws, in equality with the other social beings; of equality of conditions for receiving the benefit of instruction and of elementary education; of proportionality in the distribution of public offices legitimately voted in relation to property owned; of participation in the government of society by means of suffrage; to do and to perform whatever is not prejudicial to society and its individuals."

These rights belonged equally to all persons, regardless of their positions in life. "They are derived of human nature and of the necessity for the development of every being. They are, therefore, anterior to, and superior to, all legislation."

This project further guaranteed in perpetuity the following prohibitions: All inequalities of rights and duties before the law for both sexes in civil rights; all privileges before the law and all class distinctions; all titles of nobility; all opprobrious punishments, including the death penalty, for all classes of offenses; *ex post facto* laws; slavery; confiscation, conscription, the holding of prisoners *incomunicado*; state aid to any religion; special courts. Civil registries for marriage, birth and death would be established.

The tremendous advance in political thinking that the Republicans

SACRIFICE OF THE REPUBLIC TO SAVE SPAIN

represented in Spain can be seen in the reference to "both sexes" in Diaz Quintero's project. This was in 1873, at a time when the position of woman in political society and before the law had not been delineated clearly either in Europe or in America. This was a characteristic of the intransigent project—it represented the crest of the road of progress for Spain. But it was presented many years too soon.

Sovereignty, according to Diaz Quintero, resided in the people. He proposed the exercise of that sovereignty through a president of the republic who would serve six years, and in event he was incapacitated, he would be succeeded by the vice president of the republic, by the Cortes consisting of a Congreso and a Senate, and by the judiciary, consisting of a supreme court, cantonal and municipal courts. Three deputies would be elected to the Cortes from every 120,000 population, each to serve four years. Each cantonal congress would elect six senators, half of whom must have been either deputies or senators of the nation in previous legislatures, and the other half freely elected.

The nation would be federalized in this manner: The actual provinces of the peninsula would meet in cantons "in the use of their autonomy." These cantons would recognize reciprocally their autonomy. The pacts of the provinces would form a part of the federal constitution. Laws would be common to all the cantons and each would be equal in the nation. They "are confederated" to "resist every attack from without and every disorder from within, assuring the independence of the fatherland and protecting the liberty and the rights of the confederated" States. No canton could form an alliance with a foreign power nor could it ever separate itself from the nation. Free transit across the cantons was guaranteed nor could any canton collect customs from other cantons.

The essence of the cantonal constitution was that it was the constitution of a confederated state. The project itself contained adequate safeguards to prevent the breaking-up of Spain. The vicious feature of the cantonal proposal lay in the fact that to change from a centralized nation to a federal nation required independent States that could resign certain powers to the central power of the federation. But every province of Spain was *dependent* for its rights on the central power. It did not have any independence to concede, for that had been granted years ago. The adoption of Diaz Quintero's project would have required the admission that each canton was in itself an independent or-

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

ganism. It would have required a legal fiction. And such a legal fiction at the very time the printed copies of the project were being distributed to the Deputies of the Cortes—July 26—was being demonstrated as an impossibility for the cantonalists themselves accepted their independence literally.

Castelar's draft of the constitution assured the following rights and privileges: Arrest for cause only; freedom from arrest or judicial process for any person arrested within twenty-four hours following detention unless charges were brought; no Spaniard could be imprisoned without a court trial; the inviolability of the home was guaranteed; no one could be deprived of his goods or his rights or be disturbed in the possession of these except by judicial process; only legally authorized taxes and contributions were to be paid; the right to vote was assured; the free expression of ideas by discussion, writing or publication was assured, as was the right of reunion and peaceful association "for the ends of human life that are not contrary to public morals," and the right to direct individual or collective petitions to regularly constituted authorities; the right of petition could not be exercised by any armed force; no association with approved statutes could be suspended (a provision designed especially to protect the labor unions); every Spaniard had the right to establish and maintain schools; aliens were permitted to establish themselves freely in Spain and to exercise their professions or to establish industries unless prohibited by special laws; all public offices were open to every Spaniard qualified to fill them; "Every Spaniard is obliged to defend the fatherland when he is called by law and to contribute to the expenses of the state in proportion to his property"; military laws were to rule in those areas declared in a state of war; religious freedom was guaranteed; church and state were separated; civil registries were established for marriage, birth and death; all titles of nobility were abolished.

The Cortes would consist of a Congreso, whose deputies would be elected one from every 50,000 persons, and a Senate consisting of four senators elected by the Cortes of each of the States. The Cortes of the nation would be renewed completely every two years. The executive power would be exercised by a council of ministers under the direction of the president of the republic, who must have passed his thirtieth birthday. The president would be elected by an electoral college consisting of juntas representing each State meeting in the capital of the

SACRIFICE OF THE REPUBLIC TO SAVE SPAIN

nation. Each State junta would consist of double the number of persons the State sent to the Congreso and the Senate of the nation. The vice president would be elected similarly. The judicial power would be composed of a federal supreme court and State and local courts. The judiciary would be independent of and co-equal with, the other branches of the government.

Each State would have complete autonomy in economic and administrative matters compatible with the existence of the nation. Each State could adopt its own constitution, as long as the local constitution did not conflict with the federal constitution. The State would name its own governors and elect its own assemblies. Each State was obliged to maintain free public schools and was permitted to establish universities. Each State was required to safeguard the rights of other States as well as to conform to the regulation of the national constitution.

The two projects were held in abeyance until August 11, when discussion of them began, the widest amplitude being planned so that the viewpoint of all parties represented in the Cortes might be presented.

The youthful and brilliant Leon y Castillo, an Alfonsino, on August 11 opened discussion of the projects. Leon attacked vigorously the federal nature of the proposed constitutions. By federation "the Spanish nation is broken," he declared. If the project (he was referring to Castelar's) became the fundamental law of the nation, there would be no nation to speak of, he continued, because "it will have disappeared, and it will have disappeared divided and dishonored. This very day, under the influence of the word federation—with the desires it has aroused, with the hopes it has stimulated—can it be said that this is a nation?"

Federation was a "pathological phenomenon, a real monomania," Leon stated. Referring to Castelar's declaration that he was above all a Spaniard, Leon declared: "Ah, Señor Castelar, one cannot be Spanish and federal in these moments."

"What is federation for you? Variety within unity; the harmony which does not consist in uniformity. Suffice it to know the temper of the Spanish character to affirm that if this Chamber votes the federal form it votes the national dissolution, without wanting it and without knowing it."

The Republic was struggling between the federalism of the right

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

and the socialism of the left, Leon continued. "With the one you destroy nationality; with the other you destroy society."

"What is this constitution other than the cantonal insurrection voted into law?"

Becerra on August 12 presented the criticism of the Radical party. Federalism represented a retrogression to him. "Look at Mexico," he urged. "Federal Mexico every year, every month, has a *coup d'état* or a revolt. . . . Mexico that has neither bread nor liberty."

Representing the criticism of the parties participating in the Revolution of September, Becerra declared that federation was not the aim of the liberal parties creating that Revolution.

Though scheduled from day to day thereafter, the Chamber did not discuss further the projects. They were merely other cypresses in the cemetery of Spanish constitutions.

III. "THE CABINET OF FORCE"

Salmerón's "cabinet of force" had begun with great energy the formidable task of rescuing Spain from the chaos into which it had drifted under the vacillating hands of Pí y Margall. Salmerón had commissioned Pavía and Martínez Campos to destroy the cantonal movement and these generals were now at work executing their assignments with great thoroughness, to the great disgust of the intransigent Socialists. The *volte face* was not without its difficulties, however. The bullets of the cantonalists in the South were matched with the verbal bullets of their friends in the Cortes, laboring fretfully, bitterly, through the hot summer months of July and August in Madrid. The intransigents had returned to the Cortes determined to execute the reforms they had advocated in opposition in the days of the monarchy. They had returned with some hope that they might be able to obtain the government. They were counting on the support of the Deputies of the center who were unwilling to continue embracing the right. At the opening of the Cortes Constituyentes there had existed among the Republicans only two clearly defined divisions, the right and the left (Socialists in the main). Largely to support Pí y Margall whose heart belonged to the left but whose politics were mostly of the right, a number of Deputies whose sympathies normally lay with the left issued on July 5 a manifesto to the nation stating their goal to be the mean party of the Cortes. Those signing this manifesto were Bartolomé Pla, José Fantoni y Solís, Jerónimo Palma, José Castilla, José María Vallés y Ribot,

SACRIFICE OF THE REPUBLIC TO SAVE SPAIN

Diego López Santiso and Melitón Almagro Díaz. Their manifesto demanded the restoration of discipline in the army and the re-establishment of order, lest there be a restoration of the old regime. They demanded the immediate enactment of reform legislation, abolition of the death penalty and of slavery, separation of church and state, establishment of civil service for employes of the nation, reform of the judiciary and social reforms such as mixed juries, maximum hours of labor and reform in proprietorship as well as complete destruction of feudal privileges.¹⁹ "The center," Suñer y Capdevila, Pí's closest associate in the cabinet of conciliation, explained, "wants neither the violence of the left . . . nor the quietness, the indifference, of the right."²⁰ The manifesto followed Castelar's indication on July 4 that a conservative trend was needed in the government. Salmerón at the time of his election belonged nominally to the right but he joined the center with whom he was more in sympathy as he entered the actual direction of government. The intransigents had hoped to break up the center party when Pí resigned but that party survived, although it suffered some losses such as Suñer y Capdevila. It was only with the resignation of Salmerón in September that the center party broke up, and then not completely.

If they were disappointed in failing to obtain a government of their own making, the Deputies of the left were active nevertheless both in defending the cantonalists whose barricades were being battered down by Pavía and Martínez Campos and in opposing legislation sponsored by the right. Bartolomé y Santamaría, one of the parliamentary leaders of the intransigents, bitterly attacked the government's decree declaring the ships in the possession of Cartagena pirates. "How patriotic it is, to authorize foreign ships to attack ships that carry Spanish citizens!" he exclaimed ironically.²¹

Oreiro, Minister of the Navy, declared the ships were pirates. He was interrupted by a furious Deputy of the left, who cried "This should not be tolerated in the federal Republic." While yet another intransigent shouted "The dignity of Spain ought not to consent to this."

"This dignity of Spain is what the Minister of the Navy sustains," stoutly retorted Oreiro. "Can the Chamber tell me what they [the Cartagena ships] are?"

¹⁹ *Glorias Republicanas*, p. 665.

²⁰ *Diario*, IV, 2389 ff., September 18, 1873.

²¹ *Ibid.*, III, 1122 ff., July 21, 1873.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

"Spanish ships," came the answer. To which the Minister replied by reading the regulation regarding the nationality of a vessel. He concluded: "They have no patent."

"That of the Canton," came the insistent rebuttal of the left.

"Is this the tolerance which Spanish Deputies should have?" intervened Cervera, the Vice President of the Assembly.

The left failed in its effort to set aside Oreiro's order by 110 votes to 90.

The government obtained the passage of the law permitting provincial deputations to collect contributions with which to carry on the Carlista War. Maisonnave proposed a law mobilizing eighty thousand reserves for the Carlista War, a law the left bitterly opposed, Rodriguez Sepúlveda labeling it in the session of August 12 a species of conscription, and declaring that its advocacy was a betrayal of Republican principles. "Who has taught me what the federal system is?" he asked. "Why have I preached against stamped paper, against the monopolies and against conscription? Because Emilio Castelar, Pí y Margall and Figueras have taught me." The law was approved August 16.

Orense, Diaz Quintero and other Deputies of the left continued their parliamentary assaults on the government and the majority. Orense, recurring to his monomania of reforms, in the session of July 25 bitterly assailed the Chamber for its failure to initiate promised reforms. "There are only two means of governing peoples: either that of opinion or that of force, which is the old system we are trying to destroy. There are not more than these two means: either to gratify the 17,000,000 Spaniards, sacrificed constantly from the days of Godoy to our own time, or to gratify the 200,000 or 300,000 who live on the destinies and the premiums inherent in such fatal estimates [as that of the Treasury]." Popular government had little to fear. Only governments disliked met with resistance from the people, such as that the present government was meeting. He had worked for fifty years within the party to eliminate the tobacco and salt monopolies and had no success in the Republican Cortes to achieve that goal, Orense complained. If other reforms were to come as slowly as these, then "any Deputy who believes this Assembly is going to make reforms . . . wins the money by his innocence."

"The public has to understand that it has to gain reforms by its fists, for in that manner they cannot be taken from it easily; now I see

SACRIFICE OF THE REPUBLIC TO SAVE SPAIN

that it does not want the cantons destroyed and it does well," Orense concluded sharply.

"This is sanctioning insurrection against the Assembly," Cervera warned.

Orense boldly proclaimed his sympathy with the demagogues in Cartagena in the session of July 28. Manuel Villalba had presented a resolution thanking the volunteers of Pozoblanco and other towns of Córdoba Province for refusing to accede to the request of the governor to rebel against the government. "I think Señor Orense inconsistent on these benches," he said. "If Señor Orense thinks that they do well who defend these cantons, he ought to be in the cantons and not in the Assembly. I think that in these moments one is not a good Republican who rebels against the accords of the party and against the decisions of the Assembly."

"Señor Villalba," retorted Orense, "has done me the honor of wanting to give me lessons in consistency and in other matters. I do not accept him for master, because I have not had the pleasure of knowing him other than in the Cortes. I am where I belong, Señor Villalba, and I will say more: I would be in Cartagena were there not other cities calling me also. . . . I would be in Cartagena today, defending liberty and making war on this government that appears to me by its naming of generals to have brought us directly to despotism, as occurred in 1843."

Castellano declared on July 30 in debating the resolution to offer a vote of thanks to Almería which had resisted the demands of Contreras, that the action of the government and of the majority towards the cantons was "cowardly," a remark that was greeted with protests. Abarzuza retorted that "it is cowardly to insult the defenders of Almería from these benches."

"Let us leave here!" shouted Lafuente.

Castellano continued his strictures, declaring that the right was responsible for the "evil" of cantonalism because "you have complied with none of the promises you have made the country."

Díaz Quintero explained that he did not know whether the Republic was being lost by the right or by the left. Were he a member of the Ministry, however, and were he faced with the necessity to "ruin cities and shed blood to preserve order," he would have resigned

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

and have sought other men who could have restored order without appealing to arms.

Bartolomé y Santamaría referred to the right as the "white mountain."

The hardy Prefumo provoked further scenes that day with his resolution that "the Assembly has viewed with profound disgust the conduct of the Deputies who have raised arms against its power and its sovereignty" and commanding the proper authorities to present these Deputies before competent tribunals for trial. He declared that the Deputies in many cases levied money from cities placed at their mercy, while others among the rebels were former Carlistas, like Sauvalle, Minister of Finance in the Cartagena Cabinet. Contreras, he continued, was arrogating many privileges to himself, even using some of the silver belonging to the former Queen, Doña Isabel.

Díaz Quintero, in proposing that the resolution be not considered, lamented bitterly that "not only are there no Federalists in Spain but almost there are no Republicans. Are you going to give a vote of censure to those who have raised arms? Then include me also; I declare myself a rebel from this very hour.

"Unfortunate provinces, if you do not save yourselves, this stupid government, this stupid majority, will lead you to the loss of your liberty, to the loss of the Republic, to the loss of the fatherland," he concluded.

"Señor Díaz Quintero, you cannot sanction insurrection from here," reproved Cervera.

"Señor Presidente, I have the right to speak my opinion and that is my opinion. I will rebel against this autocracy of the President, which is insufferable, which is insupportable, and against the intolerance of the Chamber."

Antonio Orense declared that "if General Contreras merits any reward, Don Carlos de Borbón is the one who ought to give it."

Isabel, a conservative Republican, spoke with scorn of the cantonalists. "The federal Republic," he said, "is the Spanish federal Republic organized. It is not a portion of the Republic, of *republicuillas* or of cantons."

Castelar, replying to attacks directed to him in the debate, which, as almost all resolutions of any character presented the Cortes, explored the full terrain of politics, denied the accusation of Cala that the ma-

SACRIFICE OF THE REPUBLIC TO SAVE SPAIN

jority was negotiating with the conservatives and declared "Do you not perceive the phenomenon that the advanced Republican parties to which we belong pass as a meteor over all the horizons of Europe . . . and soon afterwards disappear as a bloody comet? We, the Republicans, have many prophets, few politicians; we know much of the ideal, little of experience; we embrace the entire heaven of thought and we fall in the first hole there is in our road.

"All that we have defended the conservatives have realized. Who sustained the idea of the autonomy of the Hungarian nation? a republican, Kossuth. Who realized it? a conservative, Deak.

"What do I desire? What am I wanting? To what have I consecrated my life? To think of the advent of the republic, to insure that the republic be made by Republicans; more, by the entire world. And what do you want? Do you think that with your conduct, with your proceedings, with your cantons, with your military rebellions, with the praetorian demagoguery without name, without title, without responsibility, you will save us?"

Castelar's furious denunciation was interrupted by tremendous applause. When it had subsided he continued:

"No, no! With these criminal insanities, with these suicidal stupidities, we can expect only the quick destruction and the irredeemable dishonor of the Republic." Again the orator was stopped by a prolonged burst of applause.

"It is necessary that the Republic be saved by the old Republicans, by the real Republicans, by the historic Republicans, by the Republicans of the vespers, against this nameless crowd of military adventurers, of conspirators of the soldiers' quarters, ignorant and ambitious.

"Understand that now as always, I love my fatherland with exaltation and I belong to my idolatrous Spain before belonging to liberty, before the republic, before federation, before democracy.

"I will oppose with all my strength the smallest, the slightest, dismemberment of this land . . . and the cantonal movement is a foolish threat to the integrity of the fatherland, to the future of liberty."

Castelar's fervent address assured the passage of Prefumo's resolution but it did not convert the left, for the Cortes had now reached the stage where the lines of resistance of the right and of the left were being clearly defined, with only the center the target. Castelar had raised another coping stone in his program of conservatism in his address of

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

July 30. He had served to define the outline of the bleak, insurmountable peak that separated the two extremes of the Chamber.

José María Orense revealed the struggle between the idealism of the left and the utopian nature of their plans in his resolution of August 4 in which he proposed a suggestion of Suñer y Capdevila that all federal democratic Republicans swear, whether obedient to the Assembly or not, "that they will not use arms to fight among themselves" and that by "pacific ways" all causes of dissidence be removed so that all available forces be sent to the North and to Catalonia. The impractical resolution was rejected.

The Assembly had begun the hearings on certifying the rebel Deputies to the courts for trial. A scandal was provoked in the Chamber in the session of August 14 when a vote was being taken on Maissonave's mobilization of the reserves law (which failed of passage that day due to the insufficient number of Deputies present). Gonzalez Chermá, leader of the Castellón Canton, voted with the left. Abarzuza asked whether he had heard correctly the name of a Deputy who had been at the head of a cantonal insurrection. Cervera replied that Abarzuza had heard correctly but under the regulations of the Chamber Gonzalez Chermá was in his rights.

"I think I have the right to defend myself" the cantonal Deputy began.

"Outside! outside!" cried many Deputies.

"I have equal right. . . ."

"In Cartagena. Here, no!"

Gonzalez Chermá continued with his extemporaneous defense, however, stating that his first action in proclaiming the Canton had been to recognize the rights of the government and of the Assembly.

"I have believed that the federal Republic without cantons is an irregularity that cannot continue," he explained. Rather than shed blood, however, he had been the first to advise abandoning the Canton, he asserted.

"And then you marched to Valencia!" cried an accusing voice.

"I marched because I had the liberty to march," retorted Gonzalez Chermá.

Antonio Orense, son of José María Orense, proposed August 16 that those Deputies be declared traitors who refused to aid in the passage of laws with their presence. His resolution was greeted with

SACRIFICE OF THE REPUBLIC TO SAVE SPAIN

laughter. Orense was serious, however. He referred to the failure of the mobilization law to pass August 14 because the Deputies of the left had retired from the Chamber so as to defeat the measure through lack of a quorum. He declared that he directed the resolution to members of the left, "where is found the person I love most, the person who gave me my name and life." He referred to his father. Both father and son remained respectively in the left and right divisions of the Chamber to the very end of the Republic. Having gained his object of censuring the left, Orense retired his proposition, which was then re-introduced by Estévez of the left, only to be rejected.

José Orense's proposal of a fraternal oath among all Republicans was matched with an equally preposterous plan submitted to the Cortes by a citizen of Saragossa, Quintin Alfaro de Molina, who proposed a national alliance between the Carlistas and the Republicans "with the object of cementing the Republic upon solid bases." This proposal was rejected August 16.

José Orense proposed August 30 full amnesty for all cantonalists, thus gaining 4,500 soldiers in Cartagena to be sent to the Carlista front. Only a word separated the right from the left, he continued: "whether the revolution is to be made from above or below; I prefer that it be made from below because it is more democratic and always will be more popular." Salmerón replied that, following Orense's reasoning, the simple solution of the Carlista problem would be to permit Don Carlos to occupy the throne of San Fernando. Sharply he demanded: "Is it convenient, is it suitable, is it just that you try to give an amnesty to criminals who have commenced by outraging your representation, by tearing the heart of the fatherland and who are sowing terror among the conservative classes in the name of confederation?" This was in keeping with Salmerón's position, stated earlier that day in reply to a question of Gonzalez Chermá, that the Carlista War was augmented greatly due to the conduct of the volunteers who had rebelled against the government.

Orense replied that Salmerón probably did not want to grant amnesty because he did not have a strong government. Salmerón retorted that it was due only to the respectability of Señor Orense that one could listen with patience to certain accusations he made. The Chamber refused to accord the amnesty Orense sought. This was the final

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

blow to the hopes of the intransigents of aiding the revolutionists in the South.

Typical of the confused reasoning of the intransigents was Orense's statement that Spain should seek an alliance with the United States. The United States was rich, Spain was poor. There were some people who said that the United States was seeking to gain influence in Europe.

"If the United States wants to figure in Europe," he said, "and with us, what does it matter to us? We would speak of our miseries and of our losses, and if in its [the United States'] shadow we could acquire the preponderance we have lost, let us utilize the occasion. Oh, would that the United States had this ambition!"

Many of the objectives of the center, which were also the objectives of the left, were presented in the form of projects for laws during the administration of Salmerón. Moreno Rodriguez, Minister of Justice, on August 2 proposed the independence of the church, the state to renounce its power to nominate ecclesiastics. Valentin Morán petitioned August 6 to set aside the decrees of the Minister of Public Works of June 2 and 3 concentrating the faculties of philosophy, letters and science in the University of Madrid—a decree which had been bitterly resented by the provincial universities. Adolfo de la Rosa introduced a law for the establishment of a chair in ophthalmology. A complete revision of the educational system was proposed in a law introduced August 18, regulating secondary and advanced education. Fernando Gonzalez, Minister of Public Works, proposed mixed juries for arbitration of wage disputes. Antonio Carne proposed a maximum working day of nine hours.

José Orense, from the experience of many years spent studying Spanish economic structure, introduced an important law June 22, providing that land not utilized for cultivation and owned by private or community interests, be divided among persons not having land, with the object of increasing the number of small land holdings and consequently, increasing the wealth of the nation. Though the law never passed, it was certainly one of the most important projects introduced during the Republic. Orense was in many respects the greatest student of economics in Spain, with the possible exception of Fernando Garrido. He it was who had given the impetus to the Republican demands for abolition of monopolies in various forms that kept

SACRIFICE OF THE REPUBLIC TO SAVE SPAIN

prices above the reach of the average poor peasant. The great land holdings were survivals of feudal days, and the complete destruction of feudalism was an important objective of the Republic—in fact, the inroads made on the feudal structure was the greatest contribution, in many ways, of the Spanish Republic to the advancement of the nation.

Successful cultivation of the land should be approached like any industry, Orense said, since it in fact was an industry and therefore should be done on a great scale. He was not designing his law to partition those estates where the land was actively cultivated and actively producing wealth. In most of the provinces the cultivated land holdings were sufficiently divided already. It was only where the great estates did not produce that he would increase the producing wealth of the nation through a division of the land. Payment for the land would extend over a long period. In the meantime a deserving class of people would be gaining wealth and the living standards of the nation would be raised, as well as the income paid the state.

The proposal Orense made has remained a dominant issue in Spanish affairs even in our own time.²²

A law was passed to extinguish the debt of the Treasury, providing for payment of 500,000,000 pesetas. A subscription of 150,000,000 pesetas in mortgage notes and 30,000,000 pesetas to pay the last two semi-annual coupons on the national debt was provided in the law. The total emission of notes would be secured by treasury bonds, the Almaden Mines, etc. A national subscription of 175,000,000 pesetas, secured by the sale of the royal patrimony, was also to be made within ten days following the passage of the law, the subscription to be closed within eight days thereafter.

IV. CASTELAR ELECTED PRESIDENT

The fury of the intransigents subsided somewhat as the summer wore on and the Salmerón cabinet succeeded in its program of restoring order. The political situation continued to remain grave, however, as disappointment with the success of the Republic was expressed more frequently by members of all parties. The name of Espartero, even, had come into the arena of liberal discussion towards the close of Pí y Margall's Ministry. Some of the Deputies of the center had met and

²² The Republic of 1931 considered this aspect of Spanish economic life one of the most important facing it and passed in September, 1932 an agrarian law bearing some similarity to Orense's.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

had signed a proposal to place Espartero, who, it will be recalled, was the great Progressive figure of Isabel's reign, at the head of the Republic; and Deputy Zabala in commenting on this meeting, concluded his speech in the Assembly the night of September 1 with the words "Long live the Republic and the Duque de la Victoria!" Old members of the Unión Liberal, who, with the Progressives, had launched the Revolution of September, fretted in Madrid, while Cánovas del Castillo began actively working for the restoration of Alfonso XII following conferences with Doña Isabel in Paris, where he was commissioned August 23 to assume the leadership of the Alfonsino party in Spain. Cánovas del Castillo gained the former Queen's adhesion to his plan of effecting the restoration solely by pacific means, through propaganda that would restore confidence on the part of the nation in the House of Bourbon.²³ Various conferences with leaders of various shades of opinion among the royalists resulted in little progress. The presence of an active organization, however, working for the restoration of the Prince of Asturias was another threat to those already harassing the Republic in the form of the Carlistas, the intransigents, the Cuban insurrection and the indifference of Europe.

Salmerón and Castelar continued their close friendship and the latter's election to the presidency of the Cortes August 25 was considered generally the promise that Castelar would be elevated to the presidency of the Cabinet should Salmerón resign. Castelar in his address on taking possession of the presidency of the Chamber declared that he and Salmerón were co-operating closely and that the program of Salmerón as contained in his two notable addresses to the Assembly was also his. Once again he affirmed his belief in federalism, although he again qualified that belief with the statement that the unity of the nation must be preserved. The conservatives not only elected Castelar—the intransigents did not vote at all—but they named Gil Berges first Vice President over Cervera, who also belonged to the right and who had remained in charge of the sessions following Salmerón's elevation to the presidency of the Executive Power, at the behest of the majority. Cervera thereupon offered his resignation on the plea of ill health but the resignation was not accepted.

The majority had been holding reunions constantly. Castelar and others believed that it would be better to adjourn the Cortes until Oc-

²³ Díez de Tejada, *Historia de la Restauración* (Madrid, 1879), I, 55.

SACRIFICE OF THE REPUBLIC TO SAVE SPAIN

tober but to this the Deputies of the left would not agree. Martín de Olías, a member of the constitutional commission, finally voiced the wish of the majority in the session of August 24 in proposing that the Cortes adjourn September 5, to reconvene November 5. It was impossible to discuss the constitution intelligently, he declared, in view of the great difficulty faced in the matter of territorial division in creating the federation.²⁴ Protests were being received from many cities, asking that provincial capitals be placed there. Each provincial capital thus demanding to be the capital of the new State, it required slowness and necessarily the consultation of the various popular corporations to ascertain the real will of the people. The proposal to adjourn was not accepted.

Affairs of the army brought the divergencies that existed in the Salmerón Ministry to a crisis. Salmerón had been negotiating with the artillery corps with a view to their restoration. Hidalgo, now captain general of Madrid, stood in the way. The man who had provoked the crisis that gave Amadeo his excuse for resigning the kingship, had been shifted to various positions of responsibility and on July 1 was named by Pí y Margall to be captain general of Madrid. On September 2 Salmerón relieved him of his position and on the following day the government refused to reply to questions concerning the General's dismissal.²⁵ Martínez Campos had been appealing for artillery assistance constantly from Cartagena, which city he was now besieging.²⁶ The capture of Estella by the Carlistas on August 24 led to the resignation of General Sánchez Bregua, who had been placed in command of the Republican army in the North by Salmerón. General Mackenna, captain general of Catalonia, likewise resigned. The army was in a state of revolt. It sought the restoration of the ordinances in all their rigor, as testified by an eloquent meeting of officers in Capellanes, in which the restoration of the death penalty was demanded.

Two laws had been proposed to this end. One, introduced by Maissonave September 1, proposed invoking the law of the militia of July 14, 1822, under which every Spaniard from the ages of twenty to forty-five was obliged to serve in the militia. Modesto Martínez Pacheco, a Deputy of the right, introduced a law to re-establish the military or-

²⁴ The States' division shown in the map "The Republics of Spain" were approximately the divisions proposed by Castelar's project.

²⁵ *Gaceta de Madrid* (September 3, 1873).

²⁶ *Glorias Republicanas*, p. 714 ff.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

dinances in their full rigor. On September 2 the commission of war of the Cortes reported favorably on this project, although Navarrete, president of the commission, opposed it, offering an amendment that the death penalty be not applied, while Olave, a member of the commission, unsuccessfully proposed that the law be rejected.

The proposal to restore the death penalty was a retrogression of one of the cardinal doctrines of the Republican party and it brought the left's best orators to the debate. The proposal also precipitated the crisis in Salmerón's Ministry. Salmerón was in agreement principally with Palanca in his opposition to the application of the death penalty. He was enough of a realist to understand that the death penalty was vitally necessary if the army was to be kept in order. But he was enough of the philosopher that he could not bring himself to apply it. The crisis in his Ministry began September 2 and continued until September 5. It began with the dismissal of Hidalgo and following the refusal of a group of soldiers to go to the Carlista front because of Hidalgo.²⁷ Perez Costales and José María Orense presented a resolution to the Cortes September 5 demanding an explanation of the government's position. This was rejected. The following day, however, Salmerón and his Ministry resigned.

The majority had met September 5 in the Congreso to determine its policy. Salmerón stated his objection to the institution of the death penalty and said firmly that he would not continue in power. Castelar then stated his policies and the necessity of restoring order in the army through application of the death penalty. The institution of the death penalty had become of immediate importance for two soldiers had been sentenced to death at Saragossa for shooting their colonel.²⁸ *El Guarda Cantón* bitterly remarked that Castelar would form a ministry which would suspend the life of all Spaniards and would be authorized to chloroform the cantonalists.²⁹ From the actions of Salmerón the left could see that its revolutionary policies would fare badly under the more conservative Castelar.

The resignation on September 6 ended the administration that had brought a semblance of order to Spain. "Great as are the titles which the outgoing ministry has acquired to the gratitude of the coun-

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 730.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 732; *La Igualdad* (September 7, 1873).

²⁹ *El Guarda Cantón* (September 7, 1873).

SACRIFICE OF THE REPUBLIC TO SAVE SPAIN

try, worthy of especial mention is the fact that this government gained the submission of the incipient Cantons and re-established the authority of the Assembly, without sacrificing a point of its democratic principles," *La Igualdad* observed.³⁰ Salmerón had had courage but he was more the philosopher than the statesman. In his resignation he stated that he did not agree with the imperious exigencies of public opinion, and consequently was withdrawing from power.

A parliamentary skirmish then began. Pí y Margall had broken his long silence at an informal meeting of the two extremes of the Parliament the morning of the fifth. Now, despite the fact that the election of Castelar as President of the Assembly had indicated that the left could not depend on a majority for Pí, the latter and his associates began making a determined bid for the presidency of the Executive Power.

Marceliano Isabel of the right proposed that a Deputy be named to form the government with the same faculties accorded Salmerón. This was taken into consideration. Casaldueiro, parliamentary leader of the intransigents, then proposed it be not considered. It was necessary to know the cause of the crisis, he declared, for the Assembly should not continue as it had in the past, by not ascertaining the cause. It would merely mean sacrificing another man to the whims of the majority. Salmerón's Ministry had meant the suspension of the work of "planting" the Republic. Spain, he said, was divided into Federalists and Carlists, the former in the big cities, the latter in the small communities. There were two schools within the Federalists—one wanting the establishment of federation immediately, the other wanting delay until the end of the Carlista War. "The politics of Salmerón signifies somewhat more than the imposition of the death penalty; it signifies the alliance with the rest of the liberal parties; and this goes to signify perhaps, the policy of Señor Castelar," he concluded.

A Republic for Spain rather than a Republic solely for the Republicans seemed almost as curious to the intransigents as the Republic must have seemed to Don Carlos. Nevertheless there was a grain of truth in Casaldueiro's significant question: "Do you also want to kill Señor Castelar?"

Pí y Margall delivered his first speech in the Cortes following his resignation during this debate. He defended his policy since the ad-

³⁰ *La Igualdad* (September 6, 1873).

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

vent of the Republic and his policy of conciliation. Like Castelar he too could see some mistakes, although he did not explain why he silently had permitted those errors to become realities.

His conscience was clear, Pí declared. Why should he conspire, he demanded, replying to the many rumors then current in Spain that he had been in conspiracy with the cantonalists; he was the head of the state. He had defended the doctrine of imposing reforms from below but, not wanting to break the national unity, he had abandoned that theory. From April 23 he had opposed revolutionary paths, he declared. Instead, he had promised to obtain reforms.

"I have complied with my promise. Thirty-seven days I was President of the Executive Power and in those thirty-seven days, in spite of having had two grave and thorny crises, I presented projects of laws to realize these reforms and I did not stop urging my companions to present reforms referring to their departments." He had proposed giving Cuba all the Spanish political liberties and abolishing slavery, as it had been abolished in Porto Rico. Suñer y Capdevila had aided him "in this as in everything."

"There are among you profound and irritating hatreds. You look at each other not as brothers but as enemies; there is no courtesy among you now; all has disappeared. Hatred is above all," he declared with the greatest truth.

"My policy was of conciliation, but within, not outside, the Republican party. I wanted order, but within the Republic, not outside the Republic." The left applauded this statement which so aptly explained why the liberals other than Republicans remained aloof from the Republican government.

When the cantonal movement had begun, he was perplexed, he admitted. A partial solution would not do, without aggravating the condition of the country. "It is true that this government [Salmerón's] has faced the cantonal insurrection, that it has conquered the rebels; but what I feared has succeeded. The Republicans have been conquered. Have the Carlistas been? No, while you were gaining victories in the Mediodía, the Carlistas have been gaining in the North.

"I do not accuse you for that. These are the fatalities of the situation. What I tell you is, that in view of what happened, you will not consider it strange that I found myself perplexed, fearing that making war on one would encourage the other."

SACRIFICE OF THE REPUBLIC TO SAVE SPAIN

He would have combatted the cantonal insurrection as the right had done, if it could have been by means of persuasion and friendship. "That which I never would have done would be to appeal to those means to which you have appealed; those always would have been prohibited by me. I would never have declared those ships pirates which the Federalists seized. I would never have permitted foreign nations that have not recognized us to intervene in our sad discords. I would never have bombarded the city of Valencia. I would have remembered that a bombardment was the cause of the fall of General Espartero."³¹

"I tell you it is impossible to save the Republic by the road you follow, because you distrust the popular masses, and without confidence in the popular masses it is impossible to face the Carlistas."

Disclaiming that he was a member of the right or the left, or even the center, Pí declared that in the present instance he would form a homogeneous ministry instead of one from the right.

Ríos Rosas of the conservative group, anticipated the replies of the Republicans in one of the ablest and most critical addresses of the Cortes. Ríos Rosas, as did members of the right, recognized that Pí's speech, given under the guise of defending himself against allusions, was in reality a program of government Pí was offering as alternative to Castelar. Mercilessly Ríos Rosas attacked Pí for his many failures in government. Under the Republic the Carlista movement had grown from a minor to a major menace. Pí's policies were evil and through them Figueras and Pí in fifteen days had lost the confidence of the people.

"You were the soul of the party in Figueras' Ministry," the caustic conservative charged Pí. "You were the real and effective president of the Figueras Cabinet. From the Ministry of the Interior Pí had directed the policies of the government. "Thus you, if not solely responsible, were the first responsible for the policy of that government."

The cantonal uprising, the Alcoy disaster and similar calamities "have been a necessary effect of your policy," Ríos Rosas continued accus-

³¹ Pí was one of the first Spaniards to discern the overawing power of the military in Spanish life. In this address he declared: "I have always been a great believer that the civil authority should prevail over the military authority. . . . I have always thought that the military authority should be no more than the arm of the civil authority." (*Diario*, IV, 2094.) Salmerón likewise protested against this most costly luxury of Spain.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

ingly. "What effective thing have you done in Málaga, rebellious almost from the first day in which the Republic was proclaimed? . . . Nothing. You have permitted all these scandals and at times have consented to them and at times you have approved." If Pí did not approve proclaiming the federal Republic, as he had stated in his defense, why had he not arisen from the Blue Bench to oppose it? Pí's government had been little more than a municipal government of Madrid.

"Don Carlos is ready to cross the line of the Ebro. Who is responsible for this? Do you impute it to the Republic? I deny it; the responsibility is your policy; the responsibility is your conduct; the responsibility is your incapacity in its [accepted] meaning, because I do not want to accuse anyone of criminality."

Salmerón deplored that the debate had been initiated by Ríos Rosas and upbraided Pí for opening the matter of the disunion of the Chamber. Pí's speech represented the effort to renew the federal Republic by the Republicans alone. Pí was the archetype of the party, he symbolized it. From the first cabinet there had been a dualism that had excluded the other parties. Figueras had been the point of union between the Republicans and the other parties, but his loyalty to Pí prevented that union from continuing. In neither of the two Ministries presided over by Pí was there a difference of principle, it was always a division determined by policy, by conduct, by proceedings.

The retiring President of the Executive Power warned the Chamber not to form another Ministry under Pí. "Señor Pí certainly cannot invert the terms of the political equation, to give the new concept to the federal Republic that ought to be evolved in this Chamber." The division between the right and the left need not be feared; rather, the meaning and political spirit of Pí should be. Before Europe would recognize the Republic it would be necessary for the Republic to demonstrate that the virus of demagoguery was not inherent in the Republican party. Neither the left nor the center could offer that guarantee. The right alone could do so and he himself was in accord with the policies of the right in all except one point.

The vote taken shortly before 3 A.M. September 7 showed that the center had divided, although Castelar's majority was not affected materially by the division. Castelar received 133 votes to 67 for Pí and 2 for Salmerón. Pí himself voted in blank.

SACRIFICE OF THE REPUBLIC TO SAVE SPAIN

The federal Spanish Republic had entered its last phase, in which doctrines must make their last struggle with grim reality.

V. THE PROGRAM OF SALVATION

"Salmerón prevented the dismemberment of the fatherland; may Castelar free it from the misfortune of absolutism."³² Thus the conservative Republicans regarded Castelar's task on his assumption of the presidency of the Executive Power of the Republic September 7. He was no longer the most popular man in Spain. Peasants who had grown delirious once at his seductive praise of "patria" could not understand the new Castelar. It was no wonder. Castelar had turned almost completely around on his "road to progress."

It was a disillusioned and a wiser man who, at the age of forty-one years, took up the sad task of gathering up the bits into which the nation had crumbled, partly in response to the guile of federalism and partly in obedience to the equally alluring promises of the Carlistas. Castelar told a friend: "A new man is born today, the statesman. The policy of the moment is reduced to this, that Don Carlos does not occupy the throne which his peers occupy. The cosmopolitan Jesuit supports him with weapons and with money as never was any other rebel supported. Universal democracy forgets that I, who was applauded so many times by all the democrats of Spain and of America, find myself inundated in the most terrible torments."³³

Castelar's was to be a government of combat. "Surrounded by enemies on all sides, in formidable war with factions and with demagogues, our government was and could be nothing else than a government of combat," he said to the Republicans of Granada in 1874.³⁴

In the mistakes of the past he was ready to take his full responsibility. He was also ready to assume full credit for restoring order. "Of these errors [i. e., breaking with the Radicals, tolerating demagogues in the party, preaching a utopia], I am the most responsible. But if these have been our errors, frankly confessed, our services to the cause of a close alliance between order and liberty, between authority and the Republic, have been innumerable."³⁵

In his presidential address of September 8, as in his address of July

³² *La Igualdad* (September 6, 1873).

³³ Alberola, *Semblanza de Castelar*, p. 104.

³⁴ Castelar, *Discursos en la Restauración*, I, 52.

³⁵ Castelar, *Cartas sobre la política Europea*, I, 97-98.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

8, he declared that the nation was in danger and that he regarded it his duty to save it at all costs. The address, made on his forty-first birthday,³⁶ embraced the policies Salmerón had followed and went a step further—the inclusion of the death penalty. Destined to succeed a Ministry over which had presided one of the “undoubtedly greatest philosophers our century has produced,” Castelar declared that the mission of his government and of the majority was to preserve the national unity. The duty of the party was to become a party of government. But now a white demagoguery, more terrible than the red demagoguery, threatened the Republic. This was Carlism, endeavoring to restore theocracy and feudalism. The cantonal movement had given great impetus to the Carlistas. “War is fire; war is desolation; war is incendiarism; and we will not be men but monks if we do not answer war with war, incendiarism with incendiarism, blood with blood, death with death,” he declared, a statement that was greeted with great applause.

Castelar asked for full power to restore discipline in the army with the full rigor of the ordinances. “The abolition of the death penalty is one of our principles . . . but it has occurred to no one, to no republic in the world, to say and to sustain that an army can exist without discipline.”

The death penalty was established in all the armies of the world.

“Accuse me of inconsequence if you want to; I will hear the accusation and I will not defend myself. . . . That my name perish, that present and future generations condemn me . . . does not matter to me now, I have lived enough. But let it not be said that the Republic was lost by weakness; and above all, lost in our hands.” The Republic must be of all, for all, by all, “so that it will represent justice for all men.”

Castelar’s policy was to restore the death penalty, to reorganize the artillery corps, to entrust commands to officers irrespective of parties, for the government “is resolved to employ all, without distinction of political banner.”

This policy of war to the uttermost he justified in the example of Lincoln, “the greatest idol of Christian times,” who suspended the

³⁶ According to Castelar. It will be remembered that September 7 and 8 are both given by various authorities, Castelar himself giving the latter date as that of his birth, although he was born the night of the seventh.

SACRIFICE OF THE REPUBLIC TO SAVE SPAIN

habeas corpus, suspended meetings, imposed the death penalty and maintained the national unity.

Castelar constituted his Cabinet from the right. He retained the able Maisonnave as Minister of the Interior, Oreiro as Minister of the Navy and interim Minister of War, placed Carvajal in the rôle of Minister of Foreign Affairs, and named Soler y Plá, Salmerón's Minister of Foreign Affairs, as Minister of Overseas. He chose Manuel Pedregal y Cañedo as Minister of Finance and Joaquín Gil Berges as Minister of Public Works. Luis del Rio y Ramos he named Minister of Justice. On September 9 he named General José Sánchez Bregua, an Alfonsino general who had resigned his command of the army in the North, Minister of War.

Salmerón was re-elected unanimously President of the Assembly. Castelar quickly proposed legislation he required to combat the Carlistas, for he still believed in an adjournment of the Cortes. On September 9 the government proposed a law authorizing it to adopt extraordinary means and to raise 100,000,000 pesetas for the War. The request was granted September 13. Often accused of being a dictator, Castelar was the third President of the Republic who had been granted such extraordinary powers—not the first. Pí y Margall had been granted such powers and had not used them; Salmerón had exercised them to a point where his theories conflicted with his sense of statesmanship. Castelar continued the tradition of the two preceding Presidents in obtaining extraordinary powers. On September 16, by a vote of 115 to 72, the law restoring the military ordinances was passed. Palanca, soon to be mooted as Castelar's successor, voted against the law—a step in keeping with his protection of Solier in Málaga. Miguel Morayta, one of Castelar's close friends in the Cortes, again proposed the suspension of the Cortes to take place on September 20, the Assembly to reconvene January 2. The Mesa (officers) of the Chamber would be authorized to reconvene the Assembly earlier if required. The Republican party had had enough experience with permanent commissions not to court another April 23. The proposal was widely discussed. Pí asked the majority to take a definite stand on the question of federalism.

"I have not lost at all my faith in federation. . . . I have believed and continue to believe that the federal form of government is

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

best accommodated to the temper, to the character and to the manner of the Spanish nation."

Castelar replied that "I have always been in disagreement with many of the ideas of Señor Pí y Margall; our schools, especially in economic and social points, have ever been distinct schools. Above all, I was in great dissidence with Señor Pí y Margall within the provisional government that we all formed." Four times he had wanted to leave the Ministry as a result of Pí's policies and each time he had been dissuaded. "I placed myself completely at the service and at the support of Señor Pí two entire months with all the force of my will, with all the energy of my character. Many times when it was sustaining a crisis, if any friend of mine sustained it within the government, I reprimanded him sharply. Many times the crises reached Parliament and I arose to support Señor Pí. Señor Pí may not have lost faith in the principles but he has violated them many times in the government. Many Spaniards think the cantonal movement is the proof of the federal Republic."

"No! no!"

"Yes! yes!"

"The Spanish people believe it," Castelar replied to these interruptions.

Blanco Villarta in rebuttal declared that there was little federal in Castelar's speech. It was more the program of Becerra of the Radicals. "After the speech of Señor Castelar, I have nothing more to say than two words: Federal Republicans, the federal Republic is dead! Long live the federal Republic!"

"¡Viva!" cried a voice among the Deputies of the left. There was laughter in many sections of the Chamber.

The law was passed and the Chamber prepared to adjourn. Much of the legislation that had been proposed was either withdrawn or not acted upon, such as the proposal to reorganize the educational system and to secularize the cemeteries. The right sustained one further parliamentary test when Cervera was elected first Vice President of the Chamber September 20, defeating Palanca for the position vacated when Gil Berges entered the Cabinet.

At 7:40 P. M. September 20, the Cortes Constituyentes adjourned until January 2, 1874, leaving Castelar and his conservative Ministry

SACRIFICE OF THE REPUBLIC TO SAVE SPAIN

to face one of the most terrible threats in the history of Spain, the Carlists, and to subdue the stubborn cantonalists of Cartagena.

The Assembly that had met the first of June filled with the hope of inaugurating a new era in Spain, the era of progress, adjourned in a spirit of the greatest bitterness, with the conviction present in many minds that the Republic was lost. Little of the splendid legislative program that the Republican party had advocated in opposition when it was a fairly unified party, was realized. The acid tempers of many of its members made parliamentary courtesy at times exceedingly difficult. There was a surprising number of able men in the Cortes, surprising in view of the abstention of the royalist parties. There were lawyers like Diaz Quintero, noblemen like the Marqués de Florida, professors like Timeteo Alfaro, physicians like Zabala, all of whom gave promise of a brilliant Assembly. It was a brilliant Cortes, but lost in futile endeavor, in expounding theory that would not work in practice. It was a laboratory for political ideas, where experience was the schoolmaster. The party that had fought gallantly in opposition wasted its strength when in power, while the conservative politicians looked on with amusement mixed with the deepest concern as it began to appear that not only the Republic but the nation itself might be destroyed in the testing out of theories.

Castelar proceeded immediately to his task of reorganizing the military forces. Pavía, given permission to proceed to Málaga following Solier's fiasco in Madrid, was promoted to the rank of full general and made captain general of Madrid, while the task of maintaining order in the South was left to the civil and military governors of the various provinces. "Señor Castelar continued the work of Don Nicolás Salmerón with more energy, greater vigor and less scruples," Pavía dryly observed.³⁷ Obligatory service in the militia was reintroduced in keeping with the law re-instating the militia according to the law of 1822, and 30,000 Remington rifles were ordered for the army. On September 30 Castelar, under the extraordinary powers granted him, instructed the civil governors through Maisonnave to guard against publications which incited the people to rebellion against the government. A fine of not less than five hundred pesetas nor more than five thousand was provided.³⁸ Castelar ordered two soldiers who had been sentenced to death to be executed. Finally, he called into

³⁷ Pavía, *op. cit.*, p. 107.

³⁸ *Gaceta de Madrid*.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

the army all those on the reserve list not included in the levy of 80,000 men made by Salmerón August 14, creating an army that eventually reached 100,000 men.³⁹ Martínez Campos was named captain general of Catalonia on December 6 and López Dominguez, a Republican general and nephew of Serrano, was named captain general of Burgos. The army was ordered to continue its siege of Cartagena.

Castelar re-established the artillery corps on September 21, on the basis it had on February 7, before General Primo de Rivera, its commander, resigned over the Hidalgo incident. Any generals or officers as of April 8 were permitted to apply for their old positions. While present officers were to be kept in their places, they might be replaced by the old.⁴⁰ The army officers were notified that same day that the ordinances were in full force. General Ramón Nouvilas was named President of the Supreme Court of War. Juan de Zavala y de la Puente was named commander of the artillery corps. The military were forbidden strictly to engage in polemics in the press.⁴¹

Castelar dispatched Soler y Plá, his Minister of Overseas, to Cuba to study the situation there personally, to ascertain the best method for crushing the rebellion, for preparing for the abolition of slavery and for planting necessary reforms. This visit of the Minister was vigorously attacked in Spain, because it was said that Soler y Plá possessed none of the qualifications for one making such an investigation. Soler was royally entertained, flattered and returned home without accomplishing anything towards remedying the situation of Cuba.

The campaign against Cartagena made little progress. The "Al-mansa" and the "Victoria" had been taken into custody by the English and Castelar sent Señor Millan y Caro to Gibraltar September 26 to negotiate for their return.⁴² Maisonnave and Sánchez Bregua witnessed Alicante beat off an attack September 27 of the "Fernando el Católico," "Méndez Nuñez" and the "Numancia." The rebel ships were falling into a sad state of repair, while every sally they made along the coast was watched closely by the observing ships of Prussia, England and France. The Republican fleet bombarded Cartagena October 23 while December 11 Castelar placed López Dominguez in charge

³⁹ *Diario*, IV, 2515.

⁴⁰ *Gaceta de Madrid* (September 22, 1873).

⁴¹ *Ibid* (September 23, 1873).

⁴² *Historia del Sitio*, p. 16.

SACRIFICE OF THE REPUBLIC TO SAVE SPAIN

of operations on land. "La Tetuán" of the rebel fleet blew up December 30, on which night there was a great fire in Cartagena. Hard pressed, about two thousand five hundred people and the Junta of Public Safety, with the exception of its new president, Roqué Barcia, got aboard the "Numancia," moored in the harbor. The ship escaped the Republican fleet on guard and landed at Mers el Kebir, where the mutineers were incarcerated by the French and the "Numancia" returned to Chicarro. On January 13, General López Dominguez triumphantly entered Cartagena, ten days after the fall of Castelar.⁴³

The Carlistas found great comfort in the cantonal movement, notably that of Cartagena. The Spanish fleet principally under the control of Contreras threatened the entire Spanish coast. The capture of Estella August 24 had heartened greatly the Carlistas, for that city, which earlier had beaten off the ultramontanes in a spirited resistance, yielded after eight days of siege, and Sanz, its military commander, was accorded full honors of war by Dorregaray, the Carlista commander. Truly, the defense by the constitutionalists was one of the brilliant chapters of the Civil War; and veritably, a Civil War it now was, thanks to the pitiful weakness of Pí y Margall when President and Minister of the Interior. Almost the entire northern frontier adjoining France was in the control of the Pretender, whose wife in France actively purchased fire arms and munitions for her husband's troops.⁴⁴ One such purchase indirectly led to complications with England. The Carlistas had purchased arms sold to France by the United States for use against the Prussians. These arms were landed in June at Fuenterrabía and when the Republican naval forces succeeded in stopping the unloading, the English "Deerhound" engaged by the smugglers made to sea but was overhauled by a Spanish ship. This led to a diplomatic protest by England.

Don Carlos, after what amounted to a triumphal procession through Navarre, the Basque Provinces and others loyal to him—where the religious element received him fervently—continued to complete

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 28; José López Dominguez, *Cartagena*, Memoria y comentarios sobre el Sitio de Cartagena (Madrid, 1877). Castelar, says López, was insistent upon crushing Cartagena immediately and ordered the bombardment to be conducted "with energy," if other means failed. "Public opinion is suspicious," Castelar declared, "and is ready to believe that the government has some political interest in prolonging indefinitely the siege. Energy! energy! energy!" López Dominguez, *op. cit.*, p. 77.

⁴⁴ The extent of the Carlista front may be seen in the map "The Republics of Spain." The river Ebro marked the general line of Carlista power.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

the organization of his government and his army, which, it was planned, would take care of the conquest of all Spain. He set up a complete government, making the third such government in Spain—Cartagena having also set up a government of its own independent of Madrid—and ruled as King in fact as well as in name. He lacked a brilliant staff of commanders, although all of his generals were men of great courage, while some, like the cure Santa Cruz, were noted for their ferocity. Indeed, this noble cleric, who savagely fought not only constitutionalists but even Carlistas on occasion, finally aroused the antagonism of Lizárraga, one of Don Carlos' generals.

The General wrote a protest to the Pretender, in which, in the strongest terms, he urged that the priest be removed from command. Santa Cruz, Lizárraga averred, had the "mind of a hyena," he neither defended religion nor Guipúzcoa, and he killed both Carlistas and liberals. Others protested against the blood-thirsty priest's actions and Don Carlos finally ordered him removed from his command.⁴⁵

Another source of disagreement in the Carlista ranks was the position of Don Alfonso, the brother of the Pretender, who had been generalissimo of the Carlista armies, in charge of operations in Catalonia. Savalls, the guerrilla leader in Catalonia, differed with Don Alfonso and at one time Don Carlos placed him under arrest. Later, the Pretender placed his brother in command of the Army of the Center, which was created to oppose the Republican Army of the Center formed by the Madrid government in July, 1874. Don Carlos created other new army divisions for Old Castile, La Mancha, Toledo and Extremadura and even made plans involving the provinces east of Castile.

The Republican army suffered in the constantly changing general command, as well as in the lack of discipline. But Nouvilas, Moriones and other generals named by Castelar, began to gain the confidence of their troops, while loyalty was re-inforced by the revived ordinance as well as by Maisonnave's decree of November 7 which declared that all reserves who had been called to the colors and had failed to appear would be considered fugitives unless they presented themselves at places designated. Towards the end of Castelar's administration, the Carlistas were unchecked as yet but a start had been made towards stopping the dangerous progress of Don Carlos and absolutism.

⁴⁵ Modesto Lafuente (Continued by Juan Valera and others), *Historia General de España* (Barcelona: Montaner y Simón, 1926), XXIV, 245-247.

SACRIFICE OF THE REPUBLIC TO SAVE SPAIN

Don Carlos was besieging Bilbao, which with the greatest heroism was resisting bombardment and surviving blockade; he dominated the Province of Burgos, and from the Province made forays into Old Castile; Guipúzcoa, Navarre and most of Aragon owed allegiance to him, a willing allegiance, for Don Carlos promised the preservation of the ancient *fueros* and the small towns and rural communities were ardently in favor of a restoration of the church-state absolute; a great part of Catalonia was either under the domination of Don Alfonso or Savalls or subject to constant attack; the railway line between Madrid and France was constantly menaced and fines were exacted to keep traffic going on other railroads; in the South, the Carlista influence was beginning to extend as far as Seville. Towards the end of 1873 the Carlistas were bringing mingled terror and jubilation to the cities of the southeastern part of Spain. Simultaneously with the threat of Contreras at the Port of Grao at Valencia Carlistas entered Hellín and Caravaca, in Murcia. Orihuela, alternately at the mercy of Contreras and the constitutional troops, welcomed the Carlistas. In the Province of Castellón the Carlistas threatened the capital city. Santés, in a spectacular march of thirty-three hours, reached far into the heart of Spain to surprise and to capture Cuenca. At one time the Carlistas reached within eighteen miles of Barcelona when Savalls captured Granollers, capital of Valles, in November. With Igualada and Granollers and with the control of the Valencia-to-Barcelona railway line (along which almost all railway stations had been destroyed by the Carlistas), the absolutist troops brought fear to the capital city of Catalonia. Barcelona had been in constant disturbance since the beginning of the Republic. On July 14 it witnessed a demonstration of the internationalists in which threats were made to destroy the churches of the city. A Committee of Public Safety soon thereafter assumed control of the city's destinies, until the Provincial Deputation, reassured by the law of the Cortes permitting the government to delegate Deputies in the various provinces, took over the reigns of government again. Strikes, rumors, Carlista advances, made the fears of the Barcelonese acute and near the stage of panic.⁴⁶ Had Savalls or Don Alfonso possessed sufficient military cunning, they could have completed in all probability the conquest of Spain's most important industrial city.

Maisonnave, as Minister of the Interior, was as conservative as Cas-

⁴⁶ Vilarrasa y Gatell, II, 869 ff.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

telar in enforcing the decrees of the government, which, for the first time in the history of the Republic, presented a united front to all factions. It was Maisonnave who was called upon to enforce the censorship of newspapers and he was ably assisted by the Governor of Madrid, the conservative Republican Deputy José Prefumo. The intransigent newspapers expressed their unmeasured anger at the steps the government was taking to suppress their coreligionists in all parts of Spain, notably in certain municipalities. Maisonnave suspended *El Federalista* and *La Justicia Federal*, both intransigent newspapers, and the Carlista *La Verdad*.⁴⁷ The suppression of municipal councils and the censoring of the press, though repulsive to Republican doctrines, were nevertheless excusable, considering the fact that Spain was actually under martial law, under the extraordinary powers invested in the government. Castelar was actually a dictator—although he had no more power than the Assembly had given Pí y Margall or Salmerón—but he always denied that he used dictatorial powers. He told the Cortes of the Restoration: "I declare that I have not exercised the dictatorship. I had extraordinary facilities, applicable to the provinces where there was war." The dictatorship, he added, was repulsive to reason.⁴⁸ Nevertheless, it is often difficult to distinguish between the dictator and the constitutional President. Certainly the removal of the Madrid city government was as arbitrary as any that had taken place under the Bourbons. Maisonnave told the Cortes the night of January 2 that he could not do otherwise, for Volunteers of the Republic paraded up and down the street in front of the Ministry of the Interior, shouting insults to him and crying "Long live Cartagena!" and "Death to the government of Madrid!" The difficulty took place near the end of December, when the Volunteers of the Republic were dissolved, the new militia law making them no longer necessary. A group of these gave *vivas* for the Cartagena rebels, as Maisonnave related. The government appealed to the Madrid city authorities, who refused to restore order. The government thereupon dissolved the Municipal Corporation in accordance with the law (still existing from the old regime) regulating municipalities.

Castelar's administration had negotiated successfully with England for the return of the "Almansa" and the "Victoria." A far graver

⁴⁷ *La Igualdad* (November 6, 1873).

⁴⁸ Castelar, *Discursos en la Restauración*, II, 61, 41.

SACRIFICE OF THE REPUBLIC TO SAVE SPAIN

threat came in the "Virginius" incident, in which the United States insisted on reparations which Spain was forced to concede.

The "Virginius," a former Confederate ship, flying the American flag but suspected of being in the service of the Cuban insurgents, was captured twenty-three leagues from Kingston, Jamaica, by the Spanish gunboat "Tornado" October 31. The ship was carrying arms and ammunition for the insurgents, Jovellar, who had been named captain general of Cuba, reported. One hundred and sixty-five prisoners were taken. The "Virginius" was brought to Santiago de Cuba November 1. Her Commander was a Captain Joseph Fry, formerly of the United States and Confederate navies. Her crew consisted of fifty-two men, of whom twenty-six were British subjects. Among her 103 passengers were many Cuban insurgents, including a son of the insurgent president. A court martial November 2 decreed that four of the captured men be shot. A Canadian and three Cubans were executed November 4. On the seventh, Captain Fry, and thirty-six other men were shot, while the following day, twelve others were executed. Altogether fifty-three persons were executed by the Cuban authorities, despite the most forcible protests of the American and British authorities.

Castelar learned of the capture of the ship only on November 6 and immediately notified Jovellar not to execute any prisoners until he consulted the government. Actually, at that time, four of the prisoners had been executed, a fact of which the government in Madrid was unaware.

The "Virginius" incident, one of the most embarrassing suffered by Spain in the field of diplomacy during the nineteenth century, might have led to a war between the two Republics, for the imperialistic newspapers of both nations clamored for war, and the name of Hamilton Fish, the American Secretary of State, was hissed at a meeting in Steinway Hall in New York.⁴⁹ Fish and Castelar were both genuinely desirous of maintaining peace and neither Spain nor the United States was prepared for war. The incident came at a time when the foreign relations of the Republic appeared more favorable than ever before, Argentina having recognized Spain August 21, an action which other South and Central American republics began to follow.

The seizure of the "Virginius" was somewhat similar to that of the "Deerhound" which had been taken by Spain when it was supply-

⁴⁹ *The Nation* (November 20, 1873).

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

ing munitions for the Carlistas. Carvajal, Minister of Foreign Affairs, insisted for some time that the "Deerhound" was subject to action of a prize court and until that court had made a judgment no diplomatic claim for it could be entertained. England refused to recognize this claim, insisting that no declaration of war had been made by Spain, that the parties to the contest had not been recognized as belligerents and that no jurisdiction over such a capture could be acquired by a prize court in time of peace. Sickles, the American Minister, in reporting this stand to Fish, was able to notify his chief that the "Deerhound" was relinquished to England November 12, at a time when the diplomatic discussion over the "Virginius" was at its height.⁵⁰

Spain suspected that the "Virginius" was engaged in traffic with the Cuban insurgents. As *La Igualdad* phrased the Spanish attitude, the United States should "recognize the plain and unquestioned right that Spain has to punish the pirates who take arms against us." Fish telegraphed the American attitude to Sickles November 7: "The capture on the high seas of a vessel bearing the American flag presents a very grave question, which will need investigation and the summary proceedings resulting in the punishment of death, with rapid haste, will attract attention as inhuman and in violation of the civilization of this age. And if it prove that an American citizen has been wrongfully executed, this government will require most ample reparation."⁵¹ The ship was American in registry and to all intents an American ship although it was common knowledge that the real ownership was Cuban.⁵² Under the Treaty of 1795 between Spain and the United States, American citizens could not be condemned to death by extraordinary procedure.

The primary cause for the extreme brutality of the executions and the immoderate and indecent haste with which they were made was the Governor of Santiago de Cuba, General Juan N. Burriel. He detained a cablegram which E. G. Schmitt, the Vice Consul of the United States, tried to send for the purpose of confirming the American

⁵⁰ *Executive Documents of the House of Representatives of the United States*, 1st Session, forty-third Congress, 1873-74 (Washington, 1874), Executive document No. 30, Sickles to Fish, p. 19, 24. The capture, England said, was merely an act of trespass at sea.

⁵¹ *Ibid*, p. 15, telegram of Fish to Sickles.

⁵² *The Nation* (November 20, 1873), remarked editorially: "About two years ago she was bought by the Cuban insurgents who are stationed in this country, although doubtless the title was taken in the name of some American citizen."

SACRIFICE OF THE REPUBLIC TO SAVE SPAIN

registry of the ship, ignored the protests of the consular officer for two days while his mock court martial in the jail was carrying out a bloody drama that stained the name of Spain throughout the world and refused to recognize any authority other than Jovellar's. Like Castelar, Jovellar himself did not realize to what extent justice had been outraged by his subordinate.⁵³ One can sympathize with the desire expressed by Schmitt: "Pity that an American warship is not here to sustain my claims!" Schmitt had protested for the third time to the General on November 2 but it was not until November 4 that Burriel condescended to reply: "In my desire to correspond duly to the exquisite zeal which you show in this matter, I would have replied at once to your communication, but as I received it precisely at the moment of important and peremptory affairs, to which I had to devote myself exclusively; further, the past two days were holidays, upon which the officials do not come to the offices, being engaged, as well as everyone else, in the meditation of the divine mysteries of All Saints and the commemoration of All Souls days, as prescribed by our holy religion; consequently, it was impossible for me, until early this morning, to comply with your wishes, to answer your communications."

And with a final flourish: "And as to being surprised at not being notified, I regret on that account the concern which you show as although in effect the 'Virginius' sailed under American colors (a phrase not very intelligible for me, supposing you mean to say that she sailed under cover of the flag of the nation you represent, as, in this sense, there are as many American colors as there are nations in both continents of the New World, and even in some of the islands) you will permit me to say in reply that I would not, for my part, decide upon the act of notification you desired."⁵⁴

Castelar's position was difficult. He had not learned of the executions until they had taken place. He had learned of the capture seven days after it had taken place. Two days after the first four had been executed, he had congratulated Jovellar on the capture and had ordered no executions to take place. This telegram did not reach Jovellar until the twelfth, due to the fact that telegraph wires had been

⁵³ On November 7 Jovellar telegraphed Henry C. Hall, the American Vice Consul at Havana, that the stipulations of the Treaty of 1795 would be observed. *Executive Documents*, p. 156.

⁵⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 158.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

cut by the insurgents. In fact, the gravity of the situation came home to the Madrid government largely through news contained in the American protests.

Carvajal called on General Sickles on hearing of the first executions to express the profound regret of the Spanish Republic. "How deeply," Castelar himself told Sickles, "I deplore the execution of the four prisoners at Santiago de Cuba. What a misfortune that my order was not received in time to prevent such an act!. . . . Such scandals must cease."⁵⁵ Leaders of all Spanish opinion seemed united in supporting the government in the present crisis. Castelar consulted various leaders such as Martos, Serrano and Cánovas del Castillo, who advised moderation.

Spain was not satisfied as to the status of the "Virginus" but promised to act in conformity with international law. Spain contended that the ship was seen attempting to land her passengers and cargo on the coast of Cuba and that pursuit had begun in Spanish waters. Fish on November 14 urged Sickles to demand the restoration of the ship, the release to the United States of the persons captured "who have not already been massacred" and the salute to the American flag in the port of Santiago de Cuba, as well as the punishment of the officials concerned in the capture and executions. This demand was not to be made unless satisfactory reparation was made by Spain. If, at the expiration of twelve days, Spain refused to make satisfactory adjustment, Sickles was instructed to close his Legation. Sickles presented Carvajal a note thereafter stating that he was instructed to protest against the action of the Cuban authorities as "barbarous and brutal and an outrage upon this epoch of civilization."⁵⁶ This note destroyed the friend-

⁵⁵ *Ibid*, Sickles to Fish, November 12, p. 24.

⁵⁶ *Ibid*, Sickles to Carvajal, November 14, p. 30. Sickles sent Fish a copy of Carvajal's reply to take cognizance of the "offensive communication." Carvajal wrote in part: "I have just received your note dated today, protesting in the exercise of your office, in the name of the government of the United States, and assuming on your own account the voice of humanity, the representation of which does not belong to you exclusively, by reason of the executions which took place in Santiago de Cuba on the 7th and 8th days of this month.

"The protest having been presented in general terms and without relation to any wrong inflicted on the American union, the government of the Spanish Republic cannot recognize your competency to make it, even as Spain would have had no such right with respect to the sanguinary acts which have happened in our own day, as well as in the United States as in other nations of the old and new continents.

"The protest being thus rejected with serene energy, I have to fix my attention

SACRIFICE OF THE REPUBLIC TO SAVE SPAIN

ly attitude of Carvajal who averred that not enough information was available upon which to found a complaint. Carvajal on the sixteenth presented the decision of the Ministry: Spain would decide upon nothing to relieve the flag of the United States from an offense until certain the offense existed; that if such violation of treaty or international law existed, Spain would make reparation. Spain asked for more time and Fish agreed, stating he wanted a settlement by November 26. Spain proposed arbitration November 23 which Fish rejected, since national honor was involved. On November 24 Spain asked if the United States would wait receipt of the facts and would President Grant demand submission of the problem to Congress. Fish replied that Grant would have to submit the case to Congress. On the twenty-fifth Sickles was instructed to leave Madrid if satisfaction was not received. Castelar notified Sickles the twenty-sixth that a note would be sent that day recognizing the principles of the demand made by the United States and promising reparation before December 25, should it be proved that the "Virginus" was a regularly documented American ship. Although Sickles had applied for his passport in conformity with Fish's note, he did not press for his papers on receipt of the message from Castelar.

Spain agreed that if the ship should be proved to be carrying the American flag rightfully, her seizure should be declared illegal, the

upon the harshness of style and upon the heated and improper words you used to qualify the conduct of the Spanish authorities. If the document subscribed by you lacks the solemnity which might be lent to it by the right to address it to me, the temperance of its form ought at least to have demonstrated that it was not dictated by passion.

"I would touch lightly upon this matter if I had only to occupy myself with the sting of the insult, but comprehending its intent, the government cannot consent that, in anticipation of its own judgment, the representative of a foreign nation, even though friendly, should characterize the Spanish authorities in other terms than those which the government itself deems just." (P. 34.)

Sickles replied: "The undersigned, nevertheless, hastens to remove a misapprehension which seems to have led His Excellency to suppose that the language of the protest, and especially the words used to characterize the conduct of the authorities at Santiago de Cuba were chosen by the undersigned in expression of his own appreciation of the acts in question. It is, indeed, quite indifferent how the undersigned may describe such events, since the civilized world will not be slow to brand, as it deserves, a violation of human and divine justice, and history will not fail to record the verdict. It may however, be interesting to His Excellency Mr. Carvajal, to know that the language of the protest to which he takes exception is a precise transcript from the instructions received by the undersigned from his government."

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

American flag should be saluted and the ship would be returned and the members of its crew also. Should Spanish law not have been complied with, the officials involved would be brought to trial. Fish rejected the proposal, for the United States denied the right of any other nation to "visit, molest or detain on the high seas in time of peace any American vessel . . . that the first proposition practically asked the United States to consent that Spain detain the 'Virginus' while she is seeking evidence to justify her act."⁵⁷ Polo de Bernabé, Spain's Minister at Washington, then told Fish he had confidential instructions; that if the ship and prisoners should be given up, would the United States inquire as to the authority of the ship to carry the flag and to inflict punishment should there be a violation of the American law, the salute to the flag to be delayed until such investigations. Fish agreed to this and on November 29 the Protocol was signed, agreeing that the ship and prisoners were to be returned to the United States, and the flag to be saluted on December 25 unless before that time Spain could prove that the ship was not entitled to carry the American flag, in which case the United States would waive the salute. On December 16 the ship was returned, with the American flag flying, in Bahia Honda. The survivors were given over to Captain Braine of the sloop of war "Juanita" at Santiago de Cuba December 18. Inquiry in New York developed that the ship was not entitled to carry the American flag, since it actually belonged to Cubans and not to a John F. Patterson, as claimed. On February 27, 1875, the Restoration government paid the United States an indemnity of \$80,000, which was distributed to the families entitled to it. England, which had protested November 18, likewise received an indemnity.⁵⁸

La Igualdad declared that the settlement was a triumph for Castelar. The newspapers generally approved the progress of the nego-

⁵⁷ Sickles was not entirely convinced that Madrid was acting in forthright manner. Confidentially he informed Fish: "My belief is that the real object of this overture is to give time to strengthen the Spanish fleet in the Gulf of Mexico and send troops to Cuba and that at last some pretext will be found to evade the reparation. The fall of Cartagena, which is daily looked for, is expected to liberate the home squadron and the besieging army." *Op. cit.*, p. 54.

⁵⁸ Sickles reported that during the negotiations Castelar could be seen daily at the English Legation but that England approved the American demand and would not interfere. Sickles further stated it to be his belief that in view of the government's interest, the tone of the newspapers veered, the severity of the American demands being contrasted with the mildness of the English protest.

SACRIFICE OF THE REPUBLIC TO SAVE SPAIN

tiations. *La Iberia* praised Carvajal's note of November 14, in which he referred to the "insult" contained in Sickles' protest of the preceding day. *La Epoca* commended the government for not forcing war. Castelar himself felt greatly relieved and in his message to the Cortes declared that "a war happily has been averted and the principles of international law have been sustained." President Grant declared that "The surrender of the vessel and the survivors to the jurisdiction of the tribunals of the United States was an admission of the principles upon which our demands had been founded. I therefore had no hesitation in agreeing to the arrangements finally made between the two governments, an arrangement which was so moderate and just and calculated to cement the good relations which so long existed between Spain and the United States." Despite the demands of the extremist newspapers, which insisted that Spain was being affronted by the United States, and despite the great indignation in Cuba, Castelar continued with a policy of conciliation under circumstances wise and statesmanlike. He had done everything in his power to prevent the executions and the long struggle with the Cubans, who used New York as a base for supplying the insurgents, made it difficult to be patient with further exploitation of Spanish misery by such ships as the "Virginius."

VI. SALMERÓN'S BREAK WITH CASTELAR

While the affair of the "Virginius" was progressing to a settlement, the political situation of Castelar at home daily grew worse. Castelar had shown that he was the only one of the old Republicans who could abandon those theories that experience had shown already to be dangerous to Spain. The contrast between Castelar and Salmerón, who, it must be said in justice, had initiated the program of the right, was revealed in the attitudes the two principal leaders of the program of salvation assumed towards the methods of salvation. Salmerón had recognized the imperious necessity of restoring the military ordinance but he refused to betray his beliefs in the matter of approving the death penalty. He had resigned the presidency knowing that Castelar would execute the policy he himself knew to be necessary. Salmerón's attitude and his actions were honorable and patriotic in this instance. But, as Castelar abandoned theory, Salmerón seemed to return to it with greater tenacity than ever before. Like Pí y Margall, he was too much of a doctrinaire to be a statesman. As Pí y Mar-

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

gall's philosophy had cost the unity of Spain, so Salmerón's philosophy soon was to cost Spain its Republic.


A month after taking office Castelar began to lose the support of the center. With the left he had definitely broken after April 23.⁵⁹ He had entered the Figueras coalition Ministry because the Republic had been voted by the Radicals, and therefore, a coalition meant conciliation. The left had lost all patience with Castelar even before he took office. On August 7, *La Justicia Federal*, one of his severest Republican enemies, declared: "We cannot follow the deceased Castelar; he is of the other world, the world of the rich, the world of the exploiters, of the tyrants, and of the merciless."⁶⁰ *El Reformista* and *El Federalista Iberica* heaped abuse on him, as a traitor to the Republic. The Radicals, who had formed a unitary Republican party in April, preceding the dissolution of the Permanent Commission, on October 28 issued a manifesto to the nation, stating that they did not seek power, that they condemned the federal Republic and the acts of the dictatorship, but that they would continue to support Castelar.⁶¹ Deputies of the left on November 18 issued a request to the Mesa of the Cortes, asking its members to reconvene the Assembly, for "we are living in a period of tyranny" which was bringing the Republic in bloody fashion to the feet of reaction.⁶² Castelar had met with the Mesa on November 14, pleading for conciliation. Therefore, when the Mesa met to consider the request of the left, heated discussion followed. However, no action was taken. In the meantime members of the old constitutional parties were considering seriously a national ministry with Castelar possibly as president. *La Política* advised Castelar to dissolve the Cortes and resign the power to the conservatives. *El Imparcial* proposed a national government to take the place of the federal Republican government. Castelar and Salmerón had remained excellent personal friends but the breach between them was widening, as it was between the government and the Mesa. A disagreement between the government and the officers of the Cortes occurred early in November, on the occasion of the funeral of Ríos Rosas, who died November 3. By a strange irony, this remarkable figure in Spanish politics—who

⁵⁹ *Correspondencia*, p. 10, letter of August 8, 1874.

⁶⁰ Godro, *Castelar* (Madrid, 1873), p. 45.

⁶¹ *La Igualdad* (October 28, 1873).

⁶² *Ibid* (November 20, 1873); *Glorias Republicanas*, p. 774.



A LITHOGRAPH IN EL MOTIN

CASTELAR'S RETROGRESSION

Disapproving in opposition the infliction of the death penalty, Castelar as President applied it. "Castelar, the civil guard, the friar, the artillerist and conservative, shooting Castelar the tribune and democrat by order of

SACRIFICE OF THE REPUBLIC TO SAVE SPAIN

was almost always in opposition—was destined in death as in life to be a disrupting element. He had been a founder of the Unión Liberal and his inability to work with his colleagues was a cause of the failure of O'Donnell. Later, he had accepted the dynasty of Amadeo and when the Republic was proclaimed, accepted it. He died in abject poverty but the Republic gave him a national funeral. The Cabinet members had arranged that they would follow the hearse and behind them were to come the members of the Permanent Commission of the Cortes, followed by a detachment of troops. Sánchez Bregua, not understanding clearly the decision reached, ordered the troops under Pavía, captain general of Madrid, to follow directly after the government. Salmerón, his *amour propre* wounded, indignantly called Pavía and asked him to place the soldiers behind the civil representatives. When Pavía refused to disobey the orders of Sánchez Bregua, Salmerón decided to leave the funeral procession. Castelar, on learning of the difficulty, declared that the Commission should march beside the government. The Mesa met later at the Congreso, where the incident drew sharp criticism against the government.⁶³

Salmerón found cause of disagreement in Castelar's attitude towards the church. The President of the Cortes as a philosopher did not accept the church. Separation of state and church had been proposed in his administration but the law had never been voted and nominally the relations with the Holy See remained as defined by the Constitution of 1869. Castelar wisely decided to observe the *status quo ante* when the question of the appointment of three archbishops came before him. As he later said, he was not in a position to enter into a quarrel with the Pope. Had the government not named the bishops, the Pope would have done so and thus the Madrid government would have to undergo the humiliation of agreeing to the Papal nominees. In the *Gaceta de Madrid* on December 20, Castelar announced the appointment of Mariano Barrio Fernández, Archbishop of Valencia, as Primate of Spain and Archbishop of Toledo; Miguel Paya y Rico, Bishop of Cuenca, as Archbishop of Santiago de Compostela; and Estéban José Perez, Bishop of Málaga, as Archbishop of Tarragona. The appointments were approved by the Pope. Already displeased with what he regarded as the harsh rule of Maisonnave and the too great favoritism shown by Sánchez Bregua to the conservative gen-

⁶³ Vilarrasa y Gatell, II, 803.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

erals, Salmerón broke with his old friend on the question of naming the Archbishops. *La República*, the newspaper representing Salmerón's policies, protested against the appointments. *La Epoca*, however, declared Castelar's actions patriotic and convenient.

The *rapprochement* between the center and the left boded ill for the continuance of Castelar's government after the Cortes reconvened, and the President's friends of the right sought to reconcile the differences between Castelar and the doctrinaire President of the Assembly. Paula Canalejas, Castelar's friend, was the ambassador chosen to effect the reconciliation. Salmerón indicated at a meeting December 26 the terms on which he would be willing to support Castelar: reorganization of the Ministry, in order to approach the center, to which group Salmerón now belonged definitely; recantation of the appointment of the Archbishops; dismissal of the royalist generals. Salmerón designated Maisonnave, Sánchez Bregua, Carvajal and Pedregal as the Ministers who should be dismissed. The generals especially distasteful to him were Pavía, Martínez Campos and López Domínguez, now in charge of the siege of Cartagena.⁶⁴ Salmerón, as the time came for the final abandonment of impractical dogmas, had returned to them with greater vigor than before. He now held the opinion that, as the Federalists commanded a majority of the Cortes, they should form the government. Formerly, he had believed that federation should come gradually. He had also believed that the government should be constituted in such a manner that the conservative elements could be admitted to share in the power once the federal republic had been established.⁶⁵

The Ministry considered Salmerón's request and the Ministers he designated as objectionable to the center offered to resign. Castelar decided that the government should stand together. His policy was, as *La Correspondencia* declared in praising his work, one of making the Republic the government of all Spaniards by all Spaniards. "Señor Castelar," said the newspaper, "has re-established the discipline in the army, has reorganized the artillery corps, has increased the army, has prevented new disorders, has applied the rigor of the ordinance, has

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, II, 829; *La Igualdad*; *La Epoca*; *Glorias Republicanas*, p. 782; Lauser, *Geschichte Spaniens*, II, 166.

⁶⁵ Llospis y Pérez, *Historia política y parlamentaria de D. Nicolás Salmerón y Alonso* (Madrid, 1915), p. 179.

SACRIFICE OF THE REPUBLIC TO SAVE SPAIN

given commands to generals of all parties. Señor Castelar believes other resolutions necessary to affiance the Republic, to re-establish order and to guarantee liberty, uniting all parties that made the Revolution of September . . . and when the Cortes reconvenes he will sustain these [resolutions] with his accustomed loyalty and frankness."⁶⁶ This was not approaching a national government in the sense that the *Círculo de la Calle de la Unión*, where Serrano, Topete and Sagasta were directing the revived *Unión Liberal*, was approaching the problem, nor in accord with the ambitions of the *Círculo de Clavel* where Cánovas del Castillo and Romero Robledo ruled. Nor was it satisfactory to *La República*, which held that "the liberals like Sagasta, like the Duque de la Torre [Serrano], like Martos, like Sardoal, like Becerra, the liberals like *El Imparcial*, are not democrats; they are the worst enemies of democracy, those who profess an accommodating and false democracy."⁶⁷

On December 27 Castelar and Salmerón held another conference and the philosopher designated the Ministers he would accept in place of those he wished ousted: Nouvilas or Peralta to be named Minister of War, Palanca Minister of the Interior and Fernando Gonzalez Minister of Foreign Affairs. Castelar replied that he wanted to govern with all the liberal elements and that the federal question should not be revived for some time. He defended his Ministers and thus the conference ended. Figueras, who had returned to Madrid from his voluntary exile in Paris, endeavored to reconcile the policies of the two leaders but in vain. Figueras offered to support Castelar while Pí y Margall, nominal leader of the center, offered his support to any Ministry other than Castelar's that might be formed.

Thus the Spanish federal Republic was doomed with the close of 1873. Salmerón had given it the *coup de grâce*.

The right—now in the minority due to the coalition of the center and the left—met January 1 to consider the form in which it would present the vote of thanks to the Ministry. None of the Cabinet attended the meeting and it was finally agreed to present a vote of thanks in the administration of Castelar, not mentioning the other Ministers.

The center met under the presidency of the apostle of conciliation, Suñer y Capdevila. Instead of having died with the election of Castelar, the center revealed almost its maximum strength at this meeting,

⁶⁶ *Glorias Republicanas*, p. 779.

⁶⁷ Vilarrasa y Gatell, II, 797 ff.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

which was attended by forty-four Deputies. Salmerón later informed the directive junta of the center party that under no consideration would he accept the presidency, because he considered the situation of the nation worse now than when he had resigned. Palanca was acceptable to the center for the presidency, and the left, meeting under the leadership of Orense, agreed to oppose Castelar in conjunction with all possible forces, to demand immediately a federal constitution, and to issue a manifesto to the nation, appealing for order and for respect to the Assembly. The meeting of the left attracted many Deputies of the center. General Socías, a member of the left, was at first mentioned as a possible candidate for the presidency but his party deserted him in favor of Palanca, whose cantonal sympathies made him highly acceptable. There was an understanding also that certain Deputies of the left would be admitted to the cabinet and that the left would maintain a truce of three months in its propaganda for immediate reforms.⁶⁸

Thus, on the eve of the re-assembly of the Cortes, in the face of the Carlista threat, with Cuban insurgency running high, and with the smouldering ruins of southern cantons an eloquent testimonial of the beneficence of cantonal doctrines in preserving national unity, the government which had applied the mandate given it by the Assembly was doomed by that same Chamber. The alternative to it was a coalition of the center-left, of doctrinaires and intransigents.

The gravity of the situation did not deter Castelar, who was determined to continue on the path he had started. When a Deputy of the left asked in the session of January 2 why he had not given up the government honorably, as Amadeo had done, he replied that he was serving the destinies of his native land. He could view his accomplishments with pride: Andalusia was pacified; Cartagena, the last stronghold of demagoguery (if we accept the Assembly itself), was undergoing a devastating siege; a war with the United States had been averted; and while the Republic was defeated in Játiva and Cuenca, Republican troops had been victorious at Belavieta, Barbarin and Montejurra and they had marched from Miranda to Tolosa. When Castelar assumed the presidency, many of the provinces did not have civil government and in many cities local authority had disappeared entirely. In a great measure regular government had been restored, even Barcelona becoming more stable. Many cities before Castelar

⁶⁸ *Ibid*; *Glorias Republicanas*.

SACRIFICE OF THE REPUBLIC TO SAVE SPAIN

had become President had been at the mercy of the Volunteers of the Republic. Castelar's government had in great measure disbanded and disarmed these roving bands of semi-bandits.

This settlement of Spanish affairs was endangered now. Even the conquest of Cartagena must be in doubt if Palanca became president.

One man in particular viewed the spectre of anarchy hovering in the halls of the Congreso with alarm. He was Manuel Pavía, captain general of Madrid. A Radical, he believed in the unitary republic. He had rendered the great service to his nation of quelling a national movement, that of the cantons, in Andalusia, and he had done so with a few loyal soldiers and a great determination. Now, in the twilight of the Republic, with his sympathies definitely opposed to the federal solution, with his loyalty to Castelar undivided, Pavía offered to save Spain from what he regarded as its destruction.

Pavía had told Francisco Salmerón on April 23 that only two solutions were open to the problem of disorder in Spain—either a unitary republic or Don Alfonso XII. Now Pavía believed that a national government of all parties was needed to save Spain.

On December 24, Castelar called Pavía, whom he trusted more than any other general in the service of the Republic, to confer with him. The President told the captain general that a military insurrection would bring on adventures without end and said he hoped Pavía would agree.

"I will follow you anywhere," replied Pavía.

Pavía then suggested to Castelar the impossibility of his retaining power. This the President conceded, but refused to accede to Pavía's request for an indefinite prorogation of the Cortes, because he was determined to follow legal processes. His philosophy was, as he told the Republicans of Granada May 26, 1874 to seek "my force first in my conscience, afterwards in public opinion and always in legality."

"I will not lose an atom of legality," he assured Pavía. "January 2 I will present myself to the Cortes; I will explain my conduct and if I am routed, with great sadness, weeping for my fatherland, I will retire to my home."⁶⁹

Castelar did not see Pavía again but, in view of the agitation for a national government, he kept closely in touch with the General's

⁶⁹ Pavía, *El Ejército del Centro* (Madrid, 1878), p. 2; Castelar, *Discursos en la Restauración*, I, 212, 214, 56; Houghton, *op. cit.*, p. 52; Díez de Tejada, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

movements through Sánchez Bregua, who reported that Pavía was addicted always to Castelar's policies. "But I did not want loyalty to myself; was I perchance king? I did not want the loyalty of the army to my person; was I perchance a dictator?"⁷⁰ Had he suspected that Pavía intended a *coup d'état*, Castelar averred that he would have removed him from his position, and if necessary, would have ordered him shot.

Pavía, finding the one avenue he preferred to the national republic closed by Castelar, turned to Serrano, Sagasta and other politicians of the Círculo del Unión to find if they could suggest any man or party that could prevent the dismemberment of the nation. They were unable to propose any means of salvation.⁷¹ Pavía then decided to dissolve the Cortes and to call together the representatives of all the political parties, including Castelar, to form a national government. He consulted his garrisons and found that they were loyal.

"Without hearing any other voice than that of my conscience, nor persuaded by any other motive than the love of my country, which was the victim of the most horrible anarchy, I initiated and brought to a happy conclusion the act of January 3, with the sole aid of public opinion and the patriotic force of the garrison," he declared.⁷²

Not only had Salmerón doomed the life of the Ministry and so imperiled the federal Republic but Pavía had doomed the life of the federal Republic.

VII. THE DRAMATIC END OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC

The night of January 2, 1874, revealed the wide divergence existing between the government and the doctrinaire Federalists. Devoted to the last to their creed, the left were prepared to batter down the government and erect a cantonal federation in Spain. They could not forgive the government for directing Republican forces against their fellow Republicans in Cartagena and in the South. So the Republic became the victim of confused desires of demagogues and philosophic pamphleteers. In its plenitude of theory was a paucity of practice. The Republic was surcharged with men enamored of fine phrases and beautiful ideas; it lacked statesmen. Salmerón, the one man who could have saved the government his center had installed, preferred to see it fall, rather than retract his beloved principles.

The certain fate of the government lent an added interest to the

⁷⁰ Castelar, *op. cit.*, I, 214.

⁷¹ Pavía, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 2.

SACRIFICE OF THE REPUBLIC TO SAVE SPAIN

opening of the Cortes. Who would succeed Castelar? This question was on all lips in the lighted cafés of Madrid. In the Plaza before the Congreso stood a large crowd of curious, waiting long into the night to hear the news. At the garrisons were the troops, ready to obey Pavía's call, should Castelar be removed. Towards morning Pavía himself joined the throng, to watch for the opportune moment for invading the Congreso.

The Assembly, which had adjourned September 20, reconvened at 3:40 P.M. January 2.

"Long live the federal Republic!" Thus the venerable Orense saluted the opening of the Assembly.

"¡Viva!" came the reply.

Salmerón, after explaining that the Mesa had declared vacated those districts from which Deputies had accepted employment under the government (a step taken in conformity with the law, but an act which reduced the voting strength of the majority at the session), pleaded for moderation, for the "most complete circumspection before the arduous political questions you go to discuss . . . and that on deciding with your vote the fate of the fatherland, dependent on your representation, which is today absolutely the sole principle of legality, you will consider only that which is most conducive to the health of the fatherland, to the defense of liberty and to the honor of the Republic."

Castelar read his message to the Cortes. Rare for him was the silence with which his address was heard. Rather, there was an air of listlessness on the part of the Deputies—the king is dead, long live the king!

Castelar's message was a dignified defense of what the government had accomplished, a program of conservatism for the future. By the irony of fate, Castelar expressed the desire that the daily mutinies cease, the era of pronunciamientos end forever. Cartagena still remained unconquered, he stated; through Burgos and Rioja the Carlistas were threatening the very heart of Castile. To oppose the forces of disunion he had grouped all liberal and democratic elements to present a united front against the united absolutists. His program included the immediate establishment of free and obligatory primary instruction paid by the nation instead of by municipal corporations, separation of church and state and abolition of slavery.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

"If obeying the double movement of conservation and progress that impels modern societies you enter on a measured policy and you attain a stable government, our Republic will be recognized by Europe," he promised.

"Our situation, grave under various aspects, has been bettered in others. Order is more assured, respect for authority is required more from those below and more observed from above. Public force has recovered its discipline and subordination. The daily revolts have ceased almost completely. . . . The municipal corporations do not declare themselves independent of the central power or erect those local dictatorships that recall the worst days of the Middle Ages."

Martín de Olías, Miguel Morayta and Paula Canalejas presented a vote of thanks to Castelar's Ministry. Bartolomé y Santamaría opposed the resolution. Only a small group of the majority were in favor of it, he stated; rather, the majority would prefer a vote of censure. Castelar's policy was not in harmony with his memorandum just read, Bartolomé said.

Castelar replied that a strong government was needed. It should be given all authority. If the government was threatened with death, it could not respond for public order. Consequently, the Assembly must select immediately another government to succeed his, if the resolution of confidence was not taken into consideration, because the government intended to resign immediately.

"Vote!" came cries from the Chamber.

"Never has such a grave declaration been made in any Chamber as today," replied Bartolomé, "never has a phrase so undemocratic been heard, a threat such as directed by Señor Castelar towards the Chamber."

Salmerón promised that the government, in response to its patriotic duty and in accord with the dictates of the Assembly, would be responsible for order. Castelar replied that it required not only material force but moral force to govern. The Assembly was not going to discuss the conduct of the government, rather, its existence.

The left retired its resolution "not to consider" and the debate opened on the motion of confidence. The left, aided by the center and by a number of Radicals like the Marqués de Florida, attacked the government vigorously, and of its members, Maisonnave, who was berated roundly.

SACRIFICE OF THE REPUBLIC TO SAVE SPAIN

"This Cabinet is completely outside the democratic creed; from the moment in which this government, the emanation of this democratic Assembly, fails our principles, we ought not only to refuse a vote of confidence but to remove it from the ministerial bench by all parliamentary means at our command," declared Corchado. His succinct objections to the government were those of Republicans who saw in Castelar the betrayer of their principles: who had denied in power what he had advocated in opposition—application of the death penalty, institution of conscription, suppression of newspapers and of municipal corporations, appointment of archbishops, and the naming of royalist generals who were intent on doing the Republic hurt.

De Andrés Montalvo, as a soldier of the right, defended Castelar, stating that the President had merely carried out the formulæ and acts of the Assembly. Quoting Salmerón's opening remarks not to fear the division of that evening, he declared that rather, one should fear the meaning and spirit of the policy Pí y Margall represented. Why were Salmerón and his friends now uniting with the center "whose policy was castigated so severely by the President of the Chamber?" he demanded, bringing Salmerón's wavering stand into the arena of battle. It had been the Assembly that had restored the death penalty, had called the reserves to the colors; and as to the naming of bishops, Suñer y Capdevila himself had done so.

Corchado replied that Castelar had abused those powers to the damage of democracy, of the Republic and of federation. Benitez de Lugo, the Marqués de Florida, charged that the government had around 50,000 men under arms because it did not have confidence in the institutions the country had been given. Romero Robledo, the conservative, announced he would vote for any government that would maintain order and that, as a result, he intended to vote for Castelar.

With brilliant irony the youthful Leon y Castillo arraigned his former professor, Salmerón.

"The policy of Señor Salmerón is the final ray of light and the first shadow in the eternal night of darkness" for the Republic, he declared with almost prophetic assurance. Since Castelar was accused of inconsistency, Leon declared that Salmerón in approving the Internationale had stated that property cannot be individual.

"Is it our fault that all, or almost all, of the men of first importance in the Republican party are Socialists and make Socialistic dec-

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

larations?" he demanded. "For we cannot compound with socialism, as we are on the side of Señor Castelar, who is Individualistic as we are."

With graphic irony he continued: "We are in the final misery; we are worse off than if in a hospital; we are in an anarchy.

"If a regiment of grenadiers enters those doors and does damage to the power, we today will not be responsible for what follows."

Becerra stated that the Radicals would support Castelar. He appealed to all democrats to form a unified party to give force to liberty; and he urged that federalism be abandoned. Maisonnave warmly and boldly defended his policy as Minister of the Interior. Canalejas expressed the belief that if Castelar were removed from power, within fifteen days the left would be masters of Spain and concluded with the sombre warning that "the life of the Republic is in peril."

Salmerón revealed the full extent of his retrogression in an address that did not carry conviction with it. The government's policy had aided in the restoration of the Radical party, "a threat in this sad Spain." The only serious and formal policy in Spain was that formulated by the military leaders; the captain general was esteemed superior to the statesman and as a result "it is almost impossible to form a national honor." Stating that he had proposed certain reforms, he continued:

"The President of the Executive Power knows that I am always disposed to support him if fortunately he would decide to make a policy that does not contradict the principles and convictions that I have professed all my life. Sad though it be, treating of an old master and friend, if he is apart from my ideas, I have to deny him my support, because above the working attributes to friendship is the duty to one's own conscience."

The doctrinaire conservative Republican had spoken. The fighting conservative Republican replied.

The Assembly now listened to Castelar gladly, for the Deputies admired his fighting spirit. No race in the world loves display of courage so much as the Spanish; and on this evening, Castelar's defense was in the nature of a spectacle in which Castelar was going to a certain death but going bravely.

It was easy to speak of removing the government and substituting another, Castelar said, but what did these "philosophers without reality

SACRIFICE OF THE REPUBLIC TO SAVE SPAIN

in life" have to offer to remedy the ills afflicting the Republic? "If you have anyone, I accept him this very hour. To destroy a government is easy; the difficulty is in replacing it.

"Gentlemen, how have I deceived you? What formula have I not established? What promise have I made that I have not complied with? What part of my program have I forgotten? . . . I said that I intended to re-establish the ordinance and I re-established it; I said I wanted to invigorate discipline and I invigorated it; I said that I wanted to draw out the reserves with a strong hand and I drew them out; I said I wanted to apply the death penalty and I applied it; I said I wanted to give military commands to the generals of all parties and to the generals of all parties I have given military commands.

"But before being liberal and before being democratic, as I have said and now repeat, I am Republican and I prefer the worst of republics to the best of monarchies; and I prefer a military dictatorship within the republic to the most generous of kings.

"If the republic of my ideas and of my dreams would be realized, I assure you that there would be few republics in the world more beautiful. . . . I would make a republic in which all men would practice all the virtues and in which there would be no more war than work, a republic that finally would raise the planet as a host consecrated to God in the immensity of the skies.

"But this is the republic of my dreams and as I have to do now with the republic of reality, I abandon the republic of wit and of poetry for the possible republic."

Here was the enunciation of the Possible Republican party which Castelar captained in the Restoration. He urged the founding of a conservative Republican party. The majority was fitted to be this party. "We lack nothing." (Here there were protests in the left.) "No, we lack nothing we have preached; you, who want to divide the world and distribute it in cantons and have in each canton a Contreras, you have much to desire.

"For us two reforms are needed, two—no more; the first is the separation of church and state; the second is the abolition of slavery."

"And the federal?" demanded a Deputy.

"The federal? That is the municipal and provincial organization; we will talk of it much later; it is not worth the trouble now; in ten years, perhaps."

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

"And the project?"

"The project? You burned it in Cartagena." Castelar's reply brought a great burst of applause.

"Do not tell me I am not frank," Castelar declared.

"You are at fault; our patience is almost at an end," interrupted Armentia of the left.

"The patience of Señor Armentia is tried?"

"Yes, Señor."

"Then, Señor Armentia, I have as much right as you to say to my fatherland what I think and what I foresee and the Chamber will judge me. I know that you will call me apostate, inconsistent, traitor; but gentlemen, I believe that there are some very just ideas that cannot be realized in this historic moment, and I do not want to lose the Republic for utopias. I am content now. I am content with the Republic. . . ."

He returned to his thesis that there should be a conservative and a liberal Republican grouping. "The Republic has but one terrible enemy, demagoguery," he added.

"I must say to Señor Castelar," declared Armentia, "who is hoping that I call him apostate, that if I call him that it will be believing him apostate in good faith, deceived by all those surrounding him; I do him this justice."

The left, sure of victory, made its first generous overture to the right in that brief little speech.

It was 5 o'clock in the morning.

In the Plaza fronting the Congreso the patient Madrileños waited. In a few more minutes they would know.

The Deputies voted on the motion of confidence. Castelar was defeated 120 votes to 100.

Among those who destroyed the government were Salmerón, Pí y Margall, Suñer y Capdevila, the Marqués de Florida, Sainz de Rueda and Francisco Solier, the late lord of Málaga, as well as many others of the center.

Castelar and his Ministry resigned.

Bartolomé presented the conventional proposal that another Deputy be commissioned to form the government, with the same powers of resolving the crisis.

At 5:40 A.M. January 3, the Cortes adjourned for twenty minutes

SACRIFICE OF THE REPUBLIC TO SAVE SPAIN

so that the parties could agree on their candidates. The center and the left agreed on a coalition government. Palanca would be President of the Executive Power; others agreed upon included General Socías for Minister of War, Tutau for Minister of Finance, Fantoni for Minister of the Interior, Fernando Gonzalez for Minister of Public Works, Angel Torres for Minister of Justice and Bartolomé y Santamaría for Minister of Overseas.⁷³

General Pavía, watching the Congreso, noted the movement among the Deputies and decided that the parties were balloting on Castelar's successor. The time had come for him to execute his plan. Dreading for the moment to continue with his bold program, Pavía mastered whatever fears he entertained and began to give the necessary orders to his troops.

At 6:55 in the morning, the Cortes convened again. The Deputies voted. Now the Mesa was counting the votes.

Salmerón, waiting for the count to be completed, was called by an adjutant of General Pavía. The captain general ordered the Congreso to be vacated in five minutes, the adjutant declared.

His voice trembling with emotion, Salmerón, announced the order to the Assembly.

"Gentlemen, a few minutes ago I received a message or an order from the captain general (I think that he ought to be the ex-captain general of Madrid) by means of two adjutants, saying that the premises must be vacated in a peremptory term. . . ."

"Never! never!"

"Order! Calm and serenity is that which corresponds to strong minds in circumstances like this—that the premises be vacated in a peremptory term, or if not, he will quickly occupy it forcibly."

Palanca and his tentative coalition ministry were forgotten. The Cortes presented a scene of the greatest confusion and tumult. It was ending its career as it had lived it, with the greatest excitement.

"Gentlemen, please listen. . . ." Salmerón pleaded in vain.

The noise, the bitter recriminations against Pavía throughout the Chamber, continued to increase in volume.

"Order, gentlemen. . . ."

"Be calm!" Deputies took up the cry and gradually a semblance of order came over the Assembly.

⁷³ *Glorias Republicanas*; Vilarrasa y Gatell.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

"I recommend calm and serenity to the Deputies. . . ." Salmerón began.

"This is a miserable cowardice!" shouted the intransigent Chao.

"Gentlemen, again I recommend calm and serenity. The count of the votes now being made cannot, ought not be continued under pressure. . . . The government presided over by the dignified and illustrious patrician, Don Emilio Castelar, is still the government. . . . Meanwhile I think that we ought to continue in permanent session and we will be strong to resist until they expel us by force, giving a spectacle . . . that future generations know that those who formerly were adversaries now are all united to defend the Republic."

"All of us!"

"All differences," continued Salmerón, "that separate us in this moment have been effaced. Even though this Chamber does not remain representing the national sovereignty which may be wrested from us by force of bayonets, the right this Assembly has will not be wrested from it."

"I regret not to share the opinion of the President respecting the scrutiny," Castelar said, "because I think that the scrutiny ought to continue as if nothing was happening outside this Chamber. Supposing that we always have here liberty of action, let us continue the scrutiny. . . . I have reorganized the army but I have not reorganized it to turn against legality but to maintain it."

"Gentlemen, I can do nothing else than die here, the first with you. . . ."

"Bravo!"

"Are there arms? They are coming. Let us defend ourselves!" cried Benot.

"Gentlemen, our defense would be futile and it would make our cause worse," Salmerón warned.

"It can't be made worse," interjected a Deputy.

"I say let us defend ourselves with those arms that are most powerful in these moments, those of our right, those of our dignity, and those of resignation to receive similar attacks."

Castelar then spoke. "There is a thing to do. . . ."

"That a vote of confidence is given the Ministry that has resigned," a Deputy interrupted.

"By no means," Castelar continued. "Notwithstanding the Cham-

SACRIFICE OF THE REPUBLIC TO SAVE SPAIN

ber votes it, this government cannot be government, so that it not be said that I have been imposed on a sovereign Assembly by fear of arms. That which is passing disqualifies me perpetually, not only for power but to be a man of politics."

"No, we believe you are loyal," a Deputy replied.

"Thus it is, gentlemen, that I am not obliged to show that I could not have any part in this. Here, with you who expect them, I will die, and all of us will die."

"Not die but conquer," replied the bellicose Benot.

Chao suggested that Pavía be removed by the Executive Power and that he be courtmartialed. Sánchez Bregua announced that he would order the captain general removed at once. Fernández Latorre urged that the decree be read to the soldiers at the doors of the Congreso.

While various Deputies pleaded for the privilege of carrying the decree to Pavía, Calvo announced that the Civil Guards had entered the Congreso and were inquiring of the porters the direction to the Assembly room.

Salmerón requested the Deputies to keep their seats, except those seeking to speak. The Marqués de Florida, gaining the floor, asked the left and center to give a vote of confidence in Castelar.

"Unanimously," cried many of the Deputies.

"I have no force now and they will not obey me," protested Castelar.

"I ask the Deputies to keep their seats," implored Salmerón. "We have no other remedy than to yield before force, but every one be at his post. Do the Deputies accord that we ought to resist? Shall we let ourselves be killed in our seats?"

"Yes, yes, all of us," replied the Deputies.

"Señor Presidente, I am at my post and nothing can tear me from it," Castelar declared. "I protest that I remain here and here I will die."

"The armed forces are entering the chamber!" shouted a Deputy.

"What a scandal!" cried various Deputies.

"What a misfortune!" Castelar groaned.

"Soldiers! Long live the federal Republic! Long live the sovereign Assembly!" some of the Deputies cried to the soldiers advancing into the chamber.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

Colonel Iglesias of the Civil Guard approached Salmerón and requested that the Deputies leave quietly

Most of the members of the right left silently. A nucleus of the intransigent Deputies stood their ground, threatening to resist the soldiers. Seeing this, soldiers fired a few shots in the air, and in a few minutes the last of the Deputies had left the chamber, many of them bitterly arraiguing the soldiers.

The federal Republic of Spain came to an end at 7:40 o'clock the morning of January 3, 1874. Castelar, its last President, was found by his friends Maisonnave and Canalejas and General Lagunero, violently ill on a chair in the hall of the Congreso—his death had been confined to rhetoric—murmuring incoherent phrases. He was taken to his home, where for some time his condition was critical.

Thus the federal Republic went the way of the cantons.

CHAPTER SIXTEEN

THE GRAND DUKEDOM

I. THE NATIONAL REPUBLIC

THE Revolution of September had completed the circuit and had been returned to the hands of its founders.

Five years of constantly changing government and political experimentation had not realized the cry of "Spain with Honor" with which the Revolution of September had been launched.

After five years of democracy, Spain had passed without the slightest resistance into the power of one man.

Fortunately for Spain, that man had not the slightest personal ambition. He was actuated solely by the highest motives of patriotism. Tempted for a moment with the thought of forming a military government, Pavía, absolute master of Spain, continued with his plans for a national republic. All night he waited for the Congreso's action. When the Assembly had adjourned in the early morning to permit the various parties to select their candidates, he judged the moment favorable and advanced his troops into the Plaza in front of the Congreso.

When the Assembly had been vacated, he refreshed himself at a *cervecería* and then returned to the Congreso where the various leaders of political opinion he had summoned were waiting for him in the office of the President of the Cortes. Castelar, called three times to the meeting, did not come, much to Pavía's disappointment. There were most of the leaders of the Revolution of September there, however, as well as the representatives of the party favoring Don Alfonso XII. Serrano, Zavala, Serrano Bedoya, Gasset, Gaminde, Sanz, Ulloa, Martos, Echegaray, Cánovas del Castillo, Estéban Collantes, Romero Robledo, García Ruiz—such were the men to whom Pavía unfolded his plan of rescuing Spain from anarchy and establishing the national republic.¹

Pavía spoke simply and to the point. He had not thought of becoming a dictator, he said. He wanted to return the power he had ac-

¹ Pavía, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

quired to the nation. That power should be exercised by no one man, by no one party.

"I have wanted solely to save society," he continued. "I turn over to you the power I have received from the hands of the Assembly. Form a national government in which all parties are represented. To you from this hour belongs the complete decision of the future."

Cánovas del Castillo spoke for the Alfonsinos, stating that his party could not accept anything the Republic had to offer, since the Republic personified most of the evils that afflicted the nation.²

Despite the withdrawal of the Alfonsinos and the failure of Castelar to represent the old Republicans, a national government was formed in which the unitary Republican, the Radical, and the Unión Liberal parties were represented. The name of the Republic was retained, although it soon lost all semblance of a Republic.

Francisco Serrano y Domínguez, Duque de la Torre, Regent of Spain following the Revolution of September and President of the Executive Power pending the arrival of King Amadeo, was chosen President of the Executive Power of the Republic—the fifth President in less than twelve months. Born in 1810 at Cádiz, Serrano had had a brilliant career in the Spanish army, having been made a general at the age of thirty. He had served with Espartero, had fought in the first Carlista War, he had pronounced against Espartero and had aided O'Donnell in the Unión Liberal. He served as captain general of Cuba where he achieved a notable record and treated the aspirations of the islanders with sympathetic understanding. He had been exiled by González Brabo when he and Ríos Rosas presented the Queen with a petition protesting the conduct of the Moderate Ministry. He had been a leading spirit in the Revolution of September. During the period of the Republic he had remained aloof from public affairs, although he was constantly a center for conspirators, as in the affair of April 23. He was one of the social leaders of Madrid, his hospitality rivaling that of the Royal Palace. Despite his pre-eminent position in Spanish life, Serrano never reached real greatness, due to his inability to make quick decisions.

Associated with Serrano in the national Ministry were Sagasta as Minister of Foreign Affairs, García Ruiz as Minister of the Interior, Zavala as Minister of War, Topete as Minister of the Navy, Balaguer

² Díez de Tejada, *op. cit.*, p. 45.



FROM A CONTEMPORARY PRINT

FRANCISCO SERRANO Y DOMINGUEZ

PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL REPUBLIC

THE GRAND DUKEDOM

as Minister of Overseas, Martos as Minister of Justice, Echegaray as Minister of Finance and Mosquera as Minister of Public Works.³

Castelar issued a vigorous protest against the *coup d'état* in a brief statement January 3, 1874. "I protest with all the energy of my soul against the attack which has wounded the Constituent Assembly in a brutal manner," he stated.⁴ Salmerón and the Mesa of the Cortes also protested against the "criminal" dissolution "without precedent in our history" and denounced "it solemnly to the nation, whose sovereignty has been disfigured and outraged." Apart from these protests, the nation—or that part of it owing allegiance to the central government—accepted the new order of affairs philosophically.

Pavía took no post in the government, retiring once his object had been achieved, to take up his new duties as captain general of New Castile.

The government formally dissolved the Cortes January 8 and promised to call free elections for an ordinary Cortes when convenient. The government also issued a manifesto to the nation, justifying the dissolution of the Cortes, which, it was claimed, had been elected under the terror of one party and consequently had no moral authority. "The parties that are in power made the Revolution of September and do not condemn their proper work," the manifesto explained. Instead of prolonging the period of constitutional debate, the government declared that the Constitution of 1869, excepting the Article relating to the monarchy, would govern the nation.⁵ Sagasta issued a circular letter to the representatives of Spain abroad on January 27, stating the object of the new government and praising the work of Castelar, who, "with noble sincerity and with heroic patriotism" had renounced his utopian beliefs and had exercised a dictatorship which, by inescapable logic, must have ended either in impotence or in being used against the Cortes.⁶

López Dominguez forced the surrender of Cartagena January 13. Contreras and his fellow demagogues fled from the city, as related elsewhere. In the fortress of San Julian were found two curious documents signed by Roqué Barcia, threatening to raise the flag of the United States. Both documents were dated December 16. In one, addressed to the "central government" Roqué Barcia threatened to raise

³ *Gaceta de Madrid*.

⁴ *La Nueva Flaca* (Madrid, January 4, 1874).

⁵ *Gaceta de Madrid* (January 8, 1874).

⁶ *Ibid* (January 27, 1874).

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

the American flag if the central government troops did not desist bombardment of the city within twenty-four hours. "Elect, government of Madrid: Either let us stop being treated like tigers or let us ask to be human creatures in the midst of a free people, dignified, laborious and honest." The other was addressed to the "Anglo-American Ambassador" and stated: "For twenty-one days and nights the iron of death has been vomited over us, as if we were wild beasts of the woods or mad dogs. . . . We do not know at this time who is fighting us; we do not know if they are robbers; we do not know if they are assassins; we do not know if they are incendiaries; we will resist today, we will resist tomorrow and always these presumptuous incendiaries, these ignorant thieves, these silencing assassins. . . . We have an immense glory in being Spaniards, race of heroes, genius of giants. . . . But if Spain consents to these heathen sacrifices . . . Spain will understand there is a creature greater than she, humanity."

"In the name of the human being, of Christianity, of civilization, of the fatherland and of the family; in the name of the people and of God, we ask the great American Republic if it authorizes us in our extremity as the ultimate means of salvation, to raise a glorious federal flag on our ships, on our fortresses, in our bastions."⁷

II. THE CONSERVATIVE TREND

The new Spanish "republic" was treated by Europe much like a grand dukedom, Castelar observed.⁸ While the government of Serrano counted on the support of most of the principal constitutional elements of Spain, with the exception of the extreme Federalists, the Carlistas and the Alfonsinos, it did not satisfy anyone. It was an extraordinary situation, perhaps the most extraordinary of this six-year period of dramatic interregnum. Serrano was the logical choice to resolve Pavía's resolution, unless one considered Espartero, who was now too old to accept the presidency even had he desired it. Serrano, Pavía observed, had the most brilliant and the most powerful opportunity in the history of Spain. He failed. He became neither a Napoleon III nor a Cromwell. He lacked the boldness of the latter and the political astuteness of the former. He had been an able general and fortune had favored him. He was the son of a liberal and he himself was a liberal. He was an aristocrat observing aristocratic de-

⁷ Vilarrasa y Gatell, II, 882-884; *Glorias Republicanas*.

⁸ Castelar, *Cartas sobre política Europea*, I, 242.

THE GRAND DUKEDOM

corum to a degree as great as any grandee in Spain. Despite that, he was an attractive individual and he had many friends among the liberals. He had been a partisan of the Duque de Montpensier but he had accepted the monarchical solution of Amadeo. Later, when that honorable King refused to exercise the dictatorship Serrano urged, Serrano retired. Now, he found himself master of Spain, clothed with all the dictatorial powers he had sought of Amadeo. What would he do with them? This was the question Spaniards began to ask more and more. Despite the fact that the government was daily growing stronger as the year progressed in its relations with the Powers, in its restoration of order and in its rebuke to the Carlistas, the government did not satisfy Spain.

Serrano's own indecisive attitude was in part responsible. Did he propose to make himself the ruler of Spain? Certain actions confirmed the suspicion that he did, at least in the minds of the Radicals, although Serrano at no time denied the right of the Spanish people to select their own form of government. It will be recalled that in the federal Republic the Council of Ministers held office at the pleasure of the Cortes, the President of the Executive Power being directly responsible to the Assembly. Serrano radically altered the nature of the presidency in a decree of February 26, by clothing the office of President with a more exclusive dignity than it had possessed in the past. The *Gaceta de Madrid* of that day announced that the Duke was retiring as actual head of the Council of Ministers but would continue to exercise the presidency of the Executive Power. The motives underlying that decision were explained thus:

"In all countries constitutionally ruled, the chief of state, whatever his title, does not govern directly but by means of responsible and removable ministers, because otherwise he would be at the same time judge and party in the political and administrative question, he would not execute his mission fully of directing and moderating, or be the impartial arbiter among the various tendencies that in modern societies dispute the rule of public opinion."

No act of usurpation was contemplated in the change, it was stated. "It is solely necessary that the President of the Executive Power renounce the immediate and personal intervention that he has in the Council of Ministers, concreting his functions to those which the Constitution of 1869 textually attributes to the chief of state." Thus freed,

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

the President would have the required independence "to exercise within the orbit of the faculties and attributes expressly defined, his impartial and elevated magistracy."

This was not expressed in the language of the Spanish Republic; it was the language of the monarchy.

Serrano had been forced to elect between the conservatives and the liberals. He had chosen the conservatives. Though his personal predilection was liberal, he had little choice to make for it was imperative that the army be commanded by the best generals of Spain. These belonged to the conservative and royalist groups. When he selected Manuel de la Concha to direct operations against the Carlistas, he had elected the conservative cause. Solution of the Carlista question Serrano rightly held to be the paramount issue. He himself, when Zavala, a conservative, succeeded him as President of the Council of Ministers, left for the North to engage in active direction of the armies fighting the Carlistas.

The conservative orientation continued slowly, but the Radicals and the unitary Republicans realized that they were eliminated from the active direction of the government. The decrees of García Ruiz, the unitary Republican Minister of the Interior, were of a conservative nature, however. He ordered all cantonal and Carlista newspapers suppressed. The government also proceeded to renew the municipal and provincial corporations in the fashion of Castelar.

The army was being strengthened. Conscription was introduced boldly and more and more troops were being sent to the front lines. Discipline in the army was completely restored, as much by the confidence engendered by the new and able generals as by the tone of the military ordinances. The growing dissension in the Carlista ranks, the failure of Ramón Cabrera to leave his London retreat and associate himself with the Pretender, all were mortal blows to the prestige of a cause that had really failed when its leaders had not taken advantage of the cantonal disunion to capture Madrid and Barcelona. Concha and Serrano inspired the army to new driving power on the part of the constitutionalists. The former was forging his way to the relief of Bilbao, heavily besieged by the Carlistas. Serrano had divided his army into two divisions, the second being commanded by General Fernando Primo de Rivera, whose capture of Estella February 19, 1875, was rewarded with the Marquisate of Estella. Primo was injured and so

THE GRAND DUKEDOM

forced to return to Madrid, where he later became captain general of Madrid and arbiter of the fate of the government. Nouvilas suffered a disastrous defeat at Castellfullit in Catalonia in March. But the Carlistas, too, were suffering reverses. The constitutionalists relieved Bilbao May 2. The failure to capture this city and the consequent failure to take Irun, broke the final Carlista drive and began the downfall of the cause of absolutism in Spain.

The alarming political situation of the capital caused Serrano to return to Madrid early in May, after the relief of Bilbao, Zavala taking his place at the front. On his return Serrano found that the national government had lost its moral force, through the defection of the Radicals. Ruiz Zorrilla had returned from exile and was actively rebuilding his lost reputation. Rivero and his friends were agitating for a liberal republic. Topete, the Admiral whose fleet had made the Revolution of September possible, sought earnestly to reconcile the quarreling groups. But the Radicals viewed the appointment of conservative generals, most of whom were known to be in sympathy with Don Alfonso XII, with open distrust. There seemed only one way out of the impasse and on May 13 the national government gave way to a purely conservative government. Topete, friend of conciliation, García Ruiz, the only old Republican in the Cabinet, and the three Radical Ministers, Martos, Mosquera and Echegaray, all retired. A new Cabinet under the presidency of Zavala was formed in which Ulloa was Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alonso Martínez, Minister of Justice, Sagasta, Minister of Public Works, Rodríguez Arias, Minister of the Navy, and Romero Ortiz, Minister of Overseas. The government announced that a homogeneous Ministry had supplanted the national cabinet but that it would not rule for one party alone.⁹ This government continued in power until September 3 when another change took place, Sagasta becoming President, Zavala having retired, and Serrano Bedoya being named Minister in his stead.

Pavía protested vigorously against the fall of the national Cabinet in a letter to Serrano, in which he presented his resignation as captain general of New Castile. Circumstances, he insisted, had not altered since the pronunciamiento of January 3. If a homogeneous Ministry at that time was not desirable—and he declared that all parties were agreed that it was not—then it was not desirable now. The new solution

⁹ *Gaceta de Madrid* (May 15, 1874).

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

was made "with absolute forgetfulness of the then solemn agreement," he declared. Serrano replied that he had no other choice, despite the fact that he personally favored conciliation.¹⁰ Pavía remained in retirement until July 26 when Sagasta persuaded him to accept the command of the newly formed Army of the Center against the Carlistas.

General Concha evolved a plan which he believed would end the Carlista War. He planned to take Estella, the Mecca of the Carlistas. He appealed for arms and food, which the government was able to supply him only with vexing irregularity. The veteran General who was now sixty-eight years old, issued a general order that any agent of rebellion in the Basque Provinces, in Navarre or in the military Provinces of Burgos, would be deported to the Island of Marianas or Fernando Po, and that the relatives, or failing relatives, the city to which any soldier in the Carlista army belonged, must pay a fine of 2,500 pesetas for him, providing that such soldier belonged to any of the cities in the cited provinces. The Carlistas replied to this order with one threatening war without quarter. Advising his soldiers that "we will not follow such a horrible example, our mission is to conquer and not to assassinate," Concha continued on his march to the mountain fastness of Estella. Repulsed in his effort to take the stronghold, Concha was killed June 27 in the operations against the town.¹¹

This was a great blow to the constitutionalists but it was compensated later when Don Carlos failed to take Irun. The failure of Don Carlos to capture Bilbao really marked the turning point in his stubborn effort to seize the throne of San Fernando. The Carlista movement—suffering from hopes too long deferred—now entered a period of unparalleled savagery. Men and women were ruthlessly killed; cities were burned; railways were destroyed; factories were demolished. These were the characteristics of the war for God, Country, King in its last phase. In November the Carlistas announced they would take Irun, gateway to France, and head of the Madrid-French railway. The promised spectacle brought special trains from France to the frontier, filled with curious French and Spanish sympathizers, while Don Carlos, General Elio, his chief of staff, and several of his Cabinet Ministers, were on hand. The day chosen for the assault was November 4, Don Carlos' day of festival. Irun bravely resisted until constitutional

¹⁰ Pavía, p. 3.

¹¹ Vilarrasa y Gatell, II, 987.

THE GRAND DUKEDOM

re-enforcements arrived and the Carlistas were forced to abandon the battle.¹²

The ducal Republic obtained what the idealistic Republic had failed to achieve—European recognition. Prussian and French rivalry indirectly contributed to the recognition of the Republic. The killing of a Prussian subject in the Carlista War brought strong protests from Prussia and suspicion on the part of Spain that the Prussians contemplated intervening in the internal affairs of Spain. Following conferences between diplomatic representatives of France and Prussia, the latter insisted on immediate recognition of the Republic, a decision reached during the negotiations over the death of the Prussian subject. France demurred, due to the strong "legitimist" sentiment in that country. In order to expose the widespread belief that France sympathized with the Carlistas Prussia sent a note to all of the Powers inviting recognition of Spain. Faced with the possibility of being accused of violating her neutrality in favor of the Carlistas, France agreed and followed the action of Prussia and Austria-Hungary in recognizing the Spanish Republic. Russia alone failed to recognize Serrano's government. The German and Austrian Ambassadors presented their credentials September 12, addressing the President of the Executive Power as "Señor Duque" and expressing the sentiment of their respective monarchs that Spain would continue "in the defense of conservative principles," to which Serrano replied that the Republic was "maintaining unimpaired the principles of social order by means of conservative procedures." Successive ambassadors made their formal presentations to Serrano, later ones addressing him correctly as President.¹³

The sacrifice of Pavía, original founder of the national Republic, September 28 marked the final break with the Radicals. Pavía, like all the other generals, bombarded Sagasta, acting as President of the Council, with appeals for arms and aid. On September 9 he declared that if he received arms and re-enforcements he could end the campaign in fifteen days. This was the nature of the complaints Concha had sent the Ministry. The government, without revenues, could supply its generals in the main only with promises. Don Alfonso de Borbón who had been transferred to the command of the Carlista Army of the Center did not oppose vigorous resistance, depending more on the

¹² *Ibid*, p. 1022.

¹³ *Ibid*; *Gaceta de Madrid*.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

power of propaganda. For that reason, Pavía eagerly sought to terminate the conflict.

The Ministers in their September reorganization adopted a more conservative tone than before. They decided to remove Pavía whose radicalism was suspected and to substitute a conservative general in his stead. At the same time they named other conservative generals. Pavía's dismissal was determined September 28 but the General did not receive notice of it until September 30 and then not from the government directly. On that day, he received a telegram dated September 29 from General Letona, newly appointed conservative captain general of Valencia, announcing that General Jovellar had been named commander of the Army of the Center.

Pavía was incensed. "The President and the government did not want to agree with the general in chief. . . . If they would have had the slightest conference with the general in chief! what errors, what equivocations they would have removed! Neither the government nor the President of the Executive Power wanted to employ any of the infinite means that they always put in judgment in such cases, before appealing to extreme and violent means," Pavía complained. On October 1 Pavía outlined to General Jovellar what he had done and the status of the campaign against Don Alfonso de Borbón.

Stung by the summary and unjust manner of his removal, Pavía returned to Madrid and demanded a hearing of Serrano, who promised a review of his case. But, as Pavía stated, General Martínez Campos and General Jovellar, who supplanted him, in the meantime pronounced for Don Alfonso XII and his appeal for review had to be presented to Jovellar himself in his capacity as Minister of War in the first Cabinet of the Restoration. It was not until June, 1878, that Pavía was able to publish a detailed defense of his conduct of the Army of the Center.¹⁴

The Radicals were outraged at Pavía's dismissal but Pavía accepted it without appealing to arms. This dismissal, the naming of avowed royalist generals, the vague nature of Serrano's plans for learning the national will, the President's conservative pronouncements, particularly his reply to the Prussian and Austro-Hungarian Ambassadors, the practical abandonment in government communications of the word "republic," all tended to create a critical disturbance in public feeling.

¹⁴ Pavía.

THE GRAND DUKEDOM

Newspapers were unable to express their sentiment freely due to the suppression of their rights, but cryptic references to the state of affairs indicated that Spain would not long remain satisfied with the negative government in power. The Radicals were conferring with Espartero. Cánovas del Castillo worked more feverishly for the restoration of the Bourbons. A student rebellion November 24 protesting a decree of the government regulating the courses of study in the universities required two days to quell in Madrid, while other universities in the provinces seconded the revolt.¹⁵ The government was encountering some resistance to its conscription program but in the main it achieved notable success in strengthening the army.

The end of the National Republic was near.

Serrano left for the Carlista front December 9, stating before he left that the first objective of the government was to end the Carlista War and then, the government would call a Cortes to determine the manner of consolidating the aspirations of Spain.

If we recall for a moment the placement of the principal royalist generals, we can discern readily in what a perilous state the Spanish Republic was in December, 1874. Serrano, the President of the Executive Power, was in the North, isolated from the government. Sagasta was directing the government as President of the Council, but he was directing a government that was viewed with open hostility by the liberals and with little or no confidence by the conservatives. General Laserna was director of operations against the Carlistas. He was a conservative. General Jovellar was in command of the Army of the Center. He was a conservative. General Primo de Rivera was captain general of Madrid and consequently arbiter of the destinies of the government, considering the fact that the Cabinet was completely divorced from the only general whose cause was that of the Republic, Serrano. General Martínez Campos was in Madrid, nominally under the surveillance of Primo. General Pavía was in retirement.

Thus, towards the end of December, the Republic had set a trap for itself. In the battle of the generals, it was Serrano opposed to the rest of the high command.

III. THE MANIFESTO OF SANDHURST; RESTORATION

Alfonso XII was only eleven years old when his mother, Doña Isabel, was dethroned by the Revolution of 1868. The Queen had ab-

¹⁵ Vilarrasa y Gatell, II, 1044.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

icated but had reserved all rights to the throne for her son. Don Alfonso spent several years in France continuing his education. Then he received the Holy Eucharist from the hands of Pope Pius IX March 6, 1870.¹⁶ Thereafter he continued his studies in Switzerland, Austria, Italy and England. He became of age November 28, 1874, an occasion that brought him many congratulatory messages from Spain. Cánovas del Castillo, who had been commissioned by Doña Isabel August 22, 1873, to be director of the Alfonsino party in Spain, believed the time at hand for the young Prince to express his program for the regeneration of the nation.

Alfonso issued a manifesto from Sandhurst which Spanish newspapers published in December. He declared: "*How many have written me demonstrating the same conviction that only the re-establishment of the constitutional monarchy can put at an end the oppression, the uncertainty and the cruel perturbations Spain experiences. They tell me that the majority of our compatriots now recognize this. . . .*

"By virtue of the spontaneous and solemn abdication of my august mother, as generous as unfortunate, I am the sole representative of the monarchical right in Spain. . . . The nation orphaned now of all political right and indefinitely deprived of its liberties, naturally turns its eyes to its accustomed constitutional right. . . .

"Without doubt the only [constitutional right] that inspires confidence now in Spain is the hereditary and representative monarchy, seen as the irreplaceable guarantee of their rights and interests, from the working classes to the highest.

"In the meanwhile, not only is everything that existed in 1868 void but what it was pretended to create since then. If the Constitution of 1845 actually is found abolished, then that one which was formed in 1869 upon the now non-existent base of the monarchy actually is found abolished. If a junta of Senators and Deputies without any legally constituted form decreed the Republic, the only Cortes convoked with the deliberate intention of planting that regime was dissolved very quickly by the bayonets of the garrison of Madrid. All political questions thus are pending and as reserved on the part of the actual governors, for the free decision of the future."

The principles of the hereditary and constitutional monarchy, the manifesto continued, were sufficiently flexible to solve the problems fac-

¹⁶ Díez de Tejada, I, 106.

THE GRAND DUKEDOM

ing its re-establishment which must be in conformity with the votes and convenience of the nation. Alfonso planned nothing arbitrarily. Princes of old had not resolved important negotiations without the advice of the Cortes and he did not intend to, either, especially since the nation had become accustomed to the Cortes. "The occasion at hand, it will be easy for a loyal prince and a free people to understand and to agree on all questions awaiting solution." The "hard lesson of these times" had contributed powerfully to this understanding, especially on the part of the laboring classes, "victims of perfidious sophistries and of absurd illusions."¹⁷

The restoration, then, promised the preservation of representative institutions and the substitution of modern principles for the feudal.

The renewed activity of the Alfonsinos gave the government much concern. Sagasta in a circular letter to the provincial governors early in November warned them to be on their guard against any disturbance—a warning obviously designed against the Alfonsinos. Shortly after Serrano left for the North the government ordered Martínez Campos to leave Madrid. Primo de Rivera intervened, declaring that the General had no interest in political affairs, as a letter he had written to Cánovas del Castillo demonstrated. Primo added that he would be responsible for the conduct of his friend in Madrid.¹⁸

Sagasta's major political error lay in not removing Primo de Rivera from the captaincy general. The Ministry itself had created the conservative trap into which it was falling now. With Serrano absent the government was at the mercy of Primo. Whether Sagasta could have removed Primo is problematical for the only generals of prestige other than Serrano on whom the liberals could have depended were Pavía, to whom the government had proved its rank ingratitude, and López Dominguez, captain general of Catalonia. As the situation existed at the close of December, Primo de Rivera controlled the destinies of Spain for he could dispossess the government in the same fashion that Pavía had destroyed the federal Republican Cortes and government.

While Cánovas del Castillo wanted to effect the restoration by legal means, Martínez Campos was of another mind. That General left Madrid December 28 on the Valencia train, accompanied by two colonels. Arriving at 12:30 that night at the ancient city of Sagunto, a second Hannibal come this time to restore the ancient House of Bour-

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 65.

¹⁸ Vilarrasa y Gatell, II, 1047.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

bon, Martínez Campos was presented to the officers of the brigade commanded by one of his companions, Colonel Daban. The General told them he wanted to pronounce for Don Alfonso XII. Sagunto would initiate the movement and the Conde de Balmaseda had promised that Ciudad-Real would second it. The officers welcomed the plan enthusiastically.

The following morning, December 29, at the request of the military governor who wished to escape complicity, the brigade left the city at 8 A.M. and proceeded a half mile from Sagunto. Martínez Campos, who had telegraphed Castillo, captain general of Valencia, and Jovellar, commander of the Army of the Center, of his intention, addressed the soldiers of the brigade briefly. He described the deplorable condition of the country and the necessity of establishing a power in the nation strong enough to overcome the terrors facing it.

"This power," he continued, "can be none other than that personified by the legitimate King, Don Alfonso XII; and because of this, impelled by my love of the nation and confident in your valor, I raise before you the restorative banner.

"Long live Alfonso XII!"

"¡Viva!" responded the brigade.

Returning to Sagunto Martínez Campos sent a telegram at 9 o'clock to Sagasta announcing that he had just proclaimed with Daban's brigade Don Alfonso as King of Spain.

"We have faith," he telegraphed the Minister-President; "our cause is the cause of Spain; our program is the manifesto of the Prince."¹⁹

Again at 11 o'clock Martínez Campos telegraphed Jovellar. "On you depends, my General, the successful restoration without opposition of the constitutional monarchy, and if the act of January 3 concluded anarchy, this movement is the beginning of the end of the Civil War in Spain and of the separatist war in Cuba."

Jovellar did not hesitate. He notified immediately the government of Madrid of his intention to second the movement. "I have decided on this in the most solemn moment of my life and I believe thus to interpret in the best possible manner the compliance of my duty in such a grave and complicated situation. I hope the government takes cognizance of this and judges me with equity and whatever be the consequences, I await tranquilly the judgment of history."²⁰

¹⁹ Díez de Tejada, I, 72.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, I, 73.

THE GRAND DUKEDOM

While Martínez Campos continued obtaining telegraphic adhesions to his pronunciamiento, Sagasta in Madrid, once advised of the *coup d'état*, immediately took what steps he could to save the government of the Republic.

He inserted in the *Gaceta de Madrid* of December 30 a protest which all the Ministers signed, stating that the "seditious banner of Don Alfonso de Borbón, had been raised in front of the Carlista enemy.

"This monstrous act that pretends to initiate another civil war, as if there were not enough calamities of all kinds afflicting the fatherland, fortunately has encountered no echo either in the armies of the North and of Catalonia or in any of the other military districts."

The Ministers conferred with Primo de Rivera who revealed that the soldiers of Madrid wanted to second the pronunciamiento but that he was keeping them appeased. Serrano Bedoya himself verified the attitude of the soldiers on a tour of inspection with Primo. The captain general was sympathetic but not enthusiastic for the cause of the government. He advised yielding to the *fait accompli*.

Cánovas del Castillo, a foe of military pronunciamientos, was ordered imprisoned and stern repressive measures were adopted towards all suspected of being Alfonsinos.

It was an extraordinary situation. The President of the Executive Power was in Castejón, virtually as isolated as was his Council of Ministers in Madrid. Serrano had been told by General Laserna that his troops did not want to fire against their companions. Serrano himself could count only on the troops under his immediate command. Furthermore were he to return with troops he might meet with resistance from the Madrid garrisons. Were he to return alone he would become Primo's prisoner.

While the other Ministers debated, Ulloa, Minister of Foreign Affairs, engaged Serrano in a telegraphic conversation.

Ulloa described the critical situation of the government. "From all parts and principally from the captain general [Primo], organ today of the aspirations of the troops that fraternize with the movement, notices are arriving of the impatience which afflicts the sympathizers and the difficulty of restraining them," Ulloa telegraphed.

Ulloa then related the result of a "polemic" with Primo. The captain general advised yielding to the movement Martínez Campos had initiated. Ulloa asked for time so that Serrano might return but Primo

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

replied that the garrison feared the Duke would return with troops. If Serrano would return alone, Primo stated, he himself would guarantee order and the safety of the chief of state.²¹

As was so often the case in critical moments with him, Serrano was indecisive. He replied that he could not come alone or under the tutelage of Primo. He did not want a battle with the revolting troops, since he approved war on the Carlistas only.

"You know all the facts of the problem," replied Ulloa. "What ought we do?"

"If resistance is impossible, if the captain general neither rebels nor obeys and if it is impossible to continue thus, either relieve the captain general and the garrison will rally to his defense, or abdicate in his hands this ephemeral and little decorous power," replied the Duke.

"Resistance is possible," Sagasta telegraphed in reply to Serrano's comforting message, "if we count—and you count—on the active loyalty of this army and if you could come quickly to Madrid with some troops. In this case we will attempt the battle here, expecting the immediate re-enforcements that this army would be able to bring. Otherwise help will have arrived after we have been conquered, making your situation compromised and impossible."

While Sagasta counselled action, Serrano hesitated. He could come quickly with only one battalion. "It is necessary not to forget the presumption of the Carlistas on viewing these facts," he added.

Ulloa then replied that the Ministry would meet with Serrano wherever he designated, so that if resistance in Madrid was impossible, it might be made elsewhere.

"I cannot reply to the last question because I have no security," responded the Duke. He suggested several points at which they might meet later.

Ulloa replied that the situation was so critical that the Ministry expected to be ousted that very night (December 30). It would do no good solely to confer with the President. "We make the proposition," Ulloa continued with some annoyance, "as Ministers and as good friends of yourself, facing all the consequences of this move, if you want to conserve the legality of your presidency in front of the power being raised."

"If we did not have the Carlistas in front of us, I would have

²¹ Vilarrasa y Gatell, II, 1080 ff.

THE GRAND DUKEDOM

taken the initiative to propose this to my dear friends the Ministers," Serrano replied. "Patriotism forbids me to make three governments in Spain."

"The Ministry believes you work with the most elevated patriotism but our loyalty demanded making this proposition," Ulloa telegraphed, adding an affectionate farewell from the Ministers.

"All of you receive, my dear friends, my immense gratitude for your friendship and affection, for the loyalty and energy with which in these calamitous times you have discharged your arduous tasks!" Serrano replied.²²

From Castejón in the North the night of December 30, 1874 came over the telegraph wires the final official words of the President of the first Spanish Republic: "Adieu, my dear and noble friends!"

It was at 9:30 at night as these words flashed into Madrid, into the office of the Minister of the Interior. As Ulloa turned from the telegraph instrument General Carbo entered to notify the Cabinet that the troops would no longer wait to pronounce for Don Alfonso.

Ten minutes later the Ministry resigned its powers into the hands of Primo de Rivera.

The Republic of Spain came to an end officially at 9:40 o'clock the night of December 30, 1874. Cánovas del Castillo, released from the Prison of Saladero, was now the Prime Minister and Regent of the Kingdom of Spain. At 11 o'clock he called together the principal royalists of the capital in the office of the Minister of War for the purpose of constituting the first Ministry of the Restoration.

The following morning the *Gaceta de Madrid* again bore the coat of arms of the monarchy. Cánovas del Castillo announced his new Ministry: Alejandro Castro, Foreign Affairs; Francisco de Cárdenas, Justice; General Jovellar, War; Pedro Salaverria, Finance; Mariano Roca de Togores, Marqués de Molins, Navy; Francisco Romero Robledo, Interior; Manuel de Orovio, Marqués de Orovio, Public Works; Adelardo López de Ayala, Overseas.

Serrano, Duque de la Torre, reached Bayonne, France, January 3, 1875, a year to the day from the time he had accepted the presidency of the National Republic, an exile.

²² *Ibid.*, 1083 ff.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

IV. THE RETURN OF THE BOURBONS

Don Alfonso, in Paris to spend the Christmas vacation with his mother and family, was dressing for the theater in the palace of his mother the night of December 30.

"Urgent!"

The young Prince tore open the letter he had just received and read a brief message written with pencil:

"Martínez Campos, in front of the Daban brigade, has proclaimed your highness King of Spain; until now *everyone* in France is ignorant of it; let your Highness observe profound silence."

Alfonso read the name of a distinguished Frenchman subscribed to the note and preserved utmost *sang froid* in disguising his happiness from the valet attending him. At the theater, he did not tell his mother or sister Isabel who accompanied him. When the family returned home, confirmation of the Pronunciamiento of Sagunto was awaiting them.

"I have known it for several hours," Alfonso said, to the surprise of the family.

Not knowing that Primo de Rivera and Jovellar had seconded the pronunciamiento, Alfonso was determined to go to Spain to take his place beside Martínez Campos.²³

The next morning Paris knew that the new Spanish King was in its environs. Throughout the day the palace was crowded with persons congratulating Alfonso. Later, the Pope sent his blessing on the eve of the King's departure for Marseilles, January 6, 1875.

January 9 he set foot on Spanish soil again, the first time in six years, at Barcelona. That day Alfonso took up the task of the Bourbons.

²³ Díez de Tejada, I, 114.

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

THE END OF AN INTELLECTUAL ADVENTURE

I. DEFYING THE HAND OF DESTINY

WITH the restoration of Alfonso XII the Glorious Revolution of September was over. The first attempt in over three hundred and fifty years of the Spanish people to govern themselves had ended in apparent failure. Not since the Communal movement of 1520 had the Spanish people shaped the direction of their government. Only once during that long period had there been an outpouring of the national soul and that was during the French revolutionary era when the country, deserted by its ruler, arose against the invader. But the movement launched by the Dos de Mayo was not political. The political destiny of Spain seemed to be that of her throne and her church. The Revolution of September divorced Spain from her traditional royal family. The Republic divorced Spain from her traditional church. These two cataclysmic movements came to Spain almost overnight and almost overnight they disappeared. Both movements defied the hand of destiny.

The three and a half centuries of political slumber of the Spanish people witnessed the decline of Spain from the world's greatest power to one of comparative insignificance in the world. If the hand of destiny had linked Spain to church and state, the decadence of the country, laid by the liberals of the nineteenth century with inescapable logic at the doors of king and bishop, demanded that that destiny be challenged. And manifest destiny proved kind to the liberals. Spain could not longer continue its decline in a world of progress.

The Bourbon tradition began in Spain in the year 1700 and it insured Spain continuance of the tradition of the church. The Bourbons were unprogressive and were decadent,¹ with one exception, that of

¹ Gonzalo de Reparaz, hijo, in his *Los Borbones de España*, historia patológica de una dinastía degenerada (Madrid: Morata, 1931) classifies the Bourbons as follows: Felipe V, mentally unbalanced and sensual; Fernando VI, mad and impotent; Carlos III, almost normal; Carlos IV, imbecile; Fernando VII, excessively sensual, cruel and sanguinary; Isabel II, nymphomaniac; Alfonso XII, tubercular.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

Carlos III. The church likewise was unprogressive. Neither admitted the people to share in the government of the nation. Faith is the most powerful coercive force among any people. In Spain faith and government have been one and the same. The people had no opportunity to practice politics and consequently to refine politics. The king gave the laws, the church demanded their unquestioned observance. When such a condition exists for more than three centuries in a world which has changed completely in its political aspect during that period, it is charged with the greatest danger for the institution responsible for the failure to progress.

This was then the basis of the political movement of the nineteenth century in Spain. Spaniards were beginning to feel conscious of their isolation in the world of intelligence. Some of them were beginning to accuse throne and church of responsibility for Spain's decadence. When this questioning spirit was aroused, political life in Spain began.

II. REMOVING OBSTACLES TO PROGRESS

Denied for so long the exercise of their rights of citizenship, the Spanish people did not as a whole take advantage of the new political life. The majority of Spaniards at the beginning of the nineteenth century were devoted to the tradition of throne and church. That is, they were satisfied with things as they were. Consequently, political life was limited and found expression in only a few parties which in turn represented relatively few of the Spanish people. The Progressives, the first modern political party, emerged from the Cádiz Cortes and revolved around the theory of national sovereignty. The Moderates, originating somewhat later, believed in throne and church but were willing to moderate somewhat the absolute power of the former. The Bourbons were unwilling to accept the Progressives and so frustrated their intentions; they dominated the Moderates and so prevented much real reform. It required a more powerful agency than these parties to bend the tradition of throne and church; that agency proved to be the army. The sword of the politician was oratory. But the generals spoke with guns. The power of the tradition was broken by the pronunciamientos of the generals. The people themselves did not gain greater share in government than they had exercised before. They were becoming accustomed, however, to the fallibility of the tradition. In the field of government they accepted the rule of generals

THE END OF AN INTELLECTUAL ADVENTURE

instead of kings and bishops. Each pronunciamiento increased the instability of throne and church. Each *coup d'état* likewise fomented the demand for constitutional liberties, for each general was forced to justify his act in the name of the people. Thus Spain during the first half of the nineteenth century suffered several constitutions, each one seeking to curb the power of throne and church or to restore it.

The repression of Fernando VII's reign aroused the new political consciousness of Spain. Isabel, the first woman to rule Spain since 1700, was unable to cope with the problems this new political life created. Her married life was unhappy, her favorites often evoked ministerial rebuke. Her government was carried on by generals. Had Isabel possessed the political acumen of Catherine the Great she could have avoided the Revolution of September. Constantly changing ministries, financial scandals, pronunciamientos paved the way for the dictatorship of Luis González Brabo. Once a demagogue, now called on to rule as a conservative statesman, González Brabo swept the way clear of all who might be loyal to the Queen. Death removed O'Donnell and Narváez, who might have rescued her from her perilous situation. The situation as early as 1866 was ready for a military pronunciamiento. It happened that in 1868 there was not one general but a half dozen wanting to make the pronunciamiento. Prim, the ablest of the group, was grudgingly permitted to be generalissimo. Prim alone among the generals had political acumen. He alone might have assured Spain of true constitutional government. But Prim was killed at the very time Amadeo of Savoy was landing in Spain. Just as death removed the only agents of salvation of Isabel, so death had removed the hope of Amadeo.

The Revolution of 1868 was not in any sense a national plebiscite. It was merely another pronunciamiento, this time by a coalition of generals instead of by one general. Its purposes were more laudable because it was the culmination of an era of pronunciamientos. Amadeo therefore was not representing the free choice of the Spanish people when he accepted the crown of Spain. He did not even obtain all of the votes of the Cortes. The Cortes itself did not represent the national will, for the Moderates did not enter into the political life of the revolutionary era and the Deputies as often as not represented the choice of the government.

The two-year reign of Don Amadeo is nevertheless a bright period

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

in Spanish monarchical history. The Constitution of 1869 he swore to uphold gave Spaniards greater liberties than any they had had since 1812. Amadeo proved loyal to that oath and gave Spain a rare example of a ruler desirous of ruling not only according to the letter of the law but in the spirit of the law as well. Ruiz Zorrilla, his Radical Prime Minister, proposed reforms for Spain that if accepted would have done much to recapture lost years of progress. Ruiz Zorrilla proposed abolition of slavery for Porto Rico and would have proposed it for Cuba had that province not been in revolt. Amadeo himself gave dignity to the throne degraded by Fernando and Isabel. The Republicans and Moderates refused to accept him and the Unionists regarded him as the King of the Radical party. Amadeo offered Spain a glorious opportunity of embarking on real constitutional rule. But the nation was not ready for him.

III. SELF-GOVERNMENT REALIZED FOR SPAIN

The life of the Spanish Republic was much like Burke's description of the life of Rousseau: "It is such a life, that, with a wild defiance, he flings in the face of his creator, whom he acknowledges only to brave."

It was the first effort in the history of Spain of the people to rule themselves. Its success would have been surprising. Its failure was not startling. If Amadeo, preserving the form of the tradition of throne and church, could not succeed in giving Spain a government essentially republican, the Republicans themselves, completely divorced from tradition, could hardly hope to do so.

The Republican party was of necessity a revolutionary party, because it was forced to work in secret during the days of the Bourbon monarchy. The Republic itself was not achieved by revolutionary means. The rank and file of the Republican party were not prepared for a republic of peace. The four Republicans who occupied successively the position of President of the Executive Power of the Republic were not revolutionists. They did not represent the principle of a great section of the party, which believed in revolutionary action. This was the first source of divergence in the Republic. The second lay in the desire of the Republicans to follow the tradition of the Moderates and exercise the government for themselves alone. The third lay in permitting cleavages to exist in the party until the time when it was called upon to govern the nation. The Progressives had under-

THE END OF AN INTELLECTUAL ADVENTURE

gone training in government. The Republicans had never experienced the refining and chastening influence of power. They were intoxicated with power, once it lay in their hands. They destroyed the vital co-operation of the Radicals. The retirement of the latter left the Republicans alone in authority. They became the government and the opposition. They refused to admit former royalists to positions of trust, in spite of the fact that few of their own members were trained for positions of responsibility.

The Republicans suffered for all the years of repression of the tradition, for the church had never encouraged education and the result proved exceedingly dangerous to Spain, for orators easily swayed illiterate audiences and converted them into angry mobs. Disorder swept over Spain during the Republic like a typhoon, devastating not only the Republic but the nation.

The question of federalism raised so disconcertingly by the cantons of the South and by Catalonia was answered with the destruction of the Republic. Federalism, as time has demonstrated, is a concept that satisfies the unquenched spirit of nationalism which still pervades the peoples of the peninsula. It is the most vital political doctrine introduced in Spain since the sixteenth century. It was directly opposed to the essential spirit of the Bourbons who strove for close-knit unity and as a result it had done as much as all other Republican concepts together to make the party a formidable one in the nation. However sound the doctrine, however much it satisfied long-denied national aspirations, Spain in 1873 courted destruction in embracing federalism. Agencies of communication were few between the various provinces, profoundly separated by the mountainous lay of the land. It would require a most intelligent citizenship to appraise the fiction insisted upon by the Federalists of creating independent provinces and then requiring them to relinquish part of that freedom to a federation. The manner of attaining federalism and its peculiar misinterpretation rather than the doctrine itself invited the destruction of the Republic, for it was tantamount to inviting anarchy.

The failure to adopt a constitution created confusion and rendered the position of the Republic daily worse. Theoretically the Republic was governed by the Constitution of 1869. Actually, it was ruled by no constitution. Finally, the situation required a fundamental base and Castelar ruled as though under the liberal Constitution.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

Castelar alone of the Republican leaders recanted. The Spanish people, he observed in the Restoration, "want their secular property, their glorious national unity, their disciplined army, their Catholic church. If you propose to found a Republic against these, it will resound much and sparkle brightly but only for a brief while, like the rumble of thunder and the sparkle of lightning."²

"Our Republic," he wrote to his friend Adolfo Calzado on January 27, 1874, "not only our Republic, our nation is lost. The Socialist utopia which some have cherished; the Federalist utopia which I also have aided in fomenting, is destroying the country, the work of many centuries, the country ever dear to our heart and intelligence. I realized that it was necessary to hurl everything into the abyss where the nation was disappearing: word, name, reputation, life, honor, if our Spain demanded this last and supreme sacrifice, that it might not die in our hands. There was no army and I recruited it; there was no discipline and I re-established it; there was no order and I brought it; there was no fatherland and now there is a fatherland."³

The bitterness which grew out of the cleavage within the Republican party long remained. "Such have been my afflictions in power that I am not able to covet it," declared Pí y Margall. "I have lost in the government my tranquillity, my repose, my illusions, my confidence in the men who constituted the base of my character. For each loyal man I have found ten traitors; for each grateful man a hundred thankless; for each disinterested and patriotic man a hundred who sought nothing in politics but the satisfaction of their appetites."⁴

Pí y Margall and the other Republican propagandists were idealists. They were philosophers called upon to exercise the rare task of governing a nation.

Figueras, first President of the Executive Power, could have eased the course of the Republic had he insisted on maintaining the coalition with the Radicals. Weakly he yielded to the demands of the moment and permitted that coalition to be broken. Later, he permitted the Permanent Commission to be destroyed, thus completely alienating the Radicals. He lacked the courage of a great leader; he dared not have the Republic proclaimed federal, although his party was Feder-

² Castelar, *Obras escogidas*, I, 166.

³ Castelar, *Correspondencia*, p. 2.

⁴ Pí y Margall, *La República de 1873*, p. 4.

THE END OF AN INTELLECTUAL ADVENTURE

alist in spirit; he violated the Constitution of the nation and later repented of it; he fled from the nation during a grave crisis because he believed he had injured the feelings of a colleague. He was kind and gentle when the nation needed brutal firmness.

Like Figueras, Pí y Margall was an idealist and philosopher. He was the most unwavering and the most original Federalist. A Catalan like Figueras he felt there could not be peace in Spain until the national aspirations of the old kingdoms were satisfied. He contributed his theory of federation by individual pact to the dogmas of the Republican party and was the first real leader of the Socialists in Spain. As Minister of the Interior and later President of the Executive Power he permitted the disintegration of the Republic. He was unable to achieve conciliation, despite the fact that it was conciliation he wanted. He endeavored to realize many of the Socialist aspirations in legislation and his program, often sound and sensible, could have been adopted by Spain with profit. No other Spaniard has exercised such a profound influence on the political life of the nation as Pí y Margall. A dominant figure during the days of polemics, he became the dominating element in the Federalist section of the Republican party during the Restoration.⁵ He inspired the Republican constitutional project of 1883 approved by the Saragossa Assembly of the party and wrote the Federal Program of 1894 which reiterated the fundamental theories which the twentieth century was to translate into the theory of regionalism.

Salmerón was even more a philosopher than Pí y Margall. Shortly after the Revolution of September had been achieved he urged application of federalism slowly. When the Republic was proclaimed he was swept from his feet in the enthusiasm for a federal Republic, although he retained his judicial poise to insist on admitting conservatives to responsibility within the government. Salmerón as third President of the Executive Power began restoring what Pí had permitted to be destroyed. His philosophy refused to permit him to sanction the infliction of the death penalty. Later, when Castelar was completing the task he had begun, Salmerón permitted himself to be swayed by the doctrinaires and thus completed the work of destroying the Republic by withdrawing his support in the Cortes from Castelar.

⁵ Pí y Margall died in Madrid November 29, 1901. His sons Francisco and Joaquín Pí y Arsuaga became Republican leaders in the twentieth century.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

In the Restoration he continued to exercise considerable influence in the Republican party; when the various sections of the party formed a Republican Union at Castellón de la Plana March 25, 1903 Salmerón was elected chief of the Union. His death in 1908 removed from the Spanish scene the last of the remarkable group of men who had so profoundly disturbed Spain and so greatly enriched its spiritual life.

Castelar, for all his faults and his egotism, is one of the greatest political figures of modern Spain. His Formula of Progress is a concise charter of Spanish liberty, doing for Spain what Rousseau did for France. Castelar clarified the propaganda of the Republicans and added the element of obligation of the citizen. He accepted federalism and separation of church and state. In the Restoration he opposed both; the political party he captained, the Possible Republicans, never exercised great influence in the Restoration. Castelar's tacit acceptance of the fact of monarchy alienated many of his admirers of the days of tribulation. Castelar's oratorical thunder against the Bourbons, his incisive attacks through the press on the monarchy, were as responsible as any of the attacks made on the throne for its eventual destruction. An idealist like his three predecessors in the Executive Power, Castelar nevertheless was enough of a realist not to hesitate in abandoning many theories he held dear in order that he might save the nation from destruction. He knowingly sacrificed his reputation among his fellow Republicans to restore order to Spain.

Castelar refined the gold of the Republicans. Pí y Margall supplied much of that gold; he was the one original thinker produced by the Republican party. As the years roll on, Castelar and Pí y Margall are assuming their rightful place among the immortals of Spain.

Pavía held the fate of Spain in his hands the morning of January 3, 1874 but chose not to exercise a dictatorship. Had it been possible for him to have obtained participation of the conservatives and the Republicans he might have achieved his national Republic. Pavía is a singular figure in the history of the Spanish army, his rectitude and patriotism contrasting strongly with others who have sought to exercise power for their own advancement.

Serrano, on whom fell the task of carrying out Pavía's design, represented the Unionist tradition of hostility to the revolutionary settlement. A man of great personal charm, he lacked decisiveness and statesmanship. At one time reputed to be a favorite of Isabel, he later aided

THE END OF AN INTELLECTUAL ADVENTURE

in overturning her throne. Unable to obtain the throne for Montpensier, he had accepted Amadeo but had withdrawn from political life when Amadeo refused to make him dictator. Had Serrano called a Cortes to meet in a reasonable period, he might have been able to establish the national Republic. He proved ungrateful to Pavía and permitted his government presided over by the wilful and opportunist Sagasta to be entrapped by the conservative generals.

The Revolution of September, we have said, ended in apparent failure. Actually, that Revolution made the Spaniards politically conscious. It gave release to a new spiritual life as reflected in a new era of literature and art, the first such release in several centuries. It proposed both through the constitutional monarchy and the Republic humanitarian and social legislation, much of which has been adopted since. It gave Spain a modern feeling and wrote on Spain's Book of Time the richest pages of its modern history. The noble purposes of the Republicans remained as monitors of progress in the New Spain they so stormily launched.

AFTERWORD

OLD WINE IN NEW BOTTLES

AFTERWORD

OLD WINE IN NEW BOTTLES

I. MOVING TOWARDS THE NEW SPAIN

THE reception Barcelona has given me far exceeds my expectation and it will exceed your desires. With my heart moved by the voice of the Spanish people who for the first time acclaim me as father, I give you thanks."¹

Thus telegraphed the eighteen-year old King Alfonso XII to his mother Doña Isabel II on the occasion of his entry into Barcelona in January, 1875. The young King, schooled to the arduous duties facing him by six years of exile, found a welcome reception, a feeling of relief from the anarchy of the Republic and the Civil War of the Carlistas. A broader education than any of his predecessors had had, a kindly sympathy and love for his people, a courage frequently manifested that won respect even of his enemies, enabled Alfonso to lay what appeared to be firm foundations for the Restoration. A conservative Constitution, based on the spirit of the Estatuto Real of 1834, was given the nation in 1876. The Civil War was ended and Spain returned to relative internal peace, although the colonies still presented a grave problem. Parliamentary government of a sort satisfied the demand of the people for representation in government, although it was not until May 5, 1889 that universal suffrage was inaugurated.

The death of the King—never strong physically—on November 25, 1885 without a male heir brought momentary uncertainty. María Cristina, the King's second wife, became Regent. Six months later, on May 17, 1886, she bore a son, Alfonso XIII. The royalists breathed easier. The famine and pestilence of Alfonso XII's reign, however, were to be followed by increasing political and economic disturbances in the Kingdom, as was demonstrated very soon. Ruiz Zorrilla, one-time Prime Minister of Amadeo, was in exile, leader of the revolutionary Republicans. He and allies conspired to initiate a pronunciamiento in the army September 22, 1886. Fearing that the plot had been dis-

¹ Federico Diez de Tejada, *Historia de la restauración* (Madrid, 1879), I, 130.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

covered, the conspirators decided to hasten the revolt; the result was that the pronunciamiento of September 19 was confined only to Madrid, with little national repercussion. Ruiz Zorrilla had thought the occasion opportune, since the monarchy, in his opinion, had been weakened by the death of the King.

The Regency passed through stirring years. There were some evidences of a more vigorous national life—of building and planning, such as the Gran Vía through the heart of Madrid, of literature, given release by the short-lived freedom of the Republic, of material well-being through the growth of industry and the increase in wages. There were other signs, more disquieting to the monarchy. The Restoration had temporarily interrupted the growth of the Republican and Socialist parties but not for long. Proposed in 1878, the Socialist Workers party was formally organized May 2, 1879. Its program adopted a year later stated its object to be "the complete emancipation of the working classes," amplifying this statement by an explanation, "the abolition of all social classes and their conversion into a single one of workers, free and equal, honorable and intelligent." The Socialists constantly insisted on equality in the enforcement of the law. Their consistency exposed the inconsistency of the monarchy, as best illustrated by an interview which Pablo Iglesias, the Socialist leader, and Juan José Morato had with Sagasta, the Liberal leader, in 1897. The former had come to protest against the failure of the government to send men of all classes to the Cuban War. Though opposed to the war and to the sending of men, they declared that if the recruiting law were to be enforced, it should be enforced with equality. The rich as well as the poor should be sent to the army. "It is impossible," replied Sagasta, "at this time, because you yourselves know that it would be an atrocity to send the sons of good families to quarters as bad as we have."²

The Republicans in the early days of the Restoration presented the spectacle of numerous small groups refusing to work for a common end. Salmerón and Ruiz Zorrilla, in exile in Paris, issued a manifesto in 1876 demanding the re-establishment of the Republic with the Constitution of 1869, except for the sections applicable to the monarchy. Pí y Margall and other leaders of the old Republican party refused to accede to this manifesto. The need of union early became apparent

² Juan José Morata, *Pablo Iglesias* (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1931), p. 142.

OLD WINE IN NEW BOTTLES

although it was not until 1903 that effective coalition was achieved. The Republican Military Association was formally organized January 1, 1883 in the army, including two brigadier generals as members and with union of all Republicans as an objective. The pactist Federalists of Pí's school held a national assembly at Saragossa in May, 1883, approving a federal Republican constitution which in turn should be approved by the various regional states. The abortive revolt of 1886 broke the alliance between Ruiz Zorrilla and Salmerón, the latter confessing he was "painfully surprised." Salmerón assumed the leadership of the Centralists, the center party of the first Republic, with a program of a federation of Spain and Portugal. Salmerón and Pí moved closer to unity in 1891 but it was not until January 23, 1893 that a formal accord of union was signed by Pí and Salmerón and others, in which it was agreed that all would abide by whatever type of constitution the republic should make. Castelar announced that he was now opposed to federalism but would work for a possible republic. In 1893, however, Abarzuza for the Possibles announced in the Cortes that Castelar's party was an outlaw under the Constitution and would accept the Regency. The friends of union, under the leadership of José Nakens, editor of the spirited weekly *El Motín*, prevailed and a union of all Republican groups was reached March 25, 1903 at Castellón, with Salmerón as leader. New names appeared among the four thousand Republicans who acclaimed the only surviving member of the four men who had served as President of the Executive Power of the federal Republic; some of these were names which gained international fame, such as Vicente Blasco Ibáñez and Alejandro Lerroux. Many of the Republicans, like Pí, and the Socialists opposed the Cuban War which ended the long struggle to maintain the overseas empire, through the loss of Spain's colonies in the war with the United States in 1898.

Not only were the political forces opposed to the monarchy seeking union but a new, more perilous movement was forming. The Federalists of Pí's school were using a new terminology as early as 1888, that of regionalism. The federal assembly of 1888 approved the regional constitutions of ten regions. The seat of regionalism was Catalonia, where in Manresa March 25, 1892 the Unió Catalanista agreed on the bases of the Catalan regional constitution. The seventeen sections of this agreement carefully outlined the powers granted the cen-

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

tral government and those reserved to the regional state, among which was the coinage of money. The plan was one devised by Juan Permanyer, a university professor. Succeeding meetings held annually amplified the original agreement; and at the third of these assemblies, in 1894 at Balaguer, a solemn mass was said for the "last legitimate king of Catalonia," the Conde de Urgel. Not only was the regional spirit growing in Catalonia with the greatest rapidity but alongside of it was a harder feeling, that of "Catalonia for the Catalans."

When Alfonso XIII became King of Spain in fact May 6, 1901, a subtle change was taking place in Spain. It was the Europeanization of Spain. Many of the Republican doctrines, as we have seen in preceding chapters, were imported from Europe and America. Federalism itself was not native; but regionalism, the modern development of federalism, was distinctly Spanish in that it was founded on the reality of Spanish life. The loss of the American colonies left Spain free to develop herself internally; instead, the Liberals sought the continuation of an imperial policy and at the same time, of a *rapprochement* with Europe. Spain determined to resume the historic burden of Morocco. "It was natural," explains the Conde de Romanones, "that the country, desirous of possible expansion and aggrandizement, considered Africa as the field of future activity."³ To this end, Spain carefully sought the approval of France, England and Italy. It had been the insistent complaint of the old Republicans that Spain was decadent, that it was an anachronism in Europe. Despite the sturdy declaration of Miguel de Unamuno that he was an "old African," many of the newer generation of '98 were European in outlook. A tremendous intellectual revival was beginning in Spain; in its forefront were Unamuno, José Ortega Gasset, Marcelino Menéndez y Pelayo, Pio Baroja, Azorín, Carmen de Burgos, Blasco Ibáñez, La Pardo Bazan. It was a keen, alert, questioning movement. When Carmen de Burgos in her column in *El Diario Universal* in 1904 casually mentioned the jocose suggestion of a friend that a club would be formed in Madrid to study divorce, dozens of writers plunged into controversy over divorce—the most alien subject possible in Catholic Spain.

This questioning, this adventurous spirit, must sooner or later

³ Conde de Romanones, *Las responsabilidades políticas del antiguo regimen de 1875 á 1923* (Madrid, Renacimiento).

OLD WINE IN NEW BOTTLES

come in open conflict with Don Alfonso XIII, most feudal king of Europe, ruling by the most feudal constitution. And, anticipating the future, we may read in the friendly columns of *The Times* a much later description of the King which will explain many of the events which are to follow: "Cradled by the throne, he has always ruled with powers which ended for most sovereigns in the eighteenth century and which have made him in the twentieth the only absolute monarch in western Europe," observed *The Times* in a leader February 19, 1931. "The splendid pageantry, the Velásquez costumes, the ubiquitous halberdiers of his Madrid Palace keep the Middle Ages alive around him in his home; and with all his ready assumption of the forms of political democracy and of the mechanical advantages of modern inventions he has retained the principle *l'état c'est moi*. He inherited from his mother, the Queen-Regent, a two-party system which was working well but which deteriorated subsequently. From the first the young King tended to show a preference for his courtiers and the members of his military household, and to consult them at least as much as his official advisors. He would act in the provinces direct through the captains general, even against the wishes of the government. He was inclined to pit one politician against another, to give his confidence arbitrarily and arbitrarily to withdraw it. The parliamentary system fell into a disrepute which itself made Spaniards acquiesce the more readily in the political control practiced by Don Alfonso. The King became in fact an expert political manipulator, and remains probably the most skilful politician in his own Kingdom."

The thirty years of Don Alfonso's reign witnessed Spain writhing away from the last vestiges of feudalism. Bitter years saw general strikes, assassinations, deaths of countless soldiers on the battle fields of Morocco, a mock parliamentary life at Madrid, a mad restlessness in the nation. During the Regency political life had been at a low ebb. There were theoretically two political parties, the Conservatives and the Liberals. Both ruled by common consent, Cánovas del Castillo now dominating for the Conservatives, Sagasta, equally conservative, ruling for the Liberals. Ruled theoretically by the Constitution of 1876, Spain was dominated actually by a small group of politicians who exchanged power without really reflecting the will of the people. "The Constitution," observed General Eduardo López de Ochoa, whose aid to General Primo de Rivera made possible the Pronunciamiento of 1923, "was

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

destroyed by the old politics.”⁴ For Sagasta and Cánovas del Castillo in the Regency one could substitute other names during the reign of Alfonso XIII. “To change the men; that is the fundamental problem of Spanish politics,” Luis Araquistáin stated.⁵ There was no public opinion in Spain, complained the Conde de Romanones. And there was no public opinion, articulate at least, because the Spanish people had no confidence in politics; and also because it is a peculiar feature of Spanish political life that the principal leaders of Spanish politics do not become warm personalities in the minds of the people. “From Argüelles to Cánovas del Castillo we do not know any of our great men intimately,” declared Dionisio Pérez.⁶ And although universal suffrage was granted in 1889, it was only a “paper suffrage.” “There is no universal suffrage in Spain,” averred Ramón Pérez de Ayala. “The universal suffrage *de facto* which is practiced in Spain is a farce, represented by a league of mountebanks who are all professional politicians. . . . The political life of the nation and the social life, the official state and the popular corporation, juridic expression and public opinion, in place of being concentric circles are eccentric circles.”⁷

“To change the men. . . .” During the nineteenth century the men were changed by the army through the pronunciamiento and by the parties through the retrainamiento. A new agency was beginning to make itself felt—Labor. As early as 1909 a revolutionary strike originating in Barcelona assumed the nature of a general strike due to the protest of the Socialists against the Moroccan War. Two powerful organizations were beginning to knock at the door of Spanish politics: the General Union of Workers, the national labor union of the Socialists, and the Confederation of Work, founded in Barcelona in 1910, affiliated with the Syndicalists. The Socialists, who had pleaded for years to have adequate educational facilities for laborers, discovered a powerful aid to their movement in the Casa del Pueblo, club houses for working men, the first of which was opened in Madrid November 28, 1908. The strike of 1909 was suppressed by the government after

⁴ General E. López de Ochoa, *De la dictadura á la república* (Madrid: Zeus, 1930), p. 220.

⁵ Luis Araquistáin, *Entre la guerra y la revolución*, España en 1917 (Madrid, 1917), p. 160.

⁶ Ramón Peris, *Dato y su vida* (Madrid), prólogo de Dionisio Pérez.

⁷ Ramón Pérez de Ayala, *Política y toros* (2d ed., Madrid: Renacimiento, 1925), p. 121.

OLD WINE IN NEW BOTTLES

three days of street fighting in Barcelona and the proclamation of martial law in the nation. Francisco Ferrer, a vigorous opponent of the church and noted for his educational work, was courtmartialed and executed October 13, 1909, on the theory that he was a principal instigator of the revolt. As a result of the events of 1909, the Socialists veered from their traditional policy of non-co-operation with the Republicans. The government under the able direction of Maura had made earlier in the year a concession to the Catalan demands in the passage of a local administration law, which gave greater municipal freedom in the conduct of elections.

Several years later, in March, 1916, the General Union and the Confederation both demanded that the government take steps to reduce the cost of living, unemployment and alleviate other social miseries. A general strike of twenty-four hours December 18, 1916 brought concession from the government. On March 27, 1917 the two Unions agreed to call on the "proletariat" for a general strike of undetermined duration to compel the "dominant classes" to make fundamental changes so that people would be guaranteed the minimum at least of the necessities of life. The general strike that followed, begun August 10, caused the government three days later to declare Spain in a state of siege.

Spain was living dangerously in 1917. Not only the general strike but other problems equally grave loomed in the nation to disturb the quietude of Don Alfonso. There was a furious discussion over the question of neutrality in the world-war, a "neutrality which killed" as Romanones characterized it. The torpedoing of Spanish ships by the Germans and the low moral state of Spain in the council of nations contributed to the resignation of Romanones' Liberal Cabinet in April. The army was restless, agitated by the "reign of favor" by which ministers rewarded friends. On June 1 there was a veritable revolt in the army, in which Juntas of Defense demanded a change in the relations of the politicians to the military. The Marqués de Alhucemas who had succeeded Romanones was forced to resign.⁸ The army won its first victory in politics since 1874. From then on the army "has been the exponent of national politics," as Azaña, Minister of War and later President in the Cabinet of the Republic of 1931 which faced the Cortes Constituyentes declared in presenting the project of a law to reform the

⁸ *Idem*; Francisco Villanueva, *La dictadura militar* (Madrid, Morata, 1930).

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

military profession.⁹ The Conservative Dato succeeded Alhucemas and removed the military officials of the King's Palace. This, declares Pérez de Ayala, transformed the flattery of the people to the King into dissatisfaction with the person of the King. It offered a simple solution to the multitude of problems raised by the military revolution, he explained. "And thus," he continues, "when one averred that favor reigned, the word 'reign' was given a restricted meaning, allusive to the sovereign."¹⁰ Not only did the complaints of the Liberals and of the Republicans against Spain's neutrality and the demand of the army for reform in government confront Alfonso but the insistence of Catalonia for practical independence conveyed a grave threat to the monarchy. The situation, already dangerous, was complicated for the Monarch by the demand of the Catalan Deputation July 5 for the meeting of the Cortes to consider national problems, particularly the Juntas of Defense in the army. The government refused to convoke Parliament and on July 19 a rump Cortes met at Barcelona, issuing a protest in which a Cortes Constituyentes was demanded in order to reform the laws in regard to the States and the municipalities so that greater autonomy might be insured them as well as a renovation of Spanish public life. Not only was labor effecting changes in political life, not only was the army virtually autonomous but a species of parliament not called by the King's Council was also meeting in defiance of the government. Soon thereafter came the general strike, followed in October by another reformist parliament, meeting this time in Madrid.

The campaign in Morocco was likewise going badly. The Juntas of Defense of the army had decreed in 1917 the suppression of distinctions and advancement for achievements in war, thus hampering the success of operations in Africa. Another cause for dismay was Abd-el-Krim, leader of the Riff tribesmen. General Silvestre had ordered him arrested on complaint of General Lyautey, in charge of the French colonial army, who declared that the Riff were making reprisals in the French area in favor of the Germans. Abd-el-Krim fled to the mountains and from there offered a vigorous resistance to the Spanish. Silvestre was reputed to be a close friend of Alfonso, who, it was said, had preferred him for High Commissioner of Morocco. The Ministry had chosen General Berenguer instead. Silvestre, as Governor of

⁹ *A B C* (August 9, 1931).

¹⁰ Pérez de Ayala, *op. cit.*, p. 131.

OLD WINE IN NEW BOTTLES

Ceuta, sought to have Morocco divided into two zones, the eastern to be reserved for him. This plan failed. Aroused by Berenguer's success in winning over the tribes of Ceuta and Larache, Silvestre in the spring of 1921 accosted Berenguer and the two almost came to blows. Thereafter, without the approval of Berenguer, Silvestre engaged the Riff and occupied Igueriben, a mile from the post of Annual. Abd-el-Krim invested the city. As a result, Silvestre and all of his eight thousand soldiers except seven men, were killed—one of the most terrible military disasters of modern times.¹¹

The Annual disaster marked the turning point of the Restoration.

The Cortes appointed a committee of twenty-one to investigate the responsibility for the Annual disaster. Republicans generally accused the King of responsibility. "The army's operations are directed by Alfonso XIII in Madrid. What else could one expect of 'Spain's greatest soldier' who had the good fortune to be born with a complete knowledge of all things?" bitterly demanded Blasco Ibáñez, who declared that Silvestre had made the Annual jaunt under the direction of the King and that among the dead General's effects was found a telegram from Don Alfonso saying "Ole, hombres, I'm waiting."¹²

The reign of terror of the Syndicalists in Madrid with almost daily murders, the great unrest among the soldiers, the threat of Catalan separation, the dissatisfaction with public life, all crowded in on the Liberal government of the Marqués de Alhucemas. General Primo de Rivera, captain general of Catalonia, created a dramatic climax to these problems in 1923.

¹¹ Jérôme et Jean Tharaud, *Rendez vous Espagnols* (Paris, Plon, 1925), p. 6 ff. This disaster, remarks Gabriel Maura Gamazo in his *Bosquejo histórico de la dictadura* (Madrid: Tipografía de Archivos, 1930) demonstrated again the futility of the Spanish policy, most of the ministries in Madrid being content to contract with the High Commission that ministerial security be not disturbed by an untoward event in Morocco. Gonzalo de Reparaz had advocated unsuccessfully a policy of peaceful penetration in Morocco similar to that practiced by the French. In his *Alfonso XIII y sus cómplices* (Madrid: Morata, 1931) Reparaz states: "With the Ten Commandments of Sidi-Omar, program of peaceful penetration, Spain would have complied with her civilizing mission in Africa without sacrificing a single soldier. But Alfonso XIII wanted war. And thus you have, reader, a sample of the criminal action of the tyrant." Therewith he reproduces a photograph of a great hole filled with the bones of Spanish soldiers sacrificed at Annual. The Moroccan war he calls the great crime of Alfonso.

¹² Vicente Blasco Ibáñez, *Alfonso XIII Unmasked* (New York: Dutton, 1924), p. 57.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

II. THE MILITARY DIRECTORY

Primo de Rivera was one of the most stimulating figures in modern Spain. Once he had aroused public discussion with his proposal to give England Ceuta in exchange for Gibraltar. That cost him the captaincy general of Cádiz. Later, when captain general of Madrid, in his capacity as a Senator he had proposed abandoning the Riffian campaign. He was dismissed as captain general, later to be appointed to Catalonia.

Towards the first of September, 1923 he called General López de Ochoa, commander of the infantry brigade in Barcelona, for a conference.

"You are the first in Barcelona with whom I speak of this matter, very grave and very delicate," Primo said. "General, are you satisfied with the present state of affairs in Spain? Do you think we ought to continue in this manner?"

When López agreed that a change was desirable, Primo unfolded a plan for a pronunciamiento which met with López's approval. The pronunciamiento was to take place that month. Later, Primo announced that he had been requested to hasten the *coup d'état*, presumably, López states, at the request of the King. On September 13, 1923, Primo pronounced at Barcelona against the parliamentary regime.¹³

The significance of this Pronunciamiento lies as much in the date on which it took place as in the program it wanted to inaugurate. The committee of twenty-one was to meet September 20 to report its findings in the Annual matter. The Cortes was to meet October 2. The voluminous findings of that committee have disappeared. López, Blasco Ibáñez and other Republicans insinuate that Alfonso was involved and could not afford to have the report made public. Conservative leaders however, deny that Alfonso was in any way implicated in the Pronunciamiento.

Spain accepted the Pronunciamiento as readily as did the King. The author of these pages, leaving Madrid the day following the Pronunciamiento, first learned of the changed state of affairs by reading a copy of *El Sol*. There seemed to be no excitement at the Station of Mediodía, nor did the author observe any regret on the faces of those who, as he journeyed to Granada, first were informed of the changed state of affairs through his copy of the newspaper.

¹³ López de Ochoa, *op. cit.*, p. 23 ff.

OLD WINE IN NEW BOTTLES

Primo issued his manifesto the evening of September 13, stating that the reign of terror must stop and the disheartening features of national life obviated, such as the depreciation of money, political intrigue, social indiscipline and the Moroccan impasse.¹⁴

There had been rumors of an impending *coup d'état* since June. Following the general strike of 1919 there had been a national wave of assassinations. General Martínez Anido, Civil Governor of Barcelona, had set in motion a number of free syndicates to oppose the direct action Sindicato Único's reign of terror and with considerable success in stopping bloodshed. But even in September the separatist movement of Catalonia was exceedingly grave. Frequent ministerial changes in Madrid gave proof of the need, as Araquistáin had phrased it, of a change of men. Don Alfonso was not unaware of this sentiment. Indeed, he had been in conference with a number of prominent Spaniards to ascertain what course he should pursue.

"The enormous mass of public opinion denies confidence in the parties and even execrates them," Antonio Maura informed the King. Maura also stated that it would be inadvisable for the King to attempt the exercise of dictatorial powers himself.¹⁵ When notified of the Pronunciamiento, Alfonso accepted it as a *fait accompli*. Two years later he told a French journalist: "Nothing is changed in our habitual life. . . . What else could we do? . . . And while at Barcelona they assassinated you in broad daylight and while our social and economic life was on its way to discomposition, our Parliament was occupied with wretched questions of the parish or of satisfying its rancors. It could not continue like that. General Primo then did what you know. He told me that he thought he could temper the situation in three months and return to legality within the period prescribed by the Constitution. This was not my opinion. I had the belief that three months would not be enough." The King stated that if the old parties did not give up their former petty ways, it would be futile to restore power to them, since they would resume where they were before the Directory.¹⁶

The Directory continued its course, at first meeting with success for Primo had the rare quality of contagious optimism which communicated itself to those with whom he came in contact. The three

¹⁴ Ramón Martínez de la Riva, *Las jornadas triunfales de un golpe de Estado* (Barcelona: Molero, 1923).

¹⁵ Maura Gamazo, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

¹⁶ Tharaud, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

months lengthened to three years, then six. During that time the army interposed objection to the solution of the Directory in Morocco and French aid was accepted in quelling Abd-el-Krim. The expenses of the war continued to mount, however. Primo's especial aversion was lawyers and he took scant pains to observe the rights of the judiciary. In fact, justice in a legal sense ceased under the Directory.¹⁷ Primo removed all legal disqualifications of women, even though women did not take advantage of the gesture to enter into national political life. Having reached an understanding with the Catalans before making his pronunciamiento, Primo adopted an intelligent attitude toward the question. He promulgated a municipal and provincial statute designed to give greater local autonomy. However, the statute remained virtually inoperative. As in the rest of Spain, roads were improved and in material progress the Province advanced. Primo also inaugurated the annual Royal Progress in Catalonia so that the Catalans might feel a personal affection for their King-Count.¹⁸ Despite the material prosperity of the nation, the Spaniards were not satisfied. In 1925 the Directory began an orientation designed to embrace civilians in its midst. The creation of a national patriotic group known as the Patriotic Union to support the new policies inaugurated by the Directory did not achieve its purpose. By 1927 Primo was talking of constitutional reform and in fact proposed a new constitution before retiring. In that year a national consultive congress was called to prepare the way for a Cortes. By 1929 many of the former Conservative statesmen on whom Alfonso would have to depend in returning to a parliamentary regime had been alienated. In addition, university students had founded the Federación Universitaria Escolar and became constantly more menacing in their hostility to the dictatorship.¹⁹

The intellectuals like Unamuno, former political leaders like Sánchez Guerra and Alcalá Zamora, generals like López de Ochoa and Weyler, Catalan leaders like Macía (who pronounced for a Catalan republic unsuccessfully in 1927) were becoming a tremendous opposition to Primo de Rivera. The tightening of the American Federal

¹⁷ R. Salazar Alonso, *La justicia bajo la dictadura* (Madrid: Zeus, 1930); Carlos Blanco, *La dictadura y los procesos militares* (Madrid: Morata, 1931). These two volumes give a rather comprehensive picture of the workings of justice under the Dictatorship.

¹⁸ *The Times* (London, June 3, 1930).

¹⁹ Emilio González López, *El espíritu universitario* (Madrid: Morata, 1931).

OLD WINE IN NEW BOTTLES

Reserve Bank rates gave the final impulse to the decision Primo had been forming to retire. The peseta began to fall in value in 1929, six months before the world economic crisis, indirectly due to the greater stringency exercised in the United States. Since stabilization of finance had been one of the principal objectives of the Military Directory, Primo's position proved impossible. On January 26, 1930, Primo issued a note asking for the principal directors of the army and the navy to indicate whether they retained confidence in him. If not, within five minutes after learning their decision he would resign his powers into the hands of the King, he announced. Surprised on reading the announcement, Don Alfonso called Primo to him and upbraided him severely for his conduct, taken without his knowledge and also Primo's audacity in appealing only to the military for confidence. The Dictator assured the King that he was acting only as Primo de Rivera, not as President of the Council of Ministers, and that he had no intention of arrogating to himself powers belonging to the King. The response to Primo's request indicated that the Directory had outlived its usefulness. On January 28 the President of the Council resigned and Alfonso named General Damaso Berenguer President.²⁰

III. THE ARROW IN THE HEART OF THE MONARCHY

Considering the daily reign of terror inspired in Spain by the Syndicalists, the general state of unrest in the nation, the tragedy of Morocco, the growing feeling of revolt in the army as evidenced in the revolt of soldiers at Málaga in 1923 entraining for Africa, the dangerous state of the Treasury, the general repugnance towards the politicians felt by the majority of Spaniards, it need not be surprising that Alfonso had accepted the solution offered by Primo de Rivera. Certainly anyone loyal to Spain must have felt perturbation; and Don Alfonso, acutely conscious of Spanish temperament, was disturbed. Without doubt he accepted the Dictatorship, utterly opposed to the spirit of the Constitution of 1876, because he felt that in that manner alone could Spain be saved. Yet the result was that Spain was saved but the monarchy was lost.

"His support of the Dictatorship established by the Marqués de Estella in 1923 has cost Don Alfonso the throne," observed *The Times* April 15. "Politically Spain had sunk into a state of confusion and corruption. . . . But beyond question the rule of the Marqués de Es-

²⁰ Maura Gamazo, *op. cit.*, p. 372.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

tella did reform Spain. Efficiency and order succeeded the wasteful futility, graft and violence. The murderous conflict between employers and workers in Barcelona—which has cost hundreds of lives—was ended. Government departments learned to do their business; great schemes of public works were carried out and there was a wave of unaccustomed prosperity. The terrible drain of blood in Morocco was stopped by a brilliant and decisive campaign. All these benefits the Dictatorship brought to Spain. But material benefits alone cannot satisfy a people. They cannot compensate permanently for the loss of liberty. Steadily discontent grew in the stifling atmosphere of the Dictatorship and as it was repressed it spread. And by a curious twist of Spanish psychology that must remain obscure to foreigners the discontented fixed their enmity not upon the Dictator—who remained popular till his death—but upon the King.”

Maura Gamazo points out that “the most gratuitous injury that could be inferred by the Spanish people lay in supposing that it [the Dictatorship] was maintained firm, year after year, without other support than that of the King and the military *camarilla* of the Dictator. . . . The case of 1930 differed much from that of 1923. The expiration of the King during this lapse was more cruel than that of other public men, condemned only to ostracism. The Monarch had to support day after day the harsh halter of the fiction which supposed his prerogatives intact when he was unable to exercise the slightest without the permission of the Marqués de Estella.”²⁶

Primo left Spain and Don Alfonso remained to bear the blame for his illegal exercise of power. Under the Constitution of 1876 the King was obliged to call a Cortes three months following the dissolution of that Primo had destroyed. Failing to do so constituted a violation of his oath. This was now the complaint of Spain’s leading public men. Don Alfonso, conscious of this criticism, played for the high stakes of the affections of the Spanish people with admirable courage and the greatest shrewdness and tenacity, in the face of almost certain defeat.

The national consciousness—or that part of it that was articulate—prepared a stern indictment of the King. “Your Majesty ever deceives, is an inveterate perjurer, and by living deceiving all will end by being deceived yourself. Your mental faculties being few and base, large

²¹ *Ibid*, p. 376.

OLD WINE IN NEW BOTTLES

and extensive are your audacities. You have made the throne an agency of commerce, using your high magistracy to accumulate millions. . . ."²² Thus wrote the trenchant Gonzalo de Reparaz. "Alfonso XIII . . . is a worthy descendant of Fernando VII. Nothing he touches escapes contamination. He is like the proverbial pitch that clings and defiles,"²³ was the bitter judgment of Blasco Ibáñez. "The monarchy of Sagunto has not known how to convert itself into a nationalizing institution . . . but has been an association of particular groups who live, parasitically, upon the Spanish organism, using the public power to defend the partial interests they represent,"²⁴ declared the intellectuals Dr. Gregorio Marañón, Pérez de Ayala and José Ortega Gasset in a manifesto to the nation.

General Berenguer, however able he might be, continued the military tradition as Prime Minister. Likewise, the power of the Dictatorship was continued. The furious assault on the monarchy which had been going on throughout Spain by the Republicans, aided from abroad by polemics smuggled into the country, by the statements of public men like that of Sánchez Guerra that Alfonso was not fit to be King, this furious assault was seeking outlet into the open. The continuance of the Dictatorship therefore merely postponed the evil day of reckoning. The strength of that pent-up feeling was seen quickly when the censorship of the press was lifted. So violent was the outburst that censorship was restored. Berenguer ostensibly began to prepare the way for constitutional reform through a regular Cortes, but an increasing faction in Spain demanded a Cortes Constituyentes—real constitutional reform.

The Republicans presented a united front against the royalists. Early in the period of the Military Directory the Socialists through the General Union had formed an alliance with Sánchez Guerra, a former Conservative Premier, and the Republican Alliance by which it was agreed that all persons imprisoned for social crimes be pardoned on the advent of the republic, that the groups individually could organize and propagate their ideas, that they would collaborate in whatever action might destroy the Dictatorship and that the General Union would not provoke strikes until the Republican regime had been instituted for

²² Gonzalo de Reparaz, *op. cit.*, p. 459.

²³ Blasco Ibáñez, *op. cit.*, p. 121.

²⁴ *Nosotros* (Buenos Aires, January, 1931), p. 94.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

a period of six months.²⁵ A more far-reaching agreement was made August 17, 1930 by the principal Republican leaders. Meeting at the Hotel de Londres in San Sebastián that afternoon at 2:30, Niceto Alcalá Zamora, later President of the Republic, Lerroux, Miguel Maura, son of the former Conservative Prime Minister, Eduardo Ortega y Gasset, Manuel Carrasco y Formiguera and others agreed on a compromise which insured effective co-operation of all Republican elements in Spain. The celebrated Pact of San Sebastián concluded that day provided that the Republicans must compromise their differences in order to achieve the republic, that religious freedom must be assured and that Catalonia and other regions must be granted the right to submit to the nation constitutions for their regions. The Pact guaranteed recognition of the "Catalan personality."²⁶

A national Republican Committee over which Alcalá Zamora presided planned a general revolution in December, 1930, to be initiated by a nation-wide strike of labor, accompanied by a collaboration of land troops and air forces. As is often the case in such revolutionary movements, there was not the absolute discipline among all the Republicans to make the rebellion a success. Like the revolt of Ciudad-Real in January, 1929, the movement of 1930 failed. Captain Fermín Galán, who belonged spiritually to the idealistic Republican school of 1873, and Captain Angel García Hernández were elected by the troops of Jaca to head the movement there. Galán, who had proposed regenerating Spanish society in a book *The New Creation*, had faith in the sublime idea of the republic; he believed that if he led his soldiers from Jaca to Huesca, response would be aroused throughout Spain. Although the general movement was scheduled to start December 15, Galán and García with the troops part in the conspiracy, overpowered the Civil Guard December 12, in spite of the protests of the representatives of the central revolutionary Committee, and leisurely proceeded towards Huesca. Galán's soldiers, tired and hungry, having taken nineteen hours for a march which should have been consummated in four, were no match for the royalist soldiers who encountered them at the Sanc-

²⁵ Vicente Marco Miranda, *Las conspiraciones contra la dictadura* (Madrid: Zeus, 1930), p. 58.

²⁶ *A B C* (August 22, 1931), statement of Alcalá Zamora and Carrasco Formiguera; *Nuevo Mundo* (Madrid, July 31, 1931), statement of Fernando Sasiain, Alcalde of San Sebastián who presided over the meeting.

OLD WINE IN NEW BOTTLES

tuary of Cillas. Galán and García later surrendered and Galán chivalrously assumed blame for the ill-fated expedition.²⁷

Both were courtmartialed and sentenced to be shot Sunday, December 14.

"Do you have accomplices?" Galán was asked at the court martial.

"Yes," he replied.

"Who are they?"

"Yourselves, cowards!" retorted Galán.

The Council of Ministers was meeting in Madrid, awaiting the outcome of the court martial. When the decision of the court was communicated by telephone, the Council divided over the question of leniency, part of the members favoring commuting the sentence. There also was revulsion shown to holding the execution on a Sunday. Berenguer mentioned to the King in a telephone conversation that some of the Ministers favored leniency.

"Never, never!" Don Alfonso is quoted as replying. "Not at all! The scales must be torn from the peoples' eyes once and for all. There must be blood spilled."²⁸

The two officers were shot at 2 o'clock Sunday afternoon, December 14. It was the first military execution in Spain for many years. Just as the heroes of the Dos de Mayo aroused a nation against the French, so the injudicious execution of Galán and García provided the martyrs for the Republican cause. It was a most serious error on the part of the government when discretion was required not to explode the Spanish powder mill.

The revolt of December 15, thus prejudiced by a false start, was hurried. The general strike Galán was expecting at Saragossa failed to materialize. Nevertheless General Queipo de Llano and Major Ramón Franco initiated the revolt at the airport of Cuatro Vientos at Madrid the morning of December 15. They knew the fate of the Jaca rebels. They also knew on arriving at the airport that the expected general strike in Madrid had failed to materialize. Nevertheless, they proceeded, sending messages from the radio station at the airport proclaiming the republic. Two airplanes, their national colors covered with red disks, dropped manifestos over Madrid proclaiming the re-

²⁷ Graco Marsá, *La sublevación de Jaca*, Relato de un rebelde (Madrid: Zeus, 1931); *The Times* (December 15, 1930).

²⁸ Capitán Claridades (Vicente Clavel), *Fermín Galán y su Nueva Creación* (Barcelona: Cervantes, 1931), p. 85 ff.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

public and urging all soldiers to join the movement and so "avoid a civil war and show the world that the Spanish nation is capable of controlling its destinies in conformity with modern ideas of justice, peace and work, thus preventing passions from making innocent victims. Join us and deserve well of the country and of the republic. Should you be weak enough to oppose the national will, you will be the first victims. Unless you submit, your barracks will be bombed within half an hour." The shower of paper astounded Madrid but aroused no response. The revolt was readily crushed and Queipo and Franco escaped to Portugal.²⁹ From his Palace window Don Alfonso could hear the bombardment at the airport—a bombardment that in reality was battering away the last vestiges of the power of the Bourbons.

Simultaneously with the crushing of the Jaca and Madrid revolts several of the leaders of the Republican Directory in charge of the general national revolt were arrested, including Alcalá Zamora, Eduardo Ortega y Gasset and Miguel Maura. Others of the Directory escaped. A manifesto, signed by all twelve of the Republican Directory, bitterly attacking the monarchy, was circulated clandestinely through Spain.

The intensity of the Republican movement convinced many of the old parliamentary leaders like Romanones, Melquiades Alvarez, leader of the Reformist party, and others that an ordinary Cortes would not do and that a Constituent Cortes must be called. They issued a statement to the press December 18 declaring that they believed the nation should be permitted to express itself on the form of government and if necessary, to remodel the Constitution. Berenguer then resigned as Prime Minister February 14, 1931, moved by the attitude of the opposition parties and the threat of Republican abstention.

Don Alfonso then decided to seek a bold solution of the problem and called José Sánchez Guerra, former Conservative Prime Minister and now one of his bitterest enemies, to form a ministry. Sánchez Guerra accepted the task but conferred with the Republican leaders like Alcalá Zamora in the Model Prison (where they daily received a stream of visitors come to express their sympathy). Alcalá Zamora hailed the turn of events as a triumph for the revolution and reiterated that the Socialist-Republican Alliance formed in 1926 still existed. The Alliance would not take part in the government, he said, but would

²⁹ Comandante Franco, *Madrid bajo las bombas* (Madrid: Zeus, 1931), pp. 157-175; *The Times* (December 16, 1931).

OLD WINE IN NEW BOTTLES

wait for the "final triumph of the republic." The new cabinet would owe its origin to the revolt of December, he added.

Madrid was filled with rumors of a pronunciamiento and Alfonso's position was exceedingly grave. On the eighteenth Sánchez Guerra told those waiting at the Palace gate in reply to a question as to whether there would be a ministry, "Ah, that depends on what takes place upstairs." Half an hour later he returned, announcing that he had failed to form a cabinet but that he was grateful to the King for having called him. *El Debate*, the clerical newspaper, had characterized Sánchez Guerra's visit to the prison as a "destructive and anarchistic gesture such as no statesman in his senses would contemplate." Sánchez Guerra had suggested Melquiades Alvarez as the one to form a cabinet but the latter informed the King he could not do so unless Alfonso resigned certain of his prerogatives—a condition on which Sánchez Guerra had insisted also. February 18, however, saw the day end with a coalition Cabinet presided over by Captain General Aznar, who had been Minister of the Navy in Alhucemas' Cabinet which Primo demolished, and including Romanones, Duque de Maura and General Berenguer, the retiring Prime Minister. *The Times* remarked that "King Alfonso's attempt to temporize with his opponents has come to nothing. . . . The new Ministry is . . . more political and more normal than any since 1923. But it is very different in complexion from the government that might have been formed if King Alfonso's first conciliatory moves had been successful." Aznar said that his first duty was to preserve order—that his position reminded him of the first orders given by a captain putting out to sea: "To port and starboard watches." Romanones, in a circular letter to Spanish diplomatic representatives, explained that Sánchez Guerra had not been able to find the ministerial support he thought required from the left but that the King had interposed no objection to a Cortes Constituyentes.

Aznar announced February 20, in a message issued in Spanish, French and English, that the Cabinet would call *bona fide* elections for the municipal and provincial councils and for the Cortes, which would be constituent in character.

The campaign for the elections was a feverish one, with the Socialists abstaining from the municipal elections but promising to contest for the Cortes, but the Republican League (José Ortega y Gasset's group) and others entering the campaign actively. Colonel Macía, re-

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

turning from his Parisian exile, announced in Barcelona that he was "more separatist, if possible, than when I left."

Candidates for the municipal elections were named April 6.

The first election in eight years found Spain eager to vote. Under the Spanish election laws, voters must be twenty-five years of age and all must vote or else pay a penalty in extra taxes (a provision which did not guarantee everyone voting, however). Inasmuch as every municipality in Spain was to be renovated, there were 80,000 municipal officers to be elected, while the candidates for these posts numbered at least 150,000. In the April 6 election 11,811 royalists and 1,503 Republicans had been nominated unopposed. The central issue of the elections was the monarchy versus the republic, and in the elections of Sunday, April 12, the Republican slogan of "Your vote must be an arrow in the heart of the monarchy" prevailed. Madrid gave thirty Republicans seats compared to twenty royalists. Santander, where the King spent his summers, elected twenty-six Republicans to thirteen royalists.³⁰

As the results of the elections swiftly carried the news of the quick orientation of Spain, Aznar remarked to a question concerning the news of the day: "What greater news could there be than that a country which we all thought monarchist should have proclaimed itself republican overnight?"³¹ The majority of the twelve members of the Republican Directory met April 14 in the home of Doctor Marañón to formulate the bases of the new government. All day various politicians visited the Palace to confer with the King. Some advised him to wait for the Cortes Constituyentes, since the municipal elections were not of a character to indicate that a change in government was wanted, while others like Melquiades Alvarez advised him to yield to the republic. The Conde de Romanones, after conferring with Alcalá Zamora, arranged for the transfer of the powers of the monarchy to the republic.

At 7:30 P.M. April 14, Alcalá Zamora, Lerroux, Azaña, De los Ríos, Maura and Albornoze wended their way through the dense crowd on the Puerta del Sol and reached the Ministry of the Interior, where the Republican government began functioning, decreeing amnesty for all involved in political revolts (including themselves!). The new Republican Cabinet consisted of the members of the Republican Directory:

³⁰ *The Times*; A B C.

³¹ *The Times* (April 15, 1931).

OLD WINE IN NEW BOTTLES

Alcalá Zamora, President; Lerroux, Foreign Affairs; De los Ríos, Justice; Maura, Interior; Indalecio Prieto, Finance; Albornoz, Public Works; Marcelino Domingo, Education; Azaña, War; Casares Quiroga, Navy; Martínez Barrios, Economy; Largo Caballero, Labor. A Minister of Communications was later added; certain changes in the composition of the Ministry also took place later.

Alcalá Zamora called for a microphone to be installed and a few minutes later he was announcing the Republic of 1931 to Spain.

Don Alfonso ended his final conference with his Ministers at 6:40 P.M. April 14. At 9 o'clock that night he left in a motor car for Cartagena, his Queen and family to follow later. He stated that he entrusted their safekeeping to Spain and declared that he left Spain with a clear conscience and in order not to provoke a civil war.

"¡Viva España!" cried the King as he left the Palace. Only once did he betray the emotion he must have felt and that was when the halberdiers in the Palace lined up in salute and gave a *viva* for him. Alfonso raised his arm as if to speak. Unable to do so, he quickly strode to the lift and descended. Embarking at Cartagena on the "Principe Alfonso," the King gave a final "¡Viva España!" while from the streets fronting the naval arsenal could be heard the faint cries "¡Viva la República!"

Don Alfonso's statement to Spain, a noble expression of rectitude, was published April 17. It follows:

"The elections held on Sunday have revealed to me that I no longer hold the love of my people, but my conscience tells me that this attitude will not be permanent, because I have always striven to serve Spain with all my devotion, to the public interest, even in the most critical times. A king may make mistakes and without doubt I have done so on occasion, but I know that our country has always shown herself generous towards the faults of others committed without malice.

"I am King of all Spaniards and I am a Spaniard. I could find ample means to maintain my royal prerogatives in effective resistance to those who assail them. But I prefer to stand resolutely aside rather than provoke a conflict which might array my fellow-countrymen against one another in civil and fratricidal strife.

"I renounce no single one of my rights which, rather than being

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

mine, are an accumulated guardianship of which I shall one day have to render strict account.

*"I shall await the true will and full expression of the collective conscience and, until the nation speaks, I deliberately suspend my exercise of the royal power and am leaving Spain, thus acknowledging that she is the sole mistress of her destinies. Also I believe that I am fulfilling the duty which the love of my country dictates. I pray God that all other Spaniards may feel and fulfill this duty as sincerely as I do."*³²

Alfonso went into retirement in Paris, where the former royal family were treated as royalty incognito. Don Alfonso had given the greatest proof of his *españolismo*. How acute was the nostalgia for Spain which the King felt was revealed in the interview the Marqués de Luca de Tena held with the King and published in *A B C* May 5. What was the state of Spain, would the Catalan question be resolved, how was the government progressing? These and others were questions the monarch fired rapidly at his visitor.

"I am decided, absolutely decided, not to oppose the slightest difficulty in the way of the Republican government which for me, as for all, is in these moments the government of Spain," Alfonso declared. He urged all monarchists in Spain to support the government when patriotism indicated and strongly reprobated any attempt to incite a military revolt.

Luca de Tena expressed the Conservative feeling toward the monarchy in his concluding observations on this interview: "*A B C* remains where it has always been—with liberty, with order, with the integrity of the nation, with religion and with justice, that is ever to say in Spain, with the constitutional and parliamentary monarchy."

IV. THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF 1931

The Republican government, following Alcalá Zamora's broadcast from the office of the Minister of the Interior, began to function with rapidity and in a manner which brought it warm praise. The Republican tri-color of red, yellow and purple stripes, flew everywhere, except in Catalonia where as frequently the red and yellow Catalan flag was seen. The government issued a Statute embodying its rights and duties:

"The provisional government of the Republic, receiving its powers

³² *A B C* (April 17, 1931); *The Times* (April 16, 1931). The translation given is that of the latter.

OLD WINE IN NEW BOTTLES

from the will of the nation, fulfills an imperious duty in hastening to affirm that the alliance represented by this government is not a mere product of the lack of liberty denied to Spain under the old unpalatable structure of the monarchical regime but from the positive necessity of establishing as the basis of organization of the state standards of justice required and desired by the people.

"The provisional government, in this transitory character as the supreme organ of the sovereign functions of the state, accepts the high and delicate mission of establishing itself as the government with full powers. It is not the task of the government to draw up a charter of citizens' rights, the regulation of the principles of which is the sovereign function of a national constituent Assembly. But as 'full powers' invested in the provisional government must not imply arbitrary faculties, the government hereby solemnly affirms, before embarking on its duty of making decisions, that it will keep its acts within the bounds of certain juridical limits, which will be the directing principles of its conduct and the inspiration of its decrees.

"In virtue of the above, the government declares:

"First, that in view of the democratic origin of its powers, and considering the responsibilities which state functions entail, it will submit the individual and collective acts of Ministers to the judgment of the Cortes Constituyentes, the supreme direct organ of the national will.

"Secondly, responding to the unsatisfied and just aspirations of Spain, the provisional government, as a purging measure of the structure of state, decides in defense of the public interests to submit immediately to judgment for fixing responsibility those governmental acts pending examination when Parliament was dissolved in 1923, as well as those following; also to hold an open inquiry into the revision of official, civil, military and administrative decisions, so as to prevent a continuation of the prevarications and arbitrariness habitual of the late regime.

"Thirdly, the provisional government proclaims that it will respect in the fullest manner the individual conscience, granting liberty of beliefs and cults without the state's requiring citizens ever to reveal their religious convictions.

"Fourthly, the provisional government will endeavor to respect the individual liberties and rights, which, under the Spanish Constitution, make a statute of rights of citizens, and also will strive to increase

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

them by creating guarantees for the protection of individual rights, recognizing, as a principle of dogmatic jurisdiction, syndical and corporative personality as the basis of modern social legislation.

"Fifthly, it declares private property guaranteed by law and consequently cannot be expropriated except for the public utility with due indemnity. Nevertheless, the government, conscious of the conditions in which the immense mass of peasants lives, the neglect of agrarian economy, adopts as a norm of policy the recognition that agrarian legislation should be adequate to the social function of the land.

"Sixthly, in virtue of the reasons justifying the plenitude of its powers, the government would incur real delinquency if it abandoned the new-born Republic to those holding strong, centuries-old positions, who, with the means at hand, might hinder consolidation. Consequently, the provisional government submits temporarily the rights under paragraph four to government supervision, of which a full account will be rendered to the Cortes Constituyentes."³³

The government began the execution of many of the reforms Republicans had long sought. It admitted women to the full advantage of suffrage, it named the first woman (Victoria Kent) to responsible office in the state, created a Ministry of Communications, it named a commission to suggest agrarian reform, it took steps to stabilize finance and to curb the excessive expense and power of the military and it began consideration of a constitution to be submitted to the Cortes Constituyentes for which elections were held Sunday, June 29. The contests for the elections were marked with considerable disorder, a condition accentuated by the continuous era of strikes which seemed to plague the nation, and by the virtual retraining of the royalists, who protested that the government prevented a free expression of their program. The Socialists won a striking gain, doubling the number of the representatives they had held in the previous Cortes. Alejandro Lerroux with 133,789 votes in Madrid, received the greatest number of votes ever cast for any candidate in the capital. The royalists were in a decided minority, and thus history had repeated itself, for the composition and the manner of election of the Constituent Cortes of 1931 differed little from that of the tragic Cortes of 1873. The Republican Alliance with 145 Deputies had the greatest numerical strength in the Cortes, followed by the Socialists with 114. Other parties were repre-

³³ *The Times* (April 16, 1931).

OLD WINE IN NEW BOTTLES

sented as follows: Radical-Socialists, fifty-six; Catalan bloc, forty-two; right Republicans, twenty-eight; Galician Federalists, twenty-two; Agrarians, nineteen; Basque, sixteen; Independents, fourteen; pure Federalists, three; others, five. As in the Cortes of 1873, lawyers predominated, having a total of 123 represented in 1931, with teachers and professors counting 63.³⁴

Although Lerroix was the most popular Republican in Spain, Prieto, the Socialist leader, announced that the Socialists would not support a Radical ministry of Lerroix. Though Lerroix is a Federalist he is not a separatist, stating that "I want to be Catalan in the rest of Spain and Spanish in Catalonia." The position of the Socialists in the Cortes was a strong one, similar to that of the center party in 1873.

The Cortes inherited many problems created by federalism—the demands of such widely separated provinces as Galicia and Catalonia, Castile and the Basque, Valencia and Andalusia, for autonomy. The constitutional commission, over which Ossorio y Gallardo, one of Spain's greatest legal minds, presided, drew up a constitutional project for presentation to the Cortes, which began its sessions July 14, in which federation was made possible. The constitution itself declared Spain to be a democratic Republic. But the document, subject to amendment, was described as "federable." Some of the provisions of the document follow:

"Spain is a democratic Republic. The powers of its organisms emanate from the people. All orders and hierarchies of the state are subordinate to the civil power. The state is composed of provinces and these, of municipalities.

"Municipalities and provinces will enjoy autonomy within the limits set down by law.

"When one or various contiguous provinces are defined among themselves as a region, by the geographical and historical characteristics, they can be constituted an autonomous entity for political and administrative ends. The statute of relation with the state will be established in accord with the following conditions: (a) that three-fourths of the municipal corporations interested propose it; (b) that three-fourths of the electors of the provinces accept it by vote; (c) that the proper provincial deputations advise it; (d) that it be approved by

³⁴ *A B C.*

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

means of a law. The autonomous region, once constituted, will itself establish its interior regime in matters in which it is competent.

"All Spaniards are equal before the law. The equality of rights, in principle, of both sexes is recognized. . . . Liberty of conscience and the right to profess freely any religion is guaranteed in Spanish territory, save in respect due the exigencies of public morals. All religious confessions may exercise their beliefs, publicly and privately, without other limitations than those imposed by public order.

"Marriage, base of the family, is under the especial safeguard of the state. It is founded in the equality of rights for both sexes. Parents will be obligated, in respect to their children, to care for them, to educate them. . . . Civil laws will regulate the rights of children born out of wedlock and the investigation of paternity, in defense of them.

"Primary instruction is free and obligatory. The student has the right to religious instruction but the teacher cannot be obliged to give it against his conscience. . . . The liberty of the professorship is recognized and guaranteed in the constitution."

The Cortes would consist of two chambers, the Senate and the Congreso. Both would elect the president of the Republic, who could be any Spanish (born) citizen past forty years old. The president would serve six years and could not be re-elected. In addition, there would be a government consisting of a president and council of ministers responsible directly to the Cortes.³⁵

Church and state in Spain would be separate and the power of the army broken. The countless acres of waste land in Spain would be cultivated and Spaniards without farms would be placed on them. Social reform in accord with modern practices was planned.

Spain was moving forward. A great shadow hung over the Republic, however. It was Catalonia and the regional demands of other provinces, following in Catalonia's wake.

The Catalan problem continued to increase in seriousness following the proclamation of the independent Catalan Republic by Colonel Macía some hours before the Republic of Madrid was proclaimed April 14. Catalonia was the aggressor. It originated. It laid down the conditions to Madrid. Madrid could only profess optimism, however chagrined it might be.

³⁵ *A B C* (July 7, 1931).

OLD WINE IN NEW BOTTLES

A complete government, including a President and a *Minister of Defense*, was established by Macía, who issued this manifesto April 14:

"At the moment of proclaiming a Catalan state under a Republican regime, I greet you with all my soul and beg you to lend me your aid in upholding it by declaring it throughout your city and by preparing to defend it, when you are called upon, in the name of Catalan liberty, of the brotherhood of the peoples of Spain, and of international peace. Make yourself worthy of it—Francisco Macía, President of the Catalan Republic."

Macía explained to the correspondent of *The Times* the significance of the proclamation: "The creation of the Catalan Republic does not mean a hostile act against anybody. We do not wish to separate ourselves from Spain but to form part of the Spanish state of our own free will and not by force. Let Spain organize her republic and we, the Catalans, will organize ours. Afterwards we will meet to create a common government for the management of the many interests which connect us. But we will not tolerate a unitary regime, which would represent for us a slavery like that we have suffered under the Bourbons. The injustice which the Bourbons committed in 1714 we hope the Spanish people will not wish to support."

This attitude—an official expression—may well be contrasted with that expressed June 7 by Ventura y Gassol, also an official of the Catalan government, at Manresa: "We are not Spaniards nor can we be, because to be Spaniards one has to be born in Spain and we are born in Catalonia. We are not nor do we want to be Spaniards, although we want them to be our brothers."

On April 19 Catalonia and Spain reached an agreement providing for a *modus vivendi*, under which Catalonia would be known as the Generalidad of Catalonia. The agreement provided:

"That the Catalan people shall themselves draw up their own constitution and present it to the federal government which will in its turn submit it with government approval to the Cortes;

"That during the provisional period before the assembly of the Cortes the Catalan government shall share executive control with Madrid in the application of any decisions [in Catalonia] relating to matters of general interest;

"That Catalonia shall be deemed to have been completely inde-

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

pendent during the period between the declaration of the Catalan Republic and the agreement;

"That the acts of Colonel Macià's government during the time of Catalan independence have the full approval of the government and that the style of the region shall be the Generalidad of Catalonia."³⁶

Macià stated in commenting on this agreement that Catalonia was willing to "sacrifice some of its rights." He continued: "All will be well if the Cortes honor the agreement. If they do not, if our aspirations are not accepted, we shall defend them by all and every means in our power."

Catalan become the official language of the Generalidad but the Catalans accepted a decree of the Madrid government making both Catalan and Spanish official languages.

The Generalidad in its new-found position of co-equal partner with the Republic proceeded to draft a Statute defining its position within the Spanish Republic. This Statute was approved overwhelmingly Sunday, August 2, 1931 by the four Provinces constituting the Generalidad (Barcelona, Gerona, Lerida and Tarragona), a total of 593,961 votes of a possible vote of 792,587 being cast for it and only 3,275 against. This plebiscite assured the success of regionalism as a political theory in the Republic.³⁷

The preamble of the Catalan Statute, made public July 14, the day on which the Cortes Constituyentes met in Madrid, states that "The Generalidad restored and the Provincial Deputation reorganized, it becomes incumbent on these to state the faculties reserved to the central power of the Republic and those which are considered peculiarly and indispensably those of the government of Catalonia."

The Statute states that Catalonia wants the Spanish state to be constructed "in a manner which makes possible federation among all the hispanic peoples," that Catalonia seeks to perfect its school system in accord with modern methods and that it "as a redemption of the peoples of Spain, wants youth freed from the grief of military service" and that it wants the constitution of the nation to contain "the most humane declaration possible in favor of peace among nations. Neither our heart nor our mind is found perverted with any imperialistic aspiration nor are we under the threat of any secular enemy. We prohibit, then, and condemn in our constitution offensive wars and as the

³⁶ *The Times* (April 20, 1931).

³⁷ *A B C* (August 7, 1931).

OLD WINE IN NEW BOTTLES

most efficacious formula to consecrate this principle we declare that no citizen can be compelled to offer military service farther than the frontiers of the nation." This declaration of pacificism was incorporated later in the Spanish Constitution.

Certain articles of the constitution of Catalonia are interesting in revealing the federal nature of the charter as well as its liberality:

"Article One. Catalonia is an autonomous State within the Spanish Republic.

"Article Two. The power of Catalonia emanates from the people and is incarnate in the Generalidad.

"Article Three. The Generalidad of Catalonia includes the territory formerly embraced in the Provinces of Barcelona, Gerona, Lerida and Tarragona.

"Article Four. To unite other territories to that of Catalonia it is necessary:

"a. That three-fourths of the municipalities seeking union ask it;

"b. That the inhabitants of said territory accord it by means of a plebiscite within the respective municipalities and in the form of general elections;

"c. That the parliament of Catalonia and the Parliament of the Republic approve it.

"Article Five. The Catalan language is the official language of Catalonia; but in the relations with the government of the Republic the official language is Spanish.

"The Statute guarantees in the interior of Catalonia to those citizens whose mother tongue is Spanish the right to use it personally before elements of administration.

"Likewise citizens whose mother tongue is Catalan have the right to use it in their relations with official organisms of the Republic in Catalonia."

Article Thirty guaranteed religious freedom; Article Thirty-one provided for free primary instruction and insured that Spanish would be taught in all centers of population where in the past three years a minimum of forty children of Spanish language lived. Other articles carefully outlined the powers of the Generalidad and the Republic and assured among other things, that if military service was compulsory, Catalans would serve only in Catalonia.³⁸ Señor Macía personally pre-

³⁸ A B C (July 14, 1931).

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

sented the Catalan charter to President Alcalá Zamora August 14 in Madrid.

Regionalism was accepted eagerly by many of the old provinces and various Statutes were drawn up, including those of Estella, Andalusia, Vasconavarra and Valencia. Long accustomed to a unitary regime, the thought of a regionalized nation brought much bitter opposition. The Catalan Statute, Emiliano Iglesias, a Catalan Radical leader, complained solved nothing and aggravated everything. Taking the plebiscite placed the sovereignty before that of the Cortes. "The procedure ought to be inverted," he insisted. The Catalan Statute was not admissable, Miguel de Unamuno believed, because, if approved, "there would be many Spaniards who would have diminished citizenship in Catalan territory. The Catalans have falsified history to arrive at the conclusion that they were submitted to slavery." The Catalans were not proselyting in the rest of Spain, the Catalan Deputy Lluhi contended. "We do not pretend to impose our ideas on any region," he told the Cortes. The Catalan aspirations were those contained in the federal program of Pí y Margall. Although Alcalá Zamora had opposed even the mild autonomous measures designed for Catalonia in 1912, he confessed at the banquet in the Hotel Ritz August 14 that his views had changed on contact with the real situation, although he refrained from approving the Statute in its totality. The Catalan Statute and the Constitution of the Republic later drawn up both conformed with the spirit of the Pact of San Sebastián. Yet the royalist parties looked with disfavor on regionalism, as well they might since its success could well prove the surest safeguard of the Republic: "If Spain has to subsist and prosper, it cannot have more than one state," observed the conservative *A B C*. "For Spain to develop, for the regime to be consolidated with order and in peace, for the provinces to advance and progress in a sane and fruitful system, we will be the first to counsel concessions and divisions. But on condition of a solid, strong, indestructible national unity."

The Pact of San Sebastián promised religious liberty. Early in the Republic Dr. Quintin Segura, Cardinal Archbishop of Spain, later expelled from the nation, declared that the church was not interested in the orientation of the state but did want its rights respected. "*The history of Spain does not commence in this year,*" he said in his pastoral letter of May 6. "*We cannot renounce a rich patrimony of sacrifices*

OLD WINE IN NEW BOTTLES

and of glories accumulated through many generations. Catholics, particularly, cannot forget that, for the space of many centuries, the church and institutions gone today have lived together, either without being confused or absorbed, and that from their co-ordinated action were born immense benefits which impartial history has written in its pages with letters of gold. The church cannot link its fate with the vicissitudes of terrestrial institutions. These change, the church is changeless. . . .

"It is unnecessary to affirm a fact known to all, that the church has no predilection for any particular form of government. Which is the better can be discussed in the terrain of philosophical principles. . . ." The church, Doctor Sigura stated, had only the mission of peace in the state and it would not interfere with the orientation of the state. However, on its part, "it asks that its rights be respected."³⁹

Churches were attacked, homes of clerics were destroyed and the government by decree granted religious freedom. During the debates in the Cortes Constituyentes over the religious question, Alcalá Zamora revealed his unyielding Catholicism and resigned as President of the Council of Ministers, although he continued as provisional President of the Republic. Manuel Azaña assumed the duties of President of the Council of Ministers as well as that of Minister of War. The President of the Republic announced that he would devote the rest of his life toward obtaining a modification of the religious laws. Education was placed in the hands of the civil authorities; birth and marriage registration were made civil matters; and cemeteries were also made civil, despite the claim of the Conde de Romanones that from July 1 to December 31, 1931, the families of 7,859 persons in Madrid elected to have them buried in the Catholic cemeteries and only 134 chose the civil cemeteries. Early in January, 1932, the Order of the Jesuits was dissolved in accordance with Article Twenty-six of the Constitution.

V. A STATECRAFT OF SOCIAL UTILITY

"We are at a divide, in which one watershed corresponds to the past and the other to the future," Alcalá Zamora told the Cortes July 14, 1931. "For the government of the past is the last of the political revolutions and the first—would that it were the only one—of the social revolutions."

"I have great respect for our spiritual progenitors," declared Julian

³⁹ *Ibid* (May 7, 1931).

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

Besteiro, the great Socialist leader who was elected President of the Cortes Constituyentes, in his address to the Chamber, "but we must meditate on the errors of humanity which have to serve as lessons for the men of today. Esteeming the great men serving the Republic, those indisputable masters whose personalities stand in vast relief—Figueras, Pí y Margall, Salmerón, Castelar—I cannot render them an esteem purely formal but with a desire to learn from them, because fathers honor their children, who derive even from their defects greatness of soul.

"We are working in conditions immensely more favorable in relation to those in which the men of the liberal revolution were laboring. We find ourselves with a great part of the work done. I must say that during the Bourbon Restoration, during more than half a century of spiritual hiatus, of contempt for all work of the spirit, there were men who ploughed the furrows in the desert and sowed the seed whose fruit we are harvesting today.

"We possess conditions of giving this Cortes an orientation and even a distinct esthetics from that of previous ones. Here we are all workers, without distinction between laborers and intellectuals. How often is History invoked falsely! Culture, erudition are necessary but we must not lose sight of reality. The present moments are not prosaic, they are palpitating with ideals yet enveloped in reality."

It was the intense feeling of the social obligations of the Republic, of the reality of conditions, which actuated the Cortes and the provisional government. The constitutional project "is in reality founded on Spanish life," Ossorio, chairman of the preliminary commission explained. "Operating on a living body, we have encountered the provinces and have respected those which proclaimed their autonomy." The project was designed to embody the best features of current opinion and the most modern constitutions, particularly that of Weimar, were used as patterns. "These are certain concepts expressed with the same words that the German constitution uses because we did not find others that were better," Ossorio explained. It was this modern feeling, this Europeanization, which led the provisional government to install microphones in the Congreso so that debates could be broadcast.

Thousands of schools were established by the provisional government. The army was reorganized. The office of captain general, that

OLD WINE IN NEW BOTTLES

useful agent of suppression of the Bourbons, was suppressed. The number of officers was reduced from 21,000 to 8,000, regimental strength was increased from 80 men to 1,200, the number of divisions and staffs was halved and the strength of the army was reduced two-thirds, Premier Azaña told the Cortes December 3. Able attention was directed to the agrarian problem. Orense had called the attention of the Cortes of the first Republic to this great weakness of Spain. Almost three-fifths of the land of Spain is either uncultivated or cultivated only in part. Much of the land was held by a few proprietors.⁴⁰ Some attempt had been made in previous years to remedy the situation through colonization. Under the Law of González Besada in 1907 systematic colonization and repopulation was undertaken. The Military Directory in 1926 attempted to hasten the process. The Republic devised a new law, designed to repopulate the land, to create small farms to aid the new farmers.⁴¹

The Cortes Constituyentes labored during the hot summer of 1931, consolidating the Republican regime. Don Alfonso XIII was outlawed November 26, following a dramatic debate. The death of Don Jaime de Borbón in Paris October 2 removed another threat to the Republic. The Pretender was a bachelor and died without a male heir. The Cortes named a new constitutional commission with a young Socialist, Luis Jiménez Asua, as chairman. This commission drew up a new constitution, based in part on Ossorio's and presented it August 17.

"It is not a constitution of the Socialist type," Jiménez Asua explained, "but of a type very advanced, as corresponds to the reality of the present moment. We did not write a constitution for a monarchy without a king. . . . In the social order the constitution is very advanced. We have made a concession to the bourgeois regime with the recognition of private property and another to the working classes with the possibility of gradually socializing the land."

The new project was modified considerably by the Cortes itself before final adoption December 9. This Constitution, the ninth for Spain in 120 years, was approved by 368 votes to none against, although the Agrarian bloc and the Vasconavarra group refrained from voting.

⁴⁰ Cristóbal de Castro, *Al servicio de los campesinos: Hombres sin tierra, tierra sin hombres* (2d ed., Madrid: Morata, 1931).

⁴¹ *A B C* (August 28, 1931).

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

The Constitution guards against two evils which most profoundly injured the Bourbon monarchy—the interference in municipal government and regional administration. By means of the initiative and referendum it grants to the people themselves a direct check on the laws.

There are three branches of the government, the executive, the legislative and the judicial. Except military men or retired military men of less than ten years retired standing, ecclesiastics or members of any ruling house, any citizen who is forty years old or more may be elected President of the Republic, to serve for a period of six years. He is to be elected by the Cortes and by an electoral college of "umpires," equal in number to the membership of the Cortes and elected by popular suffrage. An exception to this form of election was made in the case of the first President, who was elected by the Cortes alone. The President names the President of the government and the Ministers suggested by the latter. His responsibility is sharply defined. The legislative branch consists of a Congress of Deputies elected for a period of four years, at the end of which time it must be renewed completely. Any citizen twenty-three years old is eligible to be a Deputy and he may be re-elected indefinitely. When the Cortes is dissolved or when its term has expired, new elections must be held within sixty days following such dissolution or expiration and the Cortes so elected must meet within thirty days after election. The judiciary consists of a Supreme Court and lesser courts, and a special court, that of Constitutional Guarantees. This latter court is the final recourse to test the constitutionality of laws, to sustain individual guarantees, legislative competence, the criminal responsibility of the President and of members of the Supreme Court.

The Constitution may be amended at the proposal of the government or of one-fourth of the members of the Cortes, such proposal to designate the specific Articles or sections to be amended. The proposal, to be accepted as a part of the Constitution, must go through the following process: It must be approved by two-thirds of the Deputies of the Cortes during the first four years of "constitutional life" and by an absolute majority thereafter. The Cortes accepting the proposal to reform the Constitution is dissolved automatically on doing so, new elections must be held within sixty days and the new Cortes must then vote on the amendment. Thus one Cortes accepts the proposal to re-

OLD WINE IN NEW BOTTLES

form and its successor makes or rejects the reform, according to the will of the people expressed in a general election.

Other provisions of the Constitution include:

In Article One.—“The Republic constitutes an integral state compatible with the autonomy of municipalities and regions.

“Article Two. All Spaniards are equal before the law.

“Article Three. The Spanish state has no official religion.

“Article Four. Spanish is the official language of the Republic. Every Spaniard has the obligation of knowing it and the right of using it, without prejudice of the rights that the laws of the state extend to the languages of the provinces or regions. Save as provided in special laws, no one may be required to know or use any regional language.

“Article Five. The capital of the Republic is fixed in Madrid.

“Article Six. Spain renounces war as an instrument of national policy.

“Article Seven. The Spanish state will respect the universal norms of international law, incorporating them in its legal code.

“Article Eight. The Spanish state, within the irreducible limits of its present territory, will be integrated by municipalities joined in provinces and by regions which are constituted in autonomous regimes. The sovereign territories in North Africa will be organized in an autonomous regime in direct relation with the central power.

“Article Nine. All municipalities of the Republic will be autonomous in matters of their competence, and will elect their corporations by equal, direct and secret universal suffrage, save when functioning in the regime of open council. Mayors will be designated always by direct election of the people or by the corporation.

“Article Eleven. If one or more contiguous provinces with common historical, cultural and economic characteristics agree to be organized in an autonomous region to form a politico-administrative nucleus within the Spanish state, they will present their statute in conformity with Article Twelve. . . . Once approved, the statute will be the basic law of the politico-administrative organization of the autonomous region and the Spanish state will recognize and maintain it as an integral part of its juridic ordinances.

“Article Twelve. For approval of the statute of the autonomous region the following conditions are necessary:

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

"(a). That a majority of its [the region's] municipal corporations propose it, or, when less, those whose municipalities contain two-thirds part of the electoral census of the region;

"(b). That it be accepted by the procedure indicated by the electoral law, by at least two-thirds of the enrolled voters of the region. If the plebiscite is negative, the proposal of autonomy may not be renewed until five years have passed;

"(c). That the Cortes approve it.

"Article Thirteen. In no case may a federation of autonomous regions be admitted."

"Article Twenty-four. Based on an effective international reciprocity and by means of the requisites and procedures a law will fix, citizenship may be conceded to the natives of Portugal and the hispanic countries of America, including Brazil, when these ask it and live in Spanish territories, without losing or modifying their original citizenship.

"Article Twenty-six. All religious confessions are considered as associations submitted to a special law. The state, the regions, the provinces and the municipalities will not maintain, favor or aid economically churches, associations and religious institutions. A special law will regulate the total extinction, in a maximum period of two years, of the subsidy to the clergy." (The rest of this Article provides for the dissolution of religious orders considered dangerous to the state and for the nationalization of their property.)

Religious freedom is granted and guaranteed and cemeteries are placed under civil jurisdiction in Article Twenty-seven. Unfortunately, the Constitution permits the suspension of certain constitutional guarantees, following the bad precedent of previous constitutions.

In Article Forty-three—"Fathers have the same duties towards children born out of wedlock as they have to those born within it. The civil laws will regulate the investigation of paternity.

"Article Forty-four. All wealth of the country, whoever be the owner, is subordinate to the interests of national economy. . . . The ownership of all classes of goods may be the object of forced expropriation for social utility, by means of adequate indemnity. . . . With the same requisites, property may be socialized.

"Public services and exploitations that effect the common interests may be nationalized in cases in which social necessity requires it.

OLD WINE IN NEW BOTTLES

"The state may intervene by law in the exploitation and co-ordination of industries and enterprises when the rationalization of production and the interests of national economy require.

"In no instance may goods be confiscated."

Article Forty-five states that all artistic and historic wealth of the country constitutes a national treasure and must be registered with the state.

"Article Forty-six. Labor, in its various forms, is a social obligation and will enjoy the protection of the laws." The farmer is likewise protected in the following Article, providing for indemnity in case of failure of harvest, for establishment of experimental stations and agricultural colleges, etc.

The Constitution makes an integral part of its laws such treaties it makes and inscribes with the League of Nations.

The Republic is defined in Article One as "a democratic Republic of workers of all classes, organized in a regime of liberty and justice."⁴² This was the definition of Señor Besteiro.

Following the adoption of the Constitution, on the next day, December 10, the Cortes elected the first President in conformity with the constitutional provisions. Niceto Alcalá Zamora, Chairman of the the Republican Revolutionary Directory and provisional President, was elected, receiving 362 votes out of 410 cast.⁴³ Alcalá Zamora is a lawyer, and was born July 6, 1877 in Priego, Province of Córdoba. He was first elected to the Cortes as a Liberal in 1905. He became sub-Secretary of the Interior, resigning in 1913. He left the section of the Liberal party headed by Romanones and joined the Liberal Democratic group in 1914. He served as Minister of Public Works in 1917 and as Minister of War in Alhucemas' Cabinet in 1922. He announced himself a Republican April 13, 1930 in an address at Valencia. The President is amply provided for, receiving a total of 2,250,000 pesetas for all purposes. Shortly after his election, President Alcalá Zamora made a triumphal tour of the southern cities. Later, he visited Catalonia and in the autumn of 1932 he continued his program of cementing

⁴² *Constitución política de la república Española* (Madrid: Galo Sáez, 1931).

⁴³ Don Joaquín Pí y Arsuaga, a son of Francisco Pí y Margall, second president of the first Republic, received ten votes for President.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

provincial solidarity by visiting the Basque Provinces.⁴⁴ His election meant the beginning of real parliamentary government in Republican Spain.

The Republican structure was not complete, however, with the election of Alcalá Zamora. The promise of the Pact of San Sebastián remained to be fulfilled. The Catalan Statute proved the most severe test of the Republic, for it aroused the conservatives and the royalists to determined opposition and it hastened inevitable divisions within the various Republican parties. Despite the fact that the debates were held during the hot summer months of 1932, the decorum of the Cortes was not unduly disturbed, thanks to the skill of President Besteiro and the unflinching good humor of Manuel Azaña, President of the Council of Ministers. Miguel Maura, leader of the Conservative Republican party, was the spokesman of the opposition, vigorously aided by Antonio Royo Villanova, a Deputy from Valladolid and the Radical party. The Socialists, approving the Statute, expelled from their membership José Algora, a Deputy of Saragossa, who voted against Article Two of the Statute. Opposition to the Statute developed in Aragon as well as Castile. Thousands crowded into the Plaza de Toros of Madrid July 27, 1932 to cheer the protest of the Madrid mercantile group. The manifesto of the sponsors of the meeting, signed among others by Royo Villanova who had become a hero to the conservatives for his intransigence towards the Statute, declared in part: "The Catalan Statute . . . is the juridic consecration of the rupture of the national unity, an epitome of political and economic exemptions which irritates and annoys, leaving the national soul afflicted." Señor Macía declared that the meeting was an attack on Catalonia, another instance of that mentality among the Madrileños "inherited by many elements from Austrian and Bourbon domination which seeks to destroy all initiative of the other peoples."⁴⁵

The Catalan debate engrossed Spain's attention as no other problem could during 1932. Macía and Catalan leaders attended the celebration at Manresa of the fortieth anniversary of the Declaration of Manresa

⁴⁴ Although he was received with cordiality in most cities, when President Alcalá Zamora visited the village of Zaráiz in the Province of Guipúzcoa September 12, the merchants and residents closed their doors and refused to sell while the President was in the village. The Mayor was removed by the Civil Governor as a result. *La Prensa* (New York, September 14, 1932).

⁴⁵ *A B C*, July 30, 1932.

OLD WINE IN NEW BOTTLES

in June. The *Unió Catalanista*, founded at the historic meeting in Manresa which laid the foundation for the regional demand of Catalonia, issued in July an appeal to the League of Nations for adoption of the original Statute, then undergoing parliamentary assault in Madrid. The action of the Cortes in revising the Statute was stated as being another negation of the rights of Catalonia. "If the Spanish Cortes claims to lay its hand upon Catalan territory, Catalonia will continue to be submitted, against its will, to the domination which the Bourbon monarchy imposed on it," the manifesto stated.⁴⁶ The *Unió* earlier had asked Macía to resubmit the revised Statute as amended by the Cortes for the approval of the Catalans, since the new one "annulled" as well as "contradicted" the original. The Madrid Junta of the Liberal Democratic party urged Melquiades Alvarez, chief of the party, to seek a plebiscite of the nation on the Statute, affirming that "Spain cannot accept the sad and resigned position of a people which forgets its tradition and loses its pulse. It is preferable rather to concede total independence, with our frontier at the Ebro."

Azaña, however, was undeterred from his purpose to fulfill the Pact of San Sebastián. Installing a new local of the *Acción Republicana* in Madrid in June, he explained his concept of Spain which revealed how fortunate the nation was in having its political destiny in such catholic hands: "When we say Spaniard, we do not give to this word a new sense, because it is rooted in that which is most profound in the history of our country. This is our meaning of Spaniard which does not cling to a regime, particularly the preceding one, or to a structure of the state, but rather which has a character and a vitality of its own fixed in the common sentiment of the people, upon which we seek to raise by the Republic, with the Republic and upon the Republic a free, just and fruitful Spain which has for us gratitude, or at least, respect." Urbane, good humored, he adhered to his program through the summer. When Miguel Maura urged him to prorogue the Cortes until October, he refused.

"For my part, I receive mountains of telegrams and letters from all of Catalonia, urging me to keep up my campaign of opposition to the Statute," Maura told Azaña.

"That may be," replied Azaña, "but also it is true that all of Spain does not think as you do."

⁴⁶ *A B C*, July 22, 1932.

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

"You are deceived," the Conservative retorted. "All Spain is opposed to the Statute and because of that I affirm that it will not pass, notwithstanding that the government engages it shall."

The President of the Council laughed. "You explain your attitude perfectly. But since you want to rout the government, I tell you that when you achieve it, you will rabidly defend the application of the Statute and I will help you from the opposition."

"Yes, if the Statute is law, I will comply with it as with all other laws," Maura admitted.

"Yes, yes!" Azaña concluded humorously; "what you want is that I resolve the regional problem and let you take up the government with clean hands."⁴⁷

The Cortes continued its discussions of the articles of the Statute and the Agrarian Law through the summer. Article Two of the Statute provoked the most debate because it involved the greatest injury to Spanish pride in making Catalan and Spanish the dual languages of the Generalidad; but it was approved June 23 by a vote of 191 to 112. Despite numerous modifications, the Cortes approved the Statute substantially as submitted to it by the Generalidad. The Agrarian Law, although it did not satisfy the Agrarian party, was also passed. Both measures became laws September 9; the Statute was approved by a vote of 314 to 24, the Agrarian Law, 318 to 19. The long debate ended, the announcement that the Statute had been approved was greeted with applause. Deputies stood on their feet and gave the Catalan Deputies an ovation. There were *vivas* for Catalonia, for Spain and for the Republic. When a Deputy gave the royalist cry of "¡Viva España!" a Catalan cried: "¡Viva nuestra Cataluña!"⁴⁸

The Statute realized almost on the centennial of Castelar's birth and exactly a hundred years after the first enunciation of the theory, the federal principle for which Republicans had fought so long. It permitted, as President Macía said, "the government of Catalonia by ourselves." And while the Statute curtailed in a measure Catalonia's freedom of action, it left the internal management of the Generalidad under the control of Barcelona. It was the goal for which Pí y Margall had struggled so long. It permits Catalonia the use of its language; the administration within the Generalidad of the laws of the Republic; the development of education; in a word, of the Catalan personality.

⁴⁷ *Idem*.

⁴⁸ *El Sol* (Madrid, September 10, 1932).

OLD WINE IN NEW BOTTLES

It satisfied Macía. On the eve of the passage of the Statute he expressed his pleasure to *El Sol*: "Even though the Statute being approved is not that made by the Cortes of the Generalidad, it is a Statute, nevertheless, which confers on us all the services which are proper to an autonomous State, although more limited than we had sought; but it will permit in every manner the government of Catalonia to perform those services proper to the being and will of the Catalan people."⁴⁹ "The future is now in our hands," Luis Companys, the leader of the Catalan parliamentary group, exclaimed. "Catalonia has had recognized by the Cortes Constituyentes of the Republic the Statute which initiates the admission of its liberties. It is not all which we ask nor all that the Constitution permits; but it grants our people enough to be accepted with dignity. . . . Catalonia marks the beginning of the new state structure."⁵⁰ Azaña, whose persistence against all obstacles had done as much as anything to make the Statute a law, told the Catalans in a radio address that the Statute "restored the political essence of Catalan tradition." Shortly after Barcelona learned of the passage of the Law, the streets were filled with crowds alternately cheering Macía and Azaña, Spain and Catalonia; Spanish and Catalan flags were displayed everywhere. The climax was reached September 11—the Catalan Day observing the anniversary of the death of Rafael Casanova on resisting the destruction of Catalan liberties in 1714—when several hundred thousand persons visited the statue of Casanova. "With the Republic we have conquered the Bourbons," Macía declared in an address at the foot of the Casanova monument. "We return to where we were in 1714. Today we feel free with the other peoples of Spain within this Republic, which inaugurates a new era of liberty."

Fittingly enough, President Alcalá Zamora affixed his signature to the Statute September 15 in the presence of Catalan and Basque Deputies at San Sebastián, marking the completion of the Pact of San Sebastián and the beginning of the Commonwealth of Spain.

⁴⁹ *El Sol* (September 8, 1932).

⁵⁰ *El Sol* (September 10, 1932). Antonio Royo Villanova declared that, ironically enough, the debates on the Statute terminated on the anniversary of the centenary of the birth of Castelar, a greater irony since "Castelar, who began in federalism, ended being a decided unitarian. . . . I have been educated in the political ideals of Castelar . . . whose banner always was 'Nation, liberty, Republic.'" *El Sol* (September 8, 1932).

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

If the Statute crowned the work of Pí y Margall, the Agrarian Law was a fitting climax to the work of Orense and Garrido. Orense had sought to revive agriculture by cultivating idle land; Garrido had sought to improve the condition of the farmer through co-operative societies. The Agrarian Law accomplishes both, for it nationalizes the administration of agriculture through an Institute of Agricultural Reform, permits the confiscation of the great estates of absentee grandees, and places farmers on idle acres and grants special consideration to the co-operative societies. The Law was opposed by the Agrarian (Catholic) party because it threatened "a national economic disaster" through its permitting the confiscation of large estates. To others, the Law was the most important legislation of the Republic as well as the "most advanced" agricultural law in the world.⁵¹

Not only was the preliminary structure of the New Spain complete but the Republic had weathered a trial by fire a month earlier; and as a result it discredited the monarchists and increased the solidarity of the Republican parties. Directed as it was against the Azaña government, the revolt of August 10 drew Catalonia closer to Madrid than it had been at any time during the year and a half of polemics over the position of the Generalidad. Conservatives had expressed much dissatisfaction at the continuance of the Law of the Defense of the Republic under which newspapers were frequently fined, meetings of monarchist or neo-Catholic groups interdicted and the spirit of the Constitution violated. There was much justice in their complaint because the attitude of the government toward free speech and a free press had much in it of the monarchical regime. In spite of this, however, the government had permitted many civil servants who had served under Don Alfonso to remain at their posts.

Rumors of a revolt current in Madrid the night of August 9 permitted the government to take sufficient precaution that on the morning of the tenth it dispersed easily the several bands of a hundred men who marched toward the Ministry of War while an exchange of shots

⁵¹ Don José Martínez de Velasco, leader of the Agrarian party, declared the Law "destroys proprietorship and does not create another." Don Lucio Martínez, a Socialist leader, thought the Law "timid." Don Juan Díaz del Morel of the *Al Servicio de la República* party declared it is "the most advanced in the world." *El Sol* (September 9, 1932). Two valuable studies on agrarian reform in Spain are: Cristóbal de Castro, *Al servicio de los campesinos* (Madrid: Javier Morata, 1931) and Mateo Azpeitia, *La Reforma agraria en España* (Madrid: Reus, 1932).

OLD WINE IN NEW BOTTLES

soon dispersed a mixed group of boys and soldiers at the Plaza de Cibeles, in the heart of the capital. The revolt was over before dawn and cavalry from the Remount station at Alcalá de Henares on their way to second the movement, reconsidered.

Far more serious was the Republican revolt of General José Sanjurjo Sacanell, one of Spain's distinguished soldiers. Sanjurjo had been commander of the Spanish forces in Morocco. Later, he became commander of the Civil Guard; in that post he had accepted the advent of the Republic in April, 1931, thus assuring a bloodless Revolution. The Republic had maintained him at the post, but in 1932 it named him commander of the Carabineers. He was a professed and trusted Republican general. He left Madrid in an automobile the night of August 9 for Seville, accompanied by his son Captain Justo Sanjurjo y Jiménez Peña and his adjutant. The next morning he pronounced against the Azaña government at Seville, declaring himself captain general of Andalusia, dissolving the Cortes and removing the Civil Governor.

Sanjurjo's was a pronunciamiento in the best tradition. Although seconded for the moment by the Civil Guard—an unheard of occurrence—and troops, Sanjurjo was dealing with a new kind of Spain—a Spain of parliamentary procedure. Although telegraphic communication with Seville had been interrupted, Azaña in Madrid realized the seriousness of the pronunciamiento and did not disguise it from the Cortes. Parliament granted him a vote of confidence. When Azaña had finished speaking, the President of the Cortes announced the Order of the Day. This eloquent contrast to by-gone eras was the best commentary on the efficacy of the new regime which proceeded with confidence and in parliamentary paths. In the meantime troops were on their way from Madrid and from Morocco (including some Riffian troops who had fought against Sanjurjo and who had since enlisted in the Spanish army), and Calvino, Governor General of the Basque Provinces and Navarre, soon reached Seville. Sanjurjo was having no easy time in establishing himself, for the Socialists bitterly opposed him and the labor unions called a general strike. When it was learned that the General's claim that all of Spain had seconded the movement was false, Colonel González Polanco, in command of a regiment, refused to obey Sanjurjo's orders. Soon Sanjurjo's position was untenable and he secretly left the city by automobile. *En route* to Huelva

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

a soldier who had served under him in Morocco recognized him and placed him under arrest. The pronunciamiento aroused much disturbance in southern Spain and was followed by disorders, the burning of churches and buildings, the persecution of all known to be royalists. The Madrid revolt had been of an hour's duration; that of Seville ended by 3:30 A.M. August 11, when telegraphic communication was resumed with Madrid.

While the revolt at Madrid enlisted the sympathetic interest of royalists,⁵² Sanjurjo disclaimed any intention to restore Don Alfonso XIII. He protested at his trial that he sought a change in Republican regimes, the entry of the Conservatives in the government. His manifesto is neither Republican nor Monarchist. After reciting the abuses of the Azaña government, its "despotism" which had afflicted all classes from laborers and capitalists to ecclesiastics, the manifesto continued: "Revolutions will always be a crime or a species of madness wherever justice and right prevail; but it is not justice or right where tyranny prevails, justifiable means which we copy from the Revolution made in April, 1931. Sadder moments were those others of the year and a half of tyrannical sectarianism of national economy which has suffered the loss of millions upon millions; Parliament has been made a mockery and a derision most strongly arraigned by the majority of Spaniards; the organs of defense have been destroyed and the armed corps have been grossly insulted; crime has increased to an alarming extent. . . .

"For love of Spain and at the command of our conscience and of our duty, which urges us to save her from ruin, from iniquity and from dismemberment, we accept from this moment the responsibility of the government of the country and assume all the functions of the public power with the character of a provisional junta. The Cortes which are illegitimate in their origin by the regime of terror in which they were convoked and founded, and factious by the extension of their functions . . . have been dissolved. We do not come to impose a political regime against the Republic but to free Spain from alarm which in only one year has occasioned such serious moral and material

⁵² The Municipal Corporation of Madrid roundly condemned the revolt as a "criminal event which pretends the restoration in Spain of the Bourbon monarchy." The royalist newspaper *A B C* and the clerical *El Debate* (which, though critical, had accepted the Republic) were suspended and their property confiscated along with several other newspapers of the right, by the government. *El Sol* (August 13, 1932).

OLD WINE IN NEW BOTTLES

damage. The form in which the powers of the state have to be organized will be determined by the legitimate representatives of all citizens . . . in a regime of liberty."⁵³ Despite the General's disclaimer, the government proceeded in arresting hundreds of royalists and military leaders, including Generals Barrera and Calvalcanti, accused of being the real leaders of the revolt, the sons of Primo de Rivera, and a brother-in-law of Don Alfonso XIII. General Sanjurjo was sentenced to death August 25 but in response to wide-spread pleas for clemency, including the petitions of the mother of Captain Galán and the widow of Captain García Hernández, the Ministry commuted the sentence to life imprisonment. Captain Sanjurjo was found not guilty.⁵⁴

And so the Republic of New Spain entered its second phase of government of the people through the people, with the respect of a nation long disheartened by governmental weakness, with the promise of peace and legal processes to supplant the anachronisms of the pronunciamiento and the retraimiento. There was promise that the doctrine of social utility was slowly bearing fruit in the new schools and libraries over the land, in the new farms and the new farmers, in the new religious and intellectual freedom, in the new gospel of social happiness, in the new kings of Spain, its citizens.

⁵³ *El Sol* (August 11, 1932); *The Times*.

⁵⁴ *El Sol*; *The Times*. The latter newspaper declared in a leader: "Spanish Monarchism may have lost its appeal—though incidentally it is far from certain that the Republicans really won the municipal elections which broke the Monarchy—but there is a very large Conservative and Republican element in the country which resents the marked partisanship of the present Government. The persecution of the Catholic Press, however constitutional its criticisms, the prohibition of Conservative Roman Catholic meetings, and the frequency with which critics or alleged critics of the Administration have been arrested and imprisoned without trial explain their resentment. . . . The tendency to prefer revolutionary methods to organized political activity is an old vice of Spanish Conservative opinion. The Republican Government, on the other hand, have gained prestige by the cool efficiency with which they suppressed the revolt. . . ." The fact that so many retired army officers participated in the revolt was explained by *Le Temps* (Paris) by the reform of the army: "The Republican government estimated, not without reason, that the number of officers was disproportionate, there being 20,000 officers for 130,000 men divided among 138 meagre regiments. . . . It is inevitable that the New Spain, after almost a year and a half of democratic reform, should know disputes. . . . The failure of the anti-Republican revolt begun yesterday by various military leaders confirms the fact that this regime on the other side of the Pyrenees has from today bases which will not be destroyed easily."

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TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

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INDEX

- Accord of Amorevieta, 161
- Acosta, Juan, Minister of War in second Republican Cabinet, 189
- Agriculture, status of and problems of, 42, 183; agrarian reform law of Orense, 284; agrarian problem in Modern Spain, 389; Agrarian Law approved, 396; its provisions, 398; a victory for Orense and Garrido, 398
- Alcalá Galiano, decree on freedom of professors, 78
- Alcalá Zamora, Niceto, President of Spain, announces Republic of 1931, 7; Chairman of Republican Revolutionary Committee, 372; revolt of 1930, 372; imprisoned, 374; Provisional President of Spain, 377; resigns presidency of Council of Ministers over Catholic question, 387; elected President of Spain, 393; his life, 393; approves Catalan Statute, 397
- Alcoy, disturbance of Internationale in, 241
- Alexander of Russia, intervention through Holy Alliance in Spain, 21
- Alfonsinos, coalition with Carlists and Republicans in 1871, 151; Cánovas del Castillo named chieftan, 286; refuse to participate in National Republic, 328
- Alfonso VII, adopts title of Emperor of Spain, 5
- Alfonso XII, purchases palace for Francisco de Asis, 39; birth of, 55; as candidate for throne in 1868, 100; in training at Sandhurst, 136; rights to throne reserved him by Isabel, 137; Prim's attitude towards, 137; name of, presented by Miraflores, 144; pronunciamiento for, suspected by Barcelona, 192; receives Holy Eucharist from Pius IX, 338; Manifesto of Sandhurst, 338; Pronunciamiento of Martínez Campos for, 340; restored, 344; Spain's reception of, 357; character of, 357; death of, 357
- Alfonso XIII, birth of, 357; King in fact, 360; conflict of his feudal state with modern feeling of nation, 361; events of 1917, 363-364; accused of intervention in Morocco, 364; Annual disaster turning point of reign, 365; accepts Pronunciamiento of Primo de Rivera, 366; advice to King, 367; Alfonso's opinion of Directory, 367; damage to, 369-370; indictment of, by Republicans, 370; mistake in permitting execution of Galán, 373; calls on Sánchez Guerra to form ministry, 374; obtains compromise Ministry, 375; advice to, on learning results of municipal elections, 376; leaves Spain, 377; statement to nation, 377; interest in Spain and Republican settlement, 378; retirement from Spain, 1, 2; outlawed, 389
- Algeciras, Canton of, 246
- Alicante, attacked by Cartagena cantonalists, 245
- Alliance of Socialist Democracy, 155; program of, 157
- Almansa, Canton of, 245
- Alonso Martínez, Minister of Justice, 333
- Altadill, Antonio, Civil Governor of Murcia, aid in forming Canton of Cartagena, 243 ff.; removed by Salmerón, 261
- Amadeo de Saboya, King of Spain, renunciation of throne, 1, 2; "crowned mannequin," 1; visits Isabel 1865, 88; candidature of, 143; accepts throne, 144; elected King, 146; character and task facing, 147; Madrid's reception of, 150; swears to Constitution, 150; royal progress of, 152; calls on Ruiz Zorrilla to form ministry, 152; importance of Internationale, 157; situation of, in 1872, 159; calls on Serrano to form ministry, 161; refuses to suspend constitutional guarantees, 162; effect on dynasty of decision, 162; sufferance nearing end, 162;

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

- attempt to assassinate him and Queen, 163; Castelar's comment on reign, 164; considers resigning throne, 166; his failure and interview with Serrano, 166; number "191" in career of, 167; incident at presentation of Don Luis, 167-168; announces intention of resigning, 168; renunciation of, 169; leaves Spain, 170; debate in Cortes over renunciation, 174 ff.; renunciation accepted, 178; message to Cortes, 178; four of his Ministers in first Republican Cabinet, 180; nation not ready for him, 348; rare example of following path of legality, 348
- Andalusia, state in 1873, 216, 234, 260; "hope of future" to Pi, 239; steps to restore order in, under Pi, 240; pacified, 266
- Andújar, Canton of, 246
- Angoulême, duc d', dissolves Cortes, 21
- Annual disaster, 365
- Anrich, Frederico, Minister of Navy, 209; renamed, 219; sent to Cartagena, 244
- Aparisi y Guijarro, Carlista leader, interview with Carlos VII, 138
- Aragon, Kingdom of, 5; under Carlos VII, 215
- Arahal, Canton of, surrenders, 265
- Araus, Alberto, intransigent, Minister of Interior in Spanish Federation, 262
- Armentia, Angel, proposes national convention, 219; final tribute to Castelar, 322
- Army, intervention in politics for first time, 21; importance to throne from Carlista War, 30; number of high officers in, 30; disproportionate amount spent on it in relation to education, 183; dissolution of, in 1873, 186; debate over indiscipline in, 187; fraternizes with people in Barcelona, 191; attitude of Republic towards, 202; rebellion in ranks hampers campaign against Carlitas, 224; unearned promotions dangerous, 224; need for restoration of discipline, 231; strong, orderly army urged by Castelar, 238; Salmerón's promise to restore discipline in, 257; state of revolt in, 287; restoration of death penalty sought by officers, 287; ordinances in, restored, 295; strengthened under Serrano, 332; re-entry in politics of, in 1917, 363; reorganized, 388; captain general rank abolished, 388
- Artillery corps, part reorganization played in resignation of Amadeo, 167; reorganization of, urged by Castelar, 238; reorganization hampered by Hidalgo's presence, 287; reorganization of, by Castelar, 297
- Association, right of, urged by Orense in 1844, 36; by Castelar, 57; by Junta of Madrid in 1868, 99; by Septembrists, 107; guaranteed by Constitution of 1869, 111; involved in outlawing Internationale, 157
- Asturias, 5; resistance to Mohammedan, 14
- Azaña, Manuel, President of Council of Ministers, becomes President of, 387; concept of Spain, 395; program of fulfilling Pact of San Sebastián, 395-396
- Aznar Ministry, 375
- Bailén, Canton of, 246
- Bakunin, revolutionist, International Fraternity of, 155
- Balaguer, Minister of Overseas in National Republic, 328
- Barcelona, development of railways from, 42; industrial center, 41; description of, in 1860, 71; manifestos of Junta of, addressed to "Catalans," 99; disbands Jesuits, 100; protest against dissolution of Republican junta, 101; center of Internationale, 156; attitude towards Republic, and disorders in, 190-193; strike of workers, 262; Carlista threat to, 301
- Basque, 5; under Carlos VII, 215
- Beccra, Manuel, Radical leader, Minister of Public Works in first Republican Cabinet, 180; law on child labor, 182
- Benevolence, Castelar's offer of, to Radicals, and its effect, 151, 164
- Benot, Eduardo, opposes concentration of power in one person, 205; Minister of Public Works, 209; child labor law, 217 footnote
- Beranger, José María, Radical, Minister of Navy in first Republican Cabinet, 180
- Berenger, General Damaso, President of Ministry, 369; continues Dictatorship, 371

INDEX

- Besteiro, Julian, President of Cortes Constituyentes of 1931, 388; debt to old Republicans, 388
- Bourbon, House of, policies of, 19; question of retaining it in Spain in 1854, 47, 54; of depending on reactionary parties, 71; failure of projects of, 74; effect of United Italy on, 87; expulsion of demanded in 1868, 92; part in decadence of nation, 173; Restoration of, 344
- Bravo Murillo, reactionary policies of, in 1851, 44; resigns presidency, 45
- Bryce, James, on federalism in United States, 123
- Bull-ring, scene of Radical Militia maneuvers, 199
- Burke, Edmund, comment on Spain in 1791, 15
- Burriel, Juan N., Spanish general, principal cause of gravity of "Virginius" incident, 304-305
- Cádiz, liberal center, 16; Revolution of September in, 93; Revolution regarded as betrayal by, 92; revolt against dissolution of juntas in 1868, 101; conditions under Republic, 234; Canton of, 245, 260; Canton dissolved, 265
- Calatrava, Progressive, President of Council of Ministers, 31
- Calomarde, Francisco, Carlista sympathies of, 24
- Calvo Gutyati, Nicolás, Minister of Foreign Affairs in Spanish Federation, 262
- Campoamor, Ramón, Moderate, exposition of Moderate doctrines, 63-66
- Candidates for throne in 1869-70, 136
- Cánovas del Castillo, Antonio, Conservative leader, writes Manifesto of Manzanares, 46; named head of Alfonsino party, 286; imprisoned, 341; forms Ministry for Alfonso XII, 343
- Cantons, proclamation of, 216; acceptance of Pí's program would have destroyed movement, claim of Casaldueiro, 240; Málaga, 240; Cartagena, 243; Valencia, 245; Castellón, Granada, Almansa, Torrevieja, Cádiz, Salamanca, 245; Orihuela, Bailén Andújar, Tarifa, Algeciras, 246; Sanlúcar, Arahál, Marchena, Páradas, San Roque, 265; cost of, 268; reasons for movement, 268; Castelar's attack on, 281; deputies of, in Cortes, 282; amnesty for all cantonalists proposed by José Orense, 283
- Carlistas, "seduction" of Fernando VII, 22; their first War, 29; yield to Espartero, 31; revolts in 1855-56, 55; representation in Cortes Constituyentes of 1869, 108; attitude towards Revolution of September, 108; revive claims to throne, 138; coalition with Republicans and Alfonsinos, 151; Carlista War of 1871, 160; defeat of, at Oroquieta, 161; arrangement with Catalan Republicans, 161; facing Republicans at Igualada, 205; position of movement in 1873, 214; success of campaigns in 1873, 215; threaten Barcelona, 223; defeat of Cabrinetty at Alpens, 241; threaten Bilbao, 249; capture Cirauqui, Igualada and Villaviciosa in Oviedo, 263; capture of Estella, 287, 299; progress of, 299-301; capture of Cuenca, 301; victories and losses in 1874, 333; war without quarter, 334; Carlista War ended, 358
- Carlos IV, character, 16
- Carlos V, attitude toward Pragmatic sanction, 22; declares self King, 29; defeated by Espartero, 31; abdicates, 43
- Carlos VII, claim to throne, 3; birth of 43; pronounces against Isabel, 74; policies of, 138; declares war on Amadeo, 160; early life and character, 214; enters Spain, 250; organizes government, 300
- Cartagena, Canton of proclaimed, 243 ff.; ships of, declared pirates, 257; declares Executive Power of Madrid traitors, 261; Executive Power of, 262; bombardment of Almería, 262; forays of, 267, 298; captured, 299
- Carvajal, Eduardo, intransigent, plans for proclaiming federal canton of Andalusia, 223
- Carvajal, José de, conservative Republican leader, Minister of Finance in Pí's abortive cabinet, 206; Minister of Finance, 219; affirms Spain will pay debts, 230; Minister of Finance in Salmerón's Cabinet, 255; Minister of Foreign Affairs, 295

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

Casalduero, intransigent, calls Republic "absolutist," 227; effort to obtain government of intransigents, 250 ff.; characterization of Salmerón's and Castelar's policies, 289

Castelar y Ripoll, Emilio, President of Executive Power, on anomaly of church-state, 5, 6; description of Republic of 1873, 6; first to urge intellectual union with Latin nations, 7; early life of, 27; influence of Revolution of 1848 on, 40-41; letter on Democratic ideal in 1854, 48; address in 1854 on democracy, 48; interview with Isabel and her Ministers, 49; his character and place in Spanish life, 50; as an orator, 50; as patriot, 51; belief in legality in government, 52; view of Spain's mission, 52; member of University of Madrid faculty, 56; *Fórmula del Progreso*, its theories and contributions, 56 ff.; creates a political renaissance, 60; replies to *La Fórmula*, 60 ff.; attitude towards laborer, 68; opinion of socialism, 69; debate with Pí, 69; forms Individualistic Democratic Directory, 70; effort to legalize Republican party, 74; opinion of Progressives, 75; apostrophies government by generals, 75; comment on denying Democrats right to elections and on retraimiento, 76; comment on Fernando VII, 77; on reactionary dynasties, 77; protest against decree regulating professor's speech, 78; challenges Queen's right to sell patrimony, 80; dismissed from professor's post, 81; advocacy of systematic retraimiento, 82; condemned to death, 86; explanation of failure of Republicans in 1868, 98; instals party Directory in Madrid, 106; named Vice President of Directory, 106; popularity of, in 1868, 107; condemns constitutional monarchical project, 110; plea for republic to regenerate European democracy, 112; protest against Sagasta's order prohibiting demonstrations, 115; on national Directory of party, 115; failure to oppose Pí's confederationist definition, 118; theory of federalism, 121; repudiation of federation in Restoration, 122; attitude towards church, 129-134; plea for toler-

ation in debate with Manterola, 133 ff.; observation on candidatures, 139; arraigns election of Amadeo, 145; visits French Republic, 145; offer of benevolence to Radicals, 151; castigates Sagasta's conduct of elections, 161; debate over benevolence, 164; comment on Amadeo's reign, 164; fallacy of claim he freed Porto Rican slaves, 165 footnote; explanation of end of monarchy and of Spanish decadence, 173; part in proclaiming Republic, 173, 177; writes message of Cortes to Amadeo, 178; Minister of Foreign Affairs, 180; circular letter to diplomats, 185; deceived as to state of disorder in nation, 187; defends Contreras, 187; re-elected Minister of Foreign Affairs, 189; dissidence with Pí growing, 189; defense of Catalonia, 191; defense of Republic, 194; writes address of government, 201; leader of right, 201; on cleavage between right and left, 203; urges Figueras to form ministry of conciliation, 207; proposes permitting Pí to resolve crisis, 217; first indication of program of salvation, 218; turn to right, 221; appeal to all parties to state views on needs of nation, 232; program of salvation, 236 ff.; plea for strong government, 251; interdicts Pavía's march on Málaga, 261; orders Málaga taken, 267; constitutional project of, 269 ff.; necessity for order, 280; President of Cortes Constituyentes, 286; President of Executive Power, 292; his task and his presidential address, 293-294; his Cabinet, 295; criticism of Pí's federalism, 296; reorganization of military forces, 297; the "Virginus" incident, 303-309; disagreement with Salmerón, 309-313; names Archbishops, 311; his success, 312, 314; determination to follow legal paths, 315; message to Cortes, 317; attack of left on his Ministry, 319; his defense, 320-322; no confidence in, voted, 322; refuses part in National Republic, 327; protest against dissolution of Cortes, 329; National Republic like a Grand Dukedom, 330; his recantation, 350; his contributions to establishment of Republic and service to it, 352; de-

INDEX

- bate on Catalan Statute concluded on centennial of Castelar's birth, 397 footnote
- Castile, Kingdom of, 5; national character of, 13
- Catalonia, proclamation of Republic, 3; federal principle established, 3; place in Spanish federation, 4; Principality of, 5; independent position of Generalidad, 6, 7; separate identity stressed in 1868, 99; Catalan theory of confederation adopted as federal theory of national Republican Assembly, 116; Catalan theory of federation, 119-120; arrangement of Catalan Republicans with Carlistas, 161; character and history of, 189; reception of Republic of 1873, 190 ff.; Catalan State planned, 192; conditions under Republic, 224; regional constitution for, 359; Catalan personality developing, 360; demands for independence, 364; Primo's concessions to, 367; Republic of, 382; Catalan attitude towards Spain, 383; agreement of, with Spanish Republic, 383; Catalan Statute approved, 384; its provisions, 385; attitude of Spain towards Statute, 394-395; Catalan attitude toward modification of Statute, 394; joy at passage of Statute, 396
- Catholicism, unifying thread of Spain, 5; Republican principles in harmony with, 6
- Censorship of Press, in 1867, 89; under Castelar, 297
- Center party formed, 276; proposes Espartero for President, 286; attitude of, towards Castelar, 313; proposes Palanca for President of Executive Power, 314
- Centralization, Napoleonic system, 16; decentralization promised by Declaration of Manzanares in 1854, 46; decentralization urged by Castelar and Republicans, 57; gradual decentralization urged by Rubio of Progressives, 62; centralization urged by Campoamor of Moderates, 66; decentralization promised by Septembrists, 99; decentralization urged by Castelar in 1868, 106; Catalan criticism of, 119; Castelar's view of, 121; preservation of territorial integrity urged by Pí, 211; cantonal destruction of, 216; federal Republic viewed by nation as decentralization, 229; García Ruiz's interpretation of decentralization, 235
- Cervera, Rafael, proposes Pí to form a Ministry, 205; proposed as Minister of Foreign Affairs, 206
- Chao, Eduardo, Minister of Public Works in second Republican Cabinet, 189
- Chili, prosperous as unitary Republic, 124
- Cholera of 1834, 29, 31; of 1865, 83
- Church, separation from state a major problem, 3; distribution of educational funds, 4; primitive character of, in Spain, 6, 19; identification with state an anachronism, 5; called reactionary by Franco, 6; attitude of lesser clergy to Military Directory, 4; provision of Constitution of 1812, 18 footnote; confiscation of monasteries proposed, 31; number of cloisters and nunneries, 31; attacks on convents and monasteries, 31; attitude of, towards recognition of Italy, 87; hostile attitude of South in 1868, 100; separation of state and church urged by Castelar, 106; religious freedom urged by Coalition in 1868, 106; for Spain urged by Campoamor of Moderates, 65; confiscation of wealth of, by Septembrists, 108; proclaimed free in 1869, 109; religious orders dissolved, 109; state-church retained in Constitution of 1869, 111; position of, in Spain, 126; J. Blanco White on religion in Spain, 128; Syllabus of 1864, 127; attitude of Carlistas to, 129-134; provisions of Constitution of 1869, 132; protest of bishops on dissolving Holy Orders, 132; activities of lay organizations of, in elections for Cortes Constituyentes of 1869, 132; faith sacrificed to foreign whims, 135; attitude towards Amadeo, 147; amount provided for its support in 1872, 183; separation of, from state promised, 183-184; separation of, from state proposed by Pí, 211; independence of, proposed, 284; attitude of, towards Republic of 1931, 286; anti-clerical riots, 387; religious freedom granted and civil control of education, marriage, established, 387; order of Jesuits evicted, 388
- Civil Guard, established by Narváez, 34

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

- Civil service, proposed by Orense, 57
- Claret, Padre, 129
- Coalition, Radical-Republican in first Republic, 2; Republican-Socialist in 1931, 2; Progressive-Union Liberal-Democratic, 99; Septembrist Coalition absorbs Democrats, 102; program of Septembrist Coalition for elections for Cortes, 107; Republican-Carlista-Alfonsino in 1871, 151; Radical-Unionist broken, 152; of Radicals and Republicans, 180, 182, 188, 333
- Colonies, loss of, 20
- Communists, 3
- Concha, General, plan to take Estella, 334; death of, 334
- Conciliation, party of, formed in National Assembly, 196
- Concordat of 1851, 127
- Confederation, Republican Assembly of 1870 adopts Catalan as federal program, 116; Revilla's criticism of, 116; theory of, gains control of federalists in 1870, 119
- Conscription, abolition of, urged by Castelar and Republicans, 57; proposed by Radicals in 1872, 163; abolition of, for navy proposed by Radicals, 165; abolished by Republic, 182; restored by Castelar, 297
- Conservatives, attitude in 1873, 1; attitude of in 1931, 2, 3; problem of, in 1931, 6
- Constitutions of Spain: 1812, 17 ff.; 1820, 21; proposed federal Republican in 1832, 24 ff.; Estatuto Real of 1834, 29; 1837, 31; Moderate charter of 1845, 36; 1856, 54; 1869, 110; Republican constitutional projects of 1873, 269 ff.; 1876, 357; 1931, 390
- Constitution of 1812, provisions of, 17; basis for Portuguese Constitution, 17; a revolutionary document, 18; voided, 20; restored, 21; proclaimed again 1836, 31; its principles reaffirmed in 1856, 54
- Constitution of 1869, work on, begun, 110; difficulty in constructing it, 110; provisions of, 111; a compromise, more nearly fundamental charter, 111; Republican efforts to reform it in 1869, 112; voted, 113; Republican attitude toward, 113; provisions of, on church, 131; as constitution governing Republic of 1873, 183; violation of, in 1873, 177, 185, 195
- Constitution of 1876, 357; destroyed by "old politics," 361; violated by Alfonso XIII, 370
- Constitution of 1931, adopted, 389; an advanced Constitution, 389; provisions of, 390 ff.
- Constitutional projects of Republic of 1873, 269 ff.; difficulties faced in territorial divisions proposed in, 287
- Contreras, Juan, President of Spanish Federation, proposes Espartero for king, 141; on Republican Directory, 164; named captain general of Catalonia, 193; rumor of his seizing Madrid, 208; assumes direction of Cartagena Canton, 243; President of Executive Power of Spanish Federation, 244; rank of general removed by Salmerón, 261; flees when Cartagena falls, 329
- Co-operative societies, 158
- Córdoba, Pavía prevents proclamation of canton in, 263
- Cortes: of Cádiz, 16; of 1820, 21; of 1823, 21; of 1834, 29; of 1836, 31; of 1837 (granted power of initiating laws), 31; of 1840, 32; of 1853, 45; Constituyentes of 1854, 54; of 1857, 55; of 1864, 76; of 1867, 89; Constituyentes of 1869, 107; of 1871, 151; of 1872, 161; Constituyentes of 1873, 201; Constituyentes of 1931, 380
- Cortes Constituyentes of 1869, problems facing, 108; opening of, 109; Republican efforts in, 112; adjournment of, 114; protest of Catholics against toleration, 133; debate over toleration, 133
- Cortes Constituyentes of 1873, elections for, 2, 201; opening of, 201; hostility of right and left, 203; Orense elected President of, 204; federal Republic proclaimed, 204; resignation of Figueras and election of Pí to head Executive Power, 205 ff.; secret session of, 207; third Cabinet of Republic, 209; factious nature of, 209; Orense resigns as President, 209; crisis in Pí's Ministry, 217; Castelar gives first indication of his conservative program, 218; Pí's Ministry resigns, and he names Ministry of right,

INDEX

- 219; condemnation of, by Angel Arménia, proposing National Convention, 219; Salmerón elected President, 220; debate over granting extraordinary powers, 225 ff.; withdrawal of intransigents, 229; criticism of, as not representing national will, 231; address of Estéban Collantes, 232 ff.; address of García Ruiz, 234; address of Castelar 236; Castelar's program of salvation, 236; debate over Cartagena Canton, 246; Pí's resignation, 250; return of left, 250; debate over piracy decree, 277; speech of Castelar on necessity for order, 280; proposal of Antonio Orense to declare traitors Deputies not attending, 282; Castelar elected President, 286; Salmerón resigns presidency of Executive Power, 288; debate over Salmerón's successor, 289 ff.; Castelar elected President of Executive Power, 292; his Cabinet, 295; grants Castelar extraordinary powers, 295; adjourns, 296; its accomplishments, 297; reconvenes, 316; debate over vote of confidence in Castelar's Ministry, 322; dissolution of, by Pavía, 323-326; dissolved by National Republic, 329
- Cortes Constituyentes of 1931, federal claims made to, 4; composition of parties in, 380; problems facing it, 381; constitutional project of, 381; debt of project to Weimar Constitution, 383; passage of Catalan Statute, 394
- Cortes, rump, of 1917, 364
- Cuba, Castelar urges autonomy for, and abolition of slavery in, 106; need for ending war with, urged by Ruiz Zorrilla in 1872, 163; visit of Soler y Plá to study best means of ending rebellion, 298; part in "Virginius" incident 303 ff.
- Death penalty, abolished for political crimes, 54; demands of Pí and Orense for abolition of, 58; abolition of, proposed by Salmerón, 182; "judicial assassination," 242; restoration of, asked by officers, 287; Salmerón resigns rather than inflict, 288; restoration of, demanded by Castelar, 294; applied, 297
- Decentralization, *see* Centralization
- Declaration of the Press, 1870, its purpose and its definitions of federal and unitary republics, 117; disavowal of, 119; attitude of Figueras, Castelar and Pí toward, 118
- Declaration of the Thirty, 1860, definition of Democrats, 69; allowed to stand as definition of Republican social questions, 117
- Democratic party, 17, 24; evolution of and program, 35, 36; revolts initiated by, 39; first Junta formed in 1851, 43; Deputies in Cortès, 43; part in Revolution of 1854, 46; debt to O'Donnell, 46; ideals of, as explained by Castelar, 48; increased representation of, in Cortes of 1854, 54; vote of, against Bourbons, 54; definition of Democrat, 69; refused right to participate in elections, 1863, 76; joins retrainamiento of 1864, 76; Democrats denied professorships, 79; party meeting of 1865, 83; joins Prim's revolutionary movement, 86; divorce of Republicans from, 98; program of Madrid Junta of 1868, 99; absorbed by Septembrist coalition, 107; representation in Cortes Constituyentes of 1868, 108
- Deputies who proclaimed Cantons, 243-246
- Díaz Quintero, Francisco, intransigent, attack on policies of right, 218; rebels against authority of Cortes, 226; constitutional project of, 269-275; defiance of Cortes, 280
- Dictatorship, of González Brabo and Narváez, 1; of Primo de Rivera, 2
- Diplomatic corps, reorganization of, proposed by Republic of 1873, 217
- Disorder in Republic of 1873, 181, 186, 191, 205
- Dulce, Unionist general, urges revolution in 1867, 89
- Echegaray, José, Radical leader, Minister of Finance in first Republican Cabinet, 180; on disorders in Barcelona, 191; Minister of Finance in National Republic, 329; retires from National Republic, 333
- Education, creation of free system of, a major problem, 3; Republican proposals for in 1832, 26; free primary, demanded in 1848, 36; free, urged by

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

- Garrido, 68; decree on academic freedom in 1864, 78; opposition to decree on academic freedom by Castelar and Pérez de Montalvan, 78; Democrats denied professorships, 79; decree allowed to lapse, 82; liberal attitude toward primary, in 1866, 88; freedom of, granted in 1869, 109; Pius IX on church approval for, 127; disproportionate amount spent on army, 183; free and compulsory primary, proposed by Pi, 211; difficulties in way of compulsory, 211; state of, under the Republic, 216; reforms of secondary, proposed, 284; chair in ophthalmology proposed, 284; placed in hands of civil authorities, 287; new schools established, 388
- Elections, municipal, of April 12, 1931, 1, 2; of 1871, 2
- Engels, Friedrich, Communist Manifesto, 154; comment on Amadeo's resignation, 166
- Enrique de Borbón, cousin of Isabel, mentioned as consort for Isabel, 36, 37; expelled from Spain by Narváez, 100; attack on Montpensier and plea for readmission to Spain, 103-104; killed by Montpensier in duel, 137
- Espartaco, Baldomero, Duque de la Victoria, Progressive leader, quells Carlistas, 31; named Regent, 32; removed by Pronunciamiento of 1843, 33; named President of Council in 1854, 47; resigns, 55; Castelar's estimate of, 75; mentioned as candidate for king, 100, 140; refuses to be considered, 141; mentioned as possible president of Republic, 286
- Estéban Collantes, Agustín, Alfonsino leader, view on federalism, 4; represents Alfonsinos on Permanent Commission of 1873, 196; elected to Cortes Constituyentes of 1873, 201; calls Castelar's address "funeral oration of Republic," 239
- Estella, capture of by Carlistas, 215
- Estevénez, former soldier in Union army, in charge of Republican militia, 198; on visitors received by, 204; Minister of War, 206, 209
- Europeanization of Spain, 360
- Executive Power of Republic, responsible to Cortes, 195; conflict with Permanent Commission, 195; Serrano alters character of, 331
- Extraordinary powers, asked by Pi, June 30, 1873, 223; debate over granting, 225 ff.; approved, 228; defeat of Republic, Estéban Collantes declares, 234; Castelar third President to exercise, 296
- Fanelli, organizer of Internationale in Spain, 155 ff.
- Federal Center of Workers Societies, 155
- Federalism, threat to national unity, 3; fundamental problem of Spain, 4; against spirit of Europe in 1873, 4; in keeping with European trend in 1931, 4; first proposed in 1832, 24; proposed as goal of Republican party, 1860, 105; federal pacts of 1869, 114; aims of, 116; federal republic defined, 117; theory of, 119-123; confused with confederation, 123; boldness of program in nation with only twenty per cent of population literate, 122; as an alliance, 123; Catalonia's interpretation of proclamation of Republic of 1873 in terms of confederation, 190; federal Republic voted by Cortes Constituyentes, 204; cantonalism literal interpretation of, 216; of intransigents destroys national unity, 222; against spirit of Europe, Estéban Collantes declares, 234; unitary Republicans only true Federalists, García Ruiz states, 235; federal Republic negation of government, 235; Castelar reaffirms faith in, 237; Republican constitutional projects federal, 269 ff.; Leon y Castillo's attack on projects, 275; the federal Republic organized, 280; Pi asks Cortes to take definite stand on, 295; federal project to be delayed, 321; its significance to Spain and reason for its failure in 1873, 349; recantation of Castelar, 350; of Spain and Catalonia, 7; terminology of regionalism, 359
- Federal Pact of Tortosa, Córdoba, etc., 114
- Federalists, cleavage with Unitarians into the open, 115; national party Assembly in 1870 charges Pi with writing federal manifesto, 115; failure to proclaim federal Republic February 11, 1873, 179; in

INDEX

- Cortes Constituyentes of 1873, 216;
Saragossa Assembly of 1873, 359
- Felipe V, symbol of Spain, 11
- Fernández de Córdova, Radical, Minister of War in first Republican Cabinet, 180
- Fernando de Coburgo, refuses throne, 139, 141
- Fernando Gonzalez, José, Minister of Justice, 209; Minister of Public Works, 255
- Fernando de los Ríos, on union of church and state, 5
- Fernando VII, symbol of Spain, 11; character, 16; restored, 18; cornerstone of democracy, 19; loss of empire, 20; voids Constitution, 20; reinstates Constitution in 1820, 21; persecution of liberals by, in 1823, 21; remarries, 22; Pragmatic Sanction of, 22; death of, 28; Castelar's estimate of, 77
- Ferrer, Felix, Minister of War in Spanish Federation, 262
- Feudalism, effect of Isabel's marriage on, 39
- Figueras, Estanislao, President of the Executive Power, early life of, 28; opinion on retraimiento, 82; pronounces for republic, 99; named Vice President of Republican Directory, 106; criticism of Septembrists, 110; protest against Sagasta's order prohibiting demonstrations, 115; on national Directory of party, 115; agrees with Declaration of Press, 118; assumes leadership in Cortes to proclaim Republic, 174; President of Executive Power, 180; opposes making Martos dictator, 188; re-elected President of Executive Power, 189; prevents separation of Catalonia, 191, 193; promises free elections, 195; death of wife, 198; relinquishes presidency to Pí temporarily, 198; address to Cortes Constituyentes, 201; opposes roll-call on federal Republic, 204; determines to resign, 205; plea for harmony, 206; flees to France, 208; his character and contributions to party, 208; return of, 313; his contribution to Republic and his failure, 350
- Fish, Hamilton, conduct of "Virginus" negotiations, 303-309
- Florida, Marqués de, proposal to stabilize finance, 230
- Foreign policy, of O'Donnell, 74 ff.; in international affairs, Catholic, 87; Castelar's view on, 106; recommended by Rubio of Progressives, 62; in Restoration, 360
- Fórmula del Progreso, La*, 56 ff.
- Francisco de Asis, King Consort, negotiations for marriage, to Isabel, 36; marriage, 37; character of, 37, 38; Prim's suspicions of, 85
- Franco, Major Ramón, view on problem of education, 4; view on church, 6; distributes Republican manifestos from airplane, 7
- French Revolution, influence on Republic of 1873, 7
- Fueros, Republican demand for abolition of, 58; problems of, 99; unified, promised, 107
- Galán, Fermín, anticipates Republican Revolution at Jaca, 372; execution of, 373; mistake of monarchy, 373
- Galicia, federal demand of, 4; Kingdom of, 5; national characteristic of, 13
- Galvez y Arce, Antonio, intransigent, calls Cortes Constituyentes of 1873 "monarchist," 227; establishes Canton of Cartagena, 243; Minister of Overseas in Spanish Federation, 262
- García Hernández, Angel, part in Jaca revolt, 372
- García Ruiz, Eugenio, unitary Republican leader, proposes democratic republic as government of Spain in 1869, 113; explanation of unitarianism, 124; unitary definition of God, 133; opposes voting federal Republic, 205; describes Spain under Republic, 234; Minister of Interior in National Republic, 328; resigns, 333
- Garrido, Isidoro, proposes single tax, 58
- Garrido, Fernando, co-operative leader, his contribution to Republican dogma, 58; exposition of socialism, 68; debate with Orense, 69; opinion of Castelar, 70, 75; proposes that head of state be Spanish, 113; definition of federalism, 121; delegate to League of Peace and Liberty conference, 155; on co-operative societies, 158; proposes retraimiento instead of benevolence, 164

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

- Generals, government by, apostrophied by Castelar, 75
- Genova, Duque Tomás de, candidature for throne causes Unionists to withdraw from Ministry, 115; his candidature, 140
- Geography, influence on history of Spain, 11-15
- Gil Berges, Joaquín, Minister of Justice, 219; Minister of Public Works, 295
- González Brabo, Luis, reactionary minister, leader in Revolt of 1840, 32; exiled in 1853, 45; character of, 87; Narváez-González Brabo Ministry in 1866, 87; program of Ministry, 87; his Ministry and protests against, 89; exiles generals, 90; confidence of, 90; expels Montpensier, 91; resigns power in September, 1868, 96
- Gonzalez Chermá, proclaims Castellón Canton, 245; returns to Cortes, 282
- Gonzalez Eulogio, Minister of War, 219
- Gonzalez Iscar, Minister of War, 255
- Granada, Canton, of 245; Pavía enters, 266
- Grant, President U. S., satisfaction over termination of "Virginius" negotiations, 309
- Hay, John, on power of clergy, 129
- Hegel, influence on Republicans, 7
- Hidalgo, Marshal, in charge of Republican troops in April, 1873, 198; disperses Radical militia, 199; decree of search and quartering troops, 228; prevents solution of artillery question, 287; relieved of captaincy general of Madrid, 287
- Hispanic-American Union, Castelar first to advocate it, 52; Castelar's views on, 52, 7
- Home, inviolability of, urged by Orense, 36; urged by Castelar, 57; urged by Rubio, 62; proposed by Septembrists, 107; guaranteed by Constitution of 1869, 111; Hidalgo's order invades, 228
- Hugo, Victor, letter to Republicans in 1868, 105
- Ibero-Latina, name proposed by *El Sol* for Americas, 53
- Iglesias, Pablo, Socialist leader, interview with Sagasta, 358
- Illiteracy, trap for Republic of 1873, 4; twenty per cent of population literate, 122
- Individual security, urged by Castelar, 57; approved by Campoamor of Moderates, 65; individual autonomy urged by Pí y Margall, 67; freedom of individual as essential to definition of Democrat, 69; proposed by Septembrists, 107; guaranteed by Constitution of 1869, 111
- Industrial revolution, position of Barcelona, 41; railway development, 41; beginning of labor movement, 43; organization of labor unions, 68; effect of, on labor movement, 154
- Internationale, program, 154-157; organization of, in Spain and strength of, 155; debate over outlawing, 157; outlawed, 159; Communists of 1931 lineal descendants of, 3; in Andalusia under Republic, 234; commune proclaimed in Sanlúcar, 240; strike at Alcoy, 240
- International Fraternity, 155
- Intervention of European Powers in Spain, by England, 18; by Holy Alliance, 21; by France and England in 1846, 36
- Intransigence, tendency of Republicans toward, 164; of left, 203-207, 218-219; intransigent cantonal republic, 222 ff.; bitter debate between right and left over granting Pí extraordinary powers, 225; withdrawal of intransigents from Cortes Constituyentes of 1873, 229; program of, 229; return of intransigents to Cortes, 250; attitude toward Salmerón, 276; attack on Castelar, 319 ff.
- Irving, Washington, description of Isabel, 33
- Isabel II, Queen of Spain, analogy between her loss of throne and Alfonso XIII's, 1; birth of, 22; becomes Queen, 29; declared of age, 33; description of, 33; relations with Narváez, 34; marriage negotiations for, 36 ff.; unhappy marital relations of, 38; description of, in 1866, 38; effect of marriage, 39; affairs grow worse, 43; reactionary policies of Bravo Murillo in 1851, 44; attempt to assassinate, 44; greeted in silence in 1853, 45; contemplates resigning throne in 1854, 46; seeks to win over Castelar, 49; unable to break relations with Papacy, 55;

INDEX

- failure to progress, 71; supports naval officers against O'Donnell, 74; resentment at Castelar's attack on her father, 77; decides to sell part of royal patrimony, 79; effect of decision on nation, 79; Castelar's oath to dethrone her, 82; greeted with silence in 1865, 83; situation of, in 1865, 84; efforts to appease Prim, 84-86; advice to her on recognition of Italy, 87; Amadeo visits, in 1865, 88; loss of Narváez and O'Donnell, 88; challenge to, 89; alienation of her army and navy, 90; her last days as Queen, 96; reconciliation with Don Juan de Borbón, 214; impossibility of restoration, 100; seeks to protect church against Republican attacks, 129; ascendancy of clergy during her reign, 130; renounces throne in favor of Alfonso XII, 137; names Cánovas del Castillo as Alfonsino chieftan, 286; failure of her reign, 247
- Isturiz, militia protests against, 31
- Italy, recognition of, and repercussion in Spain, 87
- Jaca, Revolt of, 372
- Jaime de Borbón, Pretender, claim to throne, 3; manifesto for federative monarchy, 3
- Jefferson, Thomas, as separatist, 235
- Jews, expulsion of, 5 footnote; of Spanish origin, 134
- Jesuits, abolished in 1868 in Madrid and Barcelona, 100; expelled 1932, 387
- Joseph Bonaparte, King of Spain, failure of, 16
- Jove y Hévía, proposal to outlaw Internationale, 157; in defense of church, 183
- Juan de Borbón, Pretender, renounces rights in favor of Carlos VII, 74
- Jury, trial by, urged by Democrats in 1848, 36; urged by Castelar, 57; in criminal cases proposed by Junta of Madrid in 1868, 99; urged by Septembrists, 107; Castelar's plea for, 122; promised by Ruiz Zorrilla in 1871, 154, in 1872, 163
- Kant, influence on Republicans, 6
- Krause, influence on first Republic, 6, 67
- Labor Unions, first formed, 68, 158; first strike of, 68, 158; labor legislation of Republic of 1873, 182, 217; demand for shorter working weeks, 1873, 191; mixed juries proposed by Pí to settle labor disputes, 211, 217; strike at Alcoy, 241; strike at Barcelona, 262; maximum working day of nine hours proposed, 284; General Union of Workers and Confederation of Work, 362; strikes of, 362 ff.; political significance of, 362
- Ladico y Font, Teodoro, Minister of Finance, 209; proposal of, to lease Philippine tobacco rights, 230
- League of Peace and Liberty, 155
- Légality in government, Castelar and Amadeo chief exponents of, 52
- Leopold Hohenzollern, candidate for throne, character, advantages and disadvantages of candidature, 142; attitude of France toward, 142; withdraws name, 142
- Lerroux, Alejandro, Radical party leader, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 377; popularity of, 380; his federalism, 381
- Liberalism, neo-Catholic view of, 6; support of Constitution of 1812, 18; suppression under Fernando VII, 20, 22; resistance of liberals, 21; effect of Pragmatic Sanction, 24
- Liberals, attitude towards neutrality, 7; made political power by Fernando VII's Pragmatic Sanction, 24; concessions to, 24; principles agreed on by, for Revolution of September, 89
- López Dominguez, José, Republican general, named captain general of Burgos, 298; in charge of Cartagena bombardment, 298; enters Cartagena, 299
- Lowell, James Russell, Minister of United States, on Spanish character, 15; on Castelar's oratory, 51; on Republican habits of people, 52
- Luis of Portugal, refuses Spanish crown, 139
- Macià, Francisco, President of Generalidad of Catalonia, President of Catalan Republic, 7, 382; proclamation of, 383; opinion of final Catalan Statute, 397
- Madrid, description of, in 1860, 72; revolt

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

- of, in 1868, 95; program of Revolutionary Junta, 99; Junta of, abolishes Jesuits, 100; manifesto of Catholic Junta of, 132; Republic regarded as end of domination of, 185; tumult in, 188; removal of Municipal Corporation of, by Maisonnave, 302
- Magistrates, irremovable, proposed by Castelar, 57; urged by Junta of Madrid in 1868, 99
- Maine, Sir Henry, comment on pronunciamientos, 35
- Maisonnave, Eleuterio, conservative Republican leader, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 219; accuses intransigents, 228; description of Alcoy disaster, 241; Minister of Interior, 255; Minister of Interior under Castelar, 295; his conservative administration, 301; objectionable to Salmerón, 311
- Málaga, semi-independent Canton of, 222; conditions in, 234; Pavía's description of, 260; Pavía announces intention of taking, 266; entry in, 267
- Malcampo Ministry, fall over Internationale debate, 154, 161
- Manifesto of Sandhurst, 338
- Manresa, Pact of, 359
- Manterola, Vicente de, Carlista canon, attitude to liberalism, 6, 133; view of Spain as "den of maniacs," 133; debate with Castelar, 133
- Manzanares, Declaration of, 46
- Marchena, Canton of, surrenders, 265
- Marfori, opera singer, favorite of Isabel, in González Brabo's Ministry, 89
- María Cristina, mother of Isabel, Regent in 1833, 29; character, 29; renounces Regency, 32; part in Isabel's marriage negotiations, 37; speculation on bourse, 39; quarrel with Narváez, 43; her palace destroyed, 47
- Marriage, civil, opposed by Pius IX, 127; decreed by Republic of 1931, 387; question of paternity, 392
- Martínez Campos, Arsenio, Alfonsino general, campaign against Carlistas hampered by rebellion in ranks, 224; Salmerón names him captain general of Valencia, 261; enters Valencia, 267; named captain general of Catalonia, 298; pronounces for Don Alfonso XII, 339
- Martínez de la Rosa, 29, 30
- Martos, Cristino, Radical leader, condemned to death, 86; becomes Democratic monarchist, 98; accepts Republic, 177; elected President of National Assembly, 180; proposed as dictator, 188; urges homogeneous ministry, 189; Minister of Justice in National Republic 329; resigns, 333
- Marx, Karl, Communist Manifesto of, 154
- Masons, early lodges and liberal influence of, 16
- Meeting, right of, urged by Castelar, 57; proposed by Septembrists, 107
- Mendizábal, Progressive leader, proposal to confiscate monasteries, 31
- Merino, Catholic priest, attempt to assassinate Isabel, 44
- Mexico, intervention in, 1861, 74; failure as federal state claimed by García Ruiz, 125
- Military Directory, part in loss of Alfonso XIII's throne, 2; attitude to church, 3; establishment, 367-369; failure of and and accomplishments of, 367-370
- Military, expenditures for, five times greater than for education, 4; excessive number of generals and expenditures, 30; overawing power of, 291 footnote; reform in military profession and army in 1931, 388 ff.
- Militia, character of, 30; promised in Declaration of Mananares, 46; destroyed, 34; re-established, 55; "a bayonet . . . at heart of monarchy," 55 footnote; abolition of, urged by Campoamor, 65; Sagasta orders it dissolved, 114; Radical, and plan to overthrow Permanent Commission, 198
- Mina, revolt of, 20
- Miraflores, Marqués de, Alfonsino leader, attempts to form ministry, 75; protest against González Brabo, 89; protest against Amadeo's candidacy, 144
- Mobilization law of 1873, 278
- Moderate party, origin of, in 1820, 24; Constitution of 1834, 29; proposal to destroy Progressive power in cities, 32; Constitution of 1845, 36; power of, 60;

INDEX

- principles of, 63-66; repression by, 76; using liberal program in sale of patrimony, 80; belief of, that Queen's position was hopeless, 90; retraimiento of, in 1868, 107; Alfonso XII, candidate of, for king, 136
- Mohammedan invasion, 5, 14
- Monarchy, as form of government in 1869, 111; Republican benevolence not to, 164; death of, described by Castelar, 173; representative government under, impossible, 174; forces opposed to, in Restoration, 359
- Montpensier, Antonio de Orleans, Duque de, husband of Infante María Luisa, marriage negotiations with Infanta María Luisa, 36 ff.; expelled from Spain by González Brabo, his protest and his efforts to gain throne, 91-92; Napoleon III's attitude toward, 91; candidate for throne, 100; at Córdoba during revolt of Cádiz, his explanation of, 101 ff.; Enrique's attack on, 103 kills Enrique in duel, 137; votes received for crown, 146; secretary of, accused by Paul y Angulo of hiring men to kill Prim, 148
- Moreno Rodríguez, José, Minister of Justice, 255
- Morocco, War of 1859, 55; the great crime of Alfonso XIII, charge of Gonzalo de Reparaz, 365; Annual disaster, 365; termination of Moroccan War, 370
- Mosquera, Minister of Public Works in National Republic, 329; resigns, 333
- Municipality, autonomy of, urged by Castelar, 57; greater autonomy promised by Declaration of Manzanares, 46; Castelar's plea for independence of, 121; Pi's plan to change system of, 194; renovation of, through universal suffrage proposed by Pi, 217; autonomy of, guaranteed by Constitution of 1931, 391
- Municipal elections of 1871, 160; of 1931, significance of, 376
- Muñiz, Ricardo, Prim's Madrid agent, aid in reconciling Prim to Isabel, 85; interview with Montpensier representative, 91; declares Prim told him Paul y Angulo had cried "Fire!" 148
- Murciélago, El* (The Bat), accusations of corruption, 45
- Múrcia, Canton of: *see* Cartagena
- Muro López Salgado, José, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 209
- Napoleon III, attitude toward Montpensier and Revolution of September, 91; attitude toward candidature of Leopold Hohenzollern, 142
- National Assembly of 1873, unconstitutional nature of, 1, 181, 185; formed by unconstitutional union of Congreso and Senado, 177; accepts Amadeo's renunciation, 178; resolution proclaiming Republic, 179; Martos President of, 180; debates over indiscipline in army, 187; Coalition government resigns, 188; federal plan of Pi prevented by Radical chamber, 194; adjourns, 195; Francisco Salmerón President, 195; Permanent Commission named, 195; work of, praised by Castelar, 236
- National Convention proposed by intransigents, 219
- National Republic of 1874, established January 3, 1874, 328; Serrano named President of Executive Power, 328; Pavía's ambition for, 328; conservative orientation, 332; change in nature of Executive Power, 331; political situation in capital, 333; conservative Ministry of May 13, 333; European recognition of, 335; revolt of university students, 337; trap for Serrano, 337; end of, 343
- Narváez, Ramón, Duque de Valencia, Moderate leader, pronounces against Espartero, 32; captain general of Madrid, 34; establishes Civil and Rural Guard, 34; character and policies of, 34; removes Serrano from Palace, 39; expels English Minister, 40; sends troops to aid in restoring Pius IX, 43; disagreement with María Cristina, 43; resigns power, 43; resumes power in 1856, 55; Castelar's estimate of, 75; forms Ministry in 1864, 74; refuses to proceed against Castelar, 77; downfall of Ministry as result of Saint Daniel's night, 82; Ministry of, in 1866, 87; death of, 88
- Navarre, Kingdom of, 5; state of, under Republic and Carlistas, 223
- Navarrete y Vela-Hidalgo, José, intransigents, 219

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

sigent soldier, Deputy in Cortes Constituyentes, interpolation of, 229-230
Neutrality in world-war, 362

New Spain, republicanism most characteristic approach to, 126

O'Donnell, Leopoldo, Duque de Tetuan, founder of Unión Liberal, pronounces against Espartero, 32; pronounces against San Luis, 1854, 45; threat of founding republic if necessary, 46; program of, 46; act merely another pronunciamiento, 54; forms Ministry, 55; begins war against Morocco, 55; foreign policy and intervention in Mexico, 74; Castelar's opinion of, 75; forced to resign, 75; denies Democrats right to elections, 76; forms Ministry in 1865, 82; seeks to bring Progressives into parliamentary system, 82; defeats attempt to conciliate Prim, 86; fall of Ministry in 1866, 87; recognition of Italy, 87; death of, 88; his character, 88

O'Donnell, Enrique, explanation of Unión Liberal dogmas, 66

Olózaga, Salustiano, first anti-dynastic Progressive leader, approves retraimiento, 71; first Progressive to declare self anti-dynastic, 90; Coalition manifesto, signed by, 107; defeated by Rivero for presidency of Cortes Constituyentes of 1869, 110; his brother José author of Amadeo's renunciation, 169 footnote; warns of European distrust of Republic, 193

Olózaga, José, author of Amadeo's renunciation, 169 footnote

Oreiro y Villavicencio, Jacobo, Minister of Navy in second Republican Cabinet, 189; Minister of Navy in Pí's abortive cabinet, 206; Minister of Navy in Salmerón's Cabinet, 255; declares Cartagena ships pirates, 257; defense of decree, 277; Minister of Navy under Castelar, 295

Orense, Antonio, son of José María Orense, conservative Republican, description of Catalonia under Republic, 224; peril of intransigentism portrayed, 226; attack on intransigents, 282

Orense, José María, Marqués de Albaida,

founder of Spanish Republican party, intransigent, on Spanish poverty, 13; first grandee to become Republican, 22; early life of, 22; first advanced Progressive elected to Cortes, 35; contributions of, to Republican dogma, 57; debate with Garrido over socialism, 69; on retraimiento, 82; proposes federal republic, 105; named President of Republican Directory, 106; attack on monarchical principle in 1869, 113; proposes government to be federal democracy, 113; definition of federalism, 123; leader of left, 201; President of Cortes Constituyentes of 1873, 204; presses for federal Republic, 204; resigns presidency, 209; withdraws from chamber, 229; service to party, 229; returns to Cortes, 250; attack on right for failure to effect reforms, 278; declares sympathy for cantonalists, 279; proposes fraternal oath, 283; proposes alliance with United States, 284; agricultural reform law of, 284-285

Orihuela, Canton of, 246

Ortí y Lara, Juan Manuel, expresses fear that emancipation of reason will mean introduction of Protestantism, 131

Ostend conference, agreement on principles of Revolution of September, 89

Pact of San Sebastián, its provisions, 372

Palanca, Eduardo, intransigent, Vice President of Cortes, 203; chosen by Pí as Minister of Public Works in abortive cabinet, 206; Minister of Overseas, 255; support of Canton of Málaga, 260-261; choice of center for President of Executive Power, 314; his proposed ministry, 323
Paradas, Canton of, surrenders, 265

Party government, real beginnings of, 29, 31; Cortes granted power of initiating laws, 31; injury to, by Moderate-Progressive Coalition in 1843, 34; dissatisfaction with, 74; failure of, 76; a fiction, 60; effect of retraimiento on securing, 76; O'Donnell's effort to bring Progressives back into system, 82; recognition of Republican party, 98; phenomenon of party's appearance, 104; retirement of Unionists from system of,

INDEX

- 1872, 162; effort to achieve, under the Republic of 1873, 182; attitude of intransigent Republicans toward, 204; all parties should be called upon in Republic, Castelar urges, 239; a fiction in Restoration, 361; failure of, 362
- Patriotic Union, 368
- Paul y Angulo, José, intransigent, revolutionary Republican, named Prim's agent in South, 91; opinion of treatment of Republicans, 92; proposes directory of five as head of state in 1869, 113; threats against Amadeo's dynasty, 146; accused of having killed Prim, 148-150
- Pavía, Julian, Marqués de Novaliches, opposes Septembrists at Alcolea, 95
- Pavía, Manuel, Radical military leader, as captain general of Madrid, supports Permanent Commission, 197; dismissed by Pí, 208; named commander of army to quell cantonalists, 258; his description of state of Andalusia, 260; debate with Solier and Salmerón, 266; resigns but resignation not accepted, 266; enters Málaga, 267; captain general of Madrid, 297; overture to Castelar to preserve latter's power, 315; decides to dissolve Cortes, 316; dissolves Cortes Constitutes, 323-326; character and purpose of, 327; forms National Republic, 328; captain general of New Castile, 329; protest of, against dissolution of national government, 333; named commander of Army of Center, 334; dismissed, 336; a rare figure in Spanish army, 352
- Pedregal, Manuel, conservative Republican, Minister of Justice in Pí's abortive cabinet, 206; "Who Is Pedregal?" cry used to defeat proposed ministry, 206; Minister of Finance, 295
- Perez Costales, Ramón, Minister of Public Works, 219
- Pérez de Montalvan, Rector of University of Madrid, protests against decree limiting freedom of professors, 79; refuses to dismiss Castelar, 81; dismissed, 81; reinstated, 82
- Permanent Commission of National Assembly of 1873, named, 195; violation of Constitution, 195; conflict with Executive Power, 196-200; dissolution of, 200; represented legality, Romero Robledo claims, 231; view of Estéban Callantes on dissolution of, 233; Castelar's defense of dissolution of, 237
- Philippine tobacco rights leasing proposed, 230
- Pí y Margall, Francisco, Socialist, President of Executive Power, and principal Federalist leader, early life, 28; theory of individual pact of, 67; leadership of Socialists, 69; his Declaration of the Thirty, 69; debate with Castelar, 69; asks Republican party to return to Cortes in 1869, 115; charged with writing federal manifesto in 1870, 115; on national Directory of Republican party, 115; federal school of, 116; carries his confederationist definition over Declaration of Press definitions, 118; his theory of federalism, 120; his definition of God, 133; on formation of labor unions, 158; offers resolution to proclaim republic, 179; description of Republic, 180; Minister of Interior, 180; problems facing, 181; comment on unconstitutional nature of Republic, 181; re-elected Minister of Interior, 189; dissidence with Castelar growing, 189; part in break with Radicals, 189; becomes interim President of Executive Power, 198; plans to outwit Permanent Commission, 198; dissolves Permanent Commission, 200; leader of center, 201; proposed as President of Executive Power and to be allowed to name Ministers, 205; plan defeated and Pí named head of Executive Power, Cortes naming Ministers, 209; difficulties of forming Ministry; 207; Ministry of June 9, 209; weakness of Ministry, 209; program of Ministry, 210; social program of, 212-213; Spain's first Socialist Prime Minister, 213; effort to end Carlista War, 214; crisis in Ministry revealed, 217; legislation proposed by, 217; vote of confidence in, 219; his Ministry resigns and he names Ministry of right, 219; reaffirms policy of conciliation, 219; turn to right, 219; distrust of Ministers, 222; peril of his conciliatory policy, 222; asks extraordinary powers, 223; granted extraordinary powers, 228;

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

- defends Hidalgo's order of search, 228; hardening of Pi's attitude and analysis of problem of quelling Republicans, 239; effect of firmness at Alcoy, 243; failure of his government to prevent declaration of Cartagena Canton, 244 ff.; Sainz de Rueda's statement voicing suspicion that Pi was conspiring, 247; Pi's defense, 248; resigns, 250; candidate of left for presidency, 251; summary of life of, and cause of failure of, 252; bid for power, 289-291; on overawing power of military, 291 footnote; reaffirms faith in federalism, 295; his afflictions in power, 350; his contributions to Republican doctrine, his influence on political life of Spain and his failure in power, 351; work crowned in passage of Catalan Statute, 396
- Pierrad, General Blas, Republican general, part in San Gil revolt, 86; condemned to death, 86; first general to affiliate with Republican party and revolt of, 99; conversation with Prim over failure to proclaim republic, 109; promotions when interim Minister of War, 225
- Pirates, Cartagena ships declared, 257; attack of intransigents on decree, 277
- Pius IX, Count Mastai-Ferretti, Pope, appeals for aid against Roman Republic, 43; character of and achievements of, 126; his Concordat of 1851, 127; his Syllabus of 1864, 127; Spain's observance of his twenty-fifth anniversary as Pope, 152; confers Holy Eucharist on Alfonso XII, 338
- Politics, revival of, due to Castelar, 60
- Political parties, origins of, 24
- Political life, beginning of, 346
- Portier, revolt of, 20
- Porto Rico, Castelar urges autonomy for, and abolition of slavery in, 106, 165, 195; abolition of slavery proposed by Ruiz Zorrilla, 165; slavery abolished in, 195
- Portugal, Constitution of 1822, 17; civil war in, 23; Miguel of, recognizes Carlos V, 29; Portuguese candidatures, 139-141
- Possible Republican party, proposed by Castelar, 321; accepts fact of monarchy, 359
- Pragmatic Sanction of Fernando VII, 22
- Prefumo, José, conservative Republican, warnings regarding imminence of Cartagena Canton, 244 ff.; his accusation of Pi, 246 ff.; Civil Governor of Madrid, 302
- Press, freedom of, demanded by Orense in 1844, 36; by Castelar, 57; better press law promised in Declaration of Manzanares, 46; demanded by Junta of Madrid, 99; urged by Septembrists, 107; guaranteed by Constitution of 1869, 111
- Prim y Prats, Juan, Conde de Reus, Progressive general and principal foe of Bourbon dynasty, pronounces against Espartero, 22; victory in Moroccan War, 55; commander of army in Mexico, 74; opposes retraimiento, 76; character of, 84; attitude toward Isabel II, 84; determines to expel Bourbons, 85; negotiations with Moderates, 86; named generalissimo of Revolution of September, 89; Napoleon III's attitude towards revolution, 91; eludes González Brabo's spy, 93; his manifesto of September 18, 1868, 94; Minister of War, 98; dissuades Barcelonense from revolt, 101; conversation with Pierrad over royalist issue, 109; offers to take Republicans in government, 113; attitude toward Alfonso XII, 137; efforts to obtain a king, 139-146; disgust of, at Napoleon III's objections to Leopold, 142; attitude toward a republic, 144; how he greeted Anadeo's acceptance, 144; shot and killed, 147-150
- Primo de Rivera, Fernando, first Marqués de Estella, part in Restoration of Alfonso XII, 2; made Marqués de Estella, 332; arbiter of National Republic's destiny, 337; adheres to Pronunciamiento, 341 ff.
- Primo de Rivera, Miguel, second Marqués de Estella, character of, 366; Pronunciamiento of, 366; his Military Directory, 367; removes legal disqualifications of women, 368; inaugurates Royal Progress in Catalonia, 348; resigns, 367
- Primo de Rivera, Rafael, commander of

INDEX

- Artillery corps, proposes elections for Cortes Constituyentes of 1873, 194
- Progressive party, origins of, in 1812, 24; proposal to confiscate wealth of monasteries, 31; Regency of 1841, 32; introduces retraimiento in 1844, 36; position in 1858, 60; its dogmas, 61-63; manifesto of 1858, 75; Castelar's opinion of, 75; retraimiento of 1864, 76; one Progressive elected to Cortes of 1864, 76; protest against Saint Daniel's night, 82; O'Donnell's advances to, 82; joins Prim's revolutionary movement, 86; invitation to Unión Liberal to rebel against Isabel, 89; influence of party in Septembrist manifesto, 99; representation in Cortes Constituyentes of 1869, 108; absorption in Radical party, 152
- Pronunciamientos: La Granja, 1836, 31; 1840, 32; 1841 (O'Donnell), 32; Barcelona, 1842, 32; 1843 (Prim), 32; effect on people of, 33; Sir Henry Maine's comment on, 35; Catalonia and Saragossa, 1854, 45; O'Donnell, 1854, 45, 46; Prim, 1866, 85; Revolution of September, 1868, 93; Sagunto, 340; 1886, 357; Primo de Rivera, 366; Sanjurjo, 399
- Protestantism, a "devastating plague," 131; Manterola's view of, 133; debarment to English candidature for throne, 139; attitude of church toward, 6; Protestant schools opened, 131, 135
- Proudhon, influence on Republicans, 6
- Public opinion, absence of, in Spain, 362
- Public utility, state's right to nationalize industry and services for general good, 393
- Radical party, origin of, 152; united with Republicans to defeat Serrano's Ministry of 1871, 152; program of 1871, 154; struggle for leadership of, 161; program of 1872, 163; effect of policy in destroying Republican propaganda, 164; control of Cortes of 1872, 165; proposes abolition of slavery in Porto Rico, 165; prevents proclamation of federal Republic, 179; attitude toward Republic, 179; as guardian of order, 185; analysis of its actions, 185; assaults coalition government, 186; coalition government resigns, 188; proposes to clothe Martos with Executive Power, 188; importance of retaining Ministry of War in second Republican Cabinet, 189; unitarian in principle, 194; controls Permanent Commission, 195; plans to recall National Assembly and overthrow Executive Power, 197-199; retraimiento of, 200; Republican view of break with, 202; Castelar's view of break with, 236; restored by Castelar, Salmerón's complaint, 320; shares in National Republic, 335; alliance of, in Republic of 1931, 2; policies of Alejandro Lerroux, leader of, in Republic of 1931, 381
- Radio, use in announcing Republic, 7
- Railways, opening of first in 1848, 41; development of, 41 ff.; state of, in 1860, 41; scandals over concessions of, 45; service of, interrupted by Carlistas, 216
- Rasgo, El, 80
- Reaction in Spain, under Bravo Murillo in 1851, 44; under San Luis in 1853, 45; under Fernando VII, 20 ff.; under Narváez in 1856, 55; of Unionists and Moderates, 74; in 1866, 88; under González Brabo, 89
- "Reactionary Dynasties, The," Castelar's article, 77
- Regency of María Cristina in Restoration, 357
- Regionalism, problem in 1931, 4; development of, 359-360; Catalan regional constitution formed, 1892, 359; in Republic of 1931, 386
- Religious freedom, urged by Democrats in 1848, 36; by Castelar, 57; by Junta of Madrid, 99; by Septembrists, 107; attitude of church toward, 126-134; protest of Catholic Junta of Madrid, 132; protest of Catholics to Cortes Constituyentes of 1869, 133; Ruiz Zorrilla promises to maintain it in 1872, 163; separation of church and state demanded by Pí, 211; private exercise of religion other than Catholic permitted in 1854, 54; guaranteed by Constitution of 1931, 392
- Republic of 1873, analogies between it and Republic of 1931, 1; comment of

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

The Nation on, 1; an intellectual expression, 6; "anti-Catholic," 6; lost through federalism, 119; proclaimed, 179; kind of Republic, 180; first Ministry, 180; recognition of, by United States and Switzerland, 181; problems facing, 181; legislation of, 182; relations with church, 183; debate on indiscipline in army, 187; first Ministry resigns after thirteen days, 188; second ministry, 187; reception of Republic in Barcelona and Catalonia, 192; European alarm at Catalan disorder, 193; causes of failure of second cabinet, 193; abolishes slavery in Porto Rico, 195; adjournment of National Assembly, 195; Permanent Commission named, 195; dissolved, 200; Cortes Constituyentes of 1873, 201; task facing, 201; attitude of right and left, 203 ff.; federal, voted, 204-205; resignation of Figueras' Cabinet and election of one presided over by Pi, 205 ff.; attitude of Europe toward, 213-214; Carlista peril, 214-215; peril of cantonal movement, 216; condition of Republic in June, 216; Pi's proposed legislation, 217; first indication of Castelar's conservative program, 218; Pi's second Ministry, 219; cantonal movement of June-July destroys national unity, 222; withdrawal of intransigents, 229; Romero Robledo's criticism of Republic as "confused Babel," 232; condition of, described by Estéban Collantes, 232; a Republic of "anarchy," 233; federal Republic described as negation of government, 235; Castelar's program of salvation, 236; center party organized, 239; Alcoy disaster, 241 ff.; Canton of Cartagena proclaimed, 243 ff.; Cartagena destroys Republic of 1873, 244; cantonal movement, 245 ff.; crisis of Pi's Ministry, 249; Pi resigns, 250; return of "reformist left," 250; Salmerón elected President of Executive Power, 251; Cartagena ships declared pirates, 257; Pavia ordered to quell Cantons of South, 259; Executive Power called traitor by Cartagena, 261; Cantons suppressed, 263 ff.; cost of cantonal movement, 268; a laboratory of political theory, 269;

constitutional projects of, 269 ff.; attacked by Leon y Castillo and Becerra, 275-276; manifesto of center party, 276; rebel Deputies certified to trial, 282; mobilization law, 278; other laws proposed in Salmerón's presidency, 284; Orense's agricultural reform law, 284; Castelar elected President of Cortes, 286; gravity of political situation, 285; attempt to solve artillery question, 287; restoration of death penalty proposed, 287; Salmerón resigns, 288; Castelar elected President of Executive Power, 292; Cortes Constituyentes adjourns, 296; military reforms of Castelar, 297; capture of Cartagena, 299; artillery corps re-established, 299; the "Deerhound" incident, 299; suppression of newspapers and municipal corporations, 302; the "Virginus" incident, 303 ff.; dissidence between Castelar and Salmerón, 309 ff.; Castelar names Archbishops, 311; Salmerón gives *coup de grâce* to federal Republic, 313; Pavia's decision to dissolve Cortes, 316; Cortes reconvenes, 316; Castelar defeated, 322; dramatic end of federal Republic 323 ff.; gave Spain a modern feeling and made people politically conscious, 353

Republic, as form of government for Spain, 1; cardinal principles of, 6; proclaimed by Enrique de Borbón in 1848, 40; efforts to proclaim, in 1848, 40; Barcelona pronounces for, in 1842, 32; O'Donnell's promise to proclaim it if necessary to achieve goal, 46; Cádiz pronounces for it in 1868, 101; Figueras and Blas Pierrad pronounce for it, 99; federal, aim of party, 105; efforts to proclaim, in Cortes Constituyentes of 1869, 112; proclaimed in Ferrol, 191; as a means of regenerating democracy in Europe, 112; Prim's attitude toward, 144

Republic of 1931, analogies between it and Republic of 1873, 1; an intellectual revolt, 6; announcement to Spain, 7; a delayed emotional manifestation of world-war, 7; proclaimed, 376; first Ministry of, 377; provisional Statute of, 378 ff.; reforms introduced, 380; elec-

INDEX

- tions for Cortes Constituyentes, 380; agreement with Catalan Republic, 383; passage of Constitution of 1931, 389; passage of Agrarian Law and Catalan Statute, 396; withstands pronunciamiento of Sanjurjo, 399
- Republicanism most characteristic mark of approach to New Spain, 126
- Republican party, ambitions for Spain, 7; attitude to neutrality, 7; influence of philosophers on, 6; Republican Alliance, 2; Republican temperament of people, 15; Orense real founder, 22; federal constitution proposed, 24; beginnings of, 24; early newspapers, 35; program of Orense in 1844, 36; summary of its doctrines in *La Fórmula del Progreso*, 56 ff.; cleavage between Individualists and Socialists, 69-70; revolt of 1861, 75; efforts of Castelar to legalize, 74; movement of party to left in 1858, 74; part in Revolution of September, 91, 92; divorce from Democrats and recognized in political life, 98; excluded from Serrano's Ministry, 98; campaign for Cortes Constituyentes of 1868, 66; Pierrad first general to join, 99; anti-clerical attitude in South, 100; dissolution of juntas a blow to, 101; revolt of Cádiz, 101; significance of appearance at polls of, 104; letter of Victor Hugo, 105; declaration of party for federalism, 105; representation in Cortes Constituyentes of 1869, 107; losing struggle in Cortes Constituyentes of 1869, 110; efforts to achieve goal in 1869, 112; announces it will respect but not obey Constitution of 1869, 113; Prim's offer to take party in government, 113; revolts in 1869, 114; organization of party through provincial pacts, 114; retires from Cortes in 1869, 115; cleavage between Unitarians and Federalists into open, 115; first national organization of, completed in 1870, 115; the two schools of Federalists, 116; Declaration of the Press and effort it made to reconcile Federalists and Unitarians, 117; Directory refuses to accept Declaration of the Press, reaffirming federal theory, 119; attitude of party to church, 128 ff.; demand for toleration, 133; attacks on candidatures, 139; manifesto declares foreign dynasty impossible, 145; plan to establish purely Republican ministry under Figueras, 145; votes for federal republic, 146; threats of, 146; arraigns royalists for not taking plebiscite of nation, 150; coalition with Carlistas and Alfonsinos, 151; Castelar's policy of benevolence, 151; victory in municipal elections of 1871, 160; arrangement of Catalans with Carlistas, 161; tendency toward intransigence, 164; debate over benevolence, 164; difficulty made by Radical policy, 164; challenge to Radicals over artillery corps, 167; mission of, in 1873, 174; effort to proclaim, 174 ff.; restive under coalition, 185; Radical chamber stultifies federal program, 195; Radical Unitary Republican party formed, April 6, 1873, 196, 197; yields to environment, 200; break with Radicals, 200; prisoners of Radical party, 186; division into right, center and left wings, 201; federal Republic achieved, 204; social program of Pí, 211; turn to right of party, 219; cleavage between intransigents and right, 225; center party formed, 276; Possible Republican party of Castelar, 321; not prepared for Republic of peace, 348; in Restoration, 358; manifesto of 1876, 358; Republican Military Association organized in 1893, 359; Centralists, 359; union of Salmerón and Pí, 1893, 359; Possibles accept fact of monarchy, 359; union of Republican groups in 1903, 359; opposition to Cuban war, 350; indictment of Alfonso XII, 370; adherence of Conservatives, 371; Republican Revolutionary Committee of 1930, 372; Galán's premature revolt destroys hope of success, 373; campaign in municipal elections, 375
- Retraimiento, electoral abstention, of royalists in 1873, 2; in 1931, 2; of Moderates in 1868, 107; proposed instead of benevolence by Garrido, 164; of Radicals in 1873, 200; of royalists, 201; introduced by Progressives in 1844, 36; of Progressives and Democrats in 1864, 76; attitude of Castelar, Rubio and

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

- Figueras toward, 82; danger to Republic stated by Pí, 210
- Revilla, Manuel de la, Madrid journalist, effort to reconcile Federalist schools through Declaration of the Press, 116 ff.
- Revolts, between 1819-20, 20; of del Riego, 21; of military changing government, 30; of 1836, 31; of 1830, 39; of 1848, 40; effect of Revolution of 1848 on Castelar, 41; of 1854 and 1856, 55; Republican, of 1861, 75; of naval officers in 1863, 75; of San Gil, 86; of Figueras and Pierrad in 1869, 99; of Cádiz, 101; Republican in 1869, 114; of Contreras in 1872, 186-187; of Ferrol in 1872, 191; of artillery corps in face of Carlista enemy, 167; of Velarde's troops facing Carlistas, 205
- Revolution of 1854, 45
- Revolution of 1848, influence on Republic of 1873, 7; influence on Castelar, 40
- Revolution of September, solution of, 1; what it represented in region of rights, 205; common principles agreed on at Ostend, 89; its goal, 92, 94; initiated, 93; problems facing Coalition, 98 ff.; possible solutions, 100; juntas dissolved, 101; problem of regency, 140; Unionists withdraw from revolutionary settlement, 162; merely another pronunciamiento, 166; Ruiz Zorrilla's defense of revolutionary settlement, 167; completes circuit, 327; not a national plebiscite, 347
- Riego, General Rafael del, revolt of 1820, 21
- Rio y Ramos, Luis del, warns of cantonal danger in Andalusia and Seville, 223; Minister of Justice, 295
- Ríos Rosas, Antonio, a founder of Union Liberal, criticises Narváez's government, 82; President of Cortes, and asks for convocation of Congreso, 90; castigation of Pí, 291; death of and character of, 310
- Rivero, Nicolás María, Democratic leader, organizes first Junta of Democratic party, 43; works for democratic monarchy, 98; President of Cortes Constituyentes of 1869, 110; part in proclaiming Republic, 175 ff.; questions Executive Power on Permanent Commission, 199
- Rivers in Spain, character of, 13, 14
- Rodríguez Arias, Minister of Navy, 333
- Romanones, Conde de, Liberal leader in Restoration, attitude on neutrality, 7; justifies imperialistic foreign policy of Spain, 360; Cabinet of 1917, 363; agrees that constitutional reform is necessary, 374; arranges for transfer of powers from King to Republicans, 376
- Romero Ortiz, Minister of Overseas, 333
- Romero Robledo, Francisco, Alfonsino leader, elected to Cortes Constituyentes of 1873, 201; interpolation of, 231
- Roqué Barcia, intransigent, named Vice President of Republican Directory of 1869, 106; joins Cartagena Canton, 261; his appeal to United States for aid, 329
- Ruiz Zorrilla, Manuel, Radical leader and Spain's first modern statesman, named intermediary between Prim and Queen, 86; Minister of Public Works in 1868, 99; executes confiscation of church wealth in 1869, 108; campaign in South for Duke de Genova, 140; notifies Amadeo of election, 146; makes insinuations against Paul, 150; forms Ministry under Amadeo, 152; significance of, and character of, 153; program of, 154; resigns, 154; second Ministry and program for it, 163; legislation of, in 1872, 165; denies being a Republican, 165; reorganization of artillery corps, 167; defense of Savoy dynasty, 176; revolutionary Republican in Restoration, 357; manifesto of, in 1876, 358
- Rubio, Carlos, Progressive editor of *La Iberia*, exposition of Progressive beliefs, 60 ff.; condemned to death, 86
- Sagasta, Praxedes Mateo, Liberal leader, aid to Prim, 92; Minister of Interior, 98; circular demanding order, 101; prohibits demonstrations, 114; disbands national militia, 114; reorganization of municipal councils arouses Republican protests, 115; charges federalism means disunion, 118; circular letter regarding Leopold Hohenzollern, 143; President of Cortes, 154; conduct of elections of 1872 castigated, 161; deserts Radicals, 162 footnote; Minister of Foreign Affairs in Na-

INDEX

- tional Republic, 328; President of Council in September, 333; Minister of Public Works, 333; warns against Alfonsino activity, 339; on class distinction, 358
- Saint Daniel's night, 81
- Salamanca, José, banker and Spain's first modern millionaire, influence of, 34; speculations of, 39; scandals over railway concessions, 45
- Salamanca, Canton of, 245; manifesto of, 245; dissolved, 265
- Salic Law of Succession set aside, 22
- Salmerón y Alonso, Francisco, Radical leader, declares for Espartero for king, 140; Minister of Overseas in first Republican Cabinet, 180; President of National Assembly, 195; forms Radical Unitary Republican party, 196
- Salmerón y Alonso, Nicolás, President of Executive Power, urges application of federalism slowly, 106; federal school of, 116; on intolerance, 128; on destruction of Spain by theocracy, 131; disapproves of benevolence, 164; urges Ruiz Zorrilla to yield to Republic, 165; Minister of Justice, 180; proposes abolition of death penalty, 182; promises separation of church and state, 183; re-elected Minister of Justice, 189; effort to dissuade his brother Francisco, 198; leader of center-right, 201; his turn to right and program, 220; President of Cortes Constituyentes, 220; appeals for order in chamber, 226; President of Executive Power, 251; character of, 255; his Ministry, 255; his policy, 255-256; names Pavia to command army to quell cantonal movement, 259; debate with Pavia over Málaga, 266; his "Cabinet of Force," 276; resigns presidency, 288; opposed to death penalty, 289; his service, 289; warns Cortes not to form another ministry under Pi, 292; break with Castelar, 309 ff.; his terms to Castelar, 312; message to Cortes, 317; his retrogression, 320; protest against dissolution, 329; contribution to Republic and his philosophic idealism, 351; elected chief of Republican Union in 1903, 352; death of, 352; manifesto of 1876, 358; alliance with Ruiz Zorrilla broken in 1886, 359; assumes leadership of Centralists, 359
- Sánchez Bregua, Alfonsino general, resigns command of army in North after loss of Estella, 287; Minister of War, 295; objectionable to Salmerón, 311
- Sánchez Guerra, José, Conservative Prime Minister, later Republican leader, opinion of Alfonso, 371; called by Alfonso to form ministry, 375; consults Alcalá Zamora, 374; fails to form ministry, 375
- Sancho the Great of Navarre, first attempt at Union of Spain, 5
- San Gil, massacre of, 86
- Sanjurjo, José, Commander of Carabineers, pronunciamiento of, 399; manifesto of, 400; sentence of death commuted, 401
- Sanlúcar, Commune of, 240; surrenders, 265
- San Luis, Conde de, Prime Minister, 45; scandals of administration of, 45; resigns, 47
- San Roque, Canton of, adheres to government, 265
- Santa Cruz, his operations for Carlistas in Guipúzcoa, 288; had "mind of hyena," 300
- Santo Domingo, intervention abandoned, 74
- Sauvalle, Alfredo, intransigent, Minister of Finance in Spanish Federation, 262
- Sickles, General Daniel, Minister of United States, opinion on durability of Amadeo's dynasty, 162; presents message of United States recognizing Republic, 181; his conduct of "Virginius" negotiations, 304 ff.
- Self-government, its significance and failure, 345; beginning of political life, 346
- Separatism, problem of, 4
- Serrano, General Francisco, Duque de la Torre, Regent of Spain and President of the Executive Power, mistake in not removing General Fernando Primo de Rivera, 2; favorite of Isabel, 39; petitions Isabel to convoke Cortes in 1868, exiled, 90; jealous of Prim, 90; in command of Septembrist army, 95; enters

TOWARD THE NEW SPAIN

- Madrid, October 3, 1868, 96; first Ministry, 98; Regent, 100; opens Cortes Constituyentes of 1869, 109; reported not averse to establishing his dynasty, 136; fall of Ministry of, 152; takes command of army against Carlistas, 161; Amadeo calls on him to form Ministry, 161; retires when Amadeo refuses to suspend constitutional guarantees, 162; his interview with Amadeo, 166; consulted by Radicals to overthrow Executive Power, 197; President of Executive Power of National Republic, 328; his life and character, 328, 330; program of his government, 329; his opportunity and failure, 330 ff.; alters character of Executive Power, 331; conservative orientation, 332; assumes command of army against Carlistas, 332; conservative trap for him, 337; telegraphic conversation with ministers after Pronunciamiento of Sagunto, 341 ff.; reaches Bayonne an exile, January 3, 1875, 343; his failure, 352
- Seville, Canton of proclaimed, 216, 245-260; attack by Pavía, 264; capture of, 265
- Slavery, abolition of, proposed by Pí, 211
- Socialists, coalition with Republicans, 2; irreconcilable in 1873, 3; beliefs of, 68-70; debate with Individualists, 69-70; Pí first Socialist Prime Minister, 213; cantons a Socialistic uprising, 269; Socialist Workers Party organized, 1879, 358; begin co-operation with Republicans, 363
- Social utility, basis of Republican legislation in 1931, 388
- Soler y Plá, Santiago, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 255; Minister of Overseas, 295
- Solier, Francisco, intransigent, head of Málaga Canton, 222, 260; debate with Pavía, 266; displaced as delegate of government, 266; in Madrid, 267
- Sorní, José Cristobal, Minister of Overseas, 189; discovers Radical plot to overthrow Republican Executive Power, 197, 199; effort to dissuade Francisco Salmerón, 198; Minister of Overseas, 209
- Spain: in 1791, 15; in 1824, 22; in 1843, 34; in 1846-48, 39; in 1853, 45; in 1854, 46; in 1872, 159; in 1873, 182, 194, 197, 215, 222, 231 ff.; in Restoration, 361; in 1917, 363 ff.
- Spanish Federation established, 244; *see* Cartagena
- Spanish ills, Castelar's view of causes of, 52
- Spanish peninsula, composition of peoples of, 5; geography of, 11 ff.
- Spanish unity, ceases entirely from June 26 to July 18, 1873, 222; destroyed by Republicans, Romero Robledo charges, 231; accusation of Estéban Collantes, 233; influence of geography upon, 11 ff.; character of, 13; federal threat to, 24
- Strikes, first in 1854, 68, 158, 159, 363; as political weapon in Restoration, 362
- Suffrage, universal, urged by Septembrists, 107; base of political right, 51; urged by Orense in 1844, 36; gradual application of, urged by Progressives, 62; "suffrage of most capable," proposal of Moderates, 65; as essential to definition of Democrat, 69; urged by Madrid Junta in 1868, 99; granted by Constitution of 1869, 111; Castelar's plea for, 122; base of Pí's reform, 194; proposed by Pí, 217; granted in Restoration in 1889, 351; a "paper suffrage," Ramón Pérez de Ayala charges, 362
- Suñer y Capdevilla, Francisco, intransigent, debate with church in 1864, 129; anti-religious outburst, 133; demands stopping subsidies to clergy, 184; Minister of Overseas, 219; his refusal to quell Republican rebels, 248; on program of center party, 277
- Syndicalists, reign of terror of, 365
- Tarifa, Canton of, 246; adheres to government, 265
- Tax, poll, substituted for tax on food, 101; single, urged by Castelar, 57; single, proposed by Isidoro Garrido, 58; abolition of food, urged by Orense, 57; gradual reduction of direct, urged by Campoamor of Moderates, 66; stoppage of collections of, under Republic, 216; graduated, urged by Castelar, 238
- Thiers, President of France, opinion of Castelar, 50; attitude toward Ruiz Zorrilla's

INDEX

- Ministry, 153; toward Republic and Castelar, 181
- Torrevecija, Canton of, 245
- Topete, Admiral Juan, alienated by González Brabo, 90; initiates Revolution of September, 93; Minister of Navy, 99; pleads for Montpensier, 144; arrested, 200; Minister of Navy in National Republic, 328; resigns, 333
- Torrijos, revolt of, 20
- Treasury, estimates of 1864, 79; of 1872-73, 183; condition of, in 1873, 210 ff.; effect of inflation on, 211; moratorium in payment of Spain's debt proposed by Navarrete, 230; Tutau's proposal to issue paper money, 230; Ladico's proposal to lease Philippine tobacco rights, 230; elimination of pay to those on required lists proposed, 230; Marqués de Florida's plan to stabilize finance, 230; law to extinguish debt of, 285
- Treaty of Vergara, ending first Carlista War, 31
- Turkey, flag of, raised by Cartagena Canton, 243
- Tutau, Juan, intransigent, debate with church in 1864, 129; Minister of Finance, 189; proposal to issue paper money, 230
- Ulloa, Minister of Foreign Affairs in National Republic, 333
- Unión Liberal, founded 40; program of, 66; part in Revolution of September, 89 ff.; plan to proclaim Montpensier king, 93; in control of Revolution of September, 100; representation in Cortes Constituyentes of 1869, 108; retirement from parliamentary government in 1872, 162
- Union of Spain, geographical and political factors of, 11 ff.; achieved in eleventh century, 5; under Catholic sovereigns, 5; Catholicism unifying thread, 5; danger in destroying it by breaking unity of church and state, 6
- Unitarians, cleavage with federalists, 115; theory of, 124; Radicals unitarians in principle, 199
- United States of America, recognizes Republic of 1873, 181; Spanish alliance with, proposed by Orense, 284; negotiations with, over "Virginius," 303 ff.
- Valencia, Canton of, 245; Martínez Campos enters, 267
- Vatican legation, abolition of, proposed, 215
- Vasconia, federal demands of, 4
- Victoria, Queen of England, attitude in Isabel's marriage negotiations, 36; on expulsion of Bulwer, 40
- Victoria, Queen of Spain, how greeted by Spanish, 147
- "Virginius" incident, 303-309
- Washington, George, a "monarchist," 235
- White, J. Blanco (Leucadio Doblado), on religion in Spain in 1800, 128
- World-war, influence on Republic of 1931, 7
- Zabala, Justo María, description of Navarre under Republic, 223
- Zavala, Juan, Minister of War in National Republic, 328; President of Council of Ministers, 332

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